中國(guó)債市派對(duì)遇冷

Too big to ignore but too opaque to entirely trust. China is engaged in a charm offensive to lure foreign money into its bond market, which has grown in a short period of time from a minnow to the third largest in the world, after the US and Japan.

太大而不容忽視，但又因太不透明而無(wú)法完全信任。中國(guó)正在發(fā)起一場(chǎng)魅力攻勢(shì)，吸引境外資金進(jìn)入其債券市場(chǎng)，后者已在很短時(shí)間內(nèi)從無(wú)足輕重成長(zhǎng)為全球第三大債市，僅次于美國(guó)和日本。

The opening of the bond market to foreigners is part of a transformation in the international financial system, which is slowly linking up with a Chinese economy that was once walled off behind tight capital controls. It is a crucial step in Beijing’s plan to turn the renminbi into one of the anchor currencies of the global economy.

向境外投資者開(kāi)放債市是國(guó)際金融體系變革的一部分，該體系正慢慢地與曾經(jīng)躲在嚴(yán)格資本管制圍墻后面的中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)接軌。此舉是北京將人民幣打造成全球經(jīng)濟(jì)錨定貨幣之一計(jì)劃中的關(guān)鍵一步。

But the risk for China’s economic planners is that no one shows up to their bond market party, amid fears over capital controls and default risk. International fund managers acknowledge that Chinese onshore debt is bound to become a big part of global fixed-income portfolios, but add qualifiers such as “eventually” and “medium- to long-term”. Few, it seems, want to go in first.

但中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)劃者面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是，出于對(duì)資本管制和違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的擔(dān)憂(yōu)，沒(méi)有投資者為他們的債市派對(duì)捧場(chǎng)。國(guó)際基金經(jīng)理承認(rèn)，中國(guó)的在岸債務(wù)勢(shì)必將成為全球固定收益投資組合中的一大塊，但他們加上了“最終”、“中期至長(zhǎng)期”等限定詞。似乎沒(méi)人想沖在第一位。

“For an economy that is a tenth of the global economy with a similar share in global exports and investment, the singular lack of financial integration is striking and cannot last,” says Qu Hongbin, chief Greater China economist at HSBC in Hong Kong.

匯豐(HSBC)駐香港大中華區(qū)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家屈宏斌表示：“對(duì)于一個(gè)規(guī)模占全球經(jīng)濟(jì)十分之一、出口和投資也占全球相似份額的經(jīng)濟(jì)體而言，金融一體化的缺位格外突出，不可持續(xù)。”

Until recently, foreign participation in the Chinese market was tightly controlled by quotas and licensing requirements. That changed in February 2016, when the People’s Bank of China threw wide open the doors to the interbank bond market, where most Chinese debentures trade. With one stroke, the central bank cleared the way for banks, insurers, securities firms, asset management companies, pension funds and non-profit endowments to enter the market without prior approval.

直至不久以前，外資進(jìn)入中國(guó)債市還受到額度和許可證要求的嚴(yán)格控制。但這一情況在2016年2月發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變，當(dāng)時(shí)中國(guó)人民銀行(PBoC)放開(kāi)了銀行間債券市場(chǎng)，大多數(shù)人民幣債券在這一市場(chǎng)交易。中國(guó)央行一舉為銀行、保險(xiǎn)公司、證券公司、資產(chǎn)管理公司、養(yǎng)老基金以及非盈利基金進(jìn)入該市場(chǎng)掃清了道路，取消了事先批準(zhǔn)這個(gè)要求。

Last month the government widened access further, announcing a programme to let investors in Hong Kong buy Chinese onshore bonds through their own brokerages. Modelled on the Stock Connect programmes linking Hong Kong’s exchange with those in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the Shanghai Bond Connect will allow foreigners to buy onshore Chinese bonds without the need for an onshore account.

