美日關(guān)系中潛藏著安倍下臺的種子

Japanese citizens in areas of Hokkaido woke up to an alert early on Tuesday morning as a North Korean rocket flew over Japan for the third time since 1998. Donald Trump was quick to affirm in a call to Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, that America stands behind the country “100 per cent” — an echo of the US president’s words spoken six months earlier at Mar-a-Lago in response to an earlier missile launch.

周二一大早，北海道地區(qū)居民被警報聲喚醒，那是自1998年以來，朝鮮導(dǎo)彈第三次飛越日本上空。唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)很快給日本首相安倍晉三打電話確認(rèn)，美國“100%”支持日本——6個月前特朗普在海湖莊園(Mar-a-Lago)回應(yīng)更早一次朝鮮導(dǎo)彈試射時也是這樣表態(tài)的。

Undoubtedly, Japanese fears over their national security have heightened this week. In the US, however, the missile launch could be seen as a warm-up for Pyongyang’s threatened attack on Guam. And the unified front of Mr Trump and Mr Abe masks signs of a gap opening up between the US and Japan in how they perceive the threat from North Korea. Pyongyang insulted Japan, and looked to drive a wedge into US-Japanese solidarity by reminding Tokyo that Mr Trump’s declaration that “all options are on the table” only applies to a direct attack on the US.

毫無疑問，日本圍繞國家安全的恐懼在本周加深了。但在美國，這次導(dǎo)彈試射可能被視為朝鮮威脅對關(guān)島發(fā)起的襲擊的一次熱身。特朗普和安倍晉三的統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線，掩蓋了美日兩國就如何看待朝鮮威脅出現(xiàn)分歧的跡象。朝鮮侮辱了日本，還意圖通過提醒日本，特朗普所謂“所有選項都在考慮范圍內(nèi)”的聲明僅僅適用于美國遭到直接攻擊的情況，來離間美日關(guān)系。

Mr Trump’s strategy is to step up the pressure by pinning responsibility on China. Reinforced sanctions were seen as a possible game changer for China’s business-as-usual approach. Voices in the Abe administration are not wholly negative about Mr Trump’s pressure tactics, making a complimentary comparison with his predecessor — “if this was President Obama, this would never have happened”.

特朗普的戰(zhàn)略是，通過要求中國承擔(dān)起責(zé)任來加大施壓力度。加強(qiáng)制裁曾經(jīng)被視為可能改變中國“一切照舊”態(tài)度的一種手段。安倍政府內(nèi)部對特朗普施壓策略的評價并非完全負(fù)面，在特朗普與他的前任兩人之中，他們更青睞前者——“如果由奧巴馬總統(tǒng)來處理，連這都不可能發(fā)生”。

Initially, Mr Abe’s shoring up of the alliance with the US through golf was seen as a masterstroke of diplomacy. His popularity had been suffering domestically — although he has recovered some standing via an oft-employed tactic of shifting to the centre, and even apologetically taking a rest from his much-loved golf.

安倍通過打高爾夫球強(qiáng)化日美聯(lián)盟，最初被視為一種外交高招。他在國內(nèi)的支持率此前一直低迷——不過，他通過一種“回歸中間”的常用策略、甚至抱歉地放下他摯愛的高爾夫球，使個人聲望得到了一定程度的恢復(fù)。

But there is plenty of reason to suspect US-Japan relations could contain the seeds of Mr Abe’s downfall. The menace posed by Mr Trump extends beyond East Asian security to Japan’s trade and regional policy: both could wound Mr Abe more deeply even than another scandal.

但是，我們有充分理由推斷，美日關(guān)系中可能包含著導(dǎo)致安倍晉三下臺的種子。特朗普構(gòu)成的威脅超出了東亞安全領(lǐng)域，延伸至日本的貿(mào)易與地區(qū)政策：這兩者都可能對安倍晉三造成比又一場丑聞要嚴(yán)重得多的傷害。

Japan’s ambitious trade policy is a vital part of national strategy. After US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Japan has taken the lead on reaching a deal with other TPP members, as well as achieving a broad agreement on a Japan-EU “cars for cheese” free trade partnership. These vital contributions by Japan to support rules-based free trade, integral to the liberal international order, represent a rare moment of international leadership.

日本雄心勃勃的貿(mào)易政策是國家戰(zhàn)略的一個至關(guān)重要的組成部分。在美國撤出“跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定”(TPP)之后，日本開始牽頭其他TPP成員國達(dá)成一項協(xié)議，并試圖就日歐自由貿(mào)易伙伴關(guān)系達(dá)成一項廣泛的“汽車換奶酪”協(xié)議。日本在支持基于規(guī)則的自由貿(mào)易——這是自由國際秩序的不可或缺的一部分——方面的這些重要貢獻(xiàn)，是日本表現(xiàn)出國際領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力的為數(shù)不多的時刻。

Mr Trump poses multiple threats to the success of these Japanese-led initiatives. First, the entanglement of economics and national security in Mr Trump’s approach to China make the possibility of a trade war real.

