訪談：人民幣政策背后的木馬戰(zhàn)略和全球目標(biāo)

China long kept a tight hold on its currency as a way to control its economy and to help its factories sell their products overseas. But China has grown in economic power and ambition, and the old restrictions are not helping a country that hopes to call more of the world’s financial shots.

為了控制本國經(jīng)濟(jì)，幫助國內(nèi)工廠在海外銷售產(chǎn)品，中國對自己的貨幣一直管得很嚴(yán)。但中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力和雄心都已經(jīng)壯大了起來，對于一個希望在世界金融中能更多地呼風(fēng)喚雨的國家，這些舊有的限制無法提供幫助。

In his new book, “Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi,” Eswar S. Prasad describes how China’s view of its currency has evolved, starting from the Han dynasty — China invented paper money, of course — to today’s globally ambitious leadership. Mr. Prasad, a professor at the Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was formerly head of the International Monetary Fund’s China division. In an interview, he explained China’s motivations, how money can be a back door to overhauling the country’s financial system and why some people fear a financially powerful China.

埃斯瓦爾·S·普拉薩德(Eswar S. Prasad)在自己的新書《不斷升值的貨幣——人民幣的崛起》(Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi)中，自漢朝——當(dāng)然，紙幣就是中國發(fā)明的——到希望雄心勃勃引領(lǐng)全球的今天，描述了中國對其貨幣看法的演化。普拉薩德曾任國際貨幣基金組織的中國事務(wù)主管，現(xiàn)為康奈爾大學(xué)戴森應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院教授兼布魯金斯學(xué)會高級研究員。在采訪中，他解釋了中國的動機(jī)、貨幣是怎樣能成為徹底改革國家金融體系的后門的，以及為什么有些人害怕金融上強(qiáng)大的中國。

Why is China reconsidering the role of its currency?

為什么中國在重新考慮其貨幣的角色?

China is increasing its dominance in the world economy. But there was a sense that China wasn’t getting the respect that it felt it deserved. One of the manifestations of that was that its currency was not quite seen as an elite currency.

中國正在加強(qiáng)其在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)上的主導(dǎo)地位。但目前有一種意識，即中國沒有得到它覺得自己應(yīng)得的尊重。這個問題的表現(xiàn)之一，是中國的貨幣還沒有被完全視為精英貨幣。

Chinese policy makers, especially the more reformist-minded officials, recognized that China needs to do a lot of work to get its financial markets ready before the renminbi could become a prominent international currency. Of course, there is a lot of opposition to such reforms because the system worked well for a lot of politically and economically powerful people.

中國的決策者們，特別是那些致力于改革的官員們認(rèn)識到，在人民幣成為重要國際貨幣之前，中國需要讓自己的金融市場有所準(zhǔn)備，因此有大量的工作要做。當(dāng)然，有很多人反對這種金融改革，因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)行體制對許多政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)上強(qiáng)大的人很有利。

About three or four years ago, these reformist-minded officials had a very important insight: If they could get the Chinese people and leadership to sign on to making the renminbi a great global currency, that could provide a very useful mechanism for getting around the opposition and putting in place a lot of reforms. Ultimately it would be good for China, no matter what happened to the currency.

大約三、四年前，這些致力于改革的官員有了一個非常重要的洞悉：如果他們能夠得到中國人民和中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的支持，讓人民幣成為重要全球貨幣，這就可以提供一個非常有用的機(jī)制，繞過反對意見，讓許多改革措施得以實(shí)施。不管人民幣發(fā)生什么，這最終都將對中國有利。

I view this as a sort of Trojan horse strategy.

我認(rèn)為這是一種特洛伊木馬策略。

Making the currency international requires meeting requirements from foreign institutions like the I.M.F. At the same time, China is increasingly wary of what it calls “Western influences.” Can those external pressures still help China overhaul its financial system?

讓貨幣國際化需要滿足來自國際貨幣基金組織等外國機(jī)構(gòu)的要求。與此同時，中國對所謂的“西方影響”越來越擔(dān)心。這些外部壓力還能幫助中國徹底改革其金融體系嗎?

These serve a very positive role, but they must come from the right sources in the right fashion. When the U.S. Treasury or the I.M.F. tells China to allow its currency to appreciate, that is seen as something that is not necessarily in China’s best interest.

雖然這些外部壓力能起一種非常積極的作用，但壓力必須來自合適的地方，以對的方式進(jìn)行施加。當(dāng)美國財政部或國際貨幣基金組織告訴中國要允許其貨幣升值時，這種要求被視為不一定是符合中國最佳利益的東西。

When it comes to matters where the West has some sort of prize to offer, that changes the dynamic. We’ve seen some examples of that over the last year and a half. When China decided it wanted to get the renminbi into the I.M.F.’s elite basket of currencies, it felt that this would be a great way of getting more prestige for its currency in one fell swoop. The I.M.F. and China came together and decided on a checklist of things that China needed to accomplish over the next year. That checklist turned out to be very useful particularly for the People’s Bank of China [China’s central bank] in pushing out its reforms.

