美國應(yīng)歡迎中國登上全球金融舞臺

World finance ministers will next month descend on Washington for the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For the first time since they were founded, it is not clear that some ministers will be welcomed.

世界各國財長將于下月齊聚華盛頓，參加國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)和世界銀行(World Bank)的春季會議。不知道一些財長是否會受到歡迎，這是自這兩個組織創(chuàng)建以來首次出現(xiàn)這種情況。

This month, Donald Trump, US president, submitted a budget that cut World Bank contributions by $650m and reduced US participation in the IMF.

本月，美國總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)遞交了一份預(yù)算，將美國對世界銀行的出資削減6.5億美元，還減少了美國在IMF的參與度。

As the US scales back its participation on the global stage, China has been scaling up. Ever since the financial crisis, Chinese institutions have been providing lifelines to foreign countries and billions of dollars in development finance.

在美國減少其在全球舞臺上的參與力度之際，中國正在增加自己的戲份。自全球金融危機(jī)以來，中國機(jī)構(gòu)一直在向外國提供救助，并提供了數(shù)十億美元的發(fā)展資金。

China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, is playing a growing role in providing a backstop for international liquidity. In the wake of the financial crisis, Zhou Xiaochuan, the PBoC governor, raised eyebrows when he said “the desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system . . .  is to create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies”.

在為國際流動性提供支持方面，中國央行發(fā)揮著越來越重要的作用。在全球金融危機(jī)之后，中國央行行長周小川發(fā)表了一番讓外界驚詫的言論，他當(dāng)時表示：“創(chuàng)造一種與主權(quán)國家脫鉤、并能保持幣值長期穩(wěn)定的國際儲備貨幣，從而避免主權(quán)信用貨幣作為儲備貨幣的內(nèi)在缺陷，是國際貨幣體系改革的理想目標(biāo)。”。

In addition to strong words, the PBoC governor has taken some steps. According to a forthcoming paper by Daniel McDowell, a professor at Syracuse University, the PBoC has made available about $550bn in local currency swaps around the world.

除了強(qiáng)硬的措辭之外，周小川還采取了一些措施。雪城大學(xué)(Syracuse University)教授丹尼爾•麥克道爾(Daniel McDowell)即將發(fā)表的一篇論文稱，中國央行在世界范圍內(nèi)簽訂了總額約5500億美元的人民幣互換協(xié)議。

As Eswar Prasad, a Cornell University economist, has noted in a new book, these swaps do not mean the renminbi is taking over. The US dollar is still the world’s major currency and its Federal Reserve made unlimited amounts of dollars available in the wake of the crisis. That said, China’s swaps are huge, helping to facilitate trade and may pave the way to bigger things to come.

正如康奈爾大學(xué)(Cornell University)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家埃斯瓦爾•普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)在他的新書中所指出的，這些貨幣互換協(xié)議并不意味著人民幣正取代美元。美元仍是全球最主要的貨幣，而且美聯(lián)儲(Fed)在金融危機(jī)之后提供了無限量的美元。盡管如此，中國的貨幣互換規(guī)模巨大，有利于促進(jìn)貿(mào)易并可能會為未來更重要的行動鋪平道路。

In addition, China is also leading by example. In a step more in tune with what the framers of the Bretton Woods agreements intended, the PBoC has been re-regulating capital flows to mitigate financial instability and prevent a huge devaluation in its currency. At the same time, the Trump administration is pledging to roll back the financial regulations put in place after the crisis.

另外，中國也在做出表率。中國央行一直在重新加強(qiáng)對資本流動的監(jiān)管，以減輕金融不穩(wěn)定和防止人民幣大幅貶值，這類舉措更符合布雷頓森林(Bretton Woods)協(xié)議制定者的初衷。與此同時，特朗普政府卻承諾廢除金融危機(jī)之后出臺的金融監(jiān)管規(guī)定。

China has emerged as a leader in development finance as well. The global wing of China’s national development bank, the China Development Bank, has a loan book of close to $400bn. Its partner, the Export-Import Bank of China, holds approximately $300bn. The two have a larger basket of assets than the World Bank and all the regional multilateral development banks combined.

