漢班托塔港交易令斯里蘭卡人擔(dān)心主權(quán)受損

The only vessels at Sri Lanka’s $1.3bn Hambantota port, opened with fanfare seven years ago, are a handful of idle tugs and a small, half-sunken wreck. At a $209m international airport 20km to the north, two women attend the information desk 10 hours after the day’s second and final flight. Nearby lies a 34,000-seat cricket stadium that has hosted one professional encounter in the past two years.

7年前，斯里蘭卡造價(jià)13億美元的漢班托塔港在一片禮樂(lè)聲中揭幕，如今在這里，僅有的船只是少數(shù)幾艘閑置的拖船和一艘半沉的小船。在北邊距此20公里的一個(gè)造價(jià)2.09億美元的國(guó)際機(jī)場(chǎng)，兩名女子在當(dāng)天第二個(gè)、也是最后一個(gè)航班抵達(dá)10小時(shí)后才來(lái)照看問(wèn)詢(xún)臺(tái)。附近坐落著一座擁有3.4萬(wàn)個(gè)座位的板球體育場(chǎng)，過(guò)去兩年這里只主辦過(guò)一次職業(yè)賽事。

The grand assets are all named after Mahinda Rajapaksa, the former president who, before his shock 2015 election defeat, borrowed huge sums from Chinese state entities to drive development in his lightly populated southern home district.

這些龐大資產(chǎn)都以斯里蘭卡前總統(tǒng)馬欣達(dá)•拉賈帕克薩(Mahinda Rajapaksa)的名字命名，在2015年意外敗選之前，他從中國(guó)國(guó)有實(shí)體那里借入巨額資金，推動(dòng)他人口稀少的南部家鄉(xiāng)的發(fā)展。

But with the flagship port mired in heavy losses, the new government in July ceded a controlling interest to Beijing-controlled China Merchants Port in exchange for a $1.1bn debt write-off. The deal has been denounced by government critics as an erosion of sovereignty — and spurred regional powerhouse India into investments of its own, amid concerns in New Delhi about China’s growing regional clout.

但在這個(gè)旗艦港口蒙受巨額虧損之際，斯里蘭卡新政府7月將港口控股權(quán)讓與中國(guó)政府控股的中國(guó)招商局港口控股有限公司(China Merchants Port，簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)：招商局港口)，換得11億美元債務(wù)減記。政府批評(píng)人士譴責(zé)這筆交易侵蝕國(guó)家主權(quán)，并刺激地區(qū)強(qiáng)國(guó)印度投資自己在斯里蘭卡的港口——印度對(duì)中國(guó)日益增長(zhǎng)的地區(qū)影響力感到擔(dān)憂(yōu)。

“Government is playing geopolitics with national assets? #stopsellingSL,” tweeted Namal Rajapaksa, Hambantota’s MP and son of the former president.

漢班托塔議員、前總統(tǒng)拉賈帕克薩的兒子納馬爾•拉賈帕克薩(Namal Rajapaksa)在Twitter上發(fā)帖稱(chēng)：“政府正用國(guó)有資產(chǎn)玩地緣政治?#別再變賣(mài)斯里蘭卡”

The Rajapaksa government courted China as ties frayed with the west over alleged war crimes during the closing months of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. Beijing has used the opportunity to further its Belt and Road initiative, through which it is investing hundreds of billions of dollars in trade-related infrastructure in Asia and Africa, with port development at the heart of the strategy.

拉賈帕克薩政府過(guò)去向中國(guó)示好是因?yàn)?，斯里蘭卡因2009年內(nèi)戰(zhàn)最后幾個(gè)月涉嫌犯下的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)罪行與西方交惡。中國(guó)政府利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)一步推動(dòng)其“一帶一路”計(jì)劃，通過(guò)該計(jì)劃，中國(guó)正在亞洲和非洲與貿(mào)易相關(guān)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施領(lǐng)域投資數(shù)千億美元，其戰(zhàn)略核心是港口開(kāi)發(fā)。

After its 2015 election, President Maithripala Sirisena’s government showed signs of coolness towards Beijing, having campaigned on a promise to scrutinise recent foreign investments. But it found no good alternative to the port’s Chinese takeover, says Harsha de Silva, deputy minister for national policies.

在2015年當(dāng)選后，斯里蘭卡現(xiàn)任總統(tǒng)邁特里帕拉•西里塞納(Maithripala Sirisena)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的政府顯示出對(duì)中國(guó)冷淡的跡象，高調(diào)承諾審查近期的外國(guó)投資。但斯里蘭卡國(guó)家政策副部長(zhǎng)哈沙•德席爾瓦(Harsha de Silva)表示，除了這個(gè)港口被中國(guó)收購(gòu)，政府沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)其他的好選擇。

“We inherited this thing,” he says. “One and a half billion dollars and nothing to show. Loans were coming due, we had to make payment and we hadn’t the capacity to bring large-scale business to Hambantota.”

