歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人為何無法接近特朗普？
民選領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之間的私交通常都不太重要。多數(shù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都照著手下官僚寫的簡(jiǎn)要冊(cè)子行事。他們奉行長(zhǎng)期以來的國(guó)家政策。任何有關(guān)個(gè)人“化學(xué)作用”的說法通常只是私下流傳的八卦。
But it’s different with Donald Trump. After a career running a small family company without a board, he doesn’t do bureaucracy. He surrounds himself with trusted lackeys. Anyone who manages to get a word in his ear therefore has a good chance of shaping the world’s fate.
但是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)不一樣。特朗普以前經(jīng)營(yíng)著一家沒有董事會(huì)的小型家族公司，他不奉行官僚作風(fēng)。他身邊都是自己的親信。因此，任何能在他跟前說上話的人都有機(jī)會(huì)影響這個(gè)世界的命運(yùn)。
So far, Trump hasn’t bothered much with foreign policy. Moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and leaving the Paris climate accords were chiefly symbolic acts. But that could soon change. His tax bill may prove his last big domestic legislation, especially given his shrunken Senate majority. That will free up more head space to get worked up about foreign issues, from North Korea to Iran. Other western countries therefore face an urgent question — how to influence this man?
目前為止，特朗普還沒太管外交政策的事。把美國(guó)駐以色列大使館搬到耶路撒冷以及退出巴黎氣候協(xié)定主要是象征性的舉動(dòng)。但是這種情況可能很快就會(huì)改變。他的稅改法案可能成為他最后一項(xiàng)重大國(guó)內(nèi)立法，特別是考慮到他在參議院的多數(shù)優(yōu)勢(shì)在減弱的情況。這件事結(jié)束后，他的腦子就能更多地思考從朝鮮到伊朗等的外交問題。因此其他西方國(guó)家面臨著一個(gè)迫切問題——如何去影響此人?
After his unexpected election, ambassadors in Washington hastily invited his associates to dinner. But soon after these meals, many of the associates vanished. (Remember Rudy Giuliani?)
在特朗普意外當(dāng)選后，駐華盛頓的各國(guó)大使匆忙邀請(qǐng)他的副手們共赴晚宴。但在吃過飯后不久，其中很多副手消失了。(還記得魯?shù)?bull;朱利安尼(Rudy Giuliani)嗎?)
Foreign officials quickly grasped that Trump’s White House is structured like a small family company: only relatives (excluding wives) are unsackable. Justin Trudeau, Canada’s prime minister, took Trump’s daughter Ivanka to a Canadaphile Broadway play, and Angela Merkel brought her to Berlin for a panel. But the biggest prize for western diplomats is Jared Kushner, Ivanka’s husband, the so-called “shadow secretary of state”. A French official who was garrulous on all subjects suddenly fell silent when asked to assess Kushner. The subject was too sensitive.
外國(guó)官員很快意識(shí)到，特朗普領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的白宮就像是小型家族企業(yè)：唯有親屬(妻子除外)是鐵打不動(dòng)的。加拿大總理賈斯廷•特魯多(Justin Trudeau)邀請(qǐng)?zhí)乩势盏呐畠阂寥f卡(Ivanka)去看了一部親加拿大的百老匯戲劇。安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)帶她去柏林參加一場(chǎng)對(duì)話會(huì)。但是西方外交官最想結(jié)交的是伊萬卡的丈夫、人稱“影子國(guó)務(wù)卿”的賈里德•庫什納(Jared Kushner)。有一位法國(guó)官員講起什么話題都滔滔不絕，但被問及如何評(píng)價(jià)庫什納這個(gè)人時(shí)，他突然陷入了沉默。這個(gè)話題太敏感了。
Allies have also staked out Trump’s Floridian retreat, Mar-a-Lago. Canada’s special asset is former premier Brian Mulroney, who knows Trump from the Florida vacation-home circuit, but everyone can play this game. “Any foreign intel service that doesn’t have an agent as a member or employee of Mar-a-Lago is guilty of rank incompetence,” says American neocon writer Max Boot.
盟友們還密切關(guān)注著特朗普在佛羅里達(dá)州的居所海湖莊園(Mar-a-Lago)。加拿大的法寶是前總理布賴恩•馬爾羅尼(Brian Mulroney)——他在那里認(rèn)識(shí)了特朗普——但每個(gè)人都能來這一套。美國(guó)新保守主義作家馬克斯•布特(Max Boot)表示，“如果哪家外國(guó)情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)沒有在海湖莊園安插特工，就是不稱職。”
Yet western allies still feel out of the Trumpian loop. Talking to the administration’s “grown-ups” — defence secretary Jim Mattis and national security adviser HR McMaster — only gets them so far: Trump apparently overruled the grown-ups on Jerusalem, for instance. More than in previous US administrations, reaching the president is essential. And the Europeans must reach him without being able to put forward many of the generals, billionaires and autocrats whom Trump admires.
但西方盟友仍然感覺沒進(jìn)入特朗普的圈子。和特朗普政府中的“成年人”——國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)吉姆•馬蒂斯(Jim Mattis)和國(guó)家安全顧問赫伯特•雷蒙德•麥克馬斯特(HR McMaster)——交談沒太大作用：例如，在耶路撒冷問題上，特朗普顯然駁回了成年人的建議。相比往屆美國(guó)政府，如今與總統(tǒng)接觸尤為重要。而且，歐洲人必須在講不出幾個(gè)令他欽佩的將軍、億萬富翁和獨(dú)裁者的情況下與他接觸。
Perhaps Europe’s leading Trump-whisperer is Emmanuel Macron, the French president. The best actor-politician since Ronald Reagan, Macron first demonstrated his toughness towards Trump with the famous white-knuckle handshake. Then came France’s diplomatic coup: Trump’s visit to Paris for July’s Bastille Day parade. Macron hosted him without showing a hint of the intellectual condescension to which Trump is so sensitive. When the two men met again in September, Trump spent the first 10 minutes reliving the parade, which he hopes to replicate in Washington next July 4. “And I want horses!” he told his entourage.
