“特朗普總統(tǒng)”將帶來“失序世界”
歷史有時會發(fā)生跳躍。想想第一次世界大戰(zhàn)、布爾什維克革命(Bolshevik Revolution，即俄國十月革命)、大蕭條、阿道夫•希特勒(Adolf Hitler)當選、第二次世界大戰(zhàn)、冷戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)、多個歐洲帝國的瓦解、鄧小平在中國實施的“改革開放”、蘇聯(lián)解體，以及2007-09年的金融危機和隨后的“大衰退”。
We may be on the brink of an event as transformative as many of these: the election of Donald Trump as US president. This would mark the end of a US-led west as the central force in global affairs. The result would not be a new order. It would be perilous disorder.
我們或許即將面臨一起類似的轉(zhuǎn)折性事件：唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)當選美國總統(tǒng)。那將標志著以美國為首的西方在全球事務(wù)中擔當核心角色的時代就要終結(jié)。其結(jié)果將不是形成新秩序，而是出現(xiàn)危險的失序。
The fact that Mr Trump can be a credible contender for the presidency is astounding. In business, he is a serial defaulter and litigator turned reality TV star. He is a peddler of falsehoods and conspiracy theories. He utters racist calumnies. He attacks the independence of the judiciary. He refuses to reveal his taxes. He has no experience of political office, and incoherent policies. He glories in ignorance. He even hints at a federal default. He undermines confidence in the US-created trade order, by threatening to tear up past agreements. He undermines confidence in US democracy by claiming the election will be rigged. He supports torture and the deliberate killing of the families of alleged terrorists. He admires the former KGB agent who runs Russia.
特朗普能夠成為一名有希望當選的總統(tǒng)競選者，這一事實令人咋舌。在商界，他從一個連續(xù)違約者和訴訟當事人轉(zhuǎn)型為真人秀電視明星。他兜售謊言和陰謀論。他進行種族主義誹謗。他抨擊司法機構(gòu)的獨立性。他拒絕披露自己的稅單。他沒有從政經(jīng)驗，沒有連貫的政策。他以無知為榮。他甚至暗示聯(lián)邦政府可以違約。他威脅要撕毀過去達成的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，削弱了人們對美國創(chuàng)建的貿(mào)易秩序的信心。他聲稱大選將被操縱，削弱了人們對美國民主的信心。他支持酷刑，支持故意殺死疑似恐怖分子的家人。他欽佩正在掌管俄羅斯的那名前克格勃(KGB)特工。
Evidently, a huge number of US voters have lost confidence in the country’s political and economic systems. This is so to an extent not seen even in the 1930s, when voters turned towards an established politician. Yet, for all its challenges, the US is not in such terrible shape. It is the richest large country in the history of the world. Growth is slow, but unemployment is low. If voters were to choose Mr Trump — despite his failings, displayed again in the first presidential debate — this would tell us grim things about the health of the US.
顯然，數(shù)量眾多的美國選民已經(jīng)對這個國家的政治經(jīng)濟體系失去了信心。其程度之嚴重，即便是在上世紀30年代也未曾見過，當時選民們支持一位老牌政治家。然而，盡管面臨各種挑戰(zhàn)，目前美國的情況并不是很糟。它是世界歷史上最富有的大國。增長緩慢，但失業(yè)率低。如果選民們選擇了特朗普——盡管他有很多缺點并且在第一次競選辯論中再次暴露無遺——這將告訴我們美國健康狀況有多嚴峻。
It is the world’s leading power, so this is not just a domestic US concern. What might a Trump presidency mean? Forecasting the policies of someone so unpredictable is impossible. But a few things seem at least reasonably clear.
美國是世界舞臺上處于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的大國，所以這個問題不只是美國國內(nèi)民眾會關(guān)心。特朗普當選總統(tǒng)可能意味著什么?要預(yù)測一個如此難以預(yù)測之人的政策，是絕無可能的。但有幾點至少是相當明確的。
The US and its allies remain immensely powerful. But their economic dominance is in slow decline. According to the International Monetary Fund, the share of the high-income countries (essentially, the US and its chief allies) will fall from 64 per cent of global output (measured at purchasing power) in 1990 to 39 per cent in 2020, while the US share will fall from 22 per cent to 15 per cent over this period.