上月，中國(guó)政府進(jìn)一步放寬準(zhǔn)入，宣布了一項(xiàng)允許在香港的投資者通過(guò)自家經(jīng)紀(jì)商購(gòu)買(mǎi)在岸人民幣債券的計(jì)劃。仿照連接港股與上海和深圳股市的“滬港通”、“深港通”計(jì)劃，“債券通”將讓境外投資者無(wú)需擁有在岸賬戶(hù)即可購(gòu)買(mǎi)在岸人民幣債券。

Despite expanded access, however, interest from foreign investors has so far been tepid. Foreign holdings of Chinese domestic bonds rose a modest 13 per cent last year, according to central bank figures. At Rmb853bn ($124bn) by the end of 2016, foreign holdings equal only 1.3 per cent of total market value.

然而，雖然市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入放寬了，但境外投資者迄今興趣不大。中國(guó)央行的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，境外投資者持有的人民幣債券去年溫和上漲了13%，截至2016年底為8530億元人民幣(合1240億美元)，僅相當(dāng)于市場(chǎng)總值的1.3%。

“China’s interest rates are modestly higher than in the west, and the long-term prospects for the economy and the currency are still good,” says David Dollar, former US Treasury economic and financial emissary to China and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “However, there are all kinds of risks, and interest rates strike me as low relative to the risks.”

“中國(guó)的利率略高于西方，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)以及人民幣匯率的長(zhǎng)期前景仍然不錯(cuò)，”美國(guó)財(cái)政部前駐華經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融特使、現(xiàn)為華盛頓布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)(Brookings Institution)高級(jí)研究員的杜大偉(David Dollar)說(shuō)，“然而，存在著各種各樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，同時(shí)在我看來(lái)，利率相對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不算高。”

Fund manager caution

基金經(jīng)理的謹(jǐn)慎

Among the types of foreign investors, central banks and sovereign wealth funds have responded most positively. After the International Monetary Fund’s decision in late 2015 to add the Chinese currency to its special drawing rights, the renminbi officially assumed the status of reserve currency in October last year. Because all IMF members hold SDRs among their reserves, this change meant renminbi assets automatically entered the reserve portfolios of the fund’s 189 member countries.

在不同類(lèi)型的境外投資者中，央行和主權(quán)財(cái)富基金的回應(yīng)最為積極。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF) 2015年末決定把人民幣納入其特別提款權(quán)貨幣籃子之后，人民幣去年10月正式擁有了儲(chǔ)備貨幣的地位。因?yàn)樗蠭MF成員國(guó)在本國(guó)外匯儲(chǔ)備中都持有特別提款權(quán)貨幣，這一變化意味著人民幣資產(chǎn)自動(dòng)進(jìn)入了該組織189個(gè)成員國(guó)的外匯儲(chǔ)備資產(chǎn)組合。

Beyond these automatic purchases, many other sovereign investors take their cue from the IMF. “As the renminbi becomes a bigger part of the SDR basket, central bank reserve managers, large sovereign pension plans and the like will probably have to adjust their holdings to reflect the higher allocations within global sovereign portfolios,” says Manu George, senior investment director for Asian fixed income at Schroders Investment Management.

除了這些自動(dòng)購(gòu)入，其他許多主權(quán)投資機(jī)構(gòu)也從IMF得到啟發(fā)。施羅德投資管理公司(Schroders Investment Management)亞洲固定收益部門(mén)高級(jí)投資主管馬努•喬治(Manu George)表示：“隨著人民幣在特別提款權(quán)貨幣籃子中份額擴(kuò)大，央行儲(chǔ)備經(jīng)理、大型主權(quán)養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃等很可能將不得不調(diào)整所持資產(chǎn)，以反映全球主權(quán)投資組合中人民幣債券較高的配置。”

Global central banks owned $84.5bn worth of renminbi assets as foreign exchange reserves at the end of last year, equal to 1.1 per cent of global reserves, IMF data show.

