中國的市場經(jīng)濟地位之爭
中國在同意加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)時簽署了一份102頁的議定書，其中有幾個小字正成為對該機構(gòu)本身的一個嚴(yán)峻考驗：非市場經(jīng)濟。
One year ago today was the 15th anniversary of China joining the WTO. The date is important because of a little clause in the accession protocols that deals with how countries should decide whether the goods that China exports have been unfairly dumped. It says: “In any event, the provisions [that allow trade disputants to treat China as a non-market economy] shall expire 15 years after the date of accession”.
一年前的12月11日是中國加入世貿(mào)組織的15周年紀(jì)念日。這個日子之所以異常重要，是因為中國入世協(xié)議中有一個小條款，是關(guān)于各國應(yīng)如何判定中國出口商品是否存在不公平傾銷。該條款寫道：“無論如何，(允許貿(mào)易爭議者將中國視為非市場經(jīng)濟的)項目的規(guī)定應(yīng)在加入之日后15年終止。”
In the year following that expiry date, a battle royale has erupted over whether Europe and the US should honour what Beijing sees as its agreement when the other countries say China has not stood by its commitments.
在這一期限屆滿后的一年里爆發(fā)了一場大混戰(zhàn)，其主題是當(dāng)其他國家表示中國沒有信守承諾時，歐洲和美國是否應(yīng)對北京方面認(rèn)為是協(xié)議規(guī)定的內(nèi)容予以承認(rèn)。
Let’s rewind first to the 1990s. At the time, the question for US and European negotiators was how anyone would know if Chinese exporters were dumping goods in other markets. The normal standard is whether the goods are being sold for less than their cost of production — in other words, being sold without any profit. But that standard was impossible to apply to the planned economies of the Soviet bloc, which lacked normal prices in their home markets. So goods suspected of being dumped by “non-market” economies could be measured against goods in another economy of more or less equivalent levels of development, to see whether the price was fair.
我們先倒回到上世紀(jì)九十年代。當(dāng)時美國和歐洲談判代表考慮的問題是，如果中國出口商在其他市場傾銷商品，別人如何得知呢?一般的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是商品是否以低于其生產(chǎn)成本的價格出售，換句話說，該商品的出售是否毫無利潤。但這一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)無法適用于蘇聯(lián)集團的計劃經(jīng)濟體，它們的國內(nèi)市場缺乏正常價格。因此如果懷疑“非市場”經(jīng)濟體傾銷某樣商品，可以用另一個發(fā)展水平大致相當(dāng)?shù)慕?jīng)濟體的同樣商品來衡量，看其價格是否公平。
When China agreed to join, its negotiators understood “market economy” as referring to a country without price controls, and there are some indications that the foreign negotiators did too. Anyway, they were fixated on opening access to the Chinese market for goods produced by foreign firms. Now, however, the question of whether to grant market economy status (MES) to China has become a proxy for frustrations with China’s overall economic structure, and an excuse to throw the entire concept of the WTO into question.
當(dāng)中國同意加入時，中方談判代表對“市場經(jīng)濟”的理解是指一個國家沒有價格管制，而有些跡象表明外國談判代表們也是這樣理解的?？傊?，他們一心想打開中國市場，讓外國公司生產(chǎn)的商品進(jìn)去?？墒乾F(xiàn)在，是否給予中國市場經(jīng)濟地位(MES)的問題已成為對中國整體經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)失望的代表，也成為質(zhì)疑整個世貿(mào)組織概念的一個理由。
After China joined the WTO, the “non-market” status very quickly became a disadvantage. With a burst of investment and competition in nearly every industry, Chinese producers of everything from steel to shoes to vitamins quickly drove domestic profit margins through the floor. Exporting became a way to capture the higher prices overseas. Far from dumping, the Chinese exporters were looking to make a profit. But their prices were well below those of most other countries, unleashing havoc on international producers’ margins and leading to numerous WTO complaints. No third country could replicate the scale, low labour costs and cut-throat competition of the Chinese market. But its trading partners used the clause to impose absurdly high tariffs, often exceeding 100 per cent, on its exports.
