上周的各種事件沖淡了有關經濟政策的反思。但事情還是在發(fā)生。美國商務部長威爾伯•羅斯(Wilbur Ross)將本月早些時候美國與中國達成的貿易協(xié)議稱為“一項非常偉大的成就...超過美中貿易關系史上所有成果”。
Past a certain point, exaggeration and hype become dishonesty and deception. In economic policy, as in almost everything else, the Trump Administration is way past that point. The trade deal is a “nothing burger” that a serious administration committed to helping American workers would likely not have accepted, and surely would not have hyped.
超過一定限度,夸大和炒作就會變成不誠實和欺騙。在經濟政策領域,就像在幾乎其他任何問題上一樣,特朗普政府已遠遠超過這一限度。這項貿易協(xié)議“空有其表”,一個致力于幫助美國勞動者的嚴肅政府可能不會接受這項協(xié)議,也肯定不會炒作它。
On agriculture, China reiterated a promise that it has broken in the past to let in more beef. Previously, the US, as reciprocity, had been withholding publication of a permissive rule on Chinese poultry. Now we have relented. Advantage: China.
在農業(yè)領域,中國重申了其過去曾食言的進口更多美國牛肉的承諾。此前,按照對等原則,美國一直未發(fā)布讓中國禽肉得以進入美國的規(guī)定。如今,我們松動了。受益者:中國。
Nothing else “achieved” has any meaningful nexus with US jobs. China will review product applications for eight biotech products. It promises to offer increased scope for US credit rating agencies, and electronic payment platforms. But it is far from clear that US firms will in fact be able to compete in China — and it is clear that if they do, it will be by hiring Chinese workers in China, not American workers in America. And finally, two US firms will get some enhanced ability to do bond and stock underwriting — again a benefit to shareholders and local staff rather than to US employment.
“已達成”的其他所有成果都與美國就業(yè)沒有實質關系。中國將對8種生物科技產品的產品申請進行審核。中國承諾擴大美國信用評級機構以及電子支付平臺的準入。但目前還遠不清楚,美國公司是否真正能夠在中國展開競爭,顯然,如果要在華展開競爭,它們就要在中國聘用中國勞動者,而非在美國聘用美國勞動者。最后,有兩家美國公司將獲得在華開展債券和股票承銷業(yè)務的更大自由,這將有利于股東和中國當?shù)貑T工,但對美國就業(yè)毫無幫助。
What was given up? In addition to the leverage sacrificed by committing to issue the poultry rule, other meaningful concessions were made. First, the US has agreed to allow exports of liquefied natural gas to China. To at least a small extent, that would mean higher heating costs for US consumers and higher energy costs for US producers.
我們放棄了什么?除了因承諾發(fā)布禽肉規(guī)定而犧牲的籌碼之外, 美國還做出了其他重大讓步。首先,美國同意允許向中國出口液化天然氣。這將意味著美國消費者的供暖成本以及美國生產商的能源成本將至少小幅提高。
Second, in the context of a trade negotiation, concessions were made on how US commodities regulators would view derivatives traded in Shanghai and how US bank regulators would treat Chinese banks doing business in the US. While I suspect the concessions were not major, this is reinforcing the valid concern that trade agreements may undercut the ability of regulators to protect American financial stability and more generally challenge regulatory sovereignty.
其次,在貿易談判的背景下,在美國大宗商品監(jiān)管者如何看待在上海交易的衍生品以及美國銀行監(jiān)管者將如何對待在美國開展業(yè)務的中資銀行方面,美國做出了讓步。盡管我推測這些讓步并不大,但這鞏固了以下合理擔憂:貿易協(xié)議可能會削弱監(jiān)管者保護美國金融穩(wěn)定的能力,并在更普遍意義上挑戰(zhàn)美國監(jiān)管獨立性。
Third, we agreed to embrace – by sending high level representatives – China’s One Belt One Road initiative. It is almost certainly better to be in than out of this tent, but we should be getting something in return for the legitimacy we are conferring.
第三,我們同意(通過派出高級代表)接納中國的“一帶一路”計劃。加入其中幾乎肯定要好于被排除在外,但我們的認可應得到某些回報。
Now it is true that a ludicrously hyped squib of a deal is much better than a trade war. So perhaps we should be pleased that President Trump and Mr Ross are so easily manipulated. Perhaps our officials know how bad a deal they got and are just hyping for political reasons. It is an irony of our times that those who most frequently denounce “fake news” seem to most frequently purvey it.
一項被過分炒作、令人失望的貿易協(xié)議確實遠遠好于打貿易戰(zhàn)。因此,我們或許應該為特朗普和羅斯如此輕易地就被操縱感到高興。或許,我們的官員知道他們獲得的是一項多么糟糕的協(xié)議,炒作僅僅是出于政治原因。這是我們這個時代的諷刺:那些最頻繁譴責“虛假消息”的人,似乎是虛假消息最頻繁的散布者。