中國公司治理退步

China’s attempts to open up its equity markets to foreign investors could be undermined by the country’s deteriorating standards of corporate governance.

中國的公司治理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不斷惡化，可能削弱其向境外投資者開放本國股票市場(chǎng)的努力。

In recent years Beijing has pushed for its $7.5tn mainland A-shares market to be incorporated into the widely followed MSCI Emerging Market index, which could open the door to hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign portfolio investment. Many commentators expect MSCI to grant approval next year after turning China down in June.

近年來，北京一直在推動(dòng)7.5萬億美元市值的內(nèi)地A股市場(chǎng)被納入廣受關(guān)注的明晟新興市場(chǎng)指數(shù)(MSCI Emerging Markets Index)，這可能會(huì)使A股市場(chǎng)迎來規(guī)模龐大的境外證券投資資金。許多評(píng)論人士預(yù)計(jì)，在今年6月拒絕中國之后，MSCI將在明年6月把中國A股納入該指數(shù)。

China has also started to open up its market through such measures as Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, a similar link for the Shenzhen market, due by the end of the year, and the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor scheme, all of which allow foreign investors to buy into mainland Chinese stocks.

中國也通過諸如滬港通、計(jì)劃年底啟動(dòng)的深港通、以及合格境外機(jī)構(gòu)投資者(QDII)機(jī)制等措施，逐步開放A股市場(chǎng)。這些都是允許外國投資者買入中國內(nèi)地股票的渠道。

However, biennial research by the Hong Kong-based Asian Corporate Governance Association, a non-profit organisation, suggests standards of behaviour in China’s equity market are plunging, even as they are improving in regional rivals such as Japan, Taiwan, India and South Korea, threatening to deter foreign investors increasingly focused on governance issues.

但是，香港非營利組織——亞洲公司治理協(xié)會(huì)(ACGA)的雙年度研究報(bào)告表明，中國股票市場(chǎng)上的行為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)出現(xiàn)大幅下滑，而日本、臺(tái)灣、印度和韓國等多個(gè)地區(qū)競(jìng)爭對(duì)手的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)卻在提高。這可能讓越來越關(guān)注治理問題的外國投資者對(duì)中國市場(chǎng)望而卻步。

“The overall effect of China going into the MSCI would be disastrous,” says JP Smith, partner at Ecstrat, an investment consultancy. “Ill-informed investors buying the index for asset allocation reasons would be exposed to companies with terrible governance. There is no way MSCI should consider adding China to the index.”

“中國股市被納入MSCI指數(shù)總體上將是災(zāi)難性的，”投資咨詢公司Ecstrat的合伙人JP•史密斯(JP Smith)說，“出于資產(chǎn)配置原因而買入指數(shù)的消息不靈通的投資者，將承受治理水平極差的公司所帶來的相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。MSCI絕對(duì)不應(yīng)考慮把中國股市納入其新興市場(chǎng)指數(shù)。”

“Minority shareholders are just there as a potential source of cash. There is really not a reason for them to be acknowledged at all,” he adds. “Governance has definitely been getting worse.”

“小股東只是作為潛在資金來源而存在，完全沒有理由讓他們得到認(rèn)可，”他接著說，“治理當(dāng)然越來越糟。”

In its 2016 Corporate Governance Watch report, the ACGA awarded China an overall mark of just 43 per cent, continuing the country’s decline from a high of 49 per cent in 2010.

在《2016年公司治理觀察》報(bào)告中，ACGA給予中國的總體評(píng)分只有43%。中國在2010年取得49%的最高分，此后一直在下降。

In contrast, India, ranked level with China in 2010, has risen to a record high reading of 55 per cent, while a swath of other countries in East and Southeast Asia stretched their lead over China further still, as the table shows.

相比之下，2010年與中國排名齊平的印度，其評(píng)分已上升到55%的歷史最高點(diǎn)，而東亞和東南亞的許多其他國家，進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大了對(duì)中國的領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢(shì)，如表所示。

“There was a time, around 2010, when corporate governance reform in China was progressing at such a steady rate that we half-jokingly suggested it might catch up with Hong Kong in 2022. Those days are long gone,” says Li Rui, an analyst at the ACGA

“曾有一段時(shí)間，在2010年左右，中國公司治理改革以平穩(wěn)的步伐不斷取得進(jìn)步，乃至我們半開玩笑地說，或許到2022年中國內(nèi)地就能趕上香港了。那段日子早已經(jīng)過去了，”ACGA的分析師Li Rui表示。

“China’s score has instead been on a downward trend in recent years and it is hard to see what will change in the near future.”

“近年來中國的得分一直呈下降趨勢(shì)，在不久的將來很難看到有什么變化。”

The ACGA argues that China’s political and regulatory environment has deteriorated particularly sharply since 2010, as the second chart indicates.

