美國下一步對(duì)朝鮮的三個(gè)選項(xiàng)
曾在小布什(George W Bush)政府期間擔(dān)任白宮朝鮮事務(wù)顧問的維克托•查(Victor Cha)，把朝鮮這個(gè)封閉的國家描述為“艱難選擇之地”。這是特朗普(Trump)政府下令重審美國對(duì)這個(gè)充滿侵略性、與世隔絕的國家的戰(zhàn)略幾周之后所面臨的現(xiàn)實(shí)。
Rex Tillerson, US secretary of state, will visit Asia next week in an attempt to “try and generate a new approach to North Korea”. The former Exxon chief may struggle to find fresh ideas. Here are his options:
國務(wù)卿雷克斯•蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)將于下周出訪亞洲，試圖“嘗試和形成一種新的對(duì)朝策略”。這位前?？松梨?ExxonMobil)掌舵人也許很難找到新想法。這里是他的幾個(gè)選項(xiàng)：
Cut a deal
達(dá)成協(xié)議
On the campaign trail last year, Donald Trump said he would be willing to sit down for a burger with Kim Jong Un.
在去年的競(jìng)選中，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)表示，他愿意和金正恩(Kim Jong Un)一起坐下來吃漢堡。
The suggestion, while unlikely given North Korea’s supreme leader has not ventured past his own borders since he ascended to power, raised the prospect that the US under a self-professed dealmaker president could strike a landmark agreement.
鑒于朝鮮最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人自上臺(tái)后從未冒險(xiǎn)離開本國，這一提議不大可能實(shí)現(xiàn)，但它增加了自封為交易撮合者的總統(tǒng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的美國與朝鮮達(dá)成一項(xiàng)里程碑式協(xié)議的可能性。
The notion has some currency among North Korea watchers, who believe the country would be more inclined to negotiate on its nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes if its back was not against the wall.
這個(gè)想法在一定程度上獲得了朝鮮觀察家的支持。他們認(rèn)為，如果不是毫無退路，朝鮮將更愿意就其核武器和彈道武器計(jì)劃展開談判。
“If the US really hopes to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula, it should stop looking for ways to stifle North Korea’s economy and undermine Kim Jong Un’s regime and start finding ways to make Pyongyang feel more secure,” wrote John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University, in a recent Foreign Affairs article.
不久前，延世大學(xué)(Yonsei University)教授魯樂漢(John Delury)在《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)撰文稱：“如果美國真的希望實(shí)現(xiàn)朝鮮半島的和平，那么就應(yīng)該停止想方設(shè)法扼殺朝鮮的經(jīng)濟(jì)和破壞金正恩政權(quán)，而要開始想辦法使平壤方面感到更安全。”
“This might sound counterintuitive. But consider this: North Korea will start focusing on its prosperity instead of its self-preservation only once it no longer has to worry about its own destruction.”
“這聽起來可能違反直覺，但請(qǐng)考慮一點(diǎn)，朝鮮只有不再擔(dān)心自己被摧毀，才會(huì)開始關(guān)注其國內(nèi)繁榮，而不是自衛(wèi)。”
Such a deal might entail the cancellation of US-South Korea military drills or even the prospect of an official peace treaty on the Korean peninsula in exchange for a moratorium on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development.
這樣的協(xié)議也許包括取消美韓軍事演習(xí)，甚至包括就朝鮮半島問題簽署正式和平條約、換取朝鮮暫停開發(fā)核武器的可能性。
On Monday Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said such a “dual suspension” would help break the security dilemma. Beijing, a long-time ally of Pyongyang, is widely seen as pivotal player in any scenario.
中國外長(zhǎng)王毅周一表示，這種“雙暫停”將有助于擺脫安全困境。外界廣泛認(rèn)為，朝鮮的長(zhǎng)期盟友中國在任何解決方案中都是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵角色。
The carrot and stick
胡蘿卜加大棒
For most officials and experts, including former US director of national intelligence James Clapper, the possibility of voluntary de-nuclearisation is a lost cause.
對(duì)于包括前美國國家情報(bào)總監(jiān)(DNI)詹姆斯•克拉珀(James Clapper)在內(nèi)的大多數(shù)官員和專家而言，朝鮮自愿棄核的可能性根本不存在。
Yet for others it must be the first step. Without it, the world is simply “borrowing tomorrow’s peace”, according to Chun Yung-woo, a former leader of South Korean negotiations with the North.
