“騎上你的自行車”惹誰了？

Three long decades ago Norman Tebbit, a British politician, became in­famous for saying that in the 1930s his unemployed father “got on his bike” to look for work. It was meant to be sensible advice. But “Onyerbike”, as Mr Tebbit came to be known, sparked fury because many unemployed people did not want to move to new areas.

30年前，英國政治家譚百德(Norman Tebbit)曾說到，30年代，他的父親在失業(yè)后“騎上他的自行車”找工作，這番言論給他帶來惡名，盡管他的本意是提供明智建議。譚百德(后來他被人稱為“騎上你的自行車”)之所以引發(fā)人們的憤怒，是因?yàn)楹芏嗍I(yè)者不想搬到新的地方。

Echoes of this are playing out, this time in Virginia. Hillary Clinton has infuriated coal miners in the Appalachian region by suggesting during her presidential campaign that her environmental policies will put “coal miners out of jobs”. She then tried to make amends by pledging $30bn to promote measures such as retraining; as the Financial Times reported this week, some miners are becoming software engineers.

類似的事情最近發(fā)生在佛吉尼亞州，希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)激怒了阿巴拉契亞地區(qū)的煤礦工人，因?yàn)樗诟傔x總統(tǒng)期間表示，她的環(huán)境政策將讓“煤礦工人失業(yè)”。她接著試圖彌補(bǔ)，承諾拿出300億美元推動(dòng)再培訓(xùn)等措施;正如英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》本月報(bào)道的那樣，一些礦工正成為軟件工程師。

This sounds reasonable but there is a hitch: Appalachia has few software jobs. So far, former coal miners seem unwilling to get on their bikes — or even into their pick-up trucks.

這聽上去很合理，但存在一個(gè)問題：阿巴拉契亞地區(qū)的軟件工作崗位很少。迄今，失業(yè)的煤礦工人似乎不愿騎上他們的自行車——或者說開著他們的皮卡——搬家。

On one level this seems unsurprising. On another, however, it points to a mystery hanging over the American economy and a policy issue that the next president urgently needs to address.

從一個(gè)層面上來講，這似乎并不讓人意外。然而，從另一個(gè)層面上來講，它指向縈繞著美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的一個(gè)謎團(tuán)，以及下屆總統(tǒng)亟需應(yīng)對(duì)的一個(gè)政策問題。

The US used to be renowned for having a more flexible and mobile workforce than Europe; in previous centuries millions of people travelled in search of land, riches and jobs. But mobility has declined, not just in Appalachia but everywhere else as well. In 1990, for example, economists calculated that more than 3 per cent of the workforce moved across state borders each year; that has tumbled to 1.5 per cent.

曾幾何時(shí)，美國因勞動(dòng)力比歐洲更靈活和流動(dòng)性更強(qiáng)而知名;之前的幾個(gè)世紀(jì)，數(shù)百萬人為了尋找土地、財(cái)富和就業(yè)而遷徙。但流動(dòng)性已經(jīng)下滑，不僅是在阿巴拉契亞地區(qū)，在美國其他所有地區(qū)也是一樣。例如，1990年，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家估計(jì)，每年有超過3%的勞動(dòng)者般到另一個(gè)州;如今這一比例下降至1.5%。

The decline has affected almost all ages, educational groups and regions. Indeed, the only highly mobile group are low-skilled Mexican Hispanics: as economists Brian Cadena and Brian Kovak show, Mexican-born immigrants are still moving to find work in big numbers. White unskilled workers are not.

這種下滑涉及幾乎所有年齡段、教育程度和地區(qū)的人群。的確，唯一流動(dòng)性較高的群體是低技能的西語裔墨西哥人：正如經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家布萊恩•卡德納(Brian Cadena)和布萊恩•科瓦克(Brian Kovak)所指出的那樣，大量在墨西哥出生的移民仍在搬家找工作。技能低下的白人勞動(dòng)者沒有這樣做。

Why? One theory suggests that, when house prices collapsed in 2008, it left millions of households “underwater” on their mortgages, making it hard for owners to sell and move. But this is unlikely to be the only explanation since mobility was already declining in the decade before the crash of 2008, a period when houses were easy to sell.

為什么?一種理論提出，在2008年房價(jià)暴跌時(shí)，數(shù)百萬家庭背負(fù)的房貸遠(yuǎn)高于房屋現(xiàn)值，房主很難出售房產(chǎn)和搬家。但這不太可能是唯一的解釋，因?yàn)榱鲃?dòng)性在2008年危機(jī)爆發(fā)前10年就已出現(xiàn)下滑了，那時(shí)房屋很容易出售。

Policymakers would do well to note an intriguing second theory that emerged this week from the research and statistics group at the New York Federal Reserve: this suggests the problem reflects indirect consequences of demographics. In the past three decades, as Fatih Karahan and Darius Li observe, the proportion of middle-aged workers in the US economy has risen sharply, from 45 per cent to 60 per cent.

