歐洲對(duì)中國(guó)投資的吸引力為何超過(guò)美國(guó)？

China’s outward direct investment in the US and Europe is notable for its size and geopolitical implications, but it is not seen as an unqualified good.

中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)和歐洲的直接投資以其規(guī)模和地緣政治影響聞名，但人們并不認(rèn)為這種投資對(duì)中國(guó)全然只有好處。

Private Chinese investors target overseas property to diversify their assets, while large state-owned or well-connected companies see the potential for accessing technology or establishing a global presence in strategic activities.

中國(guó)私人投資者的目標(biāo)是利用海外資產(chǎn)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)自己資產(chǎn)的多元化，同時(shí)大型國(guó)有企業(yè)或者有背景的公司投資海外是為了接觸到技術(shù)或者在戰(zhàn)略性活動(dòng)中構(gòu)建全球影響力。

Many in the US and Europe welcome the inflows for the jobs they bring, but others complain about unfair competition and regard sales of sophisticated technologies to the Chinese as a security risk.

美國(guó)和歐洲的許多人因?yàn)檫@些投資的流入帶來(lái)就業(yè)而對(duì)其表示歡迎，但其他人則抱怨不公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并認(rèn)為將先進(jìn)技術(shù)出售給中國(guó)人會(huì)帶來(lái)安全方面的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

There is a general perception that the bulk of China’s FDI goes to America. But this is misguided. It accounts for only about 2-3 per cent of China’s outward investment over the past decade and much more has been going to Europe, which is of comparable size measured by gross domestic product and trade volumes.

人們一般認(rèn)為，中國(guó)大部分對(duì)外直接投資投向了美國(guó)。但這種看法有誤。過(guò)去十年，美國(guó)僅占到中國(guó)對(duì)外投資總額的約2%-3%，對(duì)歐洲的投資要多得多;按國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值和貿(mào)易規(guī)模衡量，歐洲是與美國(guó)同一重量級(jí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

As I have noted before, US direct investment in China is also surprisingly modest compared with the much larger flows from Europe. This is because those from Europe are heavily concentrated in manufactured goods and the bloc’s strengths there have better complemented China’s market needs, while America’s exports have been focused on agricultural products.

正如我此前指出的那樣，美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的直接投資也令人意外地沒(méi)多少，而來(lái)自歐洲的直接投資規(guī)模則大得多。這是因?yàn)槟切﹣?lái)自歐洲的投資大多集中在制造業(yè)產(chǎn)品上，制造業(yè)產(chǎn)品是歐洲的優(yōu)勢(shì)，這種優(yōu)勢(shì)是對(duì)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)需求的更好補(bǔ)充，而美國(guó)的出口集中于農(nóng)產(chǎn)品上。

Economic factors only partially explain the difference in FDI from China. Political sensitivities play a significant role. Chinese companies are more attracted to Europe, again, because their industrial structures are more complementary. In addition, the EU is more receptive to such investment.

經(jīng)濟(jì)因素只是部分解釋了來(lái)自中國(guó)的直接投資的差異。政治敏感問(wèn)題扮演著重要角色。同樣，歐洲對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)的吸引力更大，是因?yàn)閮烧叩漠a(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)更為互補(bǔ)。此外，歐盟更愿意接納此類投資。

The sectors targeted vary. The Rhodium Group finds that China invests significantly more in European utilities and energy. Automobile, transportation and machinery-related activities also reflect the dominance of such products in EU-China trade.

意向行業(yè)各有不同。榮鼎咨詢(Rhodium Group)發(fā)現(xiàn)，中國(guó)更多地投資于歐洲的公用事業(yè)和能源領(lǐng)域。汽車、交通和機(jī)械行業(yè)的相關(guān)活動(dòng)，也反映出此類產(chǎn)品在歐中貿(mào)易中的主導(dǎo)地位。

American strengths are its entertainment and metals and minerals sectors, although Beijing has now clamped down on deals — as seen in the blocking of Dalian Wanda’s planned $1bn purchase of US TV production company Dick Clark Productions — given concerns about their merits and declining foreign currency reserves.

美國(guó)的優(yōu)勢(shì)在娛樂(lè)、金屬和礦業(yè)領(lǐng)域，不過(guò)，鑒于有人擔(dān)憂此類交易的真實(shí)目的和中國(guó)外匯儲(chǔ)備下降，中國(guó)政府現(xiàn)在正打擊此類交易，比如大連萬(wàn)達(dá)(Dalian Wanda)擬議的以10億美元收購(gòu)美國(guó)電視制作公司迪克克拉克制片公司(Dick Clark Productions)的交易受阻。

For China, the EU is a much easier market to penetrate because it offers a greater choice of partners. This could be seen as a “divide and conquer” strategy: if one EU country restricts access, a Chinese company could access the bloc’s market through a different member country. (Thus, Brexit is likely to make the UK less attractive for FDI if it means losing access to the EU.)

對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，進(jìn)入歐盟市場(chǎng)要容易得多，因?yàn)樗懈嗟暮献骰锇榭蛇x?？梢砸暺錇?ldquo;分而治之”策略：如果某個(gè)歐盟國(guó)家限制一家中國(guó)企業(yè)進(jìn)入，它可能通過(guò)其他成員國(guó)進(jìn)入歐盟市場(chǎng)。(因此，如果英國(guó)退歐意味著無(wú)法通過(guò)英國(guó)進(jìn)入歐盟市場(chǎng)，就可能降低英國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)直接投資的吸引力。)

Although partnerships with individual US states are possible, overarching federal policies govern American companies regardless of where their headquarters are situated. This is a disadvantage for inward investment compared with the EU’s more open environment.