ACGA認(rèn)為，自2010年以來，中國的政治和監(jiān)管環(huán)境惡化得尤其厲害。

Ms Li cites setbacks such as the circuit breaker temporarily imposed on the stock markets in January to attempt to slow a market sell-off, which was a “well-documented disaster, causing panic in China and around the world”, and Beijing’s tendency to implement periodic moratoriums on flotations, which “have done more harm than good, undermining both market stability and the value of the two stock exchanges as capital raising venues”.

Li Rui列舉了一些退步現(xiàn)象，例如在1月份為了遏制股市拋售而短暫實(shí)施的熔斷機(jī)制——這是一場(chǎng)“證據(jù)充分的災(zāi)難，在中國和世界各地引起了恐慌”。還有，北京方面傾向于每過一段時(shí)間就暫停IPO，此舉“弊大于利，損害了市場(chǎng)穩(wěn)定性和兩個(gè)證交所作為資本募集場(chǎng)所的價(jià)值”。

She is also critical of the weakness of measures to reform state-owned enterprises, which have not led to an infusion of private shareholders, lessened government intervention or created more diversified boards or better governed companies, as some hoped.

她也批評(píng)了國企改革措施的缺陷。這些措施沒有像有些人希望的那樣，吸收私人股東加入、讓政府減少干預(yù)，或者打造出更多元化的董事會(huì)或治理水平更高的公司。

“Talk of SOE reform led to a surge in the market, but most people would acknowledge that reform was a complete chimera,” says Mr Smith.

“國業(yè)改革的話題導(dǎo)致了市場(chǎng)的大幅上漲，但大多數(shù)人會(huì)承認(rèn)，國企改革是一場(chǎng)徹頭徹尾的幻想，”史密斯說。

Moreover, China’s rating for the strength of its corporate governance rules and practices has fallen to the lowest level since the ACGA initiated its survey in 2003.

此外，中國在公司治理規(guī)則和實(shí)踐方面的評(píng)分，已下降至自ACGA于2003年開始此項(xiàng)調(diào)查以來的最低水平。

Ms Li criticises Beijing for its stalled attempts to update its Corporate Governance Code, which dates to 2002, despite the fact that “most Asian markets have revised their codes once, if not twice, since then”.

Li Rui對(duì)北京方面拖延修訂2002年的《上市公司治理準(zhǔn)則》提出了批評(píng)，而“自2002年以來，大多數(shù)亞洲市場(chǎng)已修訂了一至兩次治理準(zhǔn)則”。

She also points to problems with board composition and independence, arguing that “the general consensus is that most independent directors are still just ‘vases’ in boards, there to add colour, not to object to decisions or provide useful suggestions”. This is largely because they are typically appointed or nominated by executive directors or the chairman, rather than general shareholders, so are not genuinely independent or committed to representing minority shareholders’ interests.

她還指出了董事會(huì)人員構(gòu)成和獨(dú)立性的問題，認(rèn)為“普遍共識(shí)是，大多數(shù)獨(dú)立董事仍然只是擺在董事會(huì)里的‘花瓶’”，他們僅僅增添色彩，不會(huì)反對(duì)董事會(huì)的決定或提出有用的建議”。這主要是因?yàn)?，他們通常是由?zhí)行董事或董事長而不是全體股東任命或提名的，所以不可能真正獨(dú)立，或致力于代表小股東的利益。

China has at least managed to maintain its score for enforcement at its 2014 level. The ACGA accepts that China’s regulators have become more active.

中國起碼把執(zhí)法方面的得分維持在了2014年的水平。ACGA承認(rèn)，中國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)變得更加積極。

The China Securities Regulatory Commission investigated 71 cases of market manipulation in 2015, a near fourfold increase on 2014. In the first half of 2016 it issued 109 sanctions in 88 general enforcement cases, many concerning insider trading and manipulation, an 85 per cent year-on-year rise, and levied fines totalling Rmb2.55bn ($377m), almost 20 times the level meted out in the first six months of 2015.

2015年，中國證監(jiān)會(huì)(CSRC)調(diào)查了71起市場(chǎng)操縱案，幾乎是2014年的四倍。2016年上半年，中國證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)88起案件(許多為內(nèi)幕交易類案件和市場(chǎng)操縱類案件)作出109份處罰，較去年同期增長近85%，罰沒款共計(jì)25.54億元人民幣(合3.77億美元)，幾乎是去年同期的20倍。

The Shanghai Stock Exchange also issued 22 public reprimands and criticisms in the first half of 2016, a 150 per cent year-on-year rise, with its Shenzhen counterpart issuing 40 sanctions, a 40 per cent rise.

2016年上半年，上交所做出了22次公開譴責(zé)和通報(bào)批評(píng)的處分，比去年同期增加150%;深交所則做出了40次處分決定，同比增加40%。

Despite this, the ACGA said two factors prevented China from raising its enforcement score: insufficient resources for enforcement, with regulatory staff typically inexperienced and too thinly spread; and a lack of participation by investors, particularly domestic institutional investors, in voting and company engagement.

