是海外旅游支出還是資本外逃？
美聯(lián)儲(Fed)的研究稱，偽裝成海外旅游支出的資本外流，人為地降低了中國對外公布的貿(mào)易順差，同時掩蓋了投資資本外流的規(guī)模。
Before 2014, Chinese spending on travel was consistent with that of other countries at similar income levels. But three years ago spending became “anomalously high”, the paper says.
在2014年前，中國的旅游支出與收入水平相似的其他國家持平。但美聯(lián)儲的研究論文稱，3年前，這項支出變得“異常的高”。
China’s per-capita travel spending as a share of per-capita GDP in 2014 was the same as that in the UK, where per-capita GDP is seven times higher. In 2015, such spending nearly equalled Denmark’s, where per-capita income is 10 times higher.
在2014年，中國人均旅游支出相對于人均國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比例，與人均GDP為中國7倍的英國持平。到2015年，中國的這一支出比例幾乎與人均收入為中國10倍的丹麥持平。
Growth in travel spending has also far outpaced growth in the number of travellers, a discrepancy first noted last year by Brad Setser, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
旅游支出的增長速度也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過旅游者人數(shù)的增長速度，這一出入是去年由美國外交關(guān)系委員會(Council on Foreign Relations)高級研究員布拉德•塞策(Brad Setser)最先指出的。
Taken at face value, the figures imply that spending per traveller increased from $1,300 per tourist in 2013 to $2,600 in 2016.
從表面上看，數(shù)據(jù)表明旅游者的人均支出從2013年的1300美元提高到了2016年的2600美元。
The surge in travel spending also occurred at a time of economic trends that would normally reduce such outlays.
這一旅游支出的激增還發(fā)生在經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢正常來說會使人們減少此類開支之時。
“Improbable travel transactions respond to economic forces in ways that are opposite to what would be expected of traditional goods and services imports — they increase when growth falters as well as when the domestic currency depreciates”, wrote Anna Wong, senior emerging market economist for the Fed in Washington. “As such, they are more likely to be financial outflows than consumption of goods and services.”
美聯(lián)儲駐華盛頓資深新興市場經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Anna Wong表示：“疑似虛假的旅游交易對經(jīng)濟(jì)因素的反應(yīng)，與傳統(tǒng)商品和服務(wù)進(jìn)口該有的反應(yīng)相反——它們在增長放緩和國內(nèi)貨幣貶值的時候上升。因此，它們更有可能是資本外流，而不是對商品和服務(wù)的消費。”
The paper’s findings could provide fresh ammunition to Donald Trump and other critics of China’s persistent trade surplus, since they imply that the surplus has fallen less than official data indicate.
這篇論文中的這些發(fā)現(xiàn)，可能會給唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)以及其他批評中國長期貿(mào)易順差的人士提供新的彈藥，因為這些發(fā)現(xiàn)暗示中國貿(mào)易順差的降幅比官方數(shù)據(jù)所顯示的要小。
Disguised capital outflows may have amounted to $190bn, or 1.7 per cent of gross domestic product, in the year through the end of September 2016, according to the paper. That implies that China’s true current account surplus was higher by the same amount.
根據(jù)這篇論文，在截至2016年9月的一年中，經(jīng)過偽裝的資本外流可能達(dá)到1900億美元，相當(dāng)于中國GDP的1.7%。這意味著中國經(jīng)常項目盈余的實際數(shù)額也應(yīng)高出這么多。
China’s current account surplus officially peaked at 9.9 per cent of GDP in 2007 before falling to 1.7 per cent last year. But the Fed paper estimates that Chinese imports of travel-related goods and services were smaller than reported.
根據(jù)中國官方數(shù)據(jù)，中國經(jīng)常項目盈余在2007年達(dá)到頂峰，為GDP的9.9%，在去年則下降到GDP的1.7%。而美聯(lián)儲的論文估計，中國對旅游相關(guān)商品和服務(wù)的進(jìn)口比對外公布的數(shù)額要小。
While China has long maintained a large global trade surplus in goods, a deficit in services has moderated the overall current account surplus. In recent years, China’s services trade deficit has widened, due mainly to Chinese spending on travel-related services.
盡管中國長期在全球維持著大規(guī)模商品貿(mào)易順差，服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差卻降低了總體的經(jīng)常項目盈余。最近幾年，中國服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差已經(jīng)擴(kuò)大，這主要是中國人的旅游相關(guān)服務(wù)開支導(dǎo)致的。
The country’s travel deficit soared from $129bn in 2013 to $227bn a year later and reached $261bn last year, according to balance of payments data. 根據(jù)國際收支數(shù)據(jù)，中國的旅游逆差從2013年的1290億美元激增至一年后的2270億美元，并在去年達(dá)到2610億美元。
Zhang Zhiwei, chief China economist at Deutsche Bank in Hong Kong, acknowledges the possibility of disguised capital outflow but suggests a more innocent explanation: the wealth effect from rising house prices. “It’s hard to pin down how much comes from each factor,” he says.
德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)駐香港首席中國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家張志偉承認(rèn)存在偽裝資本外流的可能性，但他提出了一種更無辜的解釋：房價攀升導(dǎo)致的財富效應(yīng)。他說：“很難確定每種因素的影響有多大。”
The Fed paper’s conclusion offers further context for a series of moves late last year to clamp down on capital outflows, including stricter regulation of foreign exchange purchases by individuals.
美聯(lián)儲這篇論文的結(jié)論，為去年底中國一系列遏制資本外流的舉措(包括加強(qiáng)對個人購匯的監(jiān)管)提供了新的背景信息。
Critics argued that China was backpedalling on economic opening and market-based reform, but Chinese officials countered that the clampdown was mostly about stricter enforcement of existing rules.
批評者認(rèn)為中國正在經(jīng)濟(jì)開放和市場化改革的道路上開倒車，中國官員卻反駁稱，這輪收緊舉措主要是加強(qiáng)了對現(xiàn)有規(guī)則的執(zhí)行力度。
Indeed, regulations had long stipulated that forex purchases by individuals — who are permitted to buy $50,000 per year — must only be used for current account purchases such as foreign shopping and tourism, medical care, tuition, and non-investment-type insurance. Until this year, however, bank tellers rarely asked for documentation to prove how the money was used.
事實上，監(jiān)管規(guī)則長期以來一直規(guī)定，個人購匯(每年購匯限額為等值5萬美元)只能用于經(jīng)常項目購買活動，比如境外購物和旅游、醫(yī)療、學(xué)費、以及非投資類型的保險。然而，直至今年以前，銀行柜員很少會索要相關(guān)文件，以證明資金的使用目的。
That allowed households to use it to buy foreign assets or to use quotas belonging to friends and family in a process known as “ant moving house”, named for how ants can transport an entire colony, one small piece at a time.
這種狀況令老百姓可以用外匯購買境外資產(chǎn)，或通過“螞蟻搬家”的方式，一次一點地使用屬于親友的外匯配額。