當(dāng)涉及到西方可以提供某種獎勵的事情時，情況就會有所改變了。我們在過去一年半中看到了一些這種例子。當(dāng)中國決定讓人民幣進(jìn)入國際貨幣基金組織的精英貨幣籃子時，它覺得這是一下子能為人民幣贏得更大聲望的好辦法。國際貨幣基金組織與中國一起制定了一個清單，需要中國在之后一年里完成。這份清單被證明非常有用，尤其是對(中國的央行)中國人民銀行改革措施的推出。

After the 2008 financial crisis, the United States pumped money into its financial system, which in effect lowered the value of China’s vast holdings of American debt. How has that affected China’s ambitions for its currency?

2008年金融危機(jī)之后，美國向其金融體系輸入了大量貨幣，這實(shí)際上降低了中國持有的龐大美國債務(wù)的價值。這件事情是怎樣影響中國對其貨幣的野心的?

It is a matter of enormous frustration for China that the U.S. has such a dominant role in global finance. Because of its old policies, China has become even more vulnerable to U.S. policy, especially monetary policy.

美國在全球金融中有如此主導(dǎo)性的作用，對中國來說是一個巨大的煩惱。中國過去的政策讓這個國家更容易受美國政策、特別是美國貨幣政策的影響。

Chinese are net creditors to the rest of the world. That is, the world owes China a lot more than China owes to the world. But the net income that China’s earning — the amount paid by foreign investors minus the amount it pays out to foreign investors — is in fact negative. Foreign investors get pretty good returns in China. But China, because most of its foreign assets are in the form of U.S. Treasuries and the government securities of other advanced economies, is earning piddling rates of return.

中國是世界上其他地方的凈債權(quán)人。也就是說，全世界欠中國的錢，比中國欠世界的多。但中國的凈收入實(shí)際上是負(fù)的，凈收入指的是外國投資者支付的金額減去向外國投資者支付的金額。外國投資者在中國有相當(dāng)好的回報。但因?yàn)橹袊蟛糠值膰赓Y產(chǎn)以美國國債和其他發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的政府證券的形式持有，中國只得到了極低的利息回報。

The fact that the U.S. dollar is so dominant in global finance, and also that the architecture of global finance is controlled by the U.S. and the Western economies, frustrates the Chinese. I think the Chinese feel that the system is stacked against them.

美元在全球金融中占主導(dǎo)地位，以及全球金融體系的構(gòu)架由美國和西方經(jīng)濟(jì)體控制的事實(shí)，都讓中國人不滿。我覺得中國人認(rèn)為這個體系對自己不利。

Many foreign economists say China should loosen its grip on its financial system — opening the capital account, as policy wonks call it. But you quote one respected Chinese voice, Justin Lin Yifu, criticizing that view. How prevalent is that opposition?

許多外國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家說，中國應(yīng)該放松對本國金融體系的控制，用政策人士的話說，應(yīng)該開放資本賬戶。但你引用了批評這種觀點(diǎn)的一個備受尊重的中國聲音——林毅夫。反對的聲音在中國有多普遍?

It is surprisingly prevalent even among Chinese economists who are pro-reform. There is a good reason for that: If one takes economic theory and the practical experience of emerging market countries into consideration, China is doing it exactly the wrong way.

反對的聲音在中國令人驚訝地普遍，即使在主張改革的中國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家中也如此。其背后有一個很好的理由：如果將經(jīng)濟(jì)理論和新興市場國家的實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)考慮進(jìn)來，中國正在用完全錯誤的方法進(jìn)行改革。

The right way to do it is to make domestic financial markets more sound, improve regulatory frameworks and make the exchange rate more flexible so that it can act as a shock absorber. Then you can open up the capital account. 正確的方法是，先讓國內(nèi)的金融市場更加健全，完善監(jiān)管框架，讓匯率變得更加靈活，從而使之成為吸收震蕩的工具。然后你才可以開放資本賬戶。

But I think there’s a logic to China’s strategy. Opening up the capital account isn’t just about money, because China doesn’t need money from abroad. But what comes with the money is very important.

但我覺得，中國的戰(zhàn)略有其自身的邏輯。開放資本賬戶不只是為了錢，因?yàn)橹袊⒉恍枰獓獾腻X。但是，伴隨錢而來的東西非常重要。

One example is where the Chinese government brought in foreign strategic investors into its banks. In 2007, in particular, there was concern that there was no improvement being undertaken in the corporate and financial structure of the big state-owned banks. The idea was that those foreign investors in the banks will have an incentive to bring with them better corporate governance practices and better risk-management practices. So all these sort of collective benefits that come with the capital are what China wants.