IMF的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，截至去年底，全球央行擁有價(jià)值845億美元的人民幣資產(chǎn)作為外匯儲(chǔ)備，相當(dāng)于全球外匯儲(chǔ)備總額的1.1%。

Taken together, the IMF and PBoC data suggest that central banks account for about two-thirds of total foreign holdings of Chinese bonds. Adding SWFs — whose renminbi holdings are mostly excluded from the IMF data — the government share of total Chinese bond holdings appears higher still. The flipside of these figures, however, is considerable caution on the part of private fund managers.

綜合來(lái)看，IMF和中國(guó)央行的數(shù)據(jù)似乎表明，各國(guó)央行占外國(guó)持有中國(guó)債券總額約三分之二。加上主權(quán)財(cái)富基金——其人民幣資產(chǎn)持有量基本被IMF數(shù)據(jù)排除在外——各國(guó)政府在中國(guó)債券持有總量中的份額顯得更高。然而這些數(shù)據(jù)說(shuō)明的另一面是，私人部門(mén)基金經(jīng)理仍相當(dāng)謹(jǐn)慎。

One factor is the risk of defaults. The first default in the Chinese bond market occurred only in 2015 by Shanghai Chaori Solar, after years in which bailouts were the norm. Though bonds remain safer than other credit in China, defaults have become more common.

違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是一個(gè)因素。中國(guó)債券市場(chǎng)的第一起違約在2015年才發(fā)生，違約方為上海超日太陽(yáng)能科技(Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology);此前多年里救助是常態(tài)。雖然債券仍比中國(guó)的其他信貸安全，但違約已變得更加常見(jiàn)。

Legal bankruptcies are also increasingly common, following years in which a bankruptcy law passed in 2006 was little used. Even so, large restructurings of important companies are typically orchestrated by government officials through extra-legal negotiations, which introduce political considerations into the process.

破產(chǎn)案件也日益常見(jiàn);中國(guó)的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)法在2006年通過(guò)后，曾經(jīng)在多年里很少動(dòng)用。即便如此，重要企業(yè)的大規(guī)模重組一般還是由政府官員通過(guò)法外談判來(lái)安排的，整個(gè)過(guò)程會(huì)納入政治考慮。

“For large enterprises with debt in the hundreds of billions, they are traditionally handled through administrative means. Local governments or even the State Council will take control and settle things out of court,” says Wang Xinxin, a professor at Renmin University Law School in Beijing.

北京中國(guó)人民大學(xué)法學(xué)院教授王欣新表示：“對(duì)于背負(fù)數(shù)千億美元債務(wù)的大企業(yè)，傳統(tǒng)上是通過(guò)行政手段處理的。地方政府乃至國(guó)務(wù)院都是在法庭外接手和解決事情。”

In the case of Huishan Dairy, whose shares dropped 85 per cent last month, provincial authorities in northeastern Liaoning province ordered creditors not to sue. The case showed how officials will intervene with debt problems even at a privately owned company, if its potential collapse threatens the local economy or the solvency of local banks. The ban on legal action meant that even creditors with collateral were at risk of being unable to enforce their claims.

以輝山乳業(yè)(Huishan Dairy)為例，該公司股價(jià)上月下跌85%，地處中國(guó)東北的遼寧省政府下令債權(quán)人不得起訴。該案例表明即使是民營(yíng)企業(yè)，只要其潛在崩潰威脅到當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)或當(dāng)?shù)劂y行的償付能力，官員們就會(huì)干預(yù)債務(wù)問(wèn)題。禁止起訴意味著，即使是擁有抵押品的債權(quán)人，也面臨著無(wú)法執(zhí)行其債權(quán)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

Another issue is credit ratings. The three large global rating agencies — Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s — all have Chinese joint ventures. But rating methodologies differ substantially.

另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是信用評(píng)級(jí)?；葑u(yù)(Fitch)、穆迪(Moody’s)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾(Standard & Poor’s)三大全球評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)都有中國(guó)合資企業(yè)，但評(píng)級(jí)方法有很大不同。

“There seems to be a disparity in analysing companies. If it’s one notch — OK, fine. But you can’t have the equivalent of an A rating onshore and then have Fitch and S&P rate it as a B,” says Jamie Tadelis, co-head of sales at SC Lowy, a Hong Kong investment bank.

