杜特爾特對(duì)西方秩序的挑戰(zhàn)

In the past 30 years, a succession of Southeast Asian leaders was supposed to represent a new direction for regional geopolitics. First there was Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad. Then came Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia.

過(guò)去30年中，多位東南亞領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人相繼被認(rèn)為代表了該地區(qū)地緣政治的新方向。先是馬來(lái)西亞的馬哈蒂爾•穆罕默德(Mahathir Mohamad)，之后是泰國(guó)的他信•西那瓦(Thaksin Shinawatra)和印度尼西亞的蘇西洛•班邦•尤多約諾(Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono)。

In the end, none was able to revamp the region and its relationship with the world. But Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines’ new president, may be the first Asian leader to ask the right questions about the future of the region.

到頭來(lái)，沒(méi)有一個(gè)人能改變?cè)摰貐^(qū)及其與世界的關(guān)系。但是菲律賓新總統(tǒng)羅德里戈•杜特爾特(Rodrigo Duterte)或許是首位就該地區(qū)的未來(lái)提出正確問(wèn)題的亞洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。

He made headlines during a trip to Beijing last month by announcing his country’s “separation” from the US and a coming embrace with China. Then he went to Japan, where he called for American troops to leave the Philippines within two years and assured the Japanese that he was not pursuing a military alliance with China.

杜特爾特上個(gè)月訪問(wèn)北京時(shí)宣布菲律賓與美國(guó)“分離”，未來(lái)將與中國(guó)建立緊密關(guān)系，他由此登上了頭條新聞。之后他在訪問(wèn)日本期間喊話美軍在兩年內(nèi)撤出菲律賓，并向日本保證他不會(huì)尋求與中國(guó)建立軍事同盟。

Those outside the region have expressed shock at Mr Duterte’s words, and have deemed him naive at best, dangerous at worst. But this reveals an unwillingness to look beyond the western-led order, spearheaded by the US, as the “natural” state of things.

該地區(qū)以外的人對(duì)杜特爾特的話深表震驚，他們認(rèn)為，說(shuō)得好聽(tīng)些，他是天真，說(shuō)得難聽(tīng)點(diǎn)，他很危險(xiǎn)。但是，這種看法本身就暴露出一種心態(tài)，除了以美國(guó)為首的西方主導(dǎo)的秩序，他們不愿把其他任何一種秩序看作“自然”的事物狀態(tài)。

Mr Duterte is raising questions about who has power, how it is wielded and what self-determination would look like for smaller nations. 關(guān)于誰(shuí)擁有權(quán)力、權(quán)力如何被使用以及自主對(duì)小國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)意味著什么，杜特爾特提出了一些問(wèn)題。

Despite his penchant for blunt language, his different tack has already had results. Take the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The administration of Benigno Aquino, Mr Duterte’s predecessor, rejected any compromise, arguing instead that history and legal precedent meant that it owned islands such as the Scarborough Shoal. China, unsurprisingly, claimed that history and legal precedent supported its own claims.

盡管他喜歡直言，但他截然不同的策略已經(jīng)起到了效果。以南中國(guó)海上的領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端為例。杜特爾特的前任、貝尼尼奧•阿基諾三世(Benigno Aquino III)政府拒絕任何妥協(xié)，認(rèn)為歷史和法律判例說(shuō)明菲律賓擁有斯卡伯勒淺灘(Scarborough Shoal,中國(guó)稱黃巖島——譯者注)等島嶼的主權(quán)。不出意料，中國(guó)聲稱歷史和法律判例支持中方的領(lǐng)土主張。

As tensions increased, there was no evidence that Manila’s strategy was working, especially as the country aligned itself with the US, a prospect that is anathema to China.

隨著局勢(shì)日益緊張，當(dāng)時(shí)沒(méi)有跡象表明馬尼拉方面的策略起到了作用，特別是菲律賓與美國(guó)站在一條線上引起了中國(guó)的反感。

By making his trip to Beijing, and eliciting a reciprocal great show of respect, Mr Duterte has done everyone a favour by cooling things down in the South China Sea. He also returned with billions of dollars in development aid and investment promises. Last week, China quietly stopped blocking Filipino fishermen from accessing the Scarborough Shoal.

通過(guò)出訪北京、彼此間大張旗鼓地互示尊重，杜特爾特讓南中國(guó)海的局勢(shì)平靜了下來(lái)，幫了所有人一個(gè)忙。他還帶回了數(shù)以十億美元計(jì)的發(fā)展援助和投資承諾。最近，中國(guó)悄然停止了阻止菲律賓漁民前往斯卡伯勒淺灘作業(yè)的行動(dòng)。

If all it took was a few polite words and some common sense to defuse the situation, one wonders why no one thought to do it earlier. Perhaps we can call this “Asian-style” diplomacy.

