美中開打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)將一損俱損

Is it wise to pick a fight with your biggest creditor and trading partner? That is one of the more intriguing questions posed by the prospect of US President Donald Trump . During the campaign, the man who will shortly hold sway over the world’s main reserve currency threatened to brand China a currency manipulator and to impose punitive tariffs to curb the country’s bilateral trade surplus with the US, which is running at close to $400bn a year.

向自己最大的債權(quán)國及貿(mào)易伙伴國挑起戰(zhàn)斗是明智的嗎?這是唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)就任美國總統(tǒng)前景所帶來的耐人尋味的問題之一。這個(gè)不久就能支配世界主要儲(chǔ)備貨幣的男人在競選中威脅要把中國列為“匯率操縱國”，并對中國征收懲罰性關(guān)稅，以遏制目前接近每年4000億美元的中美貿(mào)易順差。

Since China’s official foreign exchange reserves amounts to $3.1tn, much of which is invested in the US Treasury market, there is scope for devastating retaliatory action that might destabilise global bond markets and inflict serious damage on the world economy.

由于中國官方外匯儲(chǔ)備高達(dá)3.1萬億美元——其中很大一部分投資于美國國債——中國是有能力發(fā)起毀滅性的報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)的，其結(jié)果或許會(huì)破壞全球債券市場的穩(wěn)定、給世界經(jīng)濟(jì)造成嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。

The nature of this mutual dependency is that Americans have, in effect, been borrowing from the much poorer Chinese at exceptionally low rates of interest in order to buy the cheap goods that they turn out. Yet the benefits of this subsidy to the American consumer have been won at the cost of lost jobs in mature industries across the US.

這種相互依賴的本質(zhì)是，美國人實(shí)際上一直在以極低利率向比自己窮得多的中國人借錢，以購買中國人生產(chǎn)的廉價(jià)商品。不過，美國消費(fèi)者能夠享受這種補(bǔ)貼是有代價(jià)的，那就是美國各地的成熟行業(yè)流失了大量工作崗位。

This malign consequence of globalisation was so much at the heart of Mr Trump’s electoral appeal that it is hard to see how he can retreat from taking action of some kind against the Chinese. So the risk that Beijing might seek to sabotage the US Treasury market in retaliation by dumping its Treasury holdings merits exploration.

鑒于全球化的這種負(fù)面影響正是特朗普在競選中大聲疾呼的核心話題，要看到他轉(zhuǎn)變立場不對中國人采取某種行動(dòng)是很難的。所以我們有必要探討北京方面采取報(bào)復(fù)手段、通過拋售美債來破壞美國國債市場的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

There have in the past been suggestions in the state-controlled Chinese media that this financial weapon should be used to influence US policy, most notably in response to arms sales to Taiwan. Such a policy would cause the dollar to fall and interest rates to rise, thereby threatening the US with recession. Yet this would also inflict heavy losses on China’s dollar-denominated investments.

受政府控制的中國媒體過去有過一種聲音，中方應(yīng)當(dāng)利用這件“金融武器”影響美國政策，尤其是在應(yīng)對美國對臺軍售這件事上。這樣的政策將導(dǎo)致美元下跌、利率上升，從而可能使美國陷入衰退。不過，這也將使中國所做的以美元計(jì)價(jià)的投資遭受巨大損失。

And finding somewhere else to put the money would be problematic. Newly issued government bonds in Europe and Japan are substantially absorbed by the asset purchase programmes of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan. More important, with global economic growth anaemic and the Chinese economy struggling to address the problems of excessive investment and spiralling private and public debt, invoking an economic cold war would be monumentally dangerous for China as well as the rest of the world.

而且要找到其他投資目標(biāo)并不容易。歐洲和日本新發(fā)行的政府債券基本上被歐洲央行(ECB)和日本央行(BoJ)的資產(chǎn)購買項(xiàng)目吸收掉。更重要的是，由于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長乏力、中國經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨投資過度和公私債務(wù)不斷上升的難題，在這種形勢下爆發(fā)一場“經(jīng)濟(jì)冷戰(zhàn)”對中國和世界其他地區(qū)來說都極其危險(xiǎn)。

The US defence department has weighed these risks and found them untroubling. In a 2012 report , it concluded that using US Treasuries as a coercive tool would have limited impact and would do more harm to China than the US. Given the size of this market of nearly $14tn, and the pool of global savings available to provide alternative sources of finance for the US budget deficit, this has some plausibility. Yet in an astonishingly low-interest rate world, where central banks have been systematically rigging bond markets, there is a bond bubble. Current bond prices are thus unusually vulnerable. And, after Mr Trump’s victory, the US and global bond markets have become an even more dangerous place.

