德國大選：沉悶好于喧囂，但并不夠
重要的選舉未必?zé)狒[。德國很快就要進(jìn)行大選投票了。除德國外整個世界都忍不住哈欠連連。希望看到政壇喧囂景象的人錯了。歐洲目前的狀況比一段時間以來都要好，但它無法再將繁榮和安全當(dāng)作理所當(dāng)然的事情。沉悶正是這個歐洲最強(qiáng)大的國家所需要的。
For a temporary refugee from Britain’s Brexit convulsions, this week’s televised debate between chancellor Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz, her Social Democratic party challenger, was jarringly tame. The shock would have been greater for those in Washington accustomed to the histrionics fired daily from Donald Trump’s smartphone.
在一個暫時逃離了英國退歐動蕩的人看來，本周德國總理安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)和來自社民黨(SDP)的挑戰(zhàn)者馬丁•舒爾茨(Martin Schulz)之間的電視辯論平和得令人震驚。在華盛頓那些習(xí)慣了唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)每天通過智能手機(jī)表演日常打嘴炮的人看來，這幅景象應(yīng)該更令人震驚。
Where were the personal abuse, the invented facts and casual lies? Had neither candidate seen Mr Trump take on Hillary Clinton or France’s Emmanuel Macron face the xenophobic invective of Marine Le Pen? Had they not heard British politicians lie about the vast riches that would flow from Brexit? Try as they might, Ms Merkel and Mr Schulz could not raise the temperature.What separates them politically is a gully rather than an ideological ravine.
人身攻擊、捏造事實和隨意編造的謊言去哪了?兩位候選人都沒見識過特朗普攻擊希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)或法國馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)對埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)的排外主義謾罵嗎?他們沒聽過英國政客是如何謊稱英國退歐可以帶來巨大財富嗎?不管默克爾和舒爾茨如何努力，他們也無法讓氣氛火熱起來。他們之間的政治分歧不是一條意識形態(tài)鴻溝，而只是一條小溪。
It adds nothing to the excitement quotient that polls predict Ms Merkel will be returned for a fourth term — quite possibly at the head of another coalition with Mr Schulz’s SPD. Germany has not been immune to the populism destabilising political elites across Europe. The nativist Alternative for Germany is doing its best to whip up Islamophobia in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis. But it looks unlikely to garner much more than 10 per cent of the vote.
絲毫無助于增加此次德國大選興奮度的是，民調(diào)預(yù)測默克爾將贏得她的第四任期——非常可能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)與舒爾茨的社民黨的又一次聯(lián)盟。民粹主義在歐洲各地撼動政治精英階層，德國對民粹主義也并非免疫。在2015年移民危機(jī)后，本土主義政黨德國新選擇黨(Alternative for Germany)正竭力煽動伊斯蘭恐懼癥(Islamophobia)。但該政黨的得票似乎不太可能超過10%太多。
The middle-ground consensualism offends many outsiders. Voters, you hear critics say, are being denied a clear “choice”. But was not the postwar constitution, framed by the victors of 1945, designed to promote conciliation? In any event, there is another explanation for the absence of rage. Germany is prosperous and stable in a continent that recently has seemed anything but. The crises of the euro and migration have been contained. Germans, you could say, have already made their choice — they are content with things much as they are.
中間立場的共識主義(consensualism)惹惱了很多局外人。你可以聽到批評人士稱，選民被剝奪了做出明確“選擇”的權(quán)利。但1945年由戰(zhàn)勝國制定的戰(zhàn)后憲法不正是為了促進(jìn)調(diào)和嗎?無論如何，還有一個理由可以解釋德國為何不憤怒。德國繁榮而穩(wěn)定，而它所處的大陸近來與這兩個詞毫不沾邊。歐元危機(jī)和移民危機(jī)已經(jīng)得到了控制。你可以說，德國人已經(jīng)做出了選擇——他們對現(xiàn)狀基本滿意。
Those who like noise for its own sake should look at Britain. There the political alternatives are now represented by a ruling party obsessed with the destructive endeavour of wrenching Britain from its own continent and by a far left opposition leader wrapped in nostalgia for Soviet era socialism. The choice between the Conservative prime minister Theresa May and Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn is not one to be wished on anyone else.
那些單純喜歡熱鬧的人應(yīng)該看看英國。眼下的英國政壇提供給選民兩個選擇，一個是執(zhí)著于退歐這項毀滅性事業(yè)的執(zhí)政黨，另一個是懷念蘇聯(lián)時代社會主義的極左翼反對黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。在保守黨首相特里薩•梅(Theresa May)和工黨領(lǐng)袖杰里米•科爾賓(Jeremy Corbyn)之間二選一，這個選擇不會是任何人想要的。
What marks out Ms Merkel is not just her longevity (she has broken her promise not to make Helmut Kohl’s mistake of running for a fourth term), but her unabashed support for the open, liberal international order. When others went running to Washington to pay homage to Mr Trump after his election victory, Ms Merkel was studiously insistent she would deal with the new president on her own terms. Her Atlanticism is unquestionable, but not unconditional.