如果想要緩和局勢(shì)所需要的只是一些禮貌的言辭和常識(shí)的話，人們會(huì)納悶之前為什么沒(méi)人想到這么做。或許我們可以把這稱為“亞洲式”外交。

China and the Philippines have a relationship far older than the Philippines’ relationship with the US, and one free of histories of colonialism. China is also re-emerging as the economic and cultural centre of East Asia.

中國(guó)與菲律賓的關(guān)系，要比菲律賓與美國(guó)的關(guān)系久遠(yuǎn)得多，也沒(méi)有殖民歷史。如今中國(guó)也正再次崛起為東亞的經(jīng)濟(jì)和文化中心。

We can even understand Mr Duterte’s attitude to China using the Asian concept of “face”. By heralding Beijing as the focal point for a different economic, political and cultural order, Mr Duterte accorded it a lot of prestige. And, in return, China is willing to support the new Filipino president, perhaps by receding from the issues that divide them. Many in the west — with their focus on credibility, “rational” interests and power as a zero-sum game — will always miss relationships based on prestige and mutual benefit.

我們甚至可以從“臉面”這個(gè)亞洲概念來(lái)理解杜特爾特對(duì)中國(guó)的態(tài)度。通過(guò)宣傳中國(guó)是一種不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治和文化秩序的焦點(diǎn)，杜特爾特讓中國(guó)大有面子。反過(guò)來(lái)，中國(guó)愿意支持這位菲律賓新總統(tǒng)，或許會(huì)擱下使兩國(guó)產(chǎn)生分歧的問(wèn)題。西方很多人——他們注重可信性(credibility)、“理性”的利益和實(shí)力，當(dāng)作一場(chǎng)零和游戲——始終不能理解建立在威望和互惠基礎(chǔ)之上的外交關(guān)系。

The larger point is that the concept of Pax Americana is outdated. The world is increasingly abandoning the view of the US as the sole (and self-appointed) protector of global peace and prosperity. In fact, the idea that America should not be a world policeman resonates with large numbers of people in the US. The world may want other countries to share that responsibility with the US or, perhaps, to replace it. Mr Duterte is the first in Asia to do something about it.

從更廣泛層面來(lái)說(shuō)，“美國(guó)治下的和平”(Pax Americana)的概念已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)。世界正在逐漸拋棄美國(guó)是全球和平和繁榮的唯一(和自封的)保護(hù)者的觀點(diǎn)。事實(shí)上，美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)有很多人贊同美國(guó)不應(yīng)該充當(dāng)世界警察的觀點(diǎn)。世界可能希望有其他國(guó)家與美國(guó)共同承擔(dān)責(zé)任，又或者取而代之。杜特爾特是亞洲第一個(gè)在這方面有所動(dòng)作的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。

Just because the Philippines is turning away from an American-led order does not mean it is rejecting the west or the US. Mr Duterte himself said that he is calling for a “separation of foreign policy” rather than “a severance of ties”.

菲律賓拒絕美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的秩序并不意味著它拒絕西方或美國(guó)。杜特爾特本人稱，他呼吁“外交政策的分離”而不是“斷絕關(guān)系”。

Those who worry about Mr Duterte betray a belief that the Philippines and other Asian countries must choose between an affinity for the US and an affinity for China — and not, as perhaps would be best, express their self-determination by finding some affinity with both. 那些對(duì)杜特爾特感到憂心忡忡的人，透露出一種觀念，即菲律賓及其他亞洲國(guó)家必須在親美和親華之間做出選擇，不能——這或許最好——通過(guò)找到既親美又親華的立場(chǎng)來(lái)表達(dá)他們的獨(dú)立自主。

Since Mr Duterte’s visit to Beijing, one must assume that other Asian leaders are watching closely to see where he takes his country and the region. His views on self-determination are shared by many who are resentful of being subservient in the hegemonic geopolitical system but have believed until now that they are helpless.

杜特爾特訪華后，人們必然會(huì)想其他亞洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人正在密切關(guān)注他將把菲律賓和整個(gè)地區(qū)帶向哪里。許多人痛恨自己在霸權(quán)主義的地緣政治體系中矮人一截，但一直以來(lái)都感到無(wú)能為力，他們認(rèn)同杜特爾特關(guān)于獨(dú)立自主的觀點(diǎn)。

The world order will change further as more leaders make the same choices as Mr Duterte. Those used to the status quo should get used to it.

隨著更多領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人做出像杜特爾特一樣的選擇，世界秩序?qū)⑦M(jìn)一步改變。習(xí)慣于現(xiàn)狀的人應(yīng)該適應(yīng)這一點(diǎn)。

The writer is founder and chief executive of The Global Institute for Tomorrow

本文作者是全球未來(lái)研究所(Global Institute for Tomorrow)創(chuàng)始人及總裁