盡管與美國(guó)某個(gè)州建立合作關(guān)系是可能的，但總括性的聯(lián)邦政策約束著美國(guó)的企業(yè)，無(wú)論它們的總部在哪個(gè)州。與歐盟更為開(kāi)放的環(huán)境相比，這是美國(guó)吸引外資的劣勢(shì)。

Security concerns are another barrier in the US because its technological superiority helps preserve its status as the leading world power.

安全擔(dān)憂是美國(guó)的另一個(gè)障礙，因?yàn)樵搰?guó)的科技優(yōu)勢(shì)幫助它保持了領(lǐng)先世界強(qiáng)國(guó)的地位。

Many Chinese investments are subject to review by the Committee on Foreign Investment (Cfius), which determines whether deals with foreign corporations, especially state-owned ones, raise antitrust or national security issues. China accounts for only a few per cent of FDI in the US, but comprises nearly a quarter of Cfius cases.

許多中國(guó)投資受到美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)(Committee on Foreign Investment)的審查，后者決定美國(guó)與外國(guó)企業(yè)(尤其是外國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè))的交易是否引發(fā)反壟斷或者國(guó)家安全問(wèn)題。中國(guó)僅占美國(guó)獲得的外國(guó)直接投資的一小部分，但幾乎占到其外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)審查案件的四分之一。

This is especially relevant in high tech. In late 2012, the US House intelligence committee recommended that Cfius block acquisitions involving Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company, on security grounds.

在高科技領(lǐng)域尤其如此。在2012年末，美國(guó)眾議院情報(bào)委員會(huì)提議，基于安全方面的考慮，美國(guó)外國(guó)投資委員會(huì)應(yīng)該阻止中國(guó)電信公司華為(Huawei)的相關(guān)收購(gòu)。

Huawei has had better luck in Europe. The UK set up a special centre to examine Huawei’s technology and establish that its products met security standards. Huawei now comprises nearly 22 per cent of mobile network infrastructure spending in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. In contrast, it has less than 3 per cent of the telecoms market in North America.

華為在歐洲的運(yùn)氣要好一些。英國(guó)曾設(shè)立一個(gè)特殊中心來(lái)審查華為的技術(shù)，最終確定其產(chǎn)品符合安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。華為目前占到歐洲、中東和非洲移動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施支出的近22%。相比之下，它在北美電信市場(chǎng)的份額不足3%。

However, such successes may be shortlived. After the Brexit referendum, the UK’s Prime Minister Theresa May signalled a more cautious approach by putting on hold Chinese-French financing of a nuclear plan on security grounds — although it was later cleared.

然而，此類成功可能是短暫的。在英國(guó)退歐公投之后，英國(guó)首相特里薩•梅(Theresa May)曾基于安全理由暫停由中法提供融資的核電站建設(shè)計(jì)劃——盡管后來(lái)予以了放行——這表明她將采取更為謹(jǐn)慎的立場(chǎng)。

This was followed by concerns in Germany about a Chinese appliance maker taking over the high-tech engineering company Kuka. And France’s President Emmanuel Macron has recently expressed reservations about Chinese investments on security grounds.

在那后，一家中國(guó)家電制造商對(duì)德國(guó)高科技工程公司庫(kù)卡(Kuka)的收購(gòu)又在德國(guó)引發(fā)擔(dān)憂。法國(guó)總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)最近表示，基于安全原因?qū)χ袊?guó)投資持保留意見(jiàn)。

In addition, as China’s FDI increases, American and European companies complain of discrimination over access to China’s growing domestic market. Reciprocity has become part of their negotiating platform.

此外，隨著中國(guó)對(duì)外直接投資增加，美國(guó)和歐洲公司抱怨自己在進(jìn)入中國(guó)日益增長(zhǎng)的國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)方面受到歧視。待遇對(duì)等已經(jīng)成為它們談判綱領(lǐng)的一部分。

The best means to deal with these issues are the bilateral investment treaties that have been under negotiation. But discussions with the EU have been disrupted by Brexit, and the Trump administration may resist any agreement that would encourage American companies to invest more abroad.

解決這些問(wèn)題的最佳方法是正在談判中的雙邊投資協(xié)定。但與歐盟的談判受到英國(guó)退歐的干擾，而特朗普(Trump)政府可能抵制任何將鼓勵(lì)美國(guó)公司加大海外投資的協(xié)議。

For Europe and the US, more foreign investment from China and the opening up of restricted sectors in China would create obvious benefits for both sides. These treaties should be high on everyone’s agenda even if right now it does not seem politically expedient.

對(duì)歐洲和美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，來(lái)自中國(guó)的直接投資增加以及中國(guó)放開(kāi)受限行業(yè)，將為雙方帶來(lái)明顯的益處。這些協(xié)定應(yīng)該得到所有人的優(yōu)先對(duì)待，即便它們看上去跟現(xiàn)在的政治環(huán)境不大合拍。

The author is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. This article draws on his recent book, ‘Cracking the China Conundrum’

本文作者是卡內(nèi)基國(guó)際和平基金會(huì)(Carnegie Endowment)高級(jí)研究員。本文取材自其最近出版的著作《破解中國(guó)難題》(Cracking the China Conundrum)