與中國(guó)打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，特朗普贏(yíng)不了

Who gains from a trade war with China?

誰(shuí)從與中國(guó)打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中獲利?

At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru over the weekend, one of the biggest questions was whether Donald J. Trump, as the next president, will stick to his threat to erect steep trade barriers against Beijing, dragging the United States into a tit-for-tat confrontation with the world’s second-largest economy.

上周末，在秘魯舉行的亞太經(jīng)濟(jì)合作組織峰會(huì)上，一個(gè)最大的問(wèn)題是，作為下一任總統(tǒng)唐納德·J·特朗普是否會(huì)堅(jiān)持他的威脅，即針對(duì)北京建立高貿(mào)易壁壘，將美國(guó)拖入一場(chǎng)與世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體針?shù)h相對(duì)的對(duì)抗。

No such war has begun, yet it seems clear that the United States has already lost. China has been steadily gaining in the global economic system.

這種戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)尚未開(kāi)始，但似乎很明顯美國(guó)已經(jīng)失敗了。中國(guó)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中的獲利一直在穩(wěn)步增長(zhǎng)。

Waging war against globalization, America is making China’s case. Eswar Prasad, a former head of the Chinese division at the International Monetary Fund, argues that “over the long term China comes out a winner no matter what.”

美國(guó)發(fā)動(dòng)的反全球化攻勢(shì)，正在讓中國(guó)的地位得到提升。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)IMF)前中國(guó)部門(mén)負(fù)責(zé)人埃斯瓦爾·普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)稱(chēng)，“從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，中國(guó)無(wú)論如何都是贏(yíng)家。”

China’s economy would surely suffer if the United States were to impose a 45 percent tariff on nearly $500 billion worth of Chinese imports. The United States absorbs only 16 percent of Chinese exports, but it is China’s healthiest export market. Fears of American protectionism are already stoking capital flight from China.

如果美國(guó)對(duì)價(jià)值近5000億美元的中國(guó)進(jìn)口商品征收45%的關(guān)稅，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)肯定會(huì)受到損害。雖然美國(guó)只吸收了中國(guó)出口的16%，但美國(guó)是中國(guó)最健康的出口市場(chǎng)。對(duì)美國(guó)保護(hù)主義的恐懼已經(jīng)激起了中國(guó)的資本外逃。

But China might be better placed than the United States to take the blow. And it would certainly counterpunch. An editorial in China’s Global Times, a Communist Party mouthpiece, is probably not far-off in its warning that American action would mean: “A batch of Boeing orders will be replaced by Airbus. U.S. auto and iPhone sales in China will suffer a setback, and U.S. soybean and maize imports will be halted.”

但中國(guó)或許能比美國(guó)更好地經(jīng)受住這種打擊。中國(guó)肯定也會(huì)反擊。中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨喉舌《環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)》的一篇社論做出的警告也許與實(shí)際情況差得并不太遠(yuǎn)，社論稱(chēng)美國(guó)的行動(dòng)將意味著：“大量波音飛機(jī)的訂單將轉(zhuǎn)到歐洲空客手里，美國(guó)汽車(chē)的在華銷(xiāo)售將受重挫，蘋(píng)果手機(jī)差不多要被擠走，美國(guó)大豆、玉米將從中國(guó)絕跡。”

China has several ways to retaliate. It could bar state-owned companies from doing business with American businesses. It could limit access to essential commodities, as it did in response to a fishing dispute with Japan by stopping exports of so-called rare earth minerals essential to the electronics industry. It could soft-pedal efforts to combat the piracy of American patents and copyrights.

中國(guó)有幾種報(bào)復(fù)方式。它可以禁止國(guó)有企業(yè)與美國(guó)公司做生意。它可以限制基本商品的出口，就像中國(guó)曾停止向日本出口電子工業(yè)必不可少的所謂稀土礦石，以作為對(duì)與日本漁業(yè)爭(zhēng)端的回應(yīng)。中國(guó)還可以放松對(duì)盜版美國(guó)專(zhuān)利和版權(quán)的打擊。

Some of the United States’ most successful companies would be in for a rough ride. The vast majority of Apple’s iPhones, for example, are assembled in China. The assembly costs, though, account for less than 4 percent of the value added of the device. That means China could force a halt in iPhone production at little cost to itself, while Apple would face a deeply disruptive, expensive effort to shift production elsewhere. Building it from scratch in the United States is nearly impossible.

美國(guó)一些最成功的企業(yè)將面臨艱難的前景。比如，絕大多數(shù)蘋(píng)果手機(jī)在中國(guó)組裝。但是，組裝成本只占不到4%的設(shè)備附加價(jià)值。這意味著中國(guó)可以迫使iPhone停止生產(chǎn)而不給自己帶來(lái)多少代價(jià)，蘋(píng)果公司卻得把生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到其他地方去，將需要做出破壞性極大的高成本努力。在美國(guó)從零開(kāi)始制造iPhone幾乎不可能。

How long could American resolve hold? An analysis by the pro-trade Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded that a full-blown trade war with China and Mexico would push unemployment in the United States to nearly 9 percent in 2020, from 4.9 percent today. That would not improve the economic outlook for millions of working-class Americans in whose name Mr. Trump proposed this fight.

