Donald Trump, the Republican candidate for US president, is the most extreme China basher in memory. In his first debate with Hillary Clinton, he blamed China for stealing jobs from Americans, for devaluing its currency and for engaging in state-sponsored cyberhacking. “Look at what China is doing to our country,” he said in his opening statement. “They are using our country as a piggy bank to rebuild China.”
美國共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)是人們記憶中最極端的抨擊中國者。在與希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)的第一場辯論中,他指責(zé)中國偷走美國人的工作、讓人民幣貶值、從事得到國家資助的黑客活動。“看看中國正在對我們的國家做什么,”他在開場陳述中稱,“他們把我們國家當(dāng)做儲錢罐,從里面拿錢重建中國。”
Not surprisingly, only 22 per cent of the Chinese public sees him favourably. What is surprising is that a large chunk of relatively well-informed elite option in China favours Mr Trump for US president. The Global Times, a state-supported nationalist newspaper, wrote that “many Chinese prefer Trump”.
毫不奇怪,只有22%的中國民眾對他抱有好感。但令人驚訝的是,大量相對見多識廣的中國精英卻青睞特朗普當(dāng)選美國總統(tǒng)。政府支持的民族主義報紙《環(huán)球時報》(Global Times)寫道:“許多中國人更喜歡特朗普”。
What explains this relatively positive assessment of Mr Trump in China? One reason is the expectation that Mrs Clinton as president would take a more hardline and confrontational approach with Beijing.
如何解釋特朗普在中國得到的這種相對正面的評價?一個原因是,人們認為如果希拉里當(dāng)選美國總統(tǒng),將對北京方面采取更加強硬與對抗性的立場。
Mrs Clinton has strongly endorsed President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia that seems designed to reinforce US military superiority in east Asia. Her adviser Laura Rosenberger said that the policy will continue in a Clinton administration: “As president, she [Mrs Clinton] will absolutely figure out ways to build on what’s been done over the past eight years.”
希拉里曾大力支持巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)似乎旨在強化美國在東亞軍事優(yōu)勢的“轉(zhuǎn)向亞洲”戰(zhàn)略。希拉里的顧問勞拉•羅森伯格(Laura Rosenberger)表示如果希拉里當(dāng)選,該政策將在她任內(nèi)延續(xù)下去:“作為總統(tǒng),她(希拉里)定將在過去8年取得的成果基礎(chǔ)上再接再厲。”
In her nomination speech in Philadelphia, Mrs Clinton sounded only slightly less extreme than Mr Trump: “If you believe that we should say no to unfair trade deals . . . that we should stand up to China . . . that we should support our steelworkers and autoworkers and homegrown manufacturers . . . join us.”
在費城發(fā)表提名演說時,希拉里言辭的極端程度僅稍遜于特朗普:“如果你認為我們應(yīng)該對不公平的貿(mào)易協(xié)議說不……應(yīng)該勇敢面對中國……應(yīng)該支持我們的鋼鐵工人、汽車工人及本土制造商……那就加入我們吧。”
Her public statements suggest that she views China as a monolithic totalitarian state bent on crushing human rights, suppressing women and combating democratisation. She has never once suggested that the Chinese form of government might have merit or that China has legitimate security interests in east Asia.
希拉里的公開言論表明,她將中國視為一個龐大的極權(quán)國家,這個國家決意打壓人權(quán)、壓迫婦女、對抗民主化。她從未有一次表示過中國的政府形態(tài)或許有其優(yōu)點,也從未有一次表示過中國在東亞擁有正當(dāng)?shù)陌踩妗?/p>
So what about Mr Trump? Most of his ire is directed at China’s allegedly unfair trade practices. He promises to push for protectionist measures specifically directed against China. But he is also viewed as a pragmatic businessman who puts forward tough gambits in negotiations. Chinese elites respect his ability to get things done.