令默克爾與眾不同的并不只是她的超長任期(她打破了自己的如下承諾，即不會犯赫爾穆特•科爾(Helmut Kohl)的錯誤、競選第四任期)，而是她不加掩飾地支持開放自由的國際秩序。當(dāng)其他人在特朗普勝選后競相前往華盛頓向他效忠之際，默克爾故意堅持照自己的想法與這位新總統(tǒng)打交道。她堅持大西洋主義，這是毋庸置疑的，但并不是無條件地堅持。
The threats speak for themselves. Vladimir Putin’s Russia wants to remake Europe’s territorial boundaries. Mr Trump is at once an unreliable and combustible ally. Britain has walked off the foreign policy field. French president Emmanuel Macron has yet to prove himself. Italy’s fractured politics are strained by rising migrant flows from North Africa. Poland and Hungary bank hefty cheques from the EU while disowning its liberal values.
威脅不言自明。弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的俄羅斯希望重新劃定歐洲邊界。同時，特朗普是既靠不住又易激動的盟友。英國離開了外交政策舞臺。法國總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍尚未證明自己。意大利支離破碎的政治正承受著北非移民日益增多的壓力。波蘭和匈牙利不斷從歐盟手中接過高額支票，同時拒不接受歐盟的自由主義價值觀。
For the moment a steady Germany is what Europe has left in terms of a nation willing to stand up for the norms and institutions of the postwar order.
此時，穩(wěn)定的德國是歐洲僅存的愿意捍衛(wèi)戰(zhàn)后秩序準(zhǔn)則和制度的國家。
Mr Trump’s belligerent nationalism and Britain’s break with Europe have torn the fabric of the west. The German chancellor is not giving up. Her commitments to freedom, the rule of law and democratic institutions are rooted in 35 years spent in the communist east. As the journalist Stefan Kornelius observes in an excellent biography, Ms Merkel knows that the liberal democracy that has assured Europe of peace and prosperity is not “a law of nature”.
特朗普堅持好斗的民族主義以及英國與歐盟分道揚鑣，這兩件事撕裂了西方。德國總理默克爾并未放棄。她對自由、法治和民主制度的堅守來源于她在共產(chǎn)主義東德生活的35年。正如記者斯特凡•科內(nèi)柳斯(Stefan Kornelius)在一本出色的傳記中所說的那樣，默克爾知道，確保歐洲和平和繁榮的自由民主并不是“自然規(guī)律”。
The chancellor is no saint. There is national self-interest at stake. Germany has been a big winner from the rules-based system and from economic globalisation. Business and exports have thrived as successive governments have sheltered under America’s security umbrella and eschewed international responsibilities beyond Europe. Ms Merkel seems to understand that the days of free-riding are over. She has made rebuilding the Franco-German relationship a priority and has added to the defence budget. And yet there is still a conscious timidity. She talks about such things to voters only in the vaguest terms.
默克爾不是圣人。她考慮的是是德國自己的利益。德國大大受益于基于規(guī)則的體系和經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化。德國歷屆政府都在美國的安全傘下得到庇護(hù)、并逃避了歐洲以外的國際責(zé)任，在這種情況下，德國商業(yè)和出口一直繁榮發(fā)展。默克爾似乎知道搭便車的好日子已經(jīng)結(jié)束了。她把重塑法德關(guān)系作為重中之重，并且增加了國防預(yù)算。但她仍然有意識地羞怯。她只用最含糊的言語向選民談起這些問題。
Circumstance — Mr Putin’s land grab of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, and the flood of refugees from the Syrian civil war — have forced the chancellor to act. But leadership on the global stage is not something sought or welcomed by the electorate. The further you travel from Berlin, the more reluctant voters are to admit that Germany can no longer hide behind its history. Dull is good, especially when it substitutes for mendacity. But it is not enough. What has been missing in the campaign is a serious discussion of the international role Germany can no longer avoid.
普京強(qiáng)占克里米亞并入侵烏克蘭東部、敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)導(dǎo)致大量難民涌入歐洲，這些情況迫使默克爾采取行動。但德國選民并不希望、也不愿意德國在全球舞臺上發(fā)揮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用。距離柏林越遠(yuǎn)的選民，越不愿意承認(rèn)德國再也無法以歷史為借口逃避責(zé)任。沉悶是好的，尤其是跟謊言相比。但僅有沉悶是不夠的。此次競選所缺失的，正是有關(guān)德國無法再逃避其國際角色的認(rèn)真討論。
The writer at present is a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin
本文作者目前是柏林羅伯特•博世基金會(Robert Bosch Academy)理查德•馮•魏茨澤克(Richard von Weizsäcker)研究員
