特朗普的貿(mào)易威脅為何啞火？
華盛頓今夏的一個(gè)話題是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)對自己陷入停滯的貿(mào)易議程日益強(qiáng)烈的挫敗感。而且他有充足的理由感到挫敗。
One of the president’s biggest economic campaign promises was a new, muscular approach to trade featuring hefty tariffs on China and other rivals as well as a wholesale ripping-up of US trade agreements. Things could still change. Yet, nine months in, it is fair to say Mr Trump is looking increasingly like a bully without a playground in which to exercise his muscle.
特朗普在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面最重大的競選承諾之一是要走一條新的、強(qiáng)硬的貿(mào)易路線，特點(diǎn)是要對中國等競爭對手開征高額關(guān)稅，以及大批撕毀美國簽署的貿(mào)易協(xié)定。未來仍可能出現(xiàn)變數(shù)。然而，9個(gè)月過去了，老實(shí)說，特朗普看起來越來越像一個(gè)沒有舞臺展示自己肌肉的惡霸。
He may bark to aides gathered in the Oval Office that he wants tariffs, and threaten on Twitter to pull out of trade agreements. But the ranks of people in his administration eager or willing to carry out those threats are dwindling. Altogether, the threats themselves are looking increasingly hollow. There are three big reasons for that.
他或許會對聚集在橢圓形辦公室的助手們咆哮稱要開征關(guān)稅，在Twitter上威脅退出多個(gè)貿(mào)易協(xié)定。但華府中急于或愿意將這些威脅付諸實(shí)施的官員逐漸減少。總之，這些威脅本身看起來越來越空洞。原因主要有三點(diǎn)：
1. Trump doesn’t control the system 1. 特朗普并不控制整個(gè)體系
The US presidency comes with a lot of power attached. But the reality is also that its influence over trade is limited, both by the US constitution and existing laws. Mr Trump may want to impose tariffs unilaterally, yet he has very little power to do so on a whim. The US constitution gives the power to regulate trade and impose tariffs to Congress. And even those statutes that give the president the most latitude to act require a process and justification at the very least.
美國總統(tǒng)之職被賦予了很多權(quán)力。但現(xiàn)實(shí)的另一面是，總統(tǒng)對貿(mào)易的影響力受到美國憲法和現(xiàn)行法律的制約。特朗普或許希望單方面開征關(guān)稅，但他沒有多大權(quán)力可以隨心所欲地這樣做。美國憲法將監(jiān)管貿(mào)易和開征關(guān)稅的權(quán)力賦予了國會。即使是那些賦予總統(tǒng)最大行動(dòng)自由的法規(guī)，也至少需要一個(gè)過程和正當(dāng)理由。
Just look at what has happened with the president’s stalled plans to impose tariffs on steel imports on the grounds of US national security. Administration officials insist they are still working on a plan. But what is holding up the steel project — which involved using a 1974 trade law that on the face of it gives the president great powers — is in part the laborious study involved and the inter-agency consultations required.
只需看看特朗普陷入停頓的以美國國家安全為由對鋼材進(jìn)口征收關(guān)稅的計(jì)劃遭遇了什么。政府官員堅(jiān)稱，他們?nèi)栽谥贫ㄒ豁?xiàng)計(jì)劃。但阻礙這項(xiàng)鋼材征稅計(jì)劃——涉及引用1974年通過的一部貿(mào)易法，該法案表面上賦予了總統(tǒng)巨大的權(quán)力——的部分是所涉及的耗時(shí)費(fèi)力的研究，部分是所需要的跨部門磋商。
Then there is Congress. The Republicans who control the legislature are by and large more pro-trade than the president. They are also more adept at using their power over the system.
然后還有國會?？刂茋鴷墓埠忘h總體上比特朗普總統(tǒng)更支持貿(mào)易。他們還更善于利用自己的權(quán)力來管控這一體系。
Moreover, the steel exercise illustrates two other parts of the system that Mr Trump doesn’t control: US business and economic reality. After a shy start, everyone bar the steel sector in the US business community has grown increasingly vocal about its distaste for anything that raises the price of steel. They have also been building a compelling case for how it would hurt the US economy.
此外，此次鋼材關(guān)稅事件還暴露出這一體系中特朗普并不控制的另外兩個(gè)部分：美國商業(yè)和經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)實(shí)。在經(jīng)過開始時(shí)羞于啟齒之后，除鋼鐵業(yè)之外，美國商界所有人都越來越大聲地反對任何將推高鋼材價(jià)格的做法。他們也一直在為開征鋼材進(jìn)口關(guān)稅將損害美國經(jīng)濟(jì)尋找一個(gè)令人信服的理由。
2. The US doesn’t wield the power Trump thinks it does on trade
2. 在貿(mào)易方面，美國并不擁有像特朗普認(rèn)為的那么大的權(quán)勢
The best example of this is the (again) stalled debate within the administration over pulling the US out of a South Korea-US trade agreement (Korus) that came into force in 2012. Jonathan Swan of Axios did a nice job at the weekend of detailing the conversation within the administration in recent weeks and how (as was the case with Nafta in April) the president got very close to issuing a formal notice of withdrawal.