美國(guó)的決心可以持續(xù)多久?支持貿(mào)易的彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所的一份分析給出的結(jié)論是，與中國(guó)和墨西哥進(jìn)行全面貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，將在2020年讓美國(guó)的失業(yè)率提高到近9%，如今的失業(yè)率是4.9%，這將無(wú)法改善數(shù)百萬(wàn)工薪階層美國(guó)人民的經(jīng)濟(jì)前景，而特朗普正是以他們的名義提出要打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的。

And that may not even be the worst part. Circling the wagons around the American border plays directly into China’s hands in other ways.

這可能還不是最糟糕的部分。美國(guó)從國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上抽身也讓中國(guó)在其他方面有機(jī)可乘。

Washington would be cast as the villain in the fight. No matter how many tricks the Chinese government might deploy against American interests, it would remain the victim in the eyes of many nations, a champion for the cause of open rules-based trade.

華盛頓將在這場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中被視為反面角色。無(wú)論中國(guó)政府在反抗美國(guó)利益上可能采取多少伎倆，它仍會(huì)在許多國(guó)家眼里保持著受害者的身份，保持著為開(kāi)放、以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的貿(mào)易事業(yè)擔(dān)當(dāng)倡導(dǎo)者的地位。

Even if Mr. Trump is just bluffing, as many of his allies say, to gain leverage in some future negotiation, much of the damage has been done. His bluster has changed the perception of the role the United States will play in the world.

即使像許多盟友所說(shuō)的那樣，特朗普只是在虛張聲勢(shì)，為的是在未來(lái)的談判中獲得優(yōu)勢(shì)，但這已經(jīng)造成了很大的損害。他的威嚇已經(jīng)改變了人們對(duì)美國(guó)在世界上所起到的作用的看法。

Amid a turn toward populist nationalism in other rich countries — like Britain and France — China has emerged in the unlikely role of defender of globalized capitalism.

在其他富裕國(guó)家(如英國(guó)和法國(guó))轉(zhuǎn)向民粹的民族主義之際，中國(guó)已搖身一變，擔(dān)當(dāng)起資本主義全球化捍衛(wèi)者這個(gè)不太可能的角色。

“China is the one major power still talking about increased integration,” said Nicholas Lardy, a China specialist at the Peterson Institute. “China is the only major country in the world projecting the idea that globalization brings benefits.” And that is the United States’ loss.

“中國(guó)是仍在談?wù)撎岣咭惑w化程度的唯一大國(guó)，”彼得森研究所的中國(guó)問(wèn)題專(zhuān)家尼古拉斯·拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)說(shuō)。“中國(guó)是世界上唯一展示全球化帶來(lái)好處觀(guān)念的主要國(guó)家”，這是美國(guó)的損失。

A great many countries in the developing world still believe prosperity depends on their successful integration into the supply chains that traverse the global economy. By turning inward — a move already reinforced by the rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership — the United States appears to have little to offer.

絕大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國(guó)家仍相信，它們的繁榮依賴(lài)于在貫穿全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的供應(yīng)鏈中找到自己成功的位置。美國(guó)的向內(nèi)轉(zhuǎn)移讓這個(gè)國(guó)家似乎不再能為世界提供什么，這已經(jīng)強(qiáng)有力地體現(xiàn)在美國(guó)對(duì)跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系的拒絕上。

Steven Ciobo, Australia’s trade minister, conveyed that point only a few days after the American election by saying that his nation would work to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — a Chinese initiative among 16 Asian and Pacific countries that excludes the United States — and would support Beijing’s proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific. Ditto for Peru and Chile, which, according to a senior Chinese official in Lima, are also now seeking to join the Chinese trade initiative.

澳大利亞貿(mào)易部長(zhǎng)史蒂文·喬博(Steven Ciobo)在美國(guó)大選后僅幾天就表示了這種看法，他說(shuō)，他的國(guó)家將為締結(jié)“區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系”做出努力，這是中國(guó)倡議的、不包括美國(guó)在內(nèi)的16個(gè)亞太國(guó)家的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，協(xié)定將支持北京提出的亞太自由貿(mào)易區(qū)。根據(jù)利馬的一位中國(guó)高級(jí)官員的說(shuō)法，秘魯和智利也正在尋求加入中國(guó)倡議的貿(mào)易協(xié)定。

“Almost certainly every economy in the Asian region sees its future lying more closely linked with China,” Mr. Prasad, the former I.M.F. official, told me. “With Trump talking about withdrawing from trade deals and making allies pay for protection, it will be tough for Asian countries to resist China’s embrace.”