中國加入世貿(mào)組織后，“非市場”地位很快就成了一個劣勢。幾乎每一個行業(yè)都經(jīng)歷了投資的激增和競爭的加劇。從鋼鐵到鞋子再到維生素，中國所有生產(chǎn)商的國內(nèi)利潤率都迅速降到極低。出口成了在海外賺取較高價格的方式。中國出口商非但不是在傾銷，反而是在尋求利潤。但他們的價格遠(yuǎn)低于其他大多數(shù)國家的價格，對國際生產(chǎn)者的利潤率造成巨大破壞，并讓世貿(mào)組織收到大量投訴。再沒有國家能復(fù)制中國市場的規(guī)模、低廉的勞動力成本和激烈的競爭。但其貿(mào)易伙伴利用上述條款對中國出口商品征收高到離譜的關(guān)稅——往往超過100%。
That is why Chinese negotiators are dead set on forcing the Europeans and Americans to recognise China as a “market economy”. The fight has focused on Europe, which needs to make a legal change. In a sleight of hand, the Europeans eliminated the entire category of “non-market economies” in October (delivering an unexpected boon to Vietnam, Albania, Mongolia and Turkmenistan) but reserves the right to do a third-country comparison on a case-by-case basis.
這就是為什么中方談判代表拼命想讓歐洲人和美國人承認(rèn)中國是“市場經(jīng)濟”。這場斗爭主要集中在歐洲，這里需要修改法律。歐洲人耍了個花招，在10月份取消了整個“非市場經(jīng)濟”類別——給越南、阿爾巴尼亞、蒙古和土庫曼斯坦帶來了意想不到的好處——但保留根據(jù)具體情況進(jìn)行第三國比較的權(quán)利。
The US doesn’t have to change any law. It only has to refrain, in future cases, from comparing Chinese goods with third country goods when deciding if they were dumped. But China has requested WTO consultations with the US too, leading Washington’s lawyers to push back forcefully and claim they have the WTO’s laws on their side. The response fully demonstrates that this case is not about pricing any more but about all the ways the Chinese economy is different.
美國不必修改任何法律。它只需要——在未來的案例中——在判定中國商品是否存在傾銷時，不將中國商品與第三國商品作比較。但中國也要求世貿(mào)組織與美國進(jìn)行磋商，導(dǎo)致華盛頓的律師們激烈反對，并聲稱世貿(mào)組織的法律站在他們這邊。其反應(yīng)充分表明此事不再是關(guān)于定價，而是關(guān)于中國經(jīng)濟的與眾不同。
For their part, US and European negotiators feel China is nowhere near a market economy. Hidden advantages given to hometown players (especially state-owned companies) include cheap financing, discriminatory rules and Beijing’s value destroying attempts to jump-start new industries.
對于美國和歐洲的談判代表來說，中國與市場經(jīng)濟毫不沾邊。本土企業(yè)(特別是國企)享受的隱形優(yōu)勢包括低成本融資、歧視性規(guī)則和中國政府助推新行業(yè)的破壞價值的嘗試。
For many years, the Obama administration had been building slow and careful WTO cases against the hidden subsidies on land, water and interest rates that Beijing awards its state-owned companies and its larger, more favourite private ones.
多年來，奧巴馬政府一直緩慢而小心地在世貿(mào)組織針對中國政府賦予國企及其所偏愛的大型私企的土地、水和利率方面的隱形補貼提起訴訟。
“They had us,” one Chinese negotiator says. Although fiercely contested by the ministry of commerce’s crack WTO team, some Chinese reformers secretly welcomed them as a stick to force tougher structural reforms on recalcitrant domestic foes.
“他們說的沒錯，”一名中國談判代表表示。盡管這些訴訟受到中國商務(wù)部一流的世貿(mào)組織工作組的強烈反駁，但是中國一些改革者私底下歡迎這些訴訟，認(rèn)為它們可以作為針對國內(nèi)頑固抗拒改革的勢力的一根大棒，以推行更為嚴(yán)格的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革。
The Trump administration threw the Obama administration’s forensic approach out the window. Instead of picking cases that might lead to structural reforms in China, it has fixed on specific items that are arriving on US shores in large quantities. It is an attempt to raise the walls of the levee, sandbag by sandbag, rather than fighting the flood at its source and risk getting swept away.
