量化寬松沒(méi)錯(cuò)

A war is being waged against the central banks. Its focus is the policies they adopted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the eurozone crisis that followed, especially quantitative easing or “large-scale asset purchases”. But complaints are also made against negative interest rates and even just low rates. These protests could cripple the ability of central banks to respond effectively to the next recession, let alone another crisis.

一場(chǎng)針對(duì)央行的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)已打響。焦點(diǎn)是各大央行在2007年至2009年全球金融危機(jī)以及隨后的歐元區(qū)危機(jī)之后采取的政策，特別是量化寬松或“大規(guī)模資產(chǎn)購(gòu)買(mǎi)”政策。但也有人抱怨負(fù)利率甚至低利率。這些抗議可能會(huì)損害央行對(duì)下一場(chǎng)衰退(更不用說(shuō)另一場(chǎng)危機(jī)了)做出有效回應(yīng)的能力。

This is a concern because short-term interest rates may remain low by historical standards even as they “normalise” in coming years. Inflation is low and long-term real interest rates seem to have become structurally low, too. Short-term rates may not even get to, say, 3 per cent before the next downturn. This would give central banks little room to cut, by historical standards, before finding themselves back at zero. In the US, the Federal Reserve has cut by four percentage points, or more, between cyclical peaks and troughs.

這一點(diǎn)令人擔(dān)憂(yōu)是因?yàn)?，按照歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，短期利率可能繼續(xù)處于低位，即便它們?cè)谖磥?lái)幾年“正?；?rdquo;。通脹較低，長(zhǎng)期實(shí)際利率似乎也已變得結(jié)構(gòu)性較低。在下次低迷之前，短期利率可能甚至不會(huì)達(dá)到3%。這將讓央行幾乎喪失降息的空間(按照歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn))，因?yàn)槔屎芸炀蜁?huì)回到零。在美國(guó)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)過(guò)去在周期性波峰和波谷之間降息4個(gè)百分點(diǎn)或更多。

This does not mean the central banks would, in reality, be out of ammunition. The possibilities are many, as former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke noted in a paper delivered in October at a conference on Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. But some of the possibilities would be un­popular, perhaps so unpopular as to be politically infeasible.

這并不意味著央行實(shí)際上會(huì)彈盡糧絕。正如美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席本•伯南克(Ben Bernanke) 10月在華盛頓彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)舉行的“反思宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策”(Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy)會(huì)議上發(fā)表的一篇論文中指出的那樣，可能性很多。但一些可能性將是不得人心的，甚至可能因此在政治上行不通。

The challenge in such situations is to make achievement of the inflation target credible by indicating both the central bank’s determination and the effectiveness of the means at its disposal. In fact, in trying to stimulate the economy, the central bank has infinite firepower. It could, if it dared, purchase almost everything, including, notably, foreign currency. If its commitment were credible, inflation would follow. The technical difficulty, rather, is calibrating policies successfully. The objections are political, not technical. Some are perfectly reasonable: use of the vast powers of central banks to price and create money must be constrained. But some objections are wrong-headed.

在這樣的形勢(shì)下，挑戰(zhàn)在于通過(guò)說(shuō)明央行的決心和央行可動(dòng)用的現(xiàn)有手段的有效性，讓實(shí)現(xiàn)通脹目標(biāo)變得可信。實(shí)際上，就刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)而言，央行擁有無(wú)限的火力。如果有膽量，它可以購(gòu)買(mǎi)幾乎一切，包括(這一點(diǎn)值得注意)外幣。如果其承諾是可信的，那么通脹將會(huì)跟隨。技術(shù)上的難點(diǎn)在于成功地校準(zhǔn)政策。反對(duì)意見(jiàn)是政治上的，而非技術(shù)上的。其中一些反對(duì)意見(jiàn)非常合理：動(dòng)用央行為貨幣定價(jià)和制造貨幣的巨大權(quán)力必須受到制約。但另一些反對(duì)意見(jiàn)屬于執(zhí)迷不悟。

One is that these policies are “unusual” or “unconventional”. So what? The world economy has evidently been in an unusual state, in which demand matches potential supply only at very low real and nominal interest rates. The long struggle to raise inflation to target in the US and, still more, in the eurozone and Japan, shows that. Equally, the relationship between unemployment and inflation has changed. Unusual conditions demand unusual policies.

其中一種反對(duì)意見(jiàn)認(rèn)為這些政策“不尋常”或“非傳統(tǒng)”。那又怎樣?全球經(jīng)濟(jì)顯然正處于不尋常的狀態(tài)，需求僅在非常低的實(shí)際和名義利率水平上與潛在供應(yīng)匹配。美國(guó)將通脹提高到目標(biāo)水平的長(zhǎng)期努力，以及歐元區(qū)和日本的更艱苦努力，都說(shuō)明了這點(diǎn)。同樣，失業(yè)與通脹之間的關(guān)系已發(fā)生變化。不尋常的狀況需要不尋常的政策。

Another objection is that policies are creating “artificial” prices. Why should the rate of interest that achieves full employment and target inflation — the “neutral”, or “natural” rate — be considered artificial? This criticism assumes that, in the absence of central bank policies, the economy would achieve an equilibrium. But an economy with a modern credit and monetary system is not self-stabilising, in this way.