“亞洲地區(qū)的每個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體都幾乎可以肯定地認(rèn)為，自己的未來(lái)與中國(guó)有著更密切的聯(lián)系，”IMF前官員普拉薩德對(duì)我說(shuō)。“在特朗普大談特談退出貿(mào)易協(xié)議、讓盟國(guó)為防御掏錢(qián)的同時(shí)，亞洲國(guó)家將很難抵擋中國(guó)的擁抱。”

And if Washington’s actions against China start to disrupt Asia’s supply chains, the United States could quickly become the region’s economic pariah.

如果華盛頓針對(duì)中國(guó)的行動(dòng)開(kāi)始擾亂亞洲的供應(yīng)鏈的話(huà)，美國(guó)可能很快會(huì)被該地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)所遺棄。

The question is, to what purpose? It can’t simply be about stopping currency manipulation. That’s an outdated fear. Instead of working to lower the value of its currency to improve its exports, China has spent about $1 trillion lately to prop up the value of the renminbi in the face of capital flight. If it stopped, the currency would drop like a stone, enhancing China’s trade competitiveness.

問(wèn)題是，要達(dá)到什么的目?不可能只是關(guān)乎于阻止貨幣操縱。這種恐懼已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)了。中國(guó)已不再為增加進(jìn)出口努力降低其貨幣的價(jià)值。面對(duì)資本外逃，中國(guó)最近花了大約1萬(wàn)億美元來(lái)支撐人民幣的價(jià)值。如果中國(guó)停止這種做法，人民幣的價(jià)值就會(huì)直線(xiàn)下降，從而提高中國(guó)的貿(mào)易競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

Moreover, slapping trade barriers against China would do little to narrow the American trade deficit. American companies building things in China wouldn’t bring much manufacturing home; in most cases they would go to some other country with cheap labor. And to the extent they did “reshore” production, most of it would be highly automated, employing few additional Americans.

此外，給中國(guó)貿(mào)易設(shè)置壁壘對(duì)縮小美國(guó)貿(mào)易逆差幾乎沒(méi)有作用。在中國(guó)制造產(chǎn)品的美國(guó)公司不會(huì)帶回多少制造業(yè);在大多數(shù)情況下，它們會(huì)去另外一些有廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力的國(guó)家。而且，就算“回流”到國(guó)內(nèi)，這種生產(chǎn)在很大程度上也會(huì)是高度自動(dòng)化的，不能給美國(guó)人提供多少額外就業(yè)。

“It does not make economic sense for Trump to want to balance trade with China,” said Derek Scissors, a China specialist at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. “Balanced trade doesn’t bring back jobs.”

“特朗普要與中國(guó)平衡貿(mào)易的說(shuō)法在經(jīng)濟(jì)上講不通，”史劍道(Derek Scissors)說(shuō)，他是保守派的美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的中國(guó)問(wèn)題專(zhuān)家。“平衡貿(mào)易并不能把就業(yè)帶回來(lái)。”

Initially, Mr. Trump might look like a winner, resolute in his defense of the working class. But any increase in popularity would be unlikely to last as the consequences started to become apparent.

特朗普起初可能看似是贏(yíng)家，有決心保衛(wèi)工人階級(jí)。但隨著這些做法的后果開(kāi)始變得明顯，任何特朗普受歡迎程度的提升都不太可能持久。

Washington has already been playing a relatively weak hand trying to contain China’s influence. China has skillfully deployed investments to win over countries from Africa to Latin America, broadening its network of influence. Its proposed Asian infrastructure bank proceeded, despite opposition from the Obama administration, after Britain and other American allies jumped on board.

相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)，華盛頓在試圖遏制中國(guó)的影響力上已經(jīng)沒(méi)有多少手牌可打。中國(guó)已通過(guò)巧妙地利用投資，贏(yíng)得了從非洲到拉丁美洲的不少?lài)?guó)家，擴(kuò)大了自己的影響范圍。中國(guó)建議的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施銀行已經(jīng)成形，盡管亞投行受到奧巴馬政府的反對(duì)，但得到了英國(guó)和其他美國(guó)盟友的參與。

“China is becoming a leading member of the international community,” Mr. Prasad wrote in his new book “Gaining Currency,” but not, “as the West prefers, by being co-opted into existing institutions under the current rules of the game.” Instead, China is “co-opting other countries into the system of rules it wants to dictate.”

“中國(guó)正在成為國(guó)際社會(huì)的主導(dǎo)成員，”普拉薩德在他的新書(shū)《人民幣的崛起》中寫(xiě)道，但不是“以西方喜歡的方式，在現(xiàn)行的游戲規(guī)則下，被納入了現(xiàn)有的體系”。相反，中國(guó)正在“把其他國(guó)家納入它想要建立的規(guī)則體系中”。

Mr. Trump just gave China’s alternative system of rules a big push forward.

特朗普恰好為中國(guó)非傳統(tǒng)規(guī)則體系的前行提供了一臂之力。