但對(duì)于其他人來說，棄核必須是第一步。曾任韓國對(duì)朝談判主要代表的千英宇(Chun Yung-woo)表示，沒有這一步，世界只是在“透支明天的和平”。
Previous deals with North Korea have been undercut by mutual distrust and a lack of transparency in Pyongyang. The breathing space gained from reduced tensions ultimately helped the regime propel its weapons programmes.
以前與朝鮮達(dá)成的協(xié)議，因彼此猜忌和平壤方面缺乏透明度而受到削弱。從緊張減輕中獲得的喘息空間，最終幫助朝鮮政權(quán)加快了其武器研發(fā)計(jì)劃。
Critics of a deal scenario, including Mr Chun, argue that sanctions must be ratcheted up to the point where the Kim regime is on the edge of collapse. Then aggressive diplomacy must be enacted to force Mr Kim to abandon his nuclear ambitions.
包括千英宇在內(nèi)的對(duì)達(dá)成協(xié)議的前景持批評(píng)態(tài)度的人認(rèn)為，必須加大制裁力度，直到金正恩政權(quán)走到崩潰邊緣。接著，必須啟動(dòng)強(qiáng)勢(shì)的外交攻勢(shì)，迫使金正恩放棄他的核野心。
Such experts believe the young marshal will only negotiate when faced with overthrow at home borne out of economic turmoil.
這些專家認(rèn)為，只有在國內(nèi)面對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩引發(fā)的政權(quán)被推翻危險(xiǎn)時(shí)，這位年輕元帥才會(huì)進(jìn)行談判。
“Sanctions should be a tool to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table,” said Yang Moo-jin from the University of North Korean studies in Seoul.
“制裁應(yīng)該成為使朝鮮回到談判桌的工具，”首爾朝鮮研究大學(xué)(University of North Korean Studies)的楊武仁(Yang Moo-jin)表示。
This line of reasoning, however, is undermined by the ineffectiveness of the current round of sanctions, the most severe yet.
然而，當(dāng)前這一輪制裁未奏效，削弱了這種推理思路。這輪制裁是迄今最嚴(yán)厲的一輪。
The US could bolster these measures with a secondary boycott of Chinese companies doing business with North Korea, said Kim Jaechun, a professor at Sogang University, but that “would do irreparable harm to its ties with China”.
西江大學(xué)(Sogang University)教授金宰春(Kim Jae-chun)說，美國可以通過抵制跟朝鮮做生意的中國企業(yè)，加大制裁力度，但這“將給美中關(guān)系造成不可挽回的損害”。
Another option would be to freeze North Korea out of the international banking system — a possibility that gained ground on Wednesday with reports that Swift, the financial messaging service, had banned three North Korean banks.
另一個(gè)選項(xiàng)是把朝鮮趕出國際銀行體系——周三，這種可能性有所加大，有報(bào)道稱，金融通訊服務(wù)商Swift已禁止三家朝鮮銀行使用其系統(tǒng)。
Pre-emptive strike 先發(fā)制人的打擊
The likely consequences of an attack on North Korea would be so catastrophic the option is rarely discussed seriously.
攻擊朝鮮造成的可能后果將極為慘重，以至于這一選項(xiàng)很少被認(rèn)真討論。
In the 1990s US President Bill Clinton considered it, only to be dissuaded by estimates of 1m South Korean casualties in retaliatory strikes from Pyongyang.
在20世紀(jì)90年代，美國總統(tǒng)比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)考慮過該選項(xiàng)，但朝鮮的報(bào)復(fù)性打擊可能給韓國造成100萬傷亡，令他放棄了。
The South Korean capital, Seoul, sits a little more than a marathon-run from the border between the two countries — the most militarised zone on earth.
韓國首都首爾與朝韓邊境的距離略大于馬拉松跑的全程長(zhǎng)度。朝韓邊境是世界上軍事化程度最高的區(qū)域。
Mr Cha on Wednesday said the chances of a strike were “not high because the North Koreans are now getting more and more sophisticated”.
維克托•查周三表示，軍事打擊的可能性“不太大，因?yàn)槌r軍隊(duì)的能力越來越強(qiáng)”。
“In the end the North Korean actions are going to predetermine the outcome of the [US] policy review . . . The North Koreans are really not giving Trump any room on this.”
“最終，朝鮮的行動(dòng)將預(yù)先決定(美國)政策審查的結(jié)果……朝鮮人在這方面真的沒給特朗普留下任何空間。”