一個例子是，中國政府將外國戰(zhàn)略投資者引進(jìn)銀行。特別是在2007年，人們當(dāng)時擔(dān)心大型國有銀行的公司和財務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)沒有得到改善。中國的想法是，讓外國投資者參與中國銀行，將刺激他們把更好的公司治理實(shí)踐和風(fēng)險管理實(shí)踐帶到中國來。所以，所有這些隨資本而來的共同利益才是中國想要的。

The Chinese government prizes stability. Will it give up control?

中國政府以穩(wěn)定為本。它會放棄控制嗎?

China represents a grand and fascinating experiment in managing these two fundamentally contradictory impulses: trying to let the markets work freely versus trying to maintain stability and control in the market. We see that in a variety of contexts, and the currency is no exception. The Chinese government would like the currency’s value to be more market-determined because they see that as important in terms of increasing the renminbi’s prominence.

讓市場自由運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，還是試圖保持市場的穩(wěn)定和對市場的控制，在管理這兩個根本上相互矛盾的沖動上，中國代表著一次壯麗且迷人的實(shí)驗(yàn)。我們在幾件事情中都看到這點(diǎn)，貨幣也不例外。中國政府希望本國貨幣的價值更多地由市場決定，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為那對提升人民幣的地位很重要。

They view the stability of the currency as an important marker of their ability to manage the economy well. This is going to create a number of stumbles and missteps in the future, and indeed it already has.

他們將貨幣的穩(wěn)定性視為自己能良好管理經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要標(biāo)志。這將在未來制造一些失誤和失策，這其實(shí)已經(jīng)發(fā)生了。

Should the world be concerned about China’s growing financial ambitions?

世界應(yīng)該擔(dān)心中國日益增長的金融野心嗎?

There is a positive view about this — that having China become more engaged with the international community is a good thing. Rather than saying that it is a developing country and should be handled by different standards, China might recognize that ultimately having good rules governing international trade and finance would be to its own benefit.

對這個問題有一種正面的看法，讓中國更多地參與國際社會是件好事。與其讓中國說自己是一個發(fā)展中國家，應(yīng)該按不同的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)受到對待，不如讓中國意識到，從根本上采用有關(guān)國際貿(mào)易和金融的良好規(guī)則將對其自身有利。

But I think there was also a fear that China could end up parlaying its economic heft into a more strategic influence that then feeds into its somewhat expansionist tendencies. In the past, and in fact until fairly recently, China took a fairly brute-force approach, using its economic clout to gain economic and political influence.

但我認(rèn)為也有一種擔(dān)心，那就是，中國可能最終希望把自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)力量轉(zhuǎn)化為更具戰(zhàn)略意義的影響力，然后將其注入某種擴(kuò)張主義傾向。在過去，事實(shí)上直到最近，中國采取的方法都相當(dāng)粗暴，用自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力來獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治影響力。

Now China has adopted what I think is a much more savvy and disciplined approach to its international engagement. First, it’s increasing its influence in existing international institutions, which allow it to influence the rules of the game from the inside. Second, it is setting up its own institutions like the A.I.I.B. [Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank] that allow it to redefine the rules of the game from the outside. Third, it is bringing lifelines to countries, and bringing them [other countries] into its embrace by setting up institutions with them.

現(xiàn)在中國在國際事務(wù)的參與上，已經(jīng)采取了在我看來是更加精明且更符合準(zhǔn)則的方式。首先，中國正在增加其在現(xiàn)有國際機(jī)構(gòu)中的影響力，這將讓中國能夠從內(nèi)部影響游戲的規(guī)則。第二，中國正在建立自己的機(jī)構(gòu)，如亞投行(亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行)，這將讓中國能夠從外部重新定義游戲的規(guī)則。第三，中國在為一些國家提供生命線，通過在這些國家建立機(jī)構(gòu)，將它們納入自己的懷抱。

China is very effectively gaining what I like to think of as a multilateral sheen for its effort to build closer economic relationships with other countries.

在為本國與其他國家建立更密切經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的努力上，我認(rèn)為中國正在卓有成效地獲得一種多邊光輝。

At a time when the political rhetoric in the U.S. is about disengaging and questioning traditional lines both economic and political, I think China stands ready to fill in the void. That is not intrinsically a bad thing. But we have to remember many of the values the U.S. in particular has fought for, or tried to expand, like supporting democratic forms of government, by-and-large free markets, freedom of expression and so on. All those are anathema to China.

美國目前的政治詞藻都是關(guān)于脫離、質(zhì)疑傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治路線的，在這個時刻，我覺得中國已經(jīng)做好了填補(bǔ)空缺的準(zhǔn)備。這本身不是一件壞事。但我們必須記住那些價值觀，尤其是美國為之奮斗、或試圖推廣的，比如支持民主形式的政府、大體上自由的市場、言論自由等等。所有這些都是為中國所仇視的東西。