預(yù)測：中國經(jīng)濟困境的3種結(jié)局

HONG KONG — China’s economy is slowing. How bad can it get?

香港——中國經(jīng)濟增長正在放緩。情況能有多糟?

China is widely expected to report on Wednesday that its economy grew about 6.7 percent in the third quarter from a year ago. That would match the growth pace China set in the first and second quarters of this year. In economics, stability like that is remarkable — and usually not to be believed.

業(yè)界普遍預(yù)期中國本周三將宣布第三季度經(jīng)濟同比增長約6.7%。這和中國今年第一、第二季度的增速持平。在經(jīng)濟學中，這樣穩(wěn)定的增速很值得注意——人們通常也不會相信。

Economists often look beyond the official numbers to find alternative ways to gauge the Chinese economy. Other figures and facts on the ground suggest that a lending binge that China has unleashed in recent months is helping to sustain growth.

經(jīng)濟學家常常把目光放在官方數(shù)字之外，尋找其他方法來衡量中國經(jīng)濟。其他相關(guān)數(shù)字和事實表明，中國近幾個月放出的大量貸款有助于維持增長。

But by historical standards, China’s growth is slowing down. This year’s growth is set to come in at a pace slower than last year’s, which was already the weakest pace in 25 years.

但以歷史標準來看，中國的增長正在放緩。今年的增速肯定會比去年慢，去年是25年來最低迷的一年。

“China’s growth has already slowed down dramatically from the heady rates before the financial crisis,” said Diana Choyleva, chief economist at Enodo Economics. “The economy has reached the end of the road when it comes to its export- and investment-led growth model.”

“中國的增長已經(jīng)從金融危機前的高速度顯著放緩，”伊諾多經(jīng)濟公司(Enodo Economics)的首席經(jīng)濟學家戴安娜·喬伊利瓦(Diana Choyleva)說。“從出口和投資拉動型增長模式的角度來看，中國經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)走到了盡頭。”

That is a major concern for central banks, economists, investors and corporate executives around the world, as China has been a major engine of growth for decades. Their main question: What happens next?

這是全球各地中央銀行、經(jīng)濟學家、投資者和企業(yè)高管關(guān)注的大事，因為在過去幾十年來，中國一直是經(jīng)濟增長的一個主要引擎。他們的主要疑問是：接下來會發(fā)生什么事?

Below are three situations that are often discussed as the most likely outcomes of China’s predicament — and what each would mean for the rest of the world.

以下三種情況，常常被視為中國困境最有可能的后果，以及每一種對世界其他地方產(chǎn)生的影響。

China escaped the worst of the 2008 global financial crisis by starting a campaign of state-directed spending that created mountains of new debt. This helped cushion the blow of the fallout around the world. But critics argue that this only delayed China’s own day of reckoning.

在2008年全球金融危機中，中國通過啟動一場由國家主導、帶來大量新債務(wù)的支出活動而躲過了最嚴重的影響。這對緩解世界各地遭受的危機沖擊起到了幫助作用。但批評者認為，它只會推遲中國自己品嘗苦果的時間。

China is still adding credit at a heady pace, and experts are starting to sound alarm bells. Under this situation, China risks its own version of the 2008 crisis that shook Wall Street and plunged the United States into recession and years of painfully slow growth. The rest of the world — which is still dealing with Europe’s woes — could follow.

中國仍然在以驚人的速度增加信用，專家紛紛對此發(fā)出警告。在這種情況下，中國有可能重蹈2008年金融危機的覆轍，那次危機沉重地打擊了華爾街，令美國陷入衰退，經(jīng)歷了數(shù)年極為緩慢的增長。目前仍在應(yīng)對歐洲麻煩的世界其他地方，可能也會跟著陷入危機。

Last month, the Bank for International Settlements published new data estimating that the gap between China’s outstanding credit and its long-term economic growth rate had widened to a record and was well above the historical level that indicates a financial crisis is likely.