香港投資銀行SC Lowy銷(xiāo)售部聯(lián)合負(fù)責(zé)人杰米•塔德里斯(Jamie Tadelis)表示：“在分析公司方面似乎存在差異。如果相差一級(jí)，那還好，沒(méi)問(wèn)題。但你不能有在岸評(píng)級(jí)相當(dāng)于A，而惠譽(yù)和標(biāo)普評(píng)級(jí)為B的局面。”

Chinese rating agencies counter that their ratings are often higher in part because most bond issuers are state-owned enterprises. Local agencies place more weight than their foreign counterparts on the likelihood of government support for a company, even if such support is not codified in law.

中國(guó)評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)反駁說(shuō)，他們的評(píng)級(jí)之所以往往較高，部分是因?yàn)槎鄶?shù)債券發(fā)行人是國(guó)有企業(yè)。這些本土機(jī)構(gòu)比外國(guó)同行更看重政府支持一家企業(yè)的幾率，即使這種支持在法律上沒(méi)有明文規(guī)定。

“We will pay attention to credit fundamentals, but at the same time, we also pay attention to the degree of credit support from various levels of government. Sometimes this support takes the form of an implicit guarantee,” says Yan Yan, chairman of China Chengxin Credit Rating, a joint venture with Moody’s.

穆迪合資企業(yè)——中誠(chéng)信國(guó)際(CCXI)董事長(zhǎng)閆衍表示：“我們既注意信貸基本面，也注意各級(jí)政府對(duì)信貸的支持程度。有時(shí)這種支持代表了一種隱形擔(dān)保。”

Some investors are also worried that the corporate bond market is indistinguishable from the broader debt overhang facing the Chinese economy. Non-financial debt in China hit 277 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 2016, up from about 150 per cent at the end of 2008, when Beijing unleashed a fiscal and monetary stimulus to cushion the impact of the global financial crisis. Corporate debt has been the biggest driver of the overall increase.

一些投資者也擔(dān)心公司債券市場(chǎng)與中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨的整體債務(wù)積壓難以區(qū)分。2016年底，中國(guó)的非金融債務(wù)相當(dāng)于國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的277%，而2008年底約為150%，當(dāng)時(shí)北京釋放了財(cái)政和貨幣刺激，以緩解全球金融危機(jī)的影響。企業(yè)債務(wù)是這些年來(lái)整體債務(wù)增加的最大因素。

However, despite the risk of excessive debt for China’s broader economy, the bond market is a relatively safe entry point for foreign debt investors. Banks — along with non-bank “shadow” lenders such as trusts, securities companies and fund management companies — are where China’s riskiest debt lurks, analysts say.

不過(guò)，盡管中國(guó)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)存在債務(wù)過(guò)高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但債券市場(chǎng)仍是境外債務(wù)投資者相對(duì)安全的切入點(diǎn)。分析師們表示，銀行，以及信托、證券公司和基金管理公司等非銀行“影子”貸款機(jī)構(gòu)，才是中國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最高的債務(wù)存在的地方。

In the bond market, junk bonds barely exist. An approval process filters out the worst would-be issuers. Most actual issuers are large state-owned companies and banks with strong credit profiles. By contrast, the shadow-banking system is the main refuge for weak borrowers unable to access credit from cheaper sources.

在中國(guó)的債券市場(chǎng)上，幾乎不存在垃圾級(jí)債券。一道審批流程篩選掉了最糟糕的潛在發(fā)行人。多數(shù)實(shí)際發(fā)行人都是大型國(guó)企和銀行，具備強(qiáng)大的信用檔案。相比之下，影子銀行體系是那些無(wú)法從更低廉來(lái)源獲得信貸的劣質(zhì)借款人的主要避難所。

Moreover, bonds are not the driver of China’s credit boom. Despite rapid volume growth, bonds still account for only 11 per cent of total outstanding corporate and household debt, according to the central bank. By contrast, bank loans comprise 72 per cent, while shadow bank credit makes up 16 per cent.