“我們接過(guò)了這個(gè)攤子，”他表示，“15億美元花了出去，但什么都看不到。貸款即將到期，我們必須還款，而我們沒(méi)有能力把大規(guī)模業(yè)務(wù)帶到漢班托塔。”

The only large vessels that stop here are carrying cars, which are forced to do so by state directive. But the port’s proponents argue that under the management of CMP, one of the world’s largest operators, expertise and industry connections could turn it into a serious operation.

停留在漢班托塔港的唯一大型船只是運(yùn)車(chē)船，這是政府法令要求的。但這個(gè)港口的支持者辯稱(chēng)，在全球最大運(yùn)營(yíng)商之一招商局港口的管理下，專(zhuān)業(yè)技能和行業(yè)關(guān)系網(wǎng)能夠帶來(lái)可觀的業(yè)務(wù)。

“This is a blue-chip listed company we are working with,” says P Dissanayake, chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, noting that big global funds have invested in CMP through its Hong Kong listing. “Do you think its shareholders will allow it to invest more than $1bn in a white elephant?”

斯里蘭卡港務(wù)局(Sri Lanka Ports Authority)主席P•迪薩納亞克(P Dissanayake)表示：“我們正與一家藍(lán)籌股上市公司合作。”他指出，招商局港口通過(guò)在香港上市，得到了大規(guī)模的全球投資。“你認(rèn)為它的股東會(huì)同意它斥資逾10億美元投資一個(gè)毫無(wú)價(jià)值的東西嗎?”

Crucial to the port’s growth, he says, will be Chinese investment in an adjacent 15,000-acre special economic zone that opened in January. Sri Lankan officials hope Chinese manufacturers will view the zone as an opportunity to gain tariff-free access to India’s market, using Colombo’s trade agreement with New Delhi.

他表示，這個(gè)港口發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵將是中國(guó)對(duì)毗鄰的今年1月設(shè)立的1.5萬(wàn)英畝特別經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的投資。斯里蘭卡官員希望，中國(guó)制造商會(huì)把該特區(qū)視為一個(gè)利用斯-印貿(mào)易協(xié)議得以免關(guān)稅進(jìn)入印度市場(chǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)。

If Chinese shipping companies embrace the new port, it could bolster Sri Lanka’s status as a South Asian hub for seaborne cargo, says Murtaza Jafferjee at JB Securities in Colombo. CMP already operates a vast container terminal at the country’s biggest port in Colombo, which is being expanded in a $1.4bn Chinese-funded project — Sri Lanka’s biggest foreign direct investment to date.

科倫坡JB證券(JB Securities)的穆?tīng)査?bull;加法爾吉(Murtaza Jafferjee)說(shuō)，如果中國(guó)的船運(yùn)公司擁抱這個(gè)新港口，斯里蘭卡作為南亞海運(yùn)樞紐之一的地位將得到提升。在位于科倫坡的斯里蘭卡最大港口，招商局港口已經(jīng)運(yùn)營(yíng)著一個(gè)大型集裝箱碼頭，該港口正在進(jìn)行中國(guó)出資的14億美元擴(kuò)建項(xiàng)目，這是迄今為止該國(guó)最大一筆外商直接投資(FDI)。

Yet the increasing Chinese presence has threatened to complicate Sri Lanka’s relationship with neighbouring India, which has grown to rely heavily on Sri Lanka’s port infrastructure. The technical limitations of India’s own ports, coupled with their distance from main international sea lanes, mean most of India’s container shipments have to be “trans-shipped” through foreign ports visited by large vessels — with Colombo accounting for roughly half of this.

然而，中國(guó)越來(lái)越強(qiáng)的存在感已令斯里蘭卡與鄰國(guó)印度之間的關(guān)系變得復(fù)雜，印度對(duì)斯里蘭卡的港口基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施已非常依賴(lài)。印度港口的技術(shù)局限性，加上印度與主要國(guó)際海運(yùn)航線(xiàn)的距離，意味著印度的大多數(shù)集裝箱運(yùn)輸必須通過(guò)大型船只來(lái)往的國(guó)外港口“轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)”——這其中大約一半的轉(zhuǎn)運(yùn)是在科倫坡港完成的。

With strategic tension rising between India and China — as evidenced by a recent stand-off between their forces on a remote Himalayan plateau — the growing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka appears to have prompted action from New Delhi. An Indian state company has offered to take a controlling stake in the airport near Hambantota on a 40-year-lease, proposing to invest $205m despite heavy continuing losses. “It’s a political decision with no commercial logic,” Mr Jafferjee says.