上個月，國際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)公布了新數(shù)據(jù)，估算中國未償還信貸與其長期經(jīng)濟增長率之間的差距已經(jīng)刷新紀錄，遠遠高于可能引發(fā)金融危機的歷史水平。

Part of the problem lies in the rapid growth of what is known as shadow financing, like wealth management products, or other forms of nontraditional lending, which have been the focus of a number of prominent frauds. In a report this month, the International Monetary Fund warned that shadow loans average almost 300 percent of the capital buffers at China’s smaller banks.

一部分問題在于“影子融資”的快速增長，比如理財產(chǎn)品或其他形式的非傳統(tǒng)貸款，這已經(jīng)成為了一系列重大欺詐案件的焦點。在本月的一份報告中，國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)警告說，影子貸款的平均數(shù)接近于中國小型銀行的資本緩沖的300%。

The sharp rise in debt prompted one I.M.F. official to warn this month of the risk of a financial “calamity” emanating from China.

鑒于這樣的債務(wù)驟增，IMF一名官員本月發(fā)出了中國有可能爆發(fā)金融“災(zāi)難”的警告。

The good news is that few people actually think such a crisis is the most likely outcome.

好消息是，真的認為這有可能導致金融危機的人并不多。

“The risks of a financial crisis remain very low,” said Andy Rothman, an investment strategist at Matthews Asia, based in San Francisco.

舊金山的銘基亞洲(Matthews Asia)的投資策略師安迪·羅思曼(Andy Rothman)說，“中國發(fā)生金融危機的風險仍然很低。”

Mr. Rothman and others point to China’s tight grip on its own financial system. It controls the country’s big banks as well as the big companies that borrow the most. It also limits how much money can leave its borders and keeps a firm grip on the value of its currency.

羅思曼等人指出，中國對金融體系的控制力很強。它控制著本國大型銀行以及借款最多的大公司，對流出本國的資金數(shù)量進行了限制，還一直掌控著人民幣的價值。

So why can’t China just spend its way out of its slowdown?

那么，中國為什么不能一直用增加支出的方式來應(yīng)對經(jīng)濟放緩呢?

Optimists point to China’s history of responding to economic challenges: the 2008 lending surge, an earlier bailout of the banking system and a painful restructuring of state-owned enterprises. This time, China could make progress with a plan to restructure debt while increasing spending on areas that could benefit its growing consumer class, like medical care and social services. That would be good news for a world economy looking for sparks.

樂觀主義者提到了中國以往應(yīng)對經(jīng)濟挑戰(zhàn)的歷史：2008年的貸款激增，對銀行系統(tǒng)的早期救助，以及國有企業(yè)的痛苦重組。這一次，中國可以通過重組債務(wù)，并增加對一些領(lǐng)域的支出來取得成效，這些領(lǐng)域包括醫(yī)療保健和社會服務(wù)，可以給中國日益擴大的消費階層帶來好處。對于正在尋求起色的全球經(jīng)濟來說，這是一個好消息。

The problem is that China’s debt burden is so much larger than ever before — both in absolute terms and compared with the economy.

問題是，中國的債務(wù)負擔比以往任何時候都沉重得多——無論是在絕對數(shù)量上，還是相對于經(jīng)濟總量而言。

At the same time, recent efforts to support growth by increasing state spending have met with another challenge: The government is getting less bang for its buck.

與此同時，通過增加政府支出來保增長的努力近期也面臨著另一個挑戰(zhàn)：政府支出的效果越來越小。

What’s more, private companies, put off by the lackluster economic outlook, have been pulling back on investment. State spending has helped keep growth rates on target so far this year, and a rebound in real estate investment has also helped, albeit at the risk of inflating a housing bubble.