此外，債券并不是中國(guó)信貸繁榮的驅(qū)動(dòng)力。根據(jù)中國(guó)央行數(shù)據(jù)，盡管發(fā)行量增長(zhǎng)迅速，但債券在企業(yè)及家庭未償債務(wù)總額中仍?xún)H占11%。相比之下，銀行貸款占72%，影子銀行信貸占16%。

Trapped money fears

資金陷阱擔(dān)憂(yōu)

Even in government bonds, which carry minimal default risk, investors have other concerns, including whether their money could be trapped in China. Late last year, in a bid to curb capital outflows and cut pressure on the renminbi, Beijing cracked down on outbound acquisitions by Chinese companies, after a record-breaking year. Chinese individuals have had difficulty buying foreign exchange for personal use.

甚至在違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最低的政府債券領(lǐng)域，投資者也有其他擔(dān)憂(yōu)，包括他們的資金是否可能被困在中國(guó)。去年末，為限制資本外流、降低人民幣壓力，中國(guó)政府對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)的海外并購(gòu)加強(qiáng)了審查，此前一年中國(guó)企業(yè)的海外并購(gòu)規(guī)模打破紀(jì)錄。中國(guó)居民的個(gè)人購(gòu)匯也曾遇到困難。

Regulators insist they are merely tightening enforcement and that the moves do not amount to new capital controls. But for investors, this distinction is semantic. In practice, currency conversion and cross-border remittance are more difficult than a year ago.

監(jiān)管者堅(jiān)稱(chēng)，他們只是在加強(qiáng)執(zhí)行，這些舉措不構(gòu)成新的資本管制。但對(duì)于投資者而言，這只是語(yǔ)義上的區(qū)別。在實(shí)踐中，外匯兌換和跨境匯款的難度大于一年前。

So far, foreign investors in Chinese stocks and bonds have not faced restrictions. And for the moment, downward pressure on the renminbi has eased and foreign exchange reserves have stabilised, reducing the likelihood of further restrictions. But every dollar of foreign investment that flows into China’s bond market today increases the regulators’ incentive to keep that money from exiting tomorrow if outflow pressure resumes, as many analysts expect it will.

迄今，購(gòu)買(mǎi)中國(guó)股票和債券的外國(guó)投資者沒(méi)有遭遇限制。同時(shí)就目前而言，人民幣下行壓力已減輕，外匯儲(chǔ)備也已企穩(wěn)，這降低了中國(guó)政府實(shí)施更多限制的可能性。但流入中國(guó)債券市場(chǎng)的每一美元外資，都會(huì)加大監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)像很多分析人士預(yù)測(cè)的那樣，在未來(lái)資本外流壓力再度出現(xiàn)時(shí)阻止資金流出的動(dòng)機(jī)。

“The government’s desire to build up its bond markets, in tandem with the goal of making the renminbi a prominent international currency, suggests that foreign investors can count on relatively unconstrained financial flows,” says Eswar Prasad, professor at Cornell University and former China head of the IMF. “However, investors may not be fully persuaded by the government’s reassurances.”

“政府希望發(fā)展債券市場(chǎng)，這符合讓人民幣成為領(lǐng)先國(guó)際貨幣的目標(biāo)，這似乎表明外國(guó)投資者可以期待相對(duì)不受限制的資金流動(dòng)，”美國(guó)康奈爾大學(xué)(Cornell University)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任IMF中國(guó)部負(fù)責(zé)人的埃斯瓦爾•普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)表示，“然而，投資者可能不會(huì)完全相信政府的保證。”

Despite their concerns, foreign investors may soon have little choice but to at least dip their toes. In January, Bloomberg became the first major index provider to include Chinese onshore bonds in a benchmark index. Days later, Citibank’s index unit announced it would add Chinese treasuries to its series of government bond indices. A month earlier, Citi became the first US bank to obtain a coveted trading licence for China’s interbank bond market.