這方面最恰當(dāng)?shù)睦邮翘乩势照畠?nèi)部已經(jīng)停止的關(guān)于讓美國退出2012年生效的《韓美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(KORUS FTA)的爭論。Axios的喬納森•斯旺(Jonathan Swan)上周末做得很好，他詳細(xì)披露了最近幾周政府內(nèi)部的有關(guān)對話，以及特朗普多么接近于發(fā)布一份退出協(xié)定的正式通知——正如今年4月退出《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(NAFTA)那樣。
The idea has since stalled, thanks to North Korea’s recent nuclear test and the acceptance (for now) by the president that withdrawing from a trade agreement with South Korea in its wake does not make geopolitical sense.
由于朝鮮近期的核試驗(yàn)，加上特朗普總統(tǒng)(暫時(shí))承認(rèn)此時(shí)退出韓美自貿(mào)協(xié)定從地緣政治上來說不可取，這一想法已經(jīng)被擱置。
But the example also illustrates how the US has been misplaying its cards.
但這個(gè)例子也說明了美國一直在出錯(cuò)牌。
During a special meeting convened during the summer to discuss Mr Trump’s concerns over Korus and the US trade deficit with South Korea, Robert Lighthizer, the US trade representative, issued a list of unilateral concessions that he wanted to see Seoul make. Those, according to people briefed on the discussions, included accelerating the Korus schedule for South Korea’s gradual removal of certain tariffs on US goods and a freeze on the same applying to Korean imports into the US.
在今夏召開的一次討論特朗普對韓美自貿(mào)協(xié)定的擔(dān)憂及美國對韓貿(mào)易逆差的特別會議上，美國貿(mào)易代表羅伯特•萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)拿出了一份他希望看到首爾做出的單方面讓步的清單。據(jù)了解此次討論的人士透露，其中包括讓韓國加快逐步取消對美國商品的某些關(guān)稅，但對韓國出口美國的商品不實(shí)施這樣的政策。
Mr Lighthizer was in effect using the same threat-laced playbook that he employed in the 1980s while negotiating “voluntary export restraints” with Japan as a senior trade official in the Reagan administration. But the answer this time from South Korea’s trade minister, Kim Hyun-chong, was a resounding “no thanks”.
萊特希澤實(shí)際上重施了在上世紀(jì)80年代使用過的威脅策略，當(dāng)時(shí)他作為里根(Reagan)政府的一名高級貿(mào)易官員與日本談判“自愿出口限制”。但這一次，韓國貿(mào)易部長金鉉宗(Kim Hyun-chong)作出了鏗鏘有力的回答：“不，謝謝”。
The response by Mr Kim, who led the Korean team that negotiated the original deal, was very well calculated. He was aware of one blunt reality: the unwinding of Korus would lead to much higher tariffs on US imports into South Korea than vice versa.
金鉉宗的回應(yīng)是經(jīng)過精心盤算的，原本韓美自貿(mào)協(xié)定就是他率領(lǐng)韓國團(tuán)隊(duì)談判的。他很清楚一個(gè)事實(shí)：韓美自貿(mào)協(xié)定取消，將導(dǎo)致美國對韓出口商品關(guān)稅大幅提升，而非反過來。
But there was another. Simply, the US in the Trump era does not speak with a unified voice on trade. Congress, the US Chamber of Commerce, myriad agricultural groups and the nation’s chief executives have all come out against the Trump plan to withdraw from Korus during the past week. And that illustrates Washington’s diminishing power at the negotiating table.
但還有另一個(gè)原因。簡言之，特朗普時(shí)代，美國在貿(mào)易問題上并沒有統(tǒng)一的聲音。近日，美國國會、美國商會(US Chamber of Commerce)、大量的農(nóng)業(yè)組織以及美國的首席執(zhí)行官們都站出來反對特朗普退出韓美自貿(mào)協(xié)定的計(jì)劃。這也說明華盛頓在談判桌上的影響力會日益減弱。
3. Business is no longer afraid of Trump
3. 商界不再懼怕特朗普
The defining debate so far on trade within the Trump administration has been between the “economic nationalists” and the globalists. However, with one high-profile exception (Mr Trump’s withdrawal on day three of his presidency from the Trans-Pacific Partnership), the globalists have been winning the war.
到目前為止，特朗普政府內(nèi)部關(guān)于貿(mào)易的決定性辯論一直是在“經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義者”與全球主義者之間進(jìn)行。然而，除了一次引人注目的例外——特朗普上任第三天就宣布退出《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)——全球主義者在這場斗爭中一直處于上風(fēng)。
That is a reflection of the work and importance within the administration of globalists such as Gary Cohn, head of the National Economic Council, and his team. It also, however, illustrates how companies are no longer afraid of Mr Trump’s use of the social-media bully pulpit and how his hyperbole is backfiring.
這反映了全球主義者——如國家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會(National Economic Council)主席加里•科恩(Gary Cohn)等及其團(tuán)隊(duì)——在政府內(nèi)部的工作和重要性。然而，這也說明了企業(yè)界不再懼怕特朗普利用社交媒體形式的“天字第一號講壇”、以及他的夸張言辭會產(chǎn)生什么反作用。
Companies have learnt quickly how to combat the president’s worst ideas on trade and discovered they have plenty of allies in both his White House and his cabinet. Many also don’t believe his threats any more. For a president whose threats are his biggest currency that is only likely to lead to more frustration.
美國企業(yè)界很快學(xué)會了如何應(yīng)對特朗普關(guān)于貿(mào)易的糟糕想法，并發(fā)現(xiàn)他們在特朗普的白宮和內(nèi)閣中都有很多盟友。許多人也不再相信他發(fā)出的威脅。對于一位慣于用威脅跟人打交道的總統(tǒng)而言，這只會帶來更多的挫敗感。