特朗普政府把奧巴馬政府訴諸法庭的方式拋到了腦后。特朗普政府沒有選擇那些可能推動中國結(jié)構(gòu)性改革的案子，而是把目標(biāo)鎖定那些大量進(jìn)入美國的特定商品。此舉試圖冒著被洪水沖走的危險一沙袋一沙袋地加高防洪墻，而不是在洪水的源頭抗洪。
This makes the MES a mess. Lawyers may quibble, but the literal text (“in any event”) is quite clear. Arguing against it makes the west look as though it signed the WTO accord (and other deals) in bad faith. Chinese reformers, who have staked their hopes for their country on creating a globally integrated economy, need international agreements to have credibility. Otherwise, they give fodder to the more nationalist strain in the country that believes international institutions are only designed to keep China down.
這使中國的“市場經(jīng)濟地位”問題成為一場混戰(zhàn)。律師們可能會狡辯，但是議定書寫得明明白白——“無論如何”。爭辯這一點讓西方看起來像是心存欺騙地簽署了世貿(mào)組織協(xié)定(以及其他協(xié)議)。中國改革者把對國家的希望寄托在打造全球一體化經(jīng)濟上，他們需要有信譽的國際協(xié)議。否則，他們就給國內(nèi)更民族主義的論調(diào)提供了彈藥，這種論調(diào)認(rèn)為國際機構(gòu)的目的就是壓制中國。
Nonetheless, China clearly isn’t a market economy in the sense of “market competition”. For instance, Beijing prioritises the interests of its state-owned companies over private Chinese and foreign companies. Granting MES seems indefensible to businesses and workers who see profits and jobs hit when cheap Chinese goods arrive on their home shores. Denying MES is also disingenuous. For one thing, the “flood” of cheap “Made in China” goods often includes the products of joint ventures by multinationals that have moved production to China. And, since all Chinese companies, state or private, export away from their ultra-competitive home markets in order to secure profits, comparing Chinese export prices with domestic Chinese prices almost always shows the products weren’t dumped.
盡管如此，中國在“市場競爭”方面明顯不算是市場經(jīng)濟。例如，中國政府把國企的利益置于私企和外企的利益之上。對于那些因廉價的中國商品涌入本國而遭受利潤損失或者失去工作的企業(yè)和工人而言，賦予中國“市場經(jīng)濟地位”似乎是不可原諒的。否定其“市場經(jīng)濟地位”又是不誠實的。一來，大量“涌入”的廉價的“中國制造”商品，往往包含把生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移至中國的跨國企業(yè)成立的合資企業(yè)所生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品。同時，由于所有中國企業(yè)——無論是國企還是私企——為了獲取利潤而避開競爭超級激烈的本土市場、選擇對外出口，因此對比中國商品的出口價格與本土價格幾乎總是顯示這些產(chǎn)品并不存在傾銷。
And then there is the politics of the US. WTO judges are very aware that the Trump administration is just looking for one “outrageous” ruling to justify pulling out of the WTO. They might be disinclined to provide one, no matter the merits of China’s argument that it has, in fact, transitioned from a Soviet-style planned economy to one based on market prices (if not market competition).
另外還有美國政治的因素。世貿(mào)組織法官非常清楚，特朗普政府只不過在尋求一次“不可容忍”的裁決作為退出世貿(mào)組織的借口。他們可能不愿意提供這樣的借口，無論中國自稱實際上已從蘇聯(lián)式計劃經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型為基于市場化定價(即使不是市場競爭)的經(jīng)濟的觀點有多可信。
“It’s become a political problem and so it will need a political solution,” said one western trade negotiator.
一名西方貿(mào)易談判代表稱，“這已經(jīng)成了一個政治問題，因此它需要政治解決方案。”
A bigger issue is that most of the complaints about the Chinese economy (and, to be fair, other countries’ complaints about Washington’s unhealthy economic choices) go well beyond strict trade and tariff issues. The WTO is a poor forum to debate broader structural issues in large economies, but there is no other option.
更大的問題是，大多數(shù)關(guān)于中國經(jīng)濟的抱怨(公平地說，還有其他國家對華盛頓方面不健康的經(jīng)濟選擇的抱怨)都不僅是嚴(yán)格意義上的貿(mào)易和關(guān)稅問題。世貿(mào)組織并不適合用來討論大型經(jīng)濟體更廣泛的結(jié)構(gòu)性問題，但現(xiàn)在沒有別的選擇。
