外交手段可以控制核威脅
核武器問題重新提上了日程。自1960年代以來，如今動用它們的可能性比任何時候都要大。當(dāng)我們竭力應(yīng)對美國的全球大撤退、英國退歐、以及伊斯蘭恐怖主義時，絕不能忽視一個可能會顛覆國際秩序并破壞我們的生活方式的問題。
There are now nine states with nuclear weapons. For six of them — the US, Britain, France, Israel, India and China — they are purely defensive weapons, designed solely as the ultimate means to deter attack. The remaining three think differently. Russia and Pakistan also conceive of using nuclear weapons as a means of turning a limited conflict in their favour. North Korea wants nuclear weapons to hold others at threat, both to protect the regime and to secure more practical benefits.
當(dāng)今擁有核武器的國家有9個。對于其中6個國家——美國、英國、法國、以色列、印度和中國——核武器純粹是防御性的，僅為以威懾阻止他方攻擊的最終手段。其余3個國家的想法則不同。俄羅斯和巴基斯坦還想利用核武器使有限的沖突對他們有利。朝鮮想利用核武器威脅其他國家，既為保衛(wèi)政權(quán)，也為獲得更多實際好處。(注：題圖為美國示威者抗議特朗普對朝軍事威脅。)
Nuclear weapons create a military balance where one does not exist between conventional forces. During the cold war, the Soviets had superior armed forces and Nato had to rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to keep the peace. The balance is now reversed. However skilful Russia’s use of the new weapons of hybrid warfare, the balance between regular forces is now reversed. Russia’s military doctrine also provides for battlefield nuclear weapons being used to bring a war in central Europe to an end on Russia’s terms. Its forces train for that scenario, and we have to take it seriously.
核武器能創(chuàng)造出一種軍事均勢的局面，這種平衡在常規(guī)軍事力量之間是不存在的。冷戰(zhàn)期間，蘇聯(lián)擁有優(yōu)越的武裝力量，而北約(NATO)不得不依靠核報復(fù)的威脅來維持和平。這種平衡如今顛倒了。不論俄羅斯多么巧妙地運用了混合戰(zhàn)爭的新式武器，常規(guī)軍事力量之間的平衡如今都被顛覆了。俄羅斯的軍事信條還支持俄羅斯使用戰(zhàn)場核武器讓一場中歐戰(zhàn)爭以俄羅斯的條件終結(jié)。其軍隊為應(yīng)對這一情景進(jìn)行訓(xùn)練，我們不得不認(rèn)真對待。
Pakistan has developed battlefield nuclear weapons as a means to defend itself. India has declared that it would respond militarily if there was another major terror attack out of Pakistan like the one in Mumbai in 2008. Knowing they would be overwhelmed by Indian forces, these weapons are Pakistan’s way to halt Indian forces shortly after they cross the border. When I was chief of MI6, I was concerned that the Indians did not understand how quickly they could cross a Pakistani nuclear tripwire. A wider nuclear exchange then becomes a real risk.
巴基斯坦已研發(fā)出戰(zhàn)場核武器作為自衛(wèi)的手段。印度宣布，如果再次發(fā)生如2008年孟買那樣的來自巴基斯坦的重大恐怖襲擊，印度將作出軍事回應(yīng)。巴基斯坦明白他們會被印度的軍事力量壓倒，因此這些核武器是在印度軍隊越過邊界后，巴基斯坦迅速阻擋他們的手段。當(dāng)我還是英國軍情六處(MI6)負(fù)責(zé)人時，我曾擔(dān)心印度人不了解他們能多快穿越巴基斯坦的核武器防線。于是一場更大范圍的核交火變成了真正的風(fēng)險。
North Korea is the issue of the day. The objective of a denuclearised Korean peninsula, pursued by the previous US administrations, is no longer an achievable goal. The best that can be hoped for is the suspension of nuclear and missile testing in return for security assurances and practical aid. Sanctions are designed to draw Kim Jong Un into a negotiation with that aim, and to pressure China to take a more active part.
朝鮮是當(dāng)今的首要問題。美國前幾屆政府追求的朝鮮半島無核化不再是可實現(xiàn)的目標(biāo)?，F(xiàn)在能夠指望的最好結(jié)果是朝鮮暫停核武和導(dǎo)彈試驗以換取安全保證和物質(zhì)援助。制裁的目的是讓金正恩(Kim Jong Un)就該目標(biāo)談判，并敦促中國發(fā)揮更為積極的作用。
But it is very hard to see President Kim pulling back now. And China is more concerned about a new US-led war in Korea or the north collapsing and sending millions of refugees into China, than it is about living with a nuclear armed Pyongyang.
但現(xiàn)在很難看到金正恩退縮。相比與擁有核武器的朝鮮比鄰而居，中國更擔(dān)心朝鮮半島爆發(fā)新的由美國主導(dǎo)的戰(zhàn)爭，或者朝鮮政權(quán)崩潰，從而導(dǎo)致數(shù)百萬難民進(jìn)入中國。
The US only really has two strategic options: contain and deter the threat; or destroy it, which would require regime change. There are always military options. But all who have studied the secret Pentagon plans are sobered by the scale of loss of life in South Korea these would entail. There is also a risk of China reluctantly coming to the aid of the north as it did in the 1950s.
