樂視“爛攤子”引債權(quán)人爭(zhēng)搶
Felix Tao還記得自己接到樂視(LeEco)的訂單時(shí)有多激動(dòng)，這是他最大的訂單之一：訂單價(jià)值160萬人民幣(24.4萬美元)，內(nèi)容是為這家科技企業(yè)集團(tuán)的手機(jī)公司樂視移動(dòng)(Le Mobile)供應(yīng)零部件。
Almost two years later, however, the young supplier from the coastal province of Shandong says he is still waiting to be paid. “LeEco keeps telling us to give them some time. We have heard that line so many times that we have it memorised,” he says.
然而，差不多兩年后，這位來自沿海省份山東的年輕供應(yīng)商說，他仍在等樂視付款。“樂視一直讓我們?cè)賹捪匏麄円恍r(shí)間。這套說辭我們已經(jīng)聽了太多次了，都會(huì)背了，”他說。
The unravelling of LeEco, the tech group that once aimed to be the Tesla and Netflix of China, has devolved into a chaotic scramble for cash, providing a case study case into the shakiness of the country’s nascent corporate bankruptcy regime.
樂視曾致力于成為中國(guó)的特斯拉(Tesla)與Netflix，它的坍塌引起債權(quán)人無序爭(zhēng)搶該集團(tuán)的現(xiàn)金，這成為研究中國(guó)新建立的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)制度根基不穩(wěn)的一個(gè)案例。
This has sweeping implications for the country’s ability to allocate and manage debt. A dysfunctional bankruptcy system has allowed China’s insolvent businesses to continue with little pressure to restructure. It has also discouraged investors and banks from properly pricing credit risk into their lending, which spells trouble for a country with $18tn in corporate debt, equal to 169 per cent of gross domestic product, according to the Bank for International Settlements.
這件事對(duì)中國(guó)的債務(wù)處置能力有著深遠(yuǎn)含義。由于破產(chǎn)制度不健全，中國(guó)一些資不抵債的企業(yè)得以繼續(xù)維持，而幾乎沒有重組的壓力。它也阻礙投資者和銀行在提供資金時(shí)恰當(dāng)?shù)貙?duì)信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行定價(jià)，對(duì)于這個(gè)企業(yè)債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)沉重的國(guó)家，這帶來了一個(gè)問題。國(guó)際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，中國(guó)企業(yè)債務(wù)總額為18萬億美元，相當(dāng)于中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的169%。
On paper, China’s corporate bankruptcy law, implemented in 2007, is nearly identical to regimes in the US and Europe. In practice, businesses typically shun bankruptcy in favour of the informal resolution channels they have used for decades.
理論上，中國(guó)自2007年開始實(shí)施的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)法與美國(guó)及歐洲的破產(chǎn)制度差別不大?？蓪?shí)際上，企業(yè)往往會(huì)回避破產(chǎn)，傾向于采取他們幾十年來慣用的不正規(guī)的處置渠道。
“Near as I can tell, [the bankruptcy process] doesn’t really exist. It’s there on paper, and I vaguely recall hearing of a few cases, but for the most part it is ignored,” says Dan Harris, a lawyer who specialises in Chinese business law.
“據(jù)我所知，(破產(chǎn)程序)名存實(shí)亡，我隱約記得聽說過一些破產(chǎn)案，但大多數(shù)情況下，破產(chǎn)程序被視而不見，”一名專攻中國(guó)商業(yè)法的律師丹•哈里斯(Dan Harris)表示。
Creditors can force a group into bankruptcy if they can demonstrate it is overdue on payments. But that can be difficult in China as creditors often do not have full access to the parent company’s financials.
如果債權(quán)人能夠證明一家企業(yè)逾期付款，就可以迫使其破產(chǎn)。但在中國(guó)很難這么做，因?yàn)閭鶛?quán)人往往無法完全知悉對(duì)方母公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況。
LeEco projected an image of business-as-usual despite reporting a Rmb637m loss in its listed business, Leshi, in the first half of 2017, amid signs the group was running out of cash. During this period, LeEco founder Jia Yueting travelled to Hong Kong to raise money for its electric car venture with US start-up Faraday Future.
樂視上市子公司樂視網(wǎng)(Leshi)公布2017年上半年虧損6.37億人民幣，集團(tuán)顯露出資金趨于枯竭的跡象，但樂視仍營(yíng)造出一種正常運(yùn)營(yíng)的印象。當(dāng)時(shí)樂視創(chuàng)始人賈躍亭還前往香港，為樂視與美國(guó)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)法拉第未來(Faraday Future)的電動(dòng)汽車合資公司融資。
This month, China’s supreme court put Mr Jia on a blacklist for unpaid debts, and Beijing ordered him to return to China to answer questions about a Leshi debt.
本月，中國(guó)最高法院將賈躍亭列入失信黑名單，北京方面責(zé)令其返回中國(guó)就樂視網(wǎng)債務(wù)做出解釋。
Alarmed by LeEco’s well-publicised financial woes, the company’s creditors took action earlier this year to seize LeEco’s remaining assets.
樂視財(cái)務(wù)困境被廣泛報(bào)道后，驚慌失措的各路債權(quán)人今年早些時(shí)候紛紛采取行動(dòng)，尋求扣押樂視剩余資產(chǎn)。
“Creditors feel they must move swiftly and aggressively to safeguard their interests in China,” says Shaun Wu, a Hong Kong lawyer who specialises in advising parties in China foreign joint venture disputes. “There is less of a willingness to stand in line and wait for everything to be sorted.”