另一種反對(duì)意見(jiàn)認(rèn)為，政策正帶來(lái)“人為”價(jià)格。為什么實(shí)現(xiàn)了完全就業(yè)和目標(biāo)通脹的利率(“中性”或“自然”利率)要被視作人為?這種批評(píng)意見(jiàn)假設(shè)，經(jīng)濟(jì)將在沒(méi)有央行政策的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)均衡。但一個(gè)具備現(xiàn)代信貸和貨幣體系的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，是不會(huì)以這種方式實(shí)現(xiàn)自我穩(wěn)定的。

A further objection is that it is unfair to savers that returns are so low. But the view that creditors should be helped, at the expense of debtors and activity in the economy, is just the perspective of a sectional interest against a far broader one.

另一個(gè)反對(duì)意見(jiàn)是，回報(bào)這么低對(duì)儲(chǔ)戶(hù)是不公平的。但是這樣的觀點(diǎn)(債權(quán)人應(yīng)該得到幫助，為此不惜犧牲債務(wù)人利益和經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng))只是出于局部利益的視角，而不是從整體利益出發(fā)。

A related criticism is that easy money policies have worsened inequality, especially of wealth. But keeping the post-crisis economy in recession in order to reduce wealth inequality would have been insane. In any case, wealth inequality matters less than inequality of incomes, where the effect of raising asset prices is to lower returns for prospective owners, so improving inequality in the longer term. Above all, the worst form of inequality is to leave millions of people stuck unnecessarily in prolonged unemployment.

一個(gè)相關(guān)的批評(píng)是，寬松貨幣政策加劇了不平等，尤其是財(cái)富不平等。但為了降低財(cái)富不平等而讓危機(jī)后的經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)衰退將是不理智的。無(wú)論如何，財(cái)富不平等的重要性不如收入不平等，在后一種情況下，資產(chǎn)價(jià)格上升會(huì)降低潛在擁有者的回報(bào)，從而改善較長(zhǎng)期的不平等。最重要的是，最糟糕的不平等形式是讓數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的人不必要地陷入長(zhǎng)期失業(yè)。

Yet another objection is that these policies will destabilise finance. The answer is to adopt policies that are deliberately targeted against financial instability, such as higher capitalisation of banks or less leverage in the economy.

還有一個(gè)反對(duì)意見(jiàn)是，這些政策將會(huì)破壞金融穩(wěn)定。答案是采取專(zhuān)門(mén)防范金融不穩(wěn)定的政策，比如提高銀行資本金要求，或者降低經(jīng)濟(jì)中的杠桿。

The most heated objections have been to quantitative easing. At the outset, critics complained it would lead to hyperinflation. When this failed to oc­cur, they just condemned it as somehow unnatural. But use of the central banks’ balance sheet is a natural extension of monetary policy, in exceptional circumstances. It signals an intention to pursue easy monetary policy for a long time and to lower interest rates further up the yield curve. This may be unusual, because circumstances are unusual, but it is not in any way unnatural.

最激烈的反對(duì)意見(jiàn)是針對(duì)量化寬松政策的。剛開(kāi)始，批評(píng)人士抱怨說(shuō)，它將會(huì)導(dǎo)致惡性通脹。當(dāng)這種情況沒(méi)有發(fā)生的時(shí)候，他們只是譴責(zé)說(shuō)，這有些不自然。但在特殊情況下，使用央行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表是貨幣政策的自然延伸。它說(shuō)明了央行有意長(zhǎng)期推行寬松貨幣政策，壓低收益率曲線(xiàn)更上方的利率。這可能不尋常，因?yàn)榍闆r就是不尋常的，但它絕不是不自然的。

Such complaints against the successful actions of central banks are not harmless. They are intended to force premature tightening now and, more important, to clip the wings of central banks in future. But, given the instability of finance, today’s low neutral interest rates and the unwillingness of governments to use fiscal policy, the willingness of central banks to adopt unconventional policies may be all we have to manage the next big downturn.

對(duì)央行成功舉措的這類(lèi)抱怨并非是無(wú)害的。它們的目的是迫使央行過(guò)早收緊政策，而且更重要的是制約央行未來(lái)的行動(dòng)自由。但是，鑒于金融不穩(wěn)定、當(dāng)今中性利率偏低以及政府不愿意使用財(cái)政政策，央行推行非常規(guī)政策的意愿，也許是我們應(yīng)對(duì)下一場(chǎng)重大低迷的唯一指望。

Preventing them from acting, perhaps by limiting their independence, would be a grave, possibly a disastrous, blunder.

阻止他們采取行動(dòng)——或許是通過(guò)限制他們的獨(dú)立性——將是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的、甚至災(zāi)難性的愚蠢失誤。