FT社評：特朗普零和觀念危及亞洲貿(mào)易

Realistically, as far as trade is concerned, the most that Asian governments can hope for from Donald Trump’s visit to the region is that he does not do any significant damage. So far, his interventions have been ignorant but not substantively harmful. But a president in possession of serious misconceptions always retains the potential to cause havoc.

現(xiàn)實(shí)地說，就貿(mào)易而言，亞洲各國對唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)訪問該地區(qū)所能期望的最好結(jié)果，就是他不帶來任何重大破壞。迄今，他的干預(yù)盡管無知，但沒有造成實(shí)質(zhì)性傷害。但是，一位抱有嚴(yán)重誤解的美國總統(tǒng)，始終有可能造成嚴(yán)重破壞。

Well before his election, Mr Trump had several Asian countries in his sights. Their crime was running bilateral trade surpluses with the US. He unleashed his full rhetorical arsenal of threats against China and Japan for alleged curre ncy manipulation (a charge which was at best several years out of date) and recast trade relations between the countries.

早在他當(dāng)選之前，特朗普就把幾個亞洲國家列為懲罰目標(biāo)。這些國家的罪行是對美國保持著雙邊貿(mào)易順差。他對中國和日本拋出全套威脅言論，稱這兩個國家操縱匯率(往最好的方向說，這個指控也過時了好幾年)，還改變了對國與國之間貿(mào)易關(guān)系的定性。

Any serious analysis of current account balances finds that formal trade deals have a minimal impact. And to some extent, Mr Trump’s own actions have worsened the overall US deficit by encouraging a rush of imports before potential restrictions are imposed.

對經(jīng)常賬戶平衡的任何認(rèn)真分析都會發(fā)現(xiàn)，正式貿(mào)易協(xié)定的影響很小。而且在某種程度上，特朗普自己的行動加劇了美國的整體逆差，因?yàn)檫@些行動鼓勵企業(yè)搶在潛在限制措施出臺之前完成進(jìn)口。

If Mr Trump is wrong-headed on his theoretical analysis of trade deficits, however, he is breathtakingly ignorant of reality. On Monday, in Japan, he asked why Japanese automakers could not manufacture more of their cars in the US rather than shipping them over. In fact, more than three-quarters of cars from Japanese companies sold in the US are manufactured in North America. Japanese-built auto plants have helped rejuvenate the US motor industry, bringing employment to several poorer states.

如果說特朗普對貿(mào)易逆差的理論分析是執(zhí)迷不悟的，那么他對現(xiàn)實(shí)的無知簡直令人錯愕。周一在日本時，他問日本汽車制造商為什么不能在美國生產(chǎn)更多汽車，而是要把造好的汽車運(yùn)到美國。事實(shí)上，日本企業(yè)在美國銷售的汽車中，四分之三以上是在北美制造的。日資建造的汽車廠幫助重振了美國汽車業(yè)，為幾個較窮的州帶來就業(yè)機(jī)會。

On a slightly more optimistic note, Mr Trump did, on this occasion at least, refrain from making any specific new threats of retaliation, and spoke of the need for co-operation between Japan and the US. But there can be little doubt that his zero-sum attitude to trade in the region could be seriously damaging to business confidence and trade there.

略微讓人樂觀的一點(diǎn)是，特朗普至少在這個場合沒有發(fā)出任何新的具體報復(fù)威脅，他還談到了日美合作的必要性。但毫無疑問，他對亞洲貿(mào)易采取的零和態(tài)度，可能嚴(yán)重?fù)p害該地區(qū)的商業(yè)信心和貿(mào)易。

Mr Trump’s most obvious withdrawal from economic co-operation in Asia was his abrupt abrogation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 12-nation comprehensive deal that was supposed to export the US economic model to the region.

特朗普退出亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)合作的最明顯舉動，是他突然廢除《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP);由12個國家達(dá)成的這項全面協(xié)定，本應(yīng)把美國經(jīng)濟(jì)模式輸出至亞太地區(qū)。

The conventional wisdom is that the vacuum left by the US giving up that role of trade leadership in east Asia will be filled by others. The EU is in the last stages of agreeing a trade deal with Japan, and even more of a (alleged) threat is China, which is pushing a trade deal involving 16 countries, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

普遍的看法是，美國放棄東亞貿(mào)易領(lǐng)導(dǎo)角色所留下的真空，將被其他國家填補(bǔ)。歐盟正處于同日本達(dá)成貿(mào)易協(xié)定的最后階段，甚至更大的(據(jù)稱)威脅是中國，中國正在推動一項涉及16個國家的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，即《區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(RCEP)。

These fears are somewhat overstated. RCEP is a rather narrow deal that is concerned largely with goods tariffs. The EU deal with Japan is a solid achievement, but there is little evidence it has the clout to corral a large posse of Asian countries together for a regional trade agreement.

這些擔(dān)憂有些夸大了。RCEP是一個相當(dāng)狹窄的協(xié)定，主要與貨物關(guān)稅有關(guān)。歐盟與日本正在談判的貿(mào)易協(xié)定是一項堅實(shí)的成就，但是沒有什么證據(jù)顯示，它會有足夠的影響力促使一大批亞洲國家凝聚共識，達(dá)成一項區(qū)域貿(mào)易協(xié)定。

More worrying is that the perpetual uncertainty induced by US caprice over trade may retard the growth of cross-border supply chains in the region aimed at the US market. Moreover, while goods trade until now has largely proceeded unimpeded by trade restrictions, the architecture of international commerce is failing comprehensively to address 21st-century issues such as cross-border data flow.

更令人擔(dān)憂的是，美國在貿(mào)易問題上任性所引發(fā)的永久不確定性，可能阻礙亞太地區(qū)針對美國市場的跨境供應(yīng)鏈的成長。此外，盡管貨物貿(mào)易迄今基本上順利進(jìn)行，沒有受到貿(mào)易限制的阻礙，但國際經(jīng)貿(mào)架構(gòu)未能全面解決21世紀(jì)的問題，比如跨境數(shù)據(jù)流。

The American president’s attitude to trade in Asia is not, as of yet, a catastrophe. So far his actions have been restricted to blocking new agreements rather than tearing up existing ones. But as long as he holds misguided mercantilist ideas with such fervour, there remains the possibility that the US will cause havoc in a region in which it should be fighting to maintain its relevance.

特朗普對亞洲貿(mào)易的態(tài)度尚未釀成一場災(zāi)難。到目前為止，他的行動僅限于阻止新協(xié)議，而不是撕毀現(xiàn)有協(xié)議。但是，只要他繼續(xù)如此癡迷于錯誤的重商主義觀念，美國就有可能搞亂這個地區(qū)，而其本來應(yīng)該力爭維護(hù)自己在該地區(qū)的重要性。