FT社評：歐盟走向保護(hù)主義乃不智之舉

Worries about the effect of trade and globalisation on workers are a staple of politics in the US and Europe. So it is perhaps unsurprising that the EU, with an eye on China and particularly on steel, is planning to make it easier to block subsidised or dumped imports with emergency tariffs.

擔(dān)心貿(mào)易和全球化對勞動(dòng)者的影響成了歐美政治的家常便飯。因此或許毫不意外的是，關(guān)注中國、尤其是中國鋼鐵的歐盟(EU)，正計(jì)劃讓通過征收緊急關(guān)稅阻止受補(bǔ)貼或傾銷的進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品入境變得更容易一些。

That it is unsurprising does not mean it is wise. There is no doubt Chinese production, thanks to state-subsidised overcapacity, is pushing down the global price of steel. Yet the advanced countries should accept that putting up barriers simply disadvantages other industries and interrupts the vital global supply chains on which modern trading economies depend.

不意外并不意味著這是明智之舉。確實(shí)，拜政府補(bǔ)貼的過剩產(chǎn)能所賜，中國生產(chǎn)出來的鋼鐵正在壓低全球鋼鐵價(jià)格。然而，發(fā)達(dá)國家應(yīng)意識(shí)到，設(shè)置壁壘會(huì)對其他行業(yè)不利，并干擾現(xiàn)代貿(mào)易經(jīng)濟(jì)所依賴的至關(guān)重要的全球供應(yīng)鏈。

The EU’s probable change of policy is designed to sidestep a looming problem of whether China should be accorded “market economy status”, which would make it harder to impose antidumping or countervailing (anti-subsidy) duties on Chinese imports. When assessing such duties on a non-market economy, the EU is permitted to use costs from a supposedly analogous third country to calculate how big the penalties can be.

歐盟可能采取的政策變化旨在繞過中國是否應(yīng)被賦予“市場經(jīng)濟(jì)地位”這一日益逼近的問題，如果中國取得這一地位，其他國家將更難對進(jìn)口自中國的商品征收反傾銷稅或反補(bǔ)貼稅。在評估針對非市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體征收的這類關(guān)稅時(shí)，歐盟可以利用被認(rèn)為類似的第三國成本來計(jì)算懲罰的力度。

China argues — and many, though not all, trade lawyers agree — that it automatically acquires market economy status next month as part of the agreement when it joined the World Trade Organisation 15 years ago. Rather than decline to grant that designation and invite a WTO dispute, the EU Commission proposes abolishing the distinction between market and non-market economies and instead allowing the EU leeway to pick data to support its case.

中國主張并得到很多(盡管不是全部)貿(mào)易律師認(rèn)同的是，作為15年前中國加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)的協(xié)議的一部分，中國將在下月自動(dòng)獲得市場經(jīng)濟(jì)地位。歐盟委員會(huì)(European Commission)并未拒絕賦予中國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)地位進(jìn)而引發(fā)WTO爭端，而是提議廢除市場經(jīng)濟(jì)與非市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的區(qū)別，讓歐盟自由選擇數(shù)據(jù)支撐其征稅理由。

The result could well be the imposition of US-style antidumping tariffs reaching well above 100 per cent, and a consequent noticeable rise in the internal EU price of commodities such as steel. This is not a positive development. If EU countries want to build infrastructure or develop world-beating manufacturing companies, they will benefit from a cheaper domestic price of steel.

結(jié)果很有可能是征收美國那種遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于100%的反傾銷關(guān)稅，繼而導(dǎo)致歐盟內(nèi)部鋼鐵等大宗商品價(jià)格顯著上漲。這并非一種有利的變化。如果歐盟國家希望建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施或發(fā)展世界級(jí)制造企業(yè)，它們將從較為廉價(jià)的國內(nèi)鋼鐵價(jià)格中受益。

The more that global value chains snake around the world, finding the most efficient place to produce, the more that putting tariffs in the way disadvantages the economy that imposes the restrictions.

全球價(jià)值鏈在世界蔓延得越長(從而找到最高效的生產(chǎn)地)，征收關(guān)稅加以阻礙越會(huì)對實(shí)施這種限制的經(jīng)濟(jì)體不利。

Economic change is wrenching, particularly for industries with regional concentration, but the future for developed economies lies with users, not producers, despite closures being savage blows to steel towns.

經(jīng)濟(jì)變革是痛苦的，尤其是對于區(qū)域集中型的行業(yè)而言，但發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的未來在于消費(fèi)者，而非生產(chǎn)者，盡管工廠關(guān)閉將對鋼鐵城鎮(zhèn)造成嚴(yán)重打擊。

Whether or not this situation contributed significantly to president-elect Donald Trump’s election victory, the hollowing-out of basic manufacturing has created intense resentment among affected communities. But making it harder for new industries to emerge by increasing the price of basic commodities only delays the transition.

不管這種形勢是否對美國當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的選舉勝利做出了巨大貢獻(xiàn)，基礎(chǔ)制造業(yè)空心化都導(dǎo)致受影響社群產(chǎn)生了強(qiáng)烈的憤恨情緒。但通過提升基礎(chǔ)大宗商品的價(jià)格加大新行業(yè)出現(xiàn)的難度，只會(huì)推遲轉(zhuǎn)型。

The forces of protection within the EU have been growing in strength, and it was the recent conversion of Germany to the cause that will probably tip the balance. The UK has generally led the fight to restrain antidumping duties, despite domestic criticism over the threatened Port Talbot steel plant in Wales. With Britain leaving the EU, however, resistance is crumbling.

歐盟內(nèi)部保護(hù)主義力量的強(qiáng)度一直在加大，特別是德國最近也轉(zhuǎn)向保護(hù)主義，這很可能會(huì)顛覆局面。盡管英國國內(nèi)對威爾士塔爾伯特港的鋼鐵廠面臨威脅感到不滿，但英國基本上一直走在抵制反傾銷稅的前沿。然而，隨著英國脫離歐盟，抵抗力正在減弱。

The new EU policy on antidumping and anti-subsidy duties is a bleak foreshadowing of a Europe in which the defenders of free trade are either switching sides, like Germany, or leaving the field, like the UK.

新的歐盟反傾銷和反補(bǔ)貼關(guān)稅政策是歐洲悲觀前景的預(yù)兆，自由貿(mào)易的維護(hù)者要么會(huì)像德國那樣改變立場，要么會(huì)像英國那樣離開歐盟。

It may bring some short-term political relief to governments whose voters are complaining about globalisation. In the longer term, though, it will do nothing to build the kind of modern, profitable sectors that will lead European economic growth.

對于那些選民正抱怨全球化的政府而言，保護(hù)主義可能會(huì)帶來一些短期的政治壓力緩和。然而，較長期而言，這無助于打造將引領(lǐng)歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的現(xiàn)代盈利產(chǎn)業(yè)。