那特朗普怎么樣呢?他的大部分憤怒都指向中國所謂的不公平貿(mào)易行為。他承諾要推出專門針對中國的貿(mào)易保護措施。但他也被視為一位實用主義商人,會在談判中使出強悍的策略。中國精英欣賞他的辦事能力。
What if Mr Trump as president does implement protectionist measures that harm China’s exports to the US? This could provide a good opportunity for the Chinese government to tackle vested interests, such as powerful state-owned enterprises, that block China’s transition to a more consumer-orientated economy. Just as China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 provided cover for former Premier Zhu Rongji to sack 50m state employees, so the Chinese government would have a new “enemy” that could be blamed for a further round of painful reforms.
如果當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)的特朗普真的實施損害中國對美出口的貿(mào)易保護主義措施,會怎么樣呢?這可以為中國政府提供一個對付既得利益集團(如強大的國有企業(yè))的良機,這些既得利益集團阻礙了中國向消費導(dǎo)向型經(jīng)濟的進一步轉(zhuǎn)型。正如中國2001年加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)為前總理朱镕基讓5000萬國企職工下崗提供掩護一樣,如果特朗普獲勝,中國政府進行新一輪痛苦改革將有一個新的“敵人”作替罪羊。
The main reason that many in China’s elites are enthused by Mr Trump is that he threatens to scale back support for US allies if they do not pay more for it. If South Korea and Japan refuse to shoulder more financial responsibility for military protection, it might provide an opportunity for Chinese expansion.
中國許多精英喜歡特朗普的主要原因是,他威脅要減少對美國盟友的支持——如果這些盟友自己不多出錢的話。如果韓國和日本拒絕為美國提供的軍事保護承擔(dān)更多費用,這可能將為中國擴張?zhí)峁C會。
Such views are not entirely unreasonable. It is hard to imagine that the US can maintain military superiority in the region over the next few decades, but few American politicians other than Mr Trump speak about such an eventuality. In the long term, US control of east Asian maritime waters and military support for allies that neighbour China is likely to decrease, and Mr Trump may negotiate an accord that gives China a greater say in its back yard.
這些看法并非全無道理。很難想象美國未來幾十年將一直在東亞地區(qū)維持軍事優(yōu)勢,但除了特朗普,很少有美國政客敢捅破這一點。從長遠來看,美國對東亞海域的控制及其對與中國相鄰的盟國的軍事支持都可能弱化,而特朗普或許會與中國協(xié)商一項協(xié)議,使中國在自己的后院獲得更大的話語權(quán)。
More worryingly, I have heard the view that a Trump presidency will discredit the American democratic system and lend support for China’s more meritocratic system, which has checks against inexperienced and unstable candidates getting anywhere close to the main levers of political power. At the very least, there will be no more of the kind of lectures Bill Clinton used to give when president about China being on the “wrong” side of history because it has not moved towards electoral democracy.
更令人擔(dān)憂的是,我還聽到一種觀點稱,特朗普當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)將讓美國民主制度蒙羞,并讓中國更偏向“精英治理”的制度獲得更多支持,中國的制度可以防止缺乏經(jīng)驗或反復(fù)無常的候選人接近政治權(quán)力中心。至少,不會再有人像比爾•克林頓(Bill Clinton)當(dāng)總統(tǒng)時那樣,說中國處于歷史的“錯誤的”一邊,因為中國沒有朝著選舉式民主邁進。
Of course, not all Chinese elites cheer for Mr Trump: my female academic friends in China tend to be horrified by his “uncivilised” ways. But American leaders should consider the kinds of views I have described when they think about the policies most likely to lead to good relations with China. The best-case scenario is that Mrs Clinton as president will take counsel from experienced China hands such as Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state, who managed to stake out a constructive relationship with China when the country was ruled by an unstable political leader of its own.
當(dāng)然,并不是所有中國精英都支持特朗普:我在中國的一些女性學(xué)者朋友往往被他“不文明的”言行嚇到。但美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在思考什么樣的政策最有可能帶來良好的美中關(guān)系時,應(yīng)該考慮我所描述的幾種觀點。最好的局面是,當(dāng)上總統(tǒng)后的希拉里能夠征求經(jīng)驗豐富的“中國通”的意見——如前國務(wù)卿亨利基辛格,他在中國被一個反復(fù)無常的政治領(lǐng)袖統(tǒng)治的時期設(shè)法在中美之間建立了建設(shè)性關(guān)系。