FT社評：卡斯特羅身后的美古關(guān)系

This time, the news of Fidel Castro’s death is true, rather than a product of wishful thinking. The Cuban revolutionary died on Friday. His legacy will be discussed in the days to come. Ironically, though, his passing is largely symbolic: Havana has prepared for this moment for years. Since he was stricken by a near-fatal illness a decade ago, his younger brother, Raúl Castro, 85, has been in charge.

這一次，菲德爾•卡斯特羅(Fidel Castro)逝世的消息是真的，而不是一種一廂情愿的想象。上周五，這位古巴革命者逝世。在接下來的幾天里，人們將就他身后留下的遺產(chǎn)開展討論。不過，諷刺的是，他的逝世在很大程度上只具有象征意義：古巴政府已為這一刻準(zhǔn)備了許多年。自十年前菲德爾患上一種近乎致命的疾病以來，他的弟弟、85歲的勞爾•卡斯特羅(Raúl Castro)一直在掌權(quán)。

Nonetheless, symbols are important. Over the past eight years, Raúl, spurred by the economic collapse of Cuba’s closest ally Venezuela, has led a modest programme of reforms to Cuba’s Soviet-style economy. He also welcomed Barack Obama to Havana earlier this year, a culmination of the US president’s efforts at rapprochement after half a century of mutual enmity. Fidel opposed both. Though retired, he was treated by hardliners as a court of appeal against domestic reforms. Even as a doddering invalid in a comfy track suit, he was a symbol for anyone in the US opposed to closer relations. Fidel’s death, therefore, increases the chances of change at the margin. It may give Raúl space to pursue the domestic reforms that Cuba so desperately needs. It also removes an emotional barrier to further US engagement.

不過，象征意義也十分重要。過去八年里，在古巴最親密盟友委內(nèi)瑞拉經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰的刺激下，勞爾領(lǐng)導(dǎo)了對古巴蘇聯(lián)式經(jīng)濟(jì)的溫和改革。今年早些時候，他還曾歡迎美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)到訪哈瓦那，這是奧巴馬恢復(fù)兩國關(guān)系的努力的頂峰。此前，兩國在長達(dá)半個世紀(jì)的時間里一直相互敵對。對上述兩項舉動，菲德爾都不支持。盡管他已經(jīng)退休，古巴的強(qiáng)硬派人士依然把他當(dāng)作反對國內(nèi)改革的上訴法庭。即使他身穿舒適的運(yùn)動服、拖著蹣跚的病弱之軀，對于美國任何反對拉近美古關(guān)系的人來說，他依然是一個象征符號。因此，菲德爾的逝世增大了古巴改革的可能性。它也許會為勞爾實(shí)施古巴急需的國內(nèi)改革創(chuàng)造空間。它也消除了美國進(jìn)一步加強(qiáng)對古關(guān)系的一大心理障礙。

Much depends on whether president-elect Donald Trump decides to work with or challenge communist Havana. Mr Trump sent mixed messages about Cuba during his campaign. At times he said he said he would continue Mr Obama’s policy of restoring diplomatic relations and loosening travel restrictions, although he would get “a better deal”. At other times he has said he would reverse the policy — easily done, as most of Mr Obama’s measures were executive decisions, reversible with the stroke of a pen (lifting the Cuban embargo, rather than relaxing it, is up to Congress).

未來美古關(guān)系在很大程度上取決于美國當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)是決定與共產(chǎn)主義的古巴政府合作還是對抗。在競選期間，在古巴問題上特朗普傳遞出的信號并不一致。有時候特朗普表示，會繼續(xù)實(shí)施奧巴馬恢復(fù)對古外交關(guān)系、放寬旅游限制的政策——不過他會達(dá)成“更好的協(xié)議”。而在另外一些場合，特朗普還曾表示會撤銷這一政策。這一點(diǎn)很容易做到，因?yàn)閵W巴馬的舉措多數(shù)是行政決策，動動筆就可以將其撤銷(不過，解除對古巴的禁運(yùn)——而不是放寬——則要由美國國會決定)。

Mr Trump, who owes little to Cuban-American lawmakers such as Florida Senator Marco Rubio, an opponent in the Republican primaries, has given little indication as to which way he may go. He may pressure Havana for concessions — freedom for political prisoners or preferential access for US goods in the Cuban market — in order to show he is a strongman.

