今年,由于朝鮮吸引了國際社會(huì)的關(guān)注,中國一直悄悄地在南方獲得更大的地緣政治利益。整個(gè)2017年,北京方面一直在裝備存爭議的南中國海(South China Sea)海域的人工島嶼,使之具有潛在軍事用途。
Aerial photos published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington show new construction on islands built by China, which now bristle with bunkers, aircraft hangars and shelters for radar, aircraft, warships and artillery.
華盛頓戰(zhàn)略與國際研究中心(CSIS)公布的航空照片顯示了中國在島上打造的新建筑物,如今島上已擁有很多地堡、飛機(jī)庫,以及用于雷達(dá)、飛機(jī)、軍艦和火炮的掩體。
The new infrastructure leaves China in a position to station fighter jets and warships on the outcrops in 2018, and to make ambitious claims to territorial waters and airspace around them if Beijing chooses, say analysts.
分析人士表示,這些新設(shè)施使中國2018年可以在島嶼上部署戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)和軍艦,如果愿意的話,可以對島嶼周圍的領(lǐng)海和領(lǐng)空提出雄心勃勃的要求。
The new infrastructure, and the lack of global attention on the South China Sea, reflects a subtle shift in priorities under the administration of Donald Trump, US president, whose Asia security policy has focused on North Korea and lacked enthusiasm for foreign alliances.
這些新設(shè)施加上全球?qū)δ现袊H鄙訇P(guān)注,反映出了總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的美國政府的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)發(fā)生的微妙轉(zhuǎn)變。特朗普的亞洲安全政策重點(diǎn)在于朝鮮,在對外聯(lián)盟方面缺乏興趣。
The most effective check on China’s expansionist behaviour in the disputed waters, analysts say, is pushback from other claimant states. But these smaller countries have been largely ignored by Washington in 2017 and are thus less bold about defending their rights.
分析人士表示,對中國在爭議海域的擴(kuò)張行為的最有效制約手段,是其他主權(quán)聲索國的抵制。但在2017年,這些小國基本被華盛頓方面忽略了,因此在捍衛(wèi)本國權(quán)利方面不那么大膽。
A 2016 international arbitration tribunal backed the Philippines after Manila sought to invalidate the “nine-dash line”, which outlines China’s historic claim to about 85 per cent of the South China Sea. But Beijing has largely neutralised the verdict amid a shift from the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte in favour of China and away from the US.
在菲律賓尋求宣告“九段線”——這是中國宣稱南中國海大約85%的面積為本國領(lǐng)土的歷史要求——無效時(shí),一家國際仲裁法庭于2016年支持了菲律賓的主張。但在菲律賓總統(tǒng)羅德里戈•杜特爾特(Rodrigo Duterte)親近中國、遠(yuǎn)離美國的背景下,北京方面基本上把該裁定變成了一張廢紙。
A more recent example of a shift towards China, according to Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University, is Singapore. It has long been in the western camp but in September agreed to step up joint military exercises with Beijing.
清華大學(xué)國際關(guān)系研究院院長閻學(xué)通說,拉近與中國關(guān)系的一個(gè)更近的例子是新加坡。新加坡長期以來一直位于西方陣營,但今年9月同意與中國舉行更多軍事演習(xí)。
“Trump’s security strategy in east Asia focuses on north-east Asia,” Mr Yan said in an interview with the Global Times, a Chinese nationalist tabloid published on Tuesday. “As he takes little count of military alliances with Southeast Asian countries, they have to reconsider their security strategies.”
“特朗普的東亞安全戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)在東北亞,”閻學(xué)通在接受《環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)》采訪(內(nèi)容發(fā)表于周二)時(shí)說,“由于他不重視與東南亞國家的軍事同盟關(guān)系,因此東南亞國家不得不重新考慮他們的安全戰(zhàn)略。”
The White House insists it has not dropped its focus on the South China Sea, and singled it out in its latest National Security Strategy, released before Christmas.
美國白宮堅(jiān)稱,美國并未放棄對南中國海的關(guān)注,在圣誕節(jié)前公布的最新《國家安全戰(zhàn)略》中提到了南中國海問題。
“[China’s] efforts to build and militarise outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations and undermine regional stability,” it said.
“(中國)在南中國海興建基地并對其軍事化的努力,危及了貿(mào)易自由流動(dòng),威脅了其他國家的主權(quán),并破壞了地區(qū)穩(wěn)定,”白宮表示。
China insists it does not plan to militarise the islands but says it reserves the right to do what it wants with them.
中國堅(jiān)稱其不打算軍事化上述島嶼,但表示保留依照自身意愿行事的權(quán)利。
“The fact is that this is China’s territory, and anything the Chinese government does here has nothing to do with other countries” said Liu Zhiqin, senior fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University, echoing Beijing’s official position.
“事實(shí)在于,這是中國的領(lǐng)土,中國政府無論在這里做什么,都與其他國家沒有關(guān)系,”中國人民大學(xué)重陽金融研究院高級研究員劉志勤說。他呼應(yīng)了官方立場。