FT社評：保護(hù)主義浪潮是可以遏制的

Every year for a decade or more, there have been dire warnings that this — this! — is the year in which the dams of international governance will break, and a flood of protectionism will inundate the world economy. The 9/11 attacks, the sustained episode of Chinese currency intervention, the collapse of the Doha round, the global financial crisis. Each was expected to pose a severe threat to trade. Each was much less damaging than feared.

十多年來，每年都會出現(xiàn)可怕的警示，就在今年——就今年!——國際治理的大壩將決堤，保護(hù)主義的洪水將淹沒世界經(jīng)濟(jì)。9•11襲擊、中國持續(xù)的匯率干預(yù)、多哈回合(Doha Round)談判失敗以及全球金融危機(jī)。每一事件都曾被認(rèn)為對貿(mào)易構(gòu)成嚴(yán)重威脅。而每一事件造成的破壞其實都遠(yuǎn)不及人們擔(dān)心的那樣嚴(yán)重。

The election of Donald Trump, the most protectionist president since the Great Depression, is a greater threat than all of those. This year has seen Mr Trump abrogate one massive trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and force the renegotiation of another, the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta). He has escalated threats of unilateral action to reduce trade deficits and continued the slow strangulation of the one functioning part of the World Trade Organization.

唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)是自大蕭條以來最具貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義色彩的總統(tǒng)，其當(dāng)選對全球貿(mào)易造成的威脅堪稱空前。今年，特朗普退出了大規(guī)模的《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership)，又迫使《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(North American Free Trade Agreement，簡稱NAFTA)重新啟動談判。他令采取單邊行動削減貿(mào)易赤字的威脅加劇，并繼續(xù)緩慢扼殺世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)還在發(fā)揮作用的那個部分。

It would be a steel-nerved gambler who bet against Mr Trump’s economically nationalist rhetoric translating into reality. But the actual imposition of seriously damaging protectionist actions has, at least, been deferred until 2018. And the imminent threats fall short of all-out trade war.

只有神經(jīng)堅強(qiáng)的賭徒，才會賭特朗普的經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義口號不會轉(zhuǎn)化為現(xiàn)實。然而，具有嚴(yán)重破壞力的保護(hù)主義行動至少在2018年以前都不會實際執(zhí)行。而且迫在眉睫的威脅不等于全面的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。

Next year will see Mr Trump being handed a whole range of implements to bash China and other trading partners with. National security investigations into aluminium and steel imports; a separate complaint about unfair pricing of aluminium sheeting from China that the US administration, unusually, initiated itself; “special safeguard” investigations into solar cells from China and washing machines from South Korea. All these give the administration the ability to impede imports.

明年人們將看到一整套用來攻擊中國與美國其他貿(mào)易伙伴的工具被交付到特朗普手中。對進(jìn)口鋁材及鋼材的國家安全調(diào)查;由美國政府自己發(fā)起的(這種做法不同尋常)對進(jìn)口自中國的鋁板不公平定價的投訴;對中國制造的太陽能電池和韓國生產(chǎn)的洗衣機(jī)展開的“特別防衛(wèi)”(special safeguard)調(diào)查。這些手段都將使美國政府有能力阻礙進(jìn)口。

But these are not the across-the-board 45 per cent import tariffs on China that Mr Trump was suggesting a year ago. A new and aggressive use of existing trade tools against imports would be self-destructive but, on the scale proposed, not catastrophic.

但這些跟特朗普一年前提出的對中國實行45%的全面進(jìn)口關(guān)稅都不可同日而語。重新積極使用現(xiàn)有的貿(mào)易工具來對付進(jìn)口將是自毀行為，但從擬議的規(guī)模來看，卻并不是災(zāi)難性的。

The most focused part of US trade policy has been driven by the most experienced senior figure in the administration, Robert Lighthizer, the US trade representative. Apart from the pursuit of Nafta renegotiations, Mr Lighthizer, a longtime critic of the WTO’s dispute settlement process, has intensified the existing US position of blocking appointments to the organisation’s appellate body in protest at what he regards as judicial over-reach.

美國貿(mào)易政策中最受關(guān)注的部分是由美國政府中最有經(jīng)驗的高級官員、美國貿(mào)易代表羅伯特•萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)推動的。萊特希澤長期以來一直批評世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)的糾紛解決機(jī)制，除推動《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(NAFTA)的重新談判以外，他還強(qiáng)化了美國現(xiàn)有立場——通過阻止對WTO上訴法官的任命，來抗議在萊特希澤看來的逾越司法管轄權(quán)行為。

Mr Lighthizer insists he is not trying to destroy the WTO, only to return it to its proper limited function. He may be sincere. Yet — apart from the intellectually dishonest appointment of judges who promise to vote a particular way, particularly on granting Washington more freedom to impose anti-dumping duties — it is hard to see exactly how the tension is likely to be resolved. Mr Lighthizer has spent 2017 assiduously backing the WTO into a corner. Next year will see when and how he intends to give it a route out.

萊特希澤堅稱，他并不是在試圖摧毀WTO，只是讓W(xué)TO退回其原本的有限職能。他或許會言而有信。然而，我們很難想象這種矛盾可能如何得到解決——除了通過以如下這種巧妙方式食言來解決：任命允諾會以特定方式投票、尤其是在賦予美國更大自由去征收反傾銷稅的問題上倒向美國的裁判官。在2017年，萊特希澤一直不遺余力地把WTO逼入角落。他打算何時以及如何給WTO一條出路，明年將會見分曉。

Being optimistic about the global trading system in 2018 is largely a question of lowering expectations. Those who were hoping that the status quo ante Trump would continue will be seriously disappointed. Those who feared a protectionist apocalypse may be slightly relieved. The one bright spot of 2017 was that other big trading powers, particularly the EU, resisted the temptation to follow the US down the protectionist route, signing new trade deals and generally trying to keep the system going.

要對2018年的全球貿(mào)易體系抱樂觀態(tài)度，需要降低期望。那些希望特朗普現(xiàn)在這種沒有火力全開的狀態(tài)能夠持續(xù)下去的人們將會非常失望。那些擔(dān)心保護(hù)主義末世即將降臨的人們或許將稍微松一口氣。2017年的一個亮點是其他大的貿(mào)易國家和地區(qū)，尤其是歐盟(EU)，抵制住了跟隨美國走保護(hù)主義路線的誘惑，簽署了新的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，并且基本上一直在努力維持貿(mào)易體系的運作。

The focus for trade policymakers in 2018 should be mainly about damage limitation. Another year in which the protectionist wolf does not appear will count as a victory.

在2018年，貿(mào)易政策制定者應(yīng)該把重點放在控制損失上。人們喊了多少年“狼來了”，如果保護(hù)主義這條狼在2018年也沒有來，就算得上是一場勝利了。