盡管如此，ACGA表示，兩個(gè)因素妨礙了中國提高執(zhí)法得分：一是執(zhí)行資源不足，監(jiān)管人員通常缺乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)，太分散;二是在投票和公司參與方面，投資者、特別是國內(nèi)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的參與力度不夠。

Mr Smith argues that the clampdown on market manipulation ignored the fact that “the biggest market manipulator is the Chinese government and the Chinese authorities, the so-called ‘national team’, which gobbled up a huge chunk of the market” when stocks crashed in July 2015.

史密斯認(rèn)為，打擊市場(chǎng)操縱行為的措施忽視了一個(gè)事實(shí)，“最大的市場(chǎng)操縱者是中國政府當(dāng)局，即所謂的“國家隊(duì)”——2015年7月股市大跌時(shí)，國家隊(duì)吸納了占整個(gè)市場(chǎng)相當(dāng)大比例的股票。

These state-owned financial institutions owned 11.9 per cent of the market at the end of 2015, according to Financial Times analysis of data from Wind Information, a research firm, although this figure has since fallen.

英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》對(duì)研究公司萬得資訊(Wind Information)數(shù)據(jù)的分析顯示，2015年底，這些國有金融機(jī)構(gòu)的持股市值占到了股市總市值的11.9%，不過，這一比例之后已有所下降。

Overall, Mr Smith describes the Chinese financial system as “crony entrepreneurialism” with a high degree of state ownership (56 per cent by market capitalisation by his calculations) and strong government control even of companies “purported to be run by entrepreneurs”.

總體而言，史密斯將中國的金融體系描述為“裙帶企業(yè)”，國有程度相當(dāng)高(依照他的計(jì)算，占據(jù)市值的56%)，并且政府甚至對(duì)“聲稱是由企業(yè)家經(jīng)營”的公司實(shí)施強(qiáng)有力的控制。

“The system is getting more arbitrary and more authoritarian. Minority shareholders are probably more right to be worried about China than anywhere else,” he adds.

“體制越來越武斷，越來越專制。跟任何其他地區(qū)相比，中國的小股東很可能更有理由對(duì)政府感到擔(dān)心，”他接著說。

“I think they will do everything they can to make it look as though the A-share market is suitable to be integrated into the MSCI [index]. They talk a good game [but] there is a difference between rhetoric and reality.”

“我認(rèn)為，他們將竭盡全力讓A股市場(chǎng)看起來適合被納入MSCI(指數(shù))。他們說得很動(dòng)聽，(但)言辭和現(xiàn)實(shí)之間有差異。”

Mr Smith fears the problem is much larger than China, however, saying he would “take issue” with the ACGA’s view that governance is broadly improving in other Asian countries.

然而，史密斯擔(dān)心，問題不只在于中國。他說，他“不認(rèn)同”ACGA關(guān)于其他亞洲國家的治理狀況正在普遍改善的觀點(diǎn)。

“The very big picture is that the whole system has been moving in a much more authoritarian direction. It’s not just China,” he says, pointing to developments in the likes of Turkey, Russia, Poland and South Korea.

他表示，“大形勢(shì)是，整個(gè)系統(tǒng)一直在朝著更具威權(quán)主義色彩的方向演變。這并非僅僅是中國的情形。”他提到了土耳其、俄羅斯、波蘭和韓國等國家出現(xiàn)的變化。

“I think governance is getting much worse and the risks for minority investors generally are increasing; that is why I don’t particularly like emerging markets at the moment,” Mr Smith says.

“我認(rèn)為，治理越來越糟糕，小股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)總體上在增加;這就是目前我不是特別喜歡新興市場(chǎng)的原因，“史密斯說。

“Generally everywhere since the global financial crisis the idea that you move in a more liberal direction towards more dispersed control systems and minority investors having a lot of say has gone backwards pretty much everywhere.

“總體說來，自從全球金融危機(jī)以來，在各個(gè)新興市場(chǎng)，關(guān)于自由化程度提高、管控制度變得更為零散、少數(shù)股東擁有很大發(fā)言權(quán)的想法在各地都有所消退。

“Governments are increasingly intervening in a way that disadvantages minority shareholders. I have been a big believer in indexation [via passive funds] but now is the time not to index EM portfolios. The index players have no choice [what stocks to buy],” Mr Smith adds.

“政府越來越多地以不利于小股東利益的方式進(jìn)行干預(yù)。我歷來推崇指數(shù)化(通過被動(dòng)型基金)，但現(xiàn)在不是指數(shù)化投資于新興市場(chǎng)組合的合適時(shí)機(jī)。指數(shù)玩家(對(duì)于買什么股票)沒有選擇，“史密斯接著說。