FT社評：特朗普將讓全球貿(mào)易陷入風險

Of all the issues on which Donald Trump opined so forcefully on the election trail, he was particularly strident and unusually specific about trade.

在唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)競選期間曾激烈討論過的所有話題中，他對于貿(mào)易問題的態(tài)度特別強硬而且出奇地具體。

Mr Trump threatened to slap a 35 per cent import tax on Ford cars if the company moved production to Mexico; he said that he would renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) and if necessary withdraw altogether; he promised to abandon the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement among 12 Asia-Pacific nations; he warned that he would use every lawful presidential power, including imposing emergency tariffs, on China if it did not stop its allegedly illegal activities.

特朗普威脅稱，如果福特(Ford)將生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到墨西哥，他將對該公司生產(chǎn)的汽車征收35%的進口稅;他表示，將就《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(North American Free Trade Agreement)展開重新談判，必要的話將完全退出;他承諾將廢除12個亞太國家達成的貿(mào)易協(xié)定《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡稱TPP)協(xié)定;他警告稱，如果中國不停止所謂的非法活動，他將針對中國使用一切合法的總統(tǒng)權(quán)力，包括實行緊急關(guān)稅。

As with all his policies, Mr Trump may modify or abandon parts of this package once in office, particularly if he grasps the potential impact on the US economy of starting a fully-fledged trade war. But it may be harder to shift the mindset that clearly underlies all his suggestions: a mercantilist zero-sum view of the world in which economies are intrinsically in competition and current account deficits prima facie reflect cheating by trade partners. With the positive wealth-creating role of trade increasingly and mistakenly being dismissed by politicians, that is a deeply worrying development.

正如特朗普提出過的所有政策一樣，他在上臺后可能會修改或放棄上述貿(mào)易政策中的一部分，尤其是在他意識到發(fā)動全面貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)可能給美國經(jīng)濟造成的影響之后。但要改變明顯支撐其上述所有看法的思維可能比較困難：他對世界持重商主義零和觀點，他認為，在這個世界中，各個經(jīng)濟體從本質(zhì)上來說是競爭關(guān)系，經(jīng)常賬戶赤字明顯反映出貿(mào)易伙伴的欺騙。貿(mào)易的財富創(chuàng)造這一積極作用被越來越多的政治人士錯誤地否認，這種發(fā)展令人深感擔憂。

There are reasons to hope Mr Trump might soften his approach once in power. First, there is a long tradition of presidential candidates talking tough on trade and then pulling back. Barack Obama promised to renegotiate Nafta on the campaign trail in 2008 — admittedly without threatening to destroy it if he did not get his way — and rapidly forgot the pledge once in office.

我們有理由期待特朗普在上臺后可能軟化其策略。首先，總統(tǒng)候選人在貿(mào)易問題上措辭強硬、但在上臺后卻收回鋒芒的傳統(tǒng)相當悠久。在2008年總統(tǒng)競選期間，巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)曾承諾就《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》重新談判(誠然，他并沒有威脅稱如果沒有達到他的愿望他將摧毀該協(xié)定)，但在上臺后卻迅速放棄了這一承諾。

Second, some of Mr Trump’s other policies, such as naming China as a currency manipulator, are no more than symbolic. And some, such as appointing tough trade negotiators and bringing World Trade Organisation cases against China, are little more than restatements of current practice.

第二，特朗普的一些其他政策(例如將中國列為匯率操縱國)不過是象征性的。還有一些政策只不過是對當前慣例的重述，例如任命強硬的貿(mào)易談判代表以及在世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)起訴中國。

But it is the White House’s ability to use emergency powers, including “safeguard” tariffs or quotas against imports, that might provide the immediate test of Mr Trump’s willingness to march into a trade war. Such tariffs applied widely — as Richard Nixon did with his “import surcharge” in 1971 — would almost certainly provoke litigation at the WTO. If the White House simply defies WTO rulings, one of the remaining pillars of multilateral trade co-operation will be knocked away.

但正是因為白宮有能力使用“保護性”關(guān)稅或進口配額等緊急權(quán)力，特朗普發(fā)起貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的意愿將受到直接的考驗。幾乎可以肯定的是，如果廣泛使用此類關(guān)稅——理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)在1971年就推出過“進口附加費”——肯定會引發(fā)WTO內(nèi)的訴訟。如果白宮無視WTO的裁決，如今多邊貿(mào)易合作僅剩的支柱之一就將崩潰。

Whatever form Mr Trump’s policies take, his worldview suggests that the US will no longer attempt to play a central role in shaping the world’s trading system. His pledge to abandon TPP — plus the fact the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the EU was barely moving — mean the US will no longer be trying to export its version of the ideal model for trade agreements. The virtues of the TPP can be disputed, but the visions of trade governance promulgated by the US’s rivals for dominance, notably China, are unlikely to be impressive. Whatever the stated ideology of any given president, the pattern once in office has tended to be the same. The White House is the adult who prioritises keeping trade flowing and Congress is the fractious adolescent who keeps demanding confrontation with trading partners and refuses to sign new deals.

無論特朗普采取何種政策，他的世界觀表明，美國將不再努力在塑造全球貿(mào)易體系方面扮演核心角色。他承諾要廢除TPP，再加上與歐盟的《跨大西洋貿(mào)易與投資伙伴關(guān)系》(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership)協(xié)定幾乎毫無進展，意味著美國不再努力輸出其理想的貿(mào)易協(xié)定模式。TPP的好處可能存在爭議，但挑戰(zhàn)美國貿(mào)易主導地位的競爭對手(尤其是中國)宣傳的貿(mào)易治理當?shù)?，這種前景不太可能讓人喜歡。美國任何一位總統(tǒng)無論宣稱持哪種意識形態(tài)，一旦上臺，表現(xiàn)模式往往是相同的。白宮是優(yōu)先保持貿(mào)易流動的成年人，國會是不斷要求與貿(mào)易伙伴對抗并拒絕簽署新協(xié)議的叛逆青少年。

Mr Trump, to put it mildly, seems unlikely to want to play the traditional presidential role. Therein lies the danger. Much will depend on his temperament and his advisers. But one thing is clear: with global trade already weak, there are serious risks to international commerce from the accession to power of a US president with such a simplistic analysis of the world.

委婉點說，特朗普似乎不太可能想扮演傳統(tǒng)的總統(tǒng)角色。這其中存在著風險。很多東西將取決于他的脾氣和顧問。但有一件事情是顯而易見的：全球貿(mào)易已經(jīng)疲弱，特朗普對世界的分析過于簡單化，他成為美國總統(tǒng)將給國際商務(wù)帶來極大風險。