此外，由于經(jīng)濟前景不樂觀，私人公司已經(jīng)開始撤資。今年到目前為止，在政府支出和房地產(chǎn)投資回暖的幫助下，中國保持了經(jīng)濟增長目標，雖然樓市泡沫膨脹的風險有所加劇。

“The resurgence of state investment has helped sustain growth in the short run, as has the modest rebound in property investment this year,” said Nicholas R. Lardy, an expert on China’s economy who is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

“國家投資的回暖有助于在短期內(nèi)維持經(jīng)濟增長，房地產(chǎn)投資今年的小幅反彈也起到了這個作用。”華盛頓彼得森國際經(jīng)濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的高級研究員、中國經(jīng)濟專家尼古拉斯·R·拉迪(Nicholas R. Lardy)說的高級研究員說。

But he added, “The productivity of state investment is low, so it is a very inefficient way to sustain growth.”

但他也說，“國家投資的生產(chǎn)率很低，所以用這個方式來維持增長效率非常低下。”

With China’s high debt, inability to spend and a lack of political will to make tough choices to fix its economy, economists are increasingly comparing it to another Asian powerhouse: Japan.

中國債務(wù)高企、支出無力，缺乏為解決經(jīng)濟問題做出艱難選擇的政治意愿，導致經(jīng)濟學家日益將它與另一個亞洲大國日本進行類比。

Like China now, Japan in the 1990s faced enormous bank debt, the bursting of a stock market bubble and overcapacity in a number of industries. Reluctant to make the sort of tough choices that result in shutting factories and killing companies, Japanese leaders tolerated years of economic stagnation instead. The result was called the Lost Decade, though many of Japan’s problems linger today.

就像中國現(xiàn)在一樣，日本在1990年代也面臨著巨大的銀行債務(wù)、股市泡沫破裂，以及很多行業(yè)產(chǎn)能過剩。日本領(lǐng)導人不愿意做出會導致工廠停業(yè)、公司倒閉的艱難選擇，而是容忍了多年的經(jīng)濟停滯。結(jié)果導致了“失落的十年”，盡管日本的很多問題如今仍然存在。

China is not Japan, of course, and its vast and upwardly mobile population stands in contrast to Japan’s wealthier but aging society. Still, a growing number of economists see the possibility of something similar.

當然，中國不是日本，它龐大的向上流動的人口，也和日本更富裕但老齡化日漸嚴重的社會形成了鮮明的對比。但依然有越來越多的經(jīng)濟學家看到了類似的可能性。

“Just having a lot of debt, and bad debt, does not cause you to have a crisis,” said Arthur R. Kroeber, the managing director of Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic research firm in Beijing.

“大量債務(wù)并且是不良債務(wù)，并不會給你造成危機，”北京的經(jīng)濟研究公司佳富龍洲(Gavekal Dragonomics)的常務(wù)董事葛藝豪(Arthur R. Kroeber)說。

“But the price that you pay — if you don’t do the financial restructuring and real economy restructuring that is necessary to restore things to health — is that you get a very long period of very low growth and anemic activity,” he added.

“但要恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟的健康，必須進行金融重組和實體經(jīng)濟重組，如果不這么做，你要付出的代價就是在非常漫長的時期里增長速度非常低，缺乏活力，”他接著說。

That could also sideline one of the world’s most reliable engines of growth. It could also cause problems in China, where leaders have long pledged to provide jobs and opportunity to the millions who still leave their rural villages looking for a better life.

這可能還會降低全球最可靠的增長引擎之一的重要性，并在中國國內(nèi)引發(fā)問題。在中國，領(lǐng)導人長期承諾為仍在為尋找更好的生活而離開農(nóng)村的數(shù)億人提供工作崗位和機會。

Still, that could be better than the alternative.

但這仍然好過另一種情況。

“This expansion of debt is way beyond anything we saw in Japan, both in terms of magnitude and time frame,” said Charlene Chu, a partner at Autonomous Research and a former China banking analyst at Fitch Ratings.

“這種債務(wù)擴張遠遠超出了我們在日本看到的情況，不管是在規(guī)模上還是時間范圍上，”曾在惠譽評級(Fitch Ratings)擔任中國銀行業(yè)分析師的Autonomous Research合伙人朱夏蓮(Charlene Chu)說。

“I think a Japan outcome in many ways would be a best-case scenario for China.”

“我覺得從很多方面來說，日本的情況是中國最好的結(jié)局。”