FT社評：朝鮮問題亟需國際干預(yù)

The Asia-Pacific region is an increasingly important driver of global growth, and sits in an increasingly delicate strategic equilibrium. One country poses an imminent danger to the region’s stability and therefore its prosperity: North Korea. The regime in Pyongyang is persistent in pursuit of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deploy them over long distances. The stand-off is terribly dangerous already, and will grow worse. Stronger international engagement is needed — now.

亞太地區(qū)是全球增長的一個越來越重要的驅(qū)動力，而其所處的戰(zhàn)略平衡卻越來越脆弱。有一個國家對該地區(qū)穩(wěn)定及繁榮構(gòu)成迫在眉睫的威脅，那就是朝鮮。平壤政權(quán)執(zhí)著地追求發(fā)展核武，以及能夠搭載核武的遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈。這種對峙局面已經(jīng)十分危險，而且還會變得更糟糕。國際社會需要立即進(jìn)行更強有力的干預(yù)。

Experts believe that North Korea possesses more than 20 nuclear bombs. It has deployed ballistic missiles with ranges that extend to Japan, and has been performing tests with the aim of developing missiles that can reach the west coast of the US. It is a matter of time before it can make nuclear bombs compact enough for such missiles to carry: five years is the consensus estimate. The US and its allies could not and should not tolerate this. The threat is not limited to the Pacific. In 2008, US government officials alleged that Pyongyang had attempted to help Syria develop a nuclear facility.

專家相信朝鮮擁有超過20枚核彈。朝鮮已部署射程可至日本的彈道導(dǎo)彈，而且一直在進(jìn)行導(dǎo)彈試驗，目標(biāo)是開發(fā)出射程能達(dá)到美國西海岸的導(dǎo)彈。朝鮮制造出小巧到遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈足以攜帶的核彈只是時間問題，外界對這個時間的普遍估計為5年。美國及其盟國對此不能也不應(yīng)容忍。這一威脅不止局限于太平洋。2008年，美國政府官員宣稱平壤方面曾企圖幫助敘利亞發(fā)展核設(shè)施。

The international community needs to bring North Korea back to the table for multilateral talks, with the end of the missile programme as the proximate goal. There are three keys for success. First, an unambiguous warning to Pyongyang that the world will never, under any conditions, acknowledge it as a legitimate or permanent nuclear power. Second, backing these warnings with heavier sanctions. Finally, the US, South Korea and Japan must accelerate their co-operation on a missile defence network in the region.

國際社會需要讓朝鮮重返多邊談判，以結(jié)束導(dǎo)彈計劃為近期目標(biāo)。想要成功達(dá)成該目標(biāo)有三個關(guān)鍵點。首先，明確警告平壤方面，不管在任何條件下，全世界都絕不會承認(rèn)它是合法、永久的擁核國。其次，以更嚴(yán)厲的制裁來支撐這一警告。最后，美國、韓國和日本必須加快它們在該地區(qū)導(dǎo)彈防御網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的合作。

On sanctions, the crucial issue is support from China. In November the UN Security Council, in response to North Korea’s latest nuclear test, passed multilateral sanctions targeting the coal trade. Coal is one of the country’s key sources of hard currency, but this will not be enough. In negotiations with China, the US reportedly called for tougher measures, such as an oil embargo. China would not agree. It has good reason: if the regime were to collapse, it faces the prospect of refugees flooding over its border or even sharing a border with a unified Korea that is a US ally and host to US troops.

制裁方面，關(guān)鍵問題是要得到中國支持。聯(lián)合國安理會(UN Security Council)在11月通過了對朝鮮煤炭貿(mào)易的多邊制裁，作為對朝鮮最近一次核試驗的回應(yīng)。煤炭是朝鮮獲得硬通貨的主要來源之一，但這一制裁還不夠。據(jù)報道，美國在與中國的談判中要求采取更嚴(yán)厲的措施，例如石油禁運。中國不會同意美國的要求，其理由很充分：如果平壤政權(quán)崩潰，中國面對的將是難民如潮水一般向中國邊境涌來，而且中國甚至可能要與一個作為美國盟友、有美軍駐守的統(tǒng)一的朝鮮比鄰而居。

Yet China accounts for 90 per cent of North Korea’s international trade. Without some degree of Chinese co-operation, UN sanctions cannot tighten meaningfully. A middle way, in which China notches up the pressure without posing an existential threat to the Pyongyang regime, must be found.

中國占朝鮮國際貿(mào)易的90%，沒有中方一定程度的合作，聯(lián)合國制裁就無法真正收緊。各方必須找到一條中間道路，讓中國能夠在不對平壤政權(quán)的存亡構(gòu)成威脅的情況下增加對朝鮮的施壓。

If the US, Japan and South Korea, accelerate missile defence co-operation, they could increase their own safety while giving China reason to adjust its stance. The three countries have already moved in this direction. The trio also conducted its first joint missile defence exercise in Hawaii in June. In July, Washington and Seoul agreed to deploy a new American missile defence system in South Korea. In November, Japan and South Korea signed an intelligence pact.

如果美日韓三方加快導(dǎo)彈防御合作，他們就可以在增強自身安全的同時，讓中國有理由調(diào)整其立場。這三個國家已經(jīng)在朝這個方向邁進(jìn)，三國還于今年6月在夏威夷舉行了第一次聯(lián)合導(dǎo)彈防御演習(xí)。7月，美韓兩國政府同意在韓國部署一個新的美制導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)。11月，日本和韓國簽署了一項情報協(xié)定。

China opposes high-altitude defence deployment in South Korea. It appears to worry that it will weaken its own missile capability. This opens the way for a quid pro quo: help with sanctions in return for missile defence concessions.

中國反對在韓國部署高空防御系統(tǒng)。中方似乎擔(dān)心該系統(tǒng)會削弱自己導(dǎo)彈的威力。這為達(dá)成交換提供了機會：中方以配合對朝制裁換取美韓在導(dǎo)彈防御方面作出讓步。

Progress will be made infinitely more difficult if China-US relations degrade. President-elect Donald Trump appears intent on shaking up the relationship, using Taiwan as a bargaining chip. If pursued, this will become a game for the highest possible stakes. One must hope that the Mr Trump has thought through his strategy. At the very least, it puts progress on North Korea in doubt.

如果中美關(guān)系惡化，這一進(jìn)程的推進(jìn)難度將大大增加。美國當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)似乎一心打算改變美中關(guān)系格局，將臺灣作為議價籌碼。如果他推行這一策略，這將是一盤賭注無窮高的游戲。只求特朗普的這一策略是經(jīng)過深思熟慮的。至少，這一策略讓能否在朝鮮問題上取得進(jìn)展變得不好說了。