政策制定者最好關(guān)注一下最近紐約聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行(New York Federal Reserve)研究和統(tǒng)計(jì)小組提出的另一種耐人尋味的理論：這個(gè)問題反映出人口結(jié)構(gòu)的間接后果。正如法提赫•卡拉漢(Fatih Karahan)和達(dá)賴厄斯•李(Darius Li)所觀察到的，過去30年，美國經(jīng)濟(jì)中的中年員工比例大幅上升，從45%升至60%。

Older workers tend to have less desire — or ability — to move. The fact of ageing may partly explain the decline in mobility. But Mr Karahan and Mr Li suggest that, when populations age, younger workers also become less willing to move. Between 1990 and 2010, mobility rates for middle-aged workers fell from 2 per cent to 1 per cent; and, for younger workers, from 5.5 per cent to 3 per cent.

年紀(jì)較大的員工往往更不愿(或者不能)搬家。老齡化可能在一定程度上解釋了流動(dòng)性放緩。但卡拉漢和李認(rèn)為，當(dāng)人口老齡化時(shí)，較年輕員工也變得不愿搬家。1990年至2010年，中年員工的流動(dòng)比率從2%降至1%，較年輕員工的比例從5.5%降至3%。

While no one knows exactly why this occurs, the NY Fed economists suspect the trend reflects the fact that companies are “adapting” by becoming more adept at hiring local workers, and Americans are losing the habit of travelling for jobs. “A 10 per cent rise in the share of middle-aged people implies a 30 per cent rise in the share of local hires,” they conclude, arguing that this localisation trend in hiring accounts for 1.2 percentage points of the 1.5 percentage point decline in interstate mobility.

盡管沒有人知道其中的確切原因，但紐約聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家懷疑，這種趨勢(shì)反映出企業(yè)正在“適應(yīng)”現(xiàn)實(shí)，變得更擅長聘用本地員工，美國人正放棄跨州找工作的習(xí)慣。他們總結(jié)稱：“中年人比例上升10%，暗示當(dāng)?shù)厝似赣帽壤仙?0%。”他們辯稱，在跨州流動(dòng)性下滑的1.5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)中，招聘本地化趨勢(shì)占到了1.2個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

This localisation trend might seem counterintuitive as the internet is supposed to have created a hyperconnected world that makes it easier to connect workers with far-flung jobs. But if the theory is correct — and I suspect it is — it has two big implications.

這種本地化趨勢(shì)似乎是反常的，因?yàn)榛ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)本該締造出一個(gè)超連接的世界，員工更容易從事遠(yuǎn)距離的工作。但如果這種理論是正確的(我猜是這樣)，它具有兩大潛在影響。

First, it helps to explain why so many communities find it hard to adapt to wrenching industrial change and the impact of trade. Hence the appeal of Donald Trump’s “America first” sloganeering on the campaign trail.

首先，它有助于解釋為什么這么多社區(qū)很難適應(yīng)工業(yè)變革以及貿(mào)易影響，覺得痛苦。因此，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在總統(tǒng)競選中提出的“美國第一”的口號(hào)頗受歡迎。

Second, the unwillingness of workers to travel implies that policymakers need to rethink. Instead of offering retraining, the next incumbent in the White House might need to offer big incentives to companies to move.

其次，員工不愿搬家的現(xiàn)象暗示，政策制定者需要三思。美國的下任總統(tǒng)可能不需要考慮提供再培訓(xùn)，而是需要為公司搬遷提供巨大激勵(lì)。

The next president may also need a 21st-century version of the 1862 Homestead Act — which offered land to settlers who went west — and find new ways to encourage workers to relocate. It will not be easy. But if mobility keeps falling, the sense of political polarisation and rage in places such as Appalachia will rise. Either way, one thing is clear — whatever happens on November 8 — the wrenching process of industrial change will not go away.

下任美國總統(tǒng)可能還需要制定一個(gè)21世紀(jì)版本的1862年《公地放領(lǐng)法》(Homestead Act，該法為那些去西部拓荒的定居者提供土地)，并找到新的方法鼓勵(lì)員工搬遷。這并不容易。但如果流動(dòng)性持續(xù)下滑，政治兩極分化感和阿巴拉契亞等地區(qū)的憤怒情緒將會(huì)加劇。不管怎樣，有一點(diǎn)很清楚，不管11月8日的總統(tǒng)大選結(jié)果如何，工業(yè)變革的痛苦過程不會(huì)消失。