美國國防部曾權(quán)衡過這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，認(rèn)為不值得擔(dān)憂。其在2012年的一份報(bào)告中得出結(jié)論：利用美國國債作為脅迫工具只會(huì)產(chǎn)生有限的作用，并且中國會(huì)比美國受到更大的損害。鑒于美國國債市場的規(guī)模接近14萬億美元，加上全球儲(chǔ)蓄池可以為美國預(yù)算赤字提供替代的資金來源，這個(gè)結(jié)論似乎有些道理。不過，在當(dāng)前這個(gè)利率極低、各國央行一直在系統(tǒng)性地操縱債券市場的時(shí)期，債券泡沫已經(jīng)形成。因此目前債券價(jià)格極易波動(dòng)。在特朗普贏得大選之后，美國和全球債券市場變得更加危險(xiǎn)了。

The president-elect is promising fiscal expansion — a combination of tax cuts, infrastructure spending and defence spending, pointing to larger budget deficits and higher interest rates. Given Mr Trump’s attacks on the Federal Reserve, the future of central bank independence in the US is in question. So markets will inevitably demand compensation for the increased inflation risk, as well as for the higher geopolitical risks inherent in Mr Trump’s undermining rhetoric on Nato and the US security guarantees for Japan and South Korea. That means much higher bond yields. The great bond bull market that has endured since the early 1980s is now surely over.

這位當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)正承諾要實(shí)施財(cái)政擴(kuò)張——將減稅與增加基建和防務(wù)支出相結(jié)合，結(jié)果將導(dǎo)致預(yù)算赤字?jǐn)U大和利息升高。鑒于特朗普對美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)的抨擊，美國央行未來能否保持獨(dú)立性被劃上了問號。因此，面對通脹風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上升以及地緣政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)升高——特朗普發(fā)表過削弱北約(Nato)以及美國為日韓提供的安全保障的言論——市場將不可避免地要求得到補(bǔ)償。這意味著債券收益率會(huì)顯著上升。自上世紀(jì)80年代初延續(xù)至今的債券大牛市現(xiàn)在無疑走到了尾聲。

Of course, campaign rhetoric is one thing, presidential office another.

當(dāng)然，競選言論是一回事，入主白宮之后的作為是另一回事。

It is in the US interest that this master of the deal should orchestrate a suitably fudged trade deal with China. The snag is that the hard-headed Chinese know a thing or two about dealmaking. As so often, the most likely outcome is muddle-through. Yet the risks remain. And a trade war would probably strengthen the arms of hardliners in Beijing who oppose the capital market liberalisation that many in the west would like to see.

這位“交易大師”應(yīng)該促成一項(xiàng)適當(dāng)含混的美中貿(mào)易協(xié)議，這是符合美國利益的做法。問題是精明的中國人通曉交易之道。就像多數(shù)時(shí)候一樣，可能性最大的結(jié)果是勉強(qiáng)應(yīng)付過去(muddle-through)。但風(fēng)險(xiǎn)猶在。而一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)很可能助長中國政府中強(qiáng)硬派的聲勢，對于西方許多人樂于看到的資本市場自由化，這些強(qiáng)硬派是反對的。

The irony is that China’s currency manipulations have latterly been addressed at holding up the renminbi in the face of heavy capital outflows rather than weakening it. And the devaluation of the euro against the dollar has been far greater than that of the renminbi. But if the need is for a scapegoat, the Chinese undoubtedly fit the bill.

說來諷刺，面對嚴(yán)重資本外流，中國近來的匯率操縱是為了支撐人民幣，而不是讓人民幣貶值。而歐元對美元的貶值幅度更甚于人民幣。但是，如果需要替罪羊的話，中國人無疑是符合要求的。