FT社評：英國亟需升級外資規(guī)則

Britain’s greatest economic strength is the ingenuity of its people. With world-class universities, a distinguished history of technological innovation and a global reputation for inventive design, Britain is justifiably proud of its creative firepower. Trinity College, Cambridge has produced nine-times as many Nobel-winning scientists as China.

英國最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)優(yōu)勢是英國人民的聰明才智。擁有世界一流的大學(xué)、輝煌的科技創(chuàng)新史以及享譽(yù)全球的創(chuàng)新設(shè)計(jì)，英國完全有理由為自身的創(chuàng)造性火力感到自豪。劍橋三一學(xué)院(Trinity College, Cambridge)培養(yǎng)的獲得諾貝爾獎的科學(xué)家是中國培養(yǎng)的9倍。

But Britain’s intellectual vibrancy has been matched by its appalling record of commercialising inventions. Various government reports have examined why the country has been so bad at building global businesses off the back of its technological breakthroughs. Traditional culprits range from managerial incompetence to an overly short-term perspective to a lack of scale-up finance.

但與英國人智力上的活躍極不相配的，是將發(fā)明商業(yè)化的極差記錄。各種各樣的政府報(bào)告研究了為什么英國在利用本國技術(shù)突破打造全球企業(yè)方面表現(xiàn)得如此糟糕。傳統(tǒng)的解釋很多——從管理無能、過于短視到缺乏規(guī)模融資。

Another factor, though, has played a part: many of Britain’s promising technology companies have gone into the maw of foreign buyers. Imagination Technologies, laid low by the cancellation of its contract with Apple, is just the latest, after agreeing a deal with the Chinese-backed Canyon Bridge.

不過，還有一個(gè)因素也起到了一定作用：英國許多有前途的科技公司已被外國買家收入囊中。因蘋果公司(Apple)取消合同而遭受打擊的Imagination Technologies正是最新一例，該公司已與中資背景的Canyon Bridge達(dá)成收購協(xié)議。

At a time when the government is trying to chart a new industrial course for a post-Brexit world, it is worth reconsidering the structures of the country’s investment regime. The first principle to reaffirm is that Britain remains open for business and warmly welcomes foreign investment, including takeovers. Foreign investors have injected much-needed managerial expertise and long-term finance into the country’s economy. To take just one example, the British car industry, for so long the joke of the industrialised world, has been revived over the past two decades, largely thanks to Japanese, German, and Indian investment.

在政府設(shè)法為后退歐時(shí)代繪制新的產(chǎn)業(yè)路線之際，有必要反思本國投資機(jī)制的結(jié)構(gòu)。第一項(xiàng)要重申的原則是，英國仍保持對商業(yè)開放，并熱情歡迎包括收購在內(nèi)的外國投資。外國投資者為英國經(jīng)濟(jì)注入了其迫切需要的管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)和長期融資。僅舉一例：長期以來一直為工業(yè)化國家笑柄的英國汽車業(yè)，過去20年重現(xiàn)生機(jī)，這很大程度上歸功于來自日本、德國和印度的投資。

But there is a case for additional scrutiny in two particular areas. The first focuses on the high-tech sector. There is a difference between the world of atoms and the world of bits. There will always be a case for manufacturers to build plants close to consumers and put down roots in the local economy. Intellectual property, on the other hand, can disappear in the click of a mouse.

但在兩個(gè)特定領(lǐng)域，有理由進(jìn)行額外的審查。第一個(gè)是高科技行業(yè)。原子世界與比特世界不一樣。制造商在離消費(fèi)者近的地方建設(shè)工廠、扎根于當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)總是合理的。而另一方面，點(diǎn)一次鼠標(biāo)就可以讓知識產(chǎn)權(quán)不復(fù)存在。

To many, it has been dismaying to see all of the “Cambridge Cluster” of tech companies being snapped up by foreign buyers. The government has been right to highlight robotics and artificial intelligence as strategic economic priorities. It would be a shame if Britain became no more than a nursery for foreign acquirers in these fields. Requiring assurances from acquirers of British companies that the work of generating intellectual property will remain in Britain amounts to protecting a national asset.

看到“劍橋產(chǎn)業(yè)集群”(Cambridge Cluster)所有科技公司都被外國買家吞噬一空，令很多人感到沮喪。英國政府強(qiáng)調(diào)把機(jī)器人和人工智能作為戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)優(yōu)先沒有錯。如果英國僅僅變成外國收購者在這些領(lǐng)域的“苗圃”，那將是一種恥辱。要求收購者保證將打造知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的工作留在英國就相當(dāng)于保護(hù)一項(xiàng)國家資產(chǎn)。

The second area of scrutiny concerns purchases by companies that are effectively state controlled or funded. It would be naive to regard Chinese companies, in particular, as private enterprises in the western sense. China is mercantilist power which uses its corporations for national strategic ends. Often — as in the case of Huawei and HNA, both energetic acquirers — the ownership and funding structures of many Chinese companies are opaque.

第二個(gè)應(yīng)審查的領(lǐng)域涉及那些實(shí)際上由國家控制或出資的公司進(jìn)行的收購。尤其是，將中國企業(yè)視為西方意義上的私營企業(yè)是幼稚的。作為一個(gè)重商主義大國，中國一直在利用本國企業(yè)為國家的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)服務(wù)。通常情況下——正如收購意愿強(qiáng)烈的華為(Huawei)和海航(HNA)顯示出的——許多中國企業(yè)的所有權(quán)和融資結(jié)構(gòu)都不透明。

One solution would be for the UK to create an inter-agency investment body, similar to the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States, to review foreign investments on the grounds of national security and economic strategy. Cfius has provided a useful additional layer of scrutiny, even if it has rarely blocked takeovers in practice.

一個(gè)解決方案是，英國可以創(chuàng)建一個(gè)類似美國外國投資委員會(CFIUS)的跨部門投資機(jī)構(gòu)，根據(jù)國家安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略審查外國投資。CFIUS提供了額外一層有用的審查，即便該機(jī)構(gòu)很少在實(shí)踐中阻止收購。

Any investment review process can be perverted into a tool for protectionist politicians. A British Cfius would require a tight mandate and close supervision. Even if the Cfius model doesn’t fit Britain, the country needs a more coherent approach to takeovers.

任何投資審查過程都可能被扭曲為信奉保護(hù)主義的政客的工具。英國的外國投資委員會將需要嚴(yán)格的授權(quán)和密切的監(jiān)督。即使CFIUS模式不適合英國，英國也需要在應(yīng)對外資收購方面拿出更協(xié)調(diào)一致的策略。