對于類似佛羅里達(dá)州參議員馬可•魯比奧(Marco Rubio，特朗普在共和黨初選時的對手)這樣的古巴裔美籍議員，特朗普并不虧欠什么。特朗普現(xiàn)在并未表現(xiàn)出會選擇哪條政策路線的跡象。為了顯示自己是個強(qiáng)勢人物，他也許會向古巴政府施加壓力迫使對方讓步——釋放政治犯或者讓美國商品優(yōu)先進(jìn)入古巴市場。

Cuba is unlikely to give immediate reason for warmer relations. Retreating into the bunker is Havana’s usual response to uncertainty. A clampdown on dissent is likely. Amid a week of national mourning, the government has launched a campaign to have millions of Cubans sign a pledge to be faithful to Fidel’s “ideas and our socialism”. Further on, the socialist bureaucracy is inherently opposed to change. And should Raúl step down in 2018, as he has pledged, his children and in-laws could sustain the dynasty.

古巴不太可能立即提供美古關(guān)系轉(zhuǎn)暖的理由。對于不確定的局面，古巴政府通常的反應(yīng)方式是撤回堡壘中。古巴可能會出現(xiàn)對異見人士的打壓。在為期一周的全國哀悼期間，古巴政府發(fā)起了一場運(yùn)動，讓成百上千萬的古巴人簽署承諾，發(fā)誓忠于菲德爾的“理念和我們的社會主義”。此外，這個社會主義的官僚體系天性反對變革。一旦2018年勞爾依照承諾下臺，他的子女及其配偶可能會繼續(xù)將這一王朝維持下去。

But Cuba — shorn of financial support from Venezuela — is posturing from a position of weakness. If Mr Trump really believes in “America first”, he will engage with Havana rather than retreat. It is in the US interest to compete with Russia and China in the Caribbean, and to allow US business entrée to Cuba. Cuba, which takes a hard line on drug trafficking and played a key role in getting Colombia’s Marxist rebels to lay down their guns, is a natural ally against terrorism. Continued rapprochement does not guarantee a happy end to Fidel’s rule but increases the chances of a soft landing.

不過，失去了委內(nèi)瑞拉財政支持的古巴不論擺出什么姿態(tài)實(shí)際都處于弱勢。如果特朗普真的相信“美國優(yōu)先”，他會與古巴政府接觸而不是后撤。在加勒比海地區(qū)與俄羅斯和中國競爭并允許美國企業(yè)進(jìn)入古巴，符合美國的利益。古巴對毒品走私持強(qiáng)硬立場，還曾發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用讓哥倫比亞的馬克思主義叛軍放下武器。它將是美國打擊恐怖主義的天然盟友。雙方繼續(xù)和解雖然并不能確保菲德爾家族的統(tǒng)治以愉快的方式結(jié)束，卻可以增大軟著陸的可能性。

The alternative is to slam the door. That would only hamper, rather than speed, the limited but important changes taking place in Cuba. These have improved the lives of many Cubans and weakened the control of the state over their lives. For Fidel, reversing that progress would be a last victory from the grave.

另一個選擇則是關(guān)上美古之間的大門。這么做只會阻礙、而不是加速古巴正在發(fā)生的有限而重要的改革。這些改革措施已改善了許多古巴人的生活，并削弱了政府對他們生活的控制。對菲德爾來說，如果這一變革進(jìn)程逆轉(zhuǎn)，那會是他在墳?zāi)估锏淖詈髣倮?br />