中國還成為了發(fā)展融資方面的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。中國國家開發(fā)銀行(CDB)國際業(yè)務(wù)部門的貸款總額接近4000億美元。其伙伴中國進(jìn)出口銀行(Export-Import Bank of China)發(fā)放的貸款也有3000億美元左右。這兩家銀行的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模超過世界銀行以及所有區(qū)域多邊發(fā)展銀行的總和。

In addition to these two banks, China has created about $116bn in bilateral and regional funds, such as the Silk Road Fund, that will invest in China’s “Marshall Plan”, the Belt and Road initiative. Other vehicles include the China-Latin America and the China-Africa Development funds, which are providing support for infrastructure and industrial transformation.

除了這兩家銀行，中國還設(shè)立了約1160億美元的多邊和區(qū)域基金，例如絲路基金(Silk Road Fund)，目標(biāo)是投資于中國的“馬歇爾計劃”(Marshall Plan)——“一帶一路”計劃。其他工具包括中拉合作基金和中非發(fā)展基金，為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和工業(yè)改革提供支持。

Of course, China has also taken the lead in creating two new development banks — the Asian Infrastructure Investment (AIIB) and the New Development banks — that begin with $50bn in start-up capital but aspire to have close to $350bn by 2020.

當(dāng)然，中國還牽頭設(shè)立了兩家擁有龐大資本金的新發(fā)展銀行：亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行(Asian Infrastructure Investment，簡稱：亞投行)和新開發(fā)銀行(New Development Bank)。

What is more, China’s institutions appear to be more flexible. As Justin Yifu Lin, former chief economist at the World Bank, notes in a new book he co-wrote (Going Beyond Aid: Development Cooperation for Structural Transformation), China’s development institutions blend concessional and non-concessional financial instruments with grants and commercial sector involvement in creative ways that are unimaginable for Washington-backed institutions.

另外，中國機(jī)構(gòu)似乎更靈活。正如世行前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家林毅夫(Justin Yifu Lin)在他與人合寫的新書(《超越發(fā)展援助》(Going Beyond Aid: Development Cooperation for Structural Transformation))中所指出的那樣，中國的開發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)把優(yōu)惠及非優(yōu)惠金融工具與資助和商業(yè)參與結(jié)合在一起，其采用的創(chuàng)造性手段是美國支持的機(jī)構(gòu)無法想象的。

Jin Liqun, head of the AIIB, recently told the Financial Times: “Now that China has developed, it is our turn to contribute.”

亞投行行長金立群最近告訴英國《金融時報》：“中國已經(jīng)有所發(fā)展，現(xiàn)在是我們貢獻(xiàn)的時候了。”

On many levels, China’s contributions could not come at a better time. The financial crisis proved that the IMF and the Fed need more firepower to prevent and mitigate a crisis. What is more, the world economy needs to invest $6tn a year over the next 15 years to plug gaps in developing country infrastructure and to rebuild the neglected infrastructure of industrialised countries. And although great progress has been made, there are still more than 700m people living in extreme poverty on the planet.

從很多層面來說，中國的貢獻(xiàn)來的正是時候。全球金融危機(jī)證明，IMF和美聯(lián)儲需要更多資金防范和緩和危機(jī)。另外，未來15年，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)需要每年投資6萬億美元來彌補(bǔ)發(fā)展中國家在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施方面的差距并重建工業(yè)化國家受忽視的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。盡管世界取得了巨大進(jìn)步，但還有7億多人生活在極度貧困中。

The Trump administration’s proposed cuts to global economic institutions appear to be yet another sign of a US retreat into isolationism. Rather than withdrawing, Washington should be leading the way to embrace China’s efforts and figure out ways to co-ordinate with, and complement, China’s new global economic prowess.

特朗普政府?dāng)M削減美國對全球經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的出資，這是表明美國正退回到孤立主義的另一個跡象。其實，美國不但不應(yīng)后退，還應(yīng)帶頭對中國的努力表示歡迎，想辦法配合——和補(bǔ)充——中國在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域新展現(xiàn)出來的才能。

Kevin P Gallagher is a professor of global development policy at Boston University’s Pardee School for Global Studies, where he co-directs the Global Economic Governance Initiative. His latest book is “The China Triangle”.

本文作者是波士頓大學(xué)(Boston University)帕迪全球研究學(xué)院(Pardee School of Global Studies)全球發(fā)展政策教授，是該院“全球經(jīng)濟(jì)治理計劃”(Global Economic Governance Initiative)的負(fù)責(zé)人之一。他的最新著作是《中國三角》(The China Triangle)。