“債權(quán)人認(rèn)為，他們必須迅速積極地采取行動(dòng)維護(hù)他們?cè)谥袊?guó)的利益。”專門為陷入中外合資糾紛的客戶提供服務(wù)的香港律師Shaun Wu說，“他們不太愿意排隊(duì)等待所有事情都安排好。”
The upshot is that instead of a smooth restructuring, Chinese insolvency typically dissolves into a disorderly fight for the cash and assets of the indebted group. When LeEco’s cash problems became public about 10 lenders occupied the group’s office, looking for assurances from management they would be repaid.
其結(jié)果是，在中國(guó)，資不抵債企業(yè)往往不會(huì)進(jìn)行平穩(wěn)的重組，而是會(huì)出現(xiàn)無序爭(zhēng)奪負(fù)債企業(yè)現(xiàn)金和資產(chǎn)的局面。在樂視的資金問題曝光之后，大約10家貸款機(jī)構(gòu)占領(lǐng)了樂視的辦公室，尋求從管理層那里得到它們將得到償付的保證。
LeEco did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
樂視沒有對(duì)多次的置評(píng)請(qǐng)求作出回應(yīng)。
The likelihood of creditors getting their money back is further complicated by a quirk of Chinese financing: CEO share pledging.
債權(quán)人收回資金的可能性還因?yàn)橐环N古怪的中國(guó)融資方式進(jìn)一步復(fù)雜化，即首席執(zhí)行官股權(quán)質(zhì)押。
Using personal shares to secure loans is common in China, where 10 per cent of the value of the mainland stock market (by value) is pledged against loans, according to Bank of America.
使用個(gè)人所持股份來獲得貸款的做法在中國(guó)很普遍，據(jù)美國(guó)銀行(Bank of America)的數(shù)據(jù)，價(jià)值約占中國(guó)內(nèi)地股市總市值10%的股票被用于質(zhì)押貸款。
The founder will often use the cash to lend to the company, and the company’s finances will quickly overlap with that of the founder. However, because China does not let individuals declare bankruptcy, the backers of insolvent groups are highly motivated to steer their companies away from such proceedings.
創(chuàng)始人通常把質(zhì)押所得資金借給企業(yè)，企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)狀況很快與創(chuàng)始人的財(cái)務(wù)狀況重疊。然而，由于中國(guó)不允許個(gè)人宣布破產(chǎn)，資不抵債企業(yè)的出資者有很強(qiáng)的動(dòng)機(jī)不讓他們的企業(yè)走破產(chǎn)程序。
“A private company may be approaching bankruptcy because the individual debt of the chairman is so high, but that personal debt cannot be forgiven,” says Han Chuanhua, a Beijing-based bankruptcy lawyer. “In that case, an individual would want to avoid bankruptcy at all costs.” “一家私人企業(yè)可能會(huì)因?yàn)槎麻L(zhǎng)個(gè)人的高負(fù)債而臨近破產(chǎn)，但個(gè)人債務(wù)是無法被免除的。”北京的破產(chǎn)律師Han Chuanhua說，“在這種情況下，個(gè)人會(huì)千方百計(jì)避免破產(chǎn)。”
Creditors are then forced to use other means to collect, such as targeting the founder’s assets.
因此，債權(quán)人被迫使用其他手段收回資金，比如把目光轉(zhuǎn)向創(chuàng)始人的資產(chǎn)。
In the case of LeEco, Mr Jia and his sister had pledged almost all their shares in LeEco’s listed arm against loans, while his brother also borrowed against shares in a connected company.
就樂視而言，賈躍亭和他姐姐將他們?cè)跇芬暽鲜凶庸镜膸缀跛泄煞荻假|(zhì)押了，而賈躍亭的哥哥也將其在一家關(guān)聯(lián)公司的股份質(zhì)押出去。
In early July, a Shanghai court froze more than $180m of LeEco assets belonging to Mr Jia, his brother and Mr Jia’s wife in lieu of missed loan payments. Weeks later, a Beijing court ordered another $33.78m of assets frozen.
今年7月初，上海一家法院將賈躍亭、其兄和其妻名下的1.8億美元的樂視資產(chǎn)凍結(jié)，以頂替未償付的貸款。幾周后，北京一家法院也下令凍結(jié)3378萬美元資產(chǎn)。
On Monday, the China Securities Regulatory Commission ordered Mr Jia to return to the country to answer questions why he was not following through on a promise to provide an interest-free loan to Leshi, yet another indicator of how the founder’s finances were entangled with the group’s.
本周一，中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)(CSRC)責(zé)令賈躍亭回國(guó)回答有關(guān)他未履行為樂視網(wǎng)提供無息借款承諾的問題。這是表明這位創(chuàng)始人的財(cái)務(wù)與樂視集團(tuán)財(cái)務(wù)相互牽扯的又一跡象。
Mr Jia could not be reached for comment.
記者無法聯(lián)系到賈躍亭就此置評(píng)。
Mr Tao says employees at Le Mobile completely stopped taking his calls months ago. He travelled to Beijing, spending four months staking out the parent company’s headquarters. More recently, he pitched a tent in the lobby to force Mr Jia to the negotiating table. He has not been successful.
Felix Tao說，樂視移動(dòng)的員工在數(shù)月前就完全不接他的電話了。他前往北京，花了4個(gè)月時(shí)間“駐扎”在樂視母公司總部外。最近，他在該集團(tuán)總部的大堂搭了一個(gè)帳篷，希望迫使賈躍亭坐上談判桌。他沒能成功。
“The company will not listen to us. Then they hired people to lock us out of the lobby,” says Mr Tao.
他說：“該公司不聽我們的話。后來他們雇了人把我們鎖在大堂外面。”