盡管感到擔(dān)憂(yōu)，但外國(guó)投資者可能很快就會(huì)別無(wú)選擇，只能至少去嘗試一下。今年1月，彭博(Bloomberg)成為首個(gè)將中國(guó)在岸債券納入基準(zhǔn)指數(shù)的大型指數(shù)供應(yīng)商。幾天后，花旗銀行(Citibank)的指數(shù)部門(mén)宣布，將把中國(guó)國(guó)債納入其一系列政府債券指數(shù)。一個(gè)月前，花旗成為首個(gè)獲得令人艷羨的中國(guó)銀行間債券市場(chǎng)交易牌照的美資銀行。

Adding Chinese onshore bonds to key benchmark indices would force asset managers’ hands. Inclusion in emerging-market bond indices could create automatic inflows worth $25bn-$40bn. If they are added to global bond indices, an additional $200bn-$300bn could flow in, according to Luke Drago Spajic, Singapore-based head of emerging Asia portfolio management at Pimco.

將中國(guó)在岸債券納入關(guān)鍵基準(zhǔn)指數(shù)，將迫使資產(chǎn)管理者配置中國(guó)債券。納入新興市場(chǎng)債券指數(shù)可能會(huì)自動(dòng)創(chuàng)造250億至400億美元的資金流入。太平洋投資管理公司(Pimco)駐新加坡的新興亞洲組合主管盧克•斯帕伊奇(Luke Spajic)表示，如果被納入全球債券指數(shù)，可能會(huì)再帶來(lái)2000億至3000億美元的流入。

“Once they’re in your index — especially emerging market indices — then if you don’t own them, you could end up with massive tracking error. You can’t own nothing,” says Mr Spajic.

斯帕伊奇表示：“一旦它們被納入你的指數(shù)，特別是新興市場(chǎng)指數(shù)，那么如果你不擁有他們，你可能會(huì)遭遇嚴(yán)重的跟蹤誤差。你不可能什么都不要。”

Beyond passive money, active managers will be attracted by high yields. Chinese 10-year government bonds currently yield about 3.4 per cent, compared with 2.35 per cent for the US, 0.25 per cent for Germany and 0.1 per cent for Japan. That creates an incentive to add more Chinese bonds.

除了被動(dòng)資金，積極投資型經(jīng)理將被高收益吸引。中國(guó)10年期國(guó)債目前的收益率約為3.4%，而美國(guó)、德國(guó)和日本分別為2.35%、0.25%和0.1%。這給基金經(jīng)理們帶來(lái)了增持中國(guó)債券的動(dòng)機(jī)。

“The question isn’t just whether investors are going to raise their holdings to benchmark levels. They may have to start buying more than index levels in order to outperform. That’s where it gets interesting,” says Mr Spajic.

斯帕伊奇表示：“問(wèn)題不僅僅是投資者是否把持有規(guī)模增至基準(zhǔn)水平。要想跑贏大盤(pán)，他們開(kāi)始購(gòu)買(mǎi)的數(shù)量可能必須超過(guò)指數(shù)水平。這將變得有意思。”

China’s currency is perhaps the single biggest factor worrying foreign fund managers. The renminbi suffered its worst fall on record in 2016. It has stabilised this year, but most economists believe that it will still fall further over the next 12 months.

人民幣或許是讓外國(guó)基金經(jīng)理感到擔(dān)憂(yōu)的最大單一因素。2016年，人民幣匯率遭遇最嚴(yán)重跌幅。今年人民幣匯率已企穩(wěn)，但多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，未來(lái)12個(gè)月人民幣匯率將繼續(xù)下跌。

“Even with yields very attractive in onshore China, wiping out a lot of that through hedging activity drives overall return prospects lower,” says Schroders’ Mr George.

施羅德投資管理公司的喬治表示：“即便中國(guó)在岸債券的收益率極具吸引力，但對(duì)沖活動(dòng)會(huì)抹去很大一部分額外收益，拉低總回報(bào)率前景。”