隨著印度與中國(guó)間戰(zhàn)略關(guān)系愈發(fā)緊張——最近兩國(guó)軍隊(duì)在偏遠(yuǎn)的喜馬拉雅高原上的一次對(duì)峙說(shuō)明了這一點(diǎn)——中國(guó)在斯里蘭卡越來(lái)越強(qiáng)的存在感似乎刺激了新德里方面的行動(dòng)。印度一家國(guó)營(yíng)公司已提出通過(guò)為期40年的租約獲得漢班托塔附近機(jī)場(chǎng)的控股權(quán)，即使一直虧損嚴(yán)重，這家公司仍表示要投資2.05億美元。“這是一個(gè)毫無(wú)商業(yè)邏輯可言的政治決定，”加法爾吉說(shuō)。

New Delhi is also pursuing the development of a natural gas project at the east coast town of Trincomalee, sparking speculation that this could prove a precursor to Indian port development in the area to counterbalance China’s investments in the south and west.

在斯里蘭卡東部沿海城鎮(zhèn)亭可馬里(Trincomalee)，印度還在開(kāi)發(fā)一個(gè)天然氣項(xiàng)目，人們紛紛猜測(cè)，這可能是印度在該區(qū)域開(kāi)發(fā)港口以制衡中國(guó)在斯南部和西部投資的一個(gè)前兆。

Colombo has sought to assuage Indian fears about China’s grip on its coastline, stressing that a Sri Lankan state-controlled company will oversee ships’ access to Hambantota, while the Chinese navy will be barred from the port. But the details of the agreement remain secret and some analysts question how watertight the latter provision may prove.

科倫坡方面已試圖緩解印度對(duì)中國(guó)控制斯里蘭卡海岸線(xiàn)的恐慌，強(qiáng)調(diào)斯里蘭卡的一家國(guó)家控股企業(yè)將監(jiān)督進(jìn)入漢班托塔港的船只，而中國(guó)海軍將被禁止入港。但該協(xié)議的細(xì)節(jié)仍未公開(kāi)，一些分析師對(duì)后一項(xiàng)條款的嚴(yán)密性表示懷疑。

In the Hambantota area itself, villagers have staged protests against the Chinese-led economic zone, fearing forced acquisition of their land as the project grows. Even the local business community is sceptical, anticipating a Chinese enclave minimally integrated with the local economy, says Hemantha Padmalal, president of the Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce.

在漢班托塔本地，村民們舉行了針對(duì)中國(guó)主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的抗議活動(dòng)，擔(dān)心隨著項(xiàng)目的發(fā)展，他們的土地會(huì)被強(qiáng)征。漢班托塔地區(qū)商會(huì)主席赫曼塔•帕德馬拉(Hemantha Padmalal)說(shuō)，甚至當(dāng)?shù)氐钠髽I(yè)界也心存質(zhì)疑，他們預(yù)計(jì)這塊中國(guó)的“飛地”與當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)的融合極為有限。

But others view the development as encouraging proof of this small country’s ability to attract the attention of much larger powers as Asia’s economic and strategic contours evolve.

但其他人則認(rèn)為這樣的發(fā)展令人鼓舞，證明隨著亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)和戰(zhàn)略輪廓的不斷演進(jìn)，這個(gè)小國(guó)已經(jīng)有能力吸引一些強(qiáng)大國(guó)家的關(guān)注。

Even as rights groups continue to attack the government for failing to prosecute alleged war criminals, Colombo has normalised its relations with the west. It has been promised a big aid injection from Washington and is on the verge of regaining a preferential trade relationship with the EU. Japan and South Korea, meanwhile, are funding infrastructure development in the mountainous central province.

盡管權(quán)益組織不斷抨擊政府未能起訴被指的戰(zhàn)犯，科倫坡方面與西方的關(guān)系已實(shí)現(xiàn)正?；?。美國(guó)已承諾對(duì)其提供一筆大規(guī)模援助，歐盟也即將恢復(fù)與其之間的優(yōu)惠貿(mào)易關(guān)系。與此同時(shí)，日本和韓國(guó)也在資助其中部山區(qū)省份的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)。

“There is a phrase, ‘strategic promiscuity’, which is what we should indulge in,” says Indrajit Coomaraswamy, governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. “The trick is to get everybody to come.”

“有個(gè)詞叫做‘戰(zhàn)略亂交’(strategic promiscuity)，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)好好用用，”斯里蘭卡央行(Central Bank of Sri Lanka)行長(zhǎng)英德拉吉特•庫(kù)馬拉斯瓦米(Indrajit Coomaraswamy)說(shuō)，“訣竅就是讓大家都來(lái)。”