美國真的只有兩個戰(zhàn)略選項：遏制并用威懾嚇阻朝鮮的核武威脅;或者摧毀這種威脅，這就必須出現(xiàn)朝鮮的政權(quán)更迭。軍事選項總是存在的。但五角大樓的秘密計劃將會導(dǎo)致韓國出現(xiàn)巨大傷亡，所有研究過這些計劃的人都會因此變得冷靜下來。此外還存在中國在不情愿的情況下像上世紀(jì)50年代那樣援助朝鮮的風(fēng)險。
Realistically, it seems the only practical option is containment. That requires missile defence systems to create uncertainty that nuclear-tipped missiles would ever get through to their target, and to deter any use of such weapons by being clear that North Korea would be destroyed if it ever tried to use them. Mr Kim may be hard for us to comprehend, but he is a rational actor and he is certainly not suicidal.
現(xiàn)實而言，唯一務(wù)實的選擇似乎只有遏制了。這要求部署導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)，從而使得帶有核彈頭的導(dǎo)彈不一定能夠擊中目標(biāo)，以及通過明確表示如果朝鮮試圖使用核武器就會被摧毀，從而威懾朝鮮不敢使用此類武器。我們可能很難理解金正恩，但他是理性的，當(dāng)然不會自取滅亡。
US concern about this isn’t exaggerated by the Trump administration: it has a serious problem on its hands. However much we may view containment as the only sensible answer, there are still dangers of miscalculation. Mr Kim may be tempted to use his nuclear arsenal to hold others to ransom.
特朗普政府沒有夸大美國對朝鮮問題的擔(dān)憂：這是它手頭上的嚴(yán)肅問題。無論我們多么將遏制視為唯一明智的解決辦法，仍然存在誤判的風(fēng)險。金正恩可能忍不住使用其核武器來勒索其他國家。
There is also a proliferation threat. We have seen how Pyongyang has used its nuclear technology as an export earner. In 2007, the Israelis destroyed a secret nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert that had been designed and built by the North Koreans.
還存在核擴散的風(fēng)險。我們已經(jīng)看到朝鮮是如何使用其核技術(shù)來出口創(chuàng)匯的。2007年，以色列人摧毀了敘利亞沙漠里的一個秘密核反應(yīng)堆，這正是由朝鮮人設(shè)計和建造的。
Is it conceivable that a future terrorist organisation might be able to obtain such a device? Unlikely. But if they had the means, then Pyongyang would be the first place to go to get it. Pakistan’s ambivalent relationship with terrorist organisations adds to the dangers.
可以想象未來的恐怖主義組織能夠獲得此類設(shè)備嗎?不太可能。但一旦他們有辦法，那么平壤將是他們獲得這種設(shè)備的首選地。巴基斯坦與恐怖主義組織的曖昧關(guān)系更是讓這種風(fēng)險上升。
One country where our nuclear weapons concerns had eased is Iran. The nuclear agreement has its weaknesses, especially that it only applies for 10 years. But it is worth having, and Tehran is complying by its technical requirements. If Donald Trump walks from the nuclear deal — as he threatened at the UN last week — then before long he could find he has another North Korea to deal with, this one in the Gulf.
我們的核武擔(dān)憂減輕的一個國家是伊朗。伊朗核協(xié)議有缺陷，尤其是它只適用10年時間。但值得簽署此類協(xié)議，而且德黑蘭正在遵守對其的技術(shù)要求。如果唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)撕毀這份核協(xié)議——就像他上周在聯(lián)合國威脅的那樣——那么不久后他就可能發(fā)現(xiàn)又有一個朝鮮要應(yīng)對，這次是在波斯灣。
The outlook on nuclear weapons might look grim. But as we showed in the cold war, these issues are manageable with skilful diplomacy and the right investments in defence. We just have to give it the right degree of priority.
核武器的前景可能看起來很嚴(yán)峻。但正如我們在冷戰(zhàn)期間證明的那樣，這些問題可以通過巧妙的外交手段和適當(dāng)?shù)姆绖?wù)投資來控制。我們只不過要給予它正確的優(yōu)先級別。
When I was at MI6, and before that our negotiator with Iran on its nuclear programme, I was always mindful of the nuclear threat. The only issue that can seriously threaten our way of life must be among our top international security priorities.
當(dāng)我在軍情六處的時候，以及在此之前擔(dān)任談判代表與伊朗就其核計劃展開談判的時候，我總是不忘核威脅。對于唯一真正威脅到我們生活方式的問題，必須給予最高國際安全優(yōu)先級別。
The writer is chairman of Macro Advisory Partners and a former chief of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service
本文作者現(xiàn)任宏觀顧問機構(gòu)(Macro Advisory Partners)主席，曾擔(dān)任英國秘密情報局(British Secret Intelligence Service，亦稱軍情六處)的局長