特朗普對這些日本牽頭的計劃能否成功構(gòu)成了多重威脅。第一，在特朗普的對華政策中，經(jīng)濟(jì)與國家安全糾纏在一起，使爆發(fā)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的可能性變得切實起來。

Second, US attempts to form bilateral free-trade deals with other Asian countries could create barriers for drawing them into high-standard multilateral agreements. The Trump administration is demanding a free-trade agreement with Japan in the hope of establishing the dominance of bilaterally managed trade. If Tokyo is forced to make more concessions in US-Japan trade negotiations than it did in TPP talks, then concluding the latter would become considerably more difficult.

第二，美國與其他亞洲國家達(dá)成雙邊自由貿(mào)易協(xié)議的努力，可能對日本把它們拉入高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的多邊協(xié)議構(gòu)成障礙。特朗普政府正要求與日本簽訂一份自由貿(mào)易協(xié)議，希望確立雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)議的主導(dǎo)地位。如果日本政府被迫在美日貿(mào)易談判中做出比TPP談判中更大的讓步，那么完成TPP談判的難度將會增加很多。

The philosophical gap in the approach of both nations to trade is exemplified in sectoral discussions, which Japan wants to view through the lens of regional rules.

日美兩國在貿(mào)易方式上的理念差距在行業(yè)談判中得到體現(xiàn)。日本想要從地區(qū)規(guī)則的角度看待這些談判。

More broadly, the US retreat from the region is a chance for Japan to create its own foreign policy independent of America. Sticking with the liberal international order is its long-term strategy.

從更廣視角來看，美國從亞太撤退，為日本打造獨立于美國的自主外交政策提供了一個機(jī)遇。堅持維護(hù)自由的國際秩序符合日本的長期戰(zhàn)略。

But here lies a third major risk to Mr Abe’s agenda. Sudden US disengagement weakens Japan’s position and leverage in Asia. Regional diplomacy will be considerably tougher for Mr Abe.

但是，安倍晉三的議程面臨第三個重大風(fēng)險。美國的突然撤退弱化了日本在亞洲的地位和影響力。安倍晉三將在地區(qū)外交中面臨更大困難。

When Mr Trump visits Asia in November for three summits, he will be sure to have meetings with Mr Abe. It is a huge opportunity for the US to develop a strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific region. But if all Mr Trump does is extol the spoils from the forthcoming talks between Japanese deputy prime minister Taro Aso and US vice-president Mike Pence, such as Japanese purchases of liquid natural gas, there will be stinging legitimacy to the question of what Mr Abe’s thus far pragmatic courting of the president is ultimately for.

當(dāng)特朗普在11月到訪亞洲參加三場峰會時，他肯定將與安倍晉三舉行會談。對美國而言，這是為亞太地區(qū)描繪一幅戰(zhàn)略性愿景的重大機(jī)遇。但如果特朗普所做的一切就是稱贊即將舉行的日本副首相麻生太郎和美國副總統(tǒng)邁克•彭斯(Mike Pence)之間談判的成果(比如日本向美國購買液化天然氣)，那么人們將有充分理由問這樣一個問題：安倍晉三一直基于務(wù)實態(tài)度對特朗普大獻(xiàn)殷勤究竟是為了什么?

Historically, relations with the US have been a deadly issue for Japanese prime ministers. The prime example is 1971, when the Japanese government was informed about Richard Nixon’s trip to China just three minutes before it was made public, and when Nixon introduced the cheap dollar by ending its convertibility to gold. Failure to manage the alliance damaged irreparably public faith in then prime minister Eisaku Sato. While history will not repeat itself exactly, Mr Abe could start to worry about falling victim to the same lethal unpredictability that ended his great uncle’s political career.

從歷史上看，日美關(guān)系對日本首相歷來是個致命問題。最典型的例子發(fā)生在1971年。那一年，日本政府在理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)訪華消息對外公布3分鐘之前，才被告知此事;也是在那一年，尼克松宣布終止以美元兌換黃金，推出了弱美元政策。在管理日美聯(lián)盟關(guān)系方面的失敗，不可挽回地?fù)p害了公眾對日本時任首相佐藤榮作的信任。盡管歷史不會絲毫不差地重演，但安倍晉三可能會開始擔(dān)心，致命不測事件會讓自己遭殃——同樣的致命不測事件曾終結(jié)他的外叔祖父佐藤的政治生涯。