歐洲最能跟特朗普說上話的或許是法國(guó)總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)。作為自羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)以來最好的演技派政客，馬克龍首先以那次著名的握手(握到指關(guān)節(jié)發(fā)白)，向特朗普展示了他的堅(jiān)韌。接著是法國(guó)的外交妙招：特朗普訪問巴黎參加了7月巴士底日(Bastille Day)閱兵。馬克龍接待特朗普時(shí)絲毫沒有流露出才智上的優(yōu)越感，特朗普在這方面非常敏感。當(dāng)倆人于9月再次會(huì)晤時(shí)，特朗普先花了10分鐘重提那次閱兵——他希望明年7月4日也在華盛頓舉行閱兵。“我要一些馬!”他告訴隨從人員。
The French aren’t sure how much this helps them. Trump still dropped out of the Paris accords. At least, they say, Macron can make his case to Trump and be heard.
法國(guó)人不確定這有多大幫助。特朗普仍然退出了巴黎協(xié)定。他們表示，至少馬克龍能向特朗普解釋自己的立場(chǎng)而且特朗普聽進(jìn)去了。
Merkel and Theresa May wish they could. Uncharismatic women who don’t live in bling-laden palaces, they can’t meet Trump king to king, and they don’t play golf. Merkel also suffers, notes Constanze Stelzenmüller of the Brookings Institution, from Trump’s disapproval of “bad, very bad Germany” — a phrase he once used in Brussels when complaining to European leaders about the German trade surplus.
默克爾和特里薩•梅(Theresa May)希望自己也能這樣。這些不住在金碧輝煌的宮殿中、缺乏魅力的女性，不能與特朗普進(jìn)行“王對(duì)王”的會(huì)面，也不會(huì)打高爾夫球。布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)(Brookings Institution)的康斯坦策•施特爾岑米勒(Constanze Stelzenmüller)指出，特朗普不贊同“糟糕、非常糟糕的德國(guó)”——這是他在布魯塞爾向歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人抱怨德國(guó)貿(mào)易順差時(shí)所說的話——也讓默克爾受挫。
His refusal to shake Merkel’s hand in Washington was a clear statement from a man who learnt the symbolism of handshakes after entering politics. (Previously, he avoided shaking for fear of germs.) Merkel regularly phones Trump. But she comes across as condescending. Thorsten Benner, head of Berlin’s Global Public Policy Institute, says, “He sees her as an irritating European who’s always lecturing him.” At most she can use Trump as an argument to nudge Germans towards more European co-operation. Jeremy Shapiro and Dina Pardijs, writing for the European Council on Foreign Relations, call this Trump’s “Antichrist effect”.
對(duì)于一個(gè)在步入政壇后(之前他因擔(dān)心感染細(xì)菌而避免與人握手)懂得握手象征意義的人來說，特朗普在華盛頓拒絕與默克爾握手就是一個(gè)明顯表現(xiàn)。默克爾經(jīng)常與特朗普通電話，但她給人一種紆尊降貴的印象。柏林全球公共政策研究所(Global Public Policy Institute)的索斯藤•本納(Thorsten Benner)表示，“他把她看作是總給他說教的惹人生氣的歐洲人。”她充其量能拿特朗普當(dāng)例子，敦促德國(guó)人加強(qiáng)歐洲合作。為歐洲對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)(European Council on Foreign Relations)撰稿的杰里米•夏皮羅(Jeremy Shapiro)和迪納•帕爾迪斯(Dina Pardijs)稱這是特朗普的“反基督效應(yīng)”。
Merkel and May are also constrained by their domestic audiences. Whereas French voters tend to have little emotional investment in US politics, most Germans and Brits want their leaders to berate Trump. May has characteristically mishandled this. Days after his inauguration, she visited Washington to hold his hand and ask for a trade deal. She offered him a state visit, which if it ever happens, will prompt a historic demonstration. Her efforts were both pointless and irresponsible. Trump probably won’t ever give the UK his advertised “very big & exciting” deal.
默克爾和梅也受到國(guó)內(nèi)民眾制約。法國(guó)選民一般不會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)政治投入多少感情，而大多數(shù)德國(guó)人和英國(guó)人都希望他們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人痛斥特朗普。梅是這方面處理不當(dāng)?shù)牡湫汀Ｔ谔乩势站吐毢髱滋?，她出訪華盛頓握著特朗普的手要求達(dá)成一項(xiàng)貿(mào)易協(xié)議。她邀請(qǐng)他對(duì)英國(guó)進(jìn)行國(guó)事訪問——如果成行將引發(fā)歷史性的示威活動(dòng)。她的努力既沒意義又不負(fù)責(zé)。特朗普可能永遠(yuǎn)也不會(huì)跟英國(guó)簽訂他所說的“非常大且令人激動(dòng)的”協(xié)議。
Now, with Trump apparently planning to bomb North Korea in the last months before it can hit the US, Europeans are mere spectators. Their best hope of influencing him might be buying commercials on Fox News’s morning shows. They can only hope 2018 will be as benign as 2017.
在如今特朗普似乎打算在朝鮮還沒能夠打擊美國(guó)的最后幾個(gè)月內(nèi)搶先轟炸朝鮮的形勢(shì)下，歐洲人只是旁觀者而已。他們要想影響特朗普，最有希望的做法或許就是在?？怂剐侣?Fox News)早間節(jié)目花錢做廣告。他們只能希望2018年和2017年一樣順順當(dāng)當(dāng)。