美國及其盟友仍然非常強大。但它們的經(jīng)濟主導(dǎo)地位正在緩慢下降。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，高收入國家(基本上就是美國及其主要盟友)占全球產(chǎn)出的比例(按購買力計算)將從1990年的64%下降到2020年的39%，而同期美國的占比將從22%下降至15%。
While the US military might is still huge, two caveats must be made. One is that winning a conventional war is quite a different matter from achieving one’s aims on the ground, as the Vietnam and Iraq wars showed. Furthermore, China’s rapidly rising defence spending could create serious military difficulties for the US in the Asia-Pacific region.
盡管美國的軍力仍然強大，但有兩點需要說明。一個是，正如越南戰(zhàn)爭和伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭所顯示的那樣，打贏一場常規(guī)戰(zhàn)爭與實現(xiàn)你在地面上的目標是完全不同的事情。此外，中國的國防開支迅速增加，可能會使美國在亞太地區(qū)面臨嚴重的軍事難題。
It follows that the ability of the US to shape the world to its liking will rest increasingly on its influence over the global economic and political systems. Indeed, this is not new. It has been a feature of US hegemony since the 1940s. But this is even more important today. The alliances the US creates, the institutions it supports and the prestige it possesses are truly invaluable assets. All such strategic assets would be in grave peril if Mr Trump were to be president.
由此可見，美國按照自己意愿塑造世界的能力，將越來越多地依賴于其對全球經(jīng)濟和政治體系的影響力。事實上，這并不是什么新鮮事。這已成為自1940年以來美國霸權(quán)的一個特點。但在今天，這一點顯得更重要。美國創(chuàng)建的聯(lián)盟、支持的機構(gòu)和擁有的聲望，是真正無價的資產(chǎn)。如果特朗普成為總統(tǒng)，所有這些戰(zhàn)略性資產(chǎn)都將面臨嚴重危險。
The biggest contrast between the US and China is that the former has so many powerful allies. Even Vladimir Putin is not a reliable ally for China. America’s allies support the US largely because they trust it. That trust is based on its perceived commitment to predictable, values-based behaviour. Its alliances have not been problem-free, far from it. But they have worked. Mr Trump’s cherished unpredictability and transactional approach to partnerships would damage the alliances irreparably.
美國和中國的最大不同在于，前者有眾多強大盟友。而對中國來說，即便普京也非可靠盟友。美國的盟友支持美國，主要是因為它們信任美國。這種信任是基于它們認為，美國會采取的行動是可以預(yù)測、以價值觀為基礎(chǔ)的。美國的聯(lián)盟關(guān)系并非毫無問題，遠非如此。但是，這些聯(lián)盟是起作用的。特朗普所重視的不可預(yù)測性，以及把伙伴關(guān)系當成交易處理的做法，將會對聯(lián)盟關(guān)系造成不可挽回的損害。
A vital feature of the US-led global order has been the role of multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In binding itself by the rules of an open economic system, the US has encouraged others to do the same. The result has been extraordinary growth in prosperity: between 1950 and 2015, average global real output per head rose sixfold. Mr Trump does not understand this system. The results of repudiation could be calamitous for all.
美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的全球秩序的一個重要特征是多邊機構(gòu)——如國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行(World Bank)和世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)——所扮演的角色。通過以開放經(jīng)濟體系的規(guī)則約束自己，美國也鼓勵了其他國家這么做。其結(jié)果就是經(jīng)濟的快速繁榮：1950年至2015年間，全球人均實際產(chǎn)出增長了6倍。特朗普不理解這種開放經(jīng)濟體系。拋棄這種體系，可能給所有人帶來災(zāi)難性的后果。
The Iraq war has damaged trust in US wisdom and competence. But the global financial crisis has been even more destructive. Many have long suspected US motives. But they thought it knew how to manage a capitalist system. The crisis devastated that confidence.
伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭損害了世人對美國智慧和能力的信心。但是，全球金融危機產(chǎn)生了更大的破壞效果。許多人一直懷疑美國的動機。但他們曾認為美國懂得如何管理一個資本主義體系。危機已摧毀了這種信心。
After all this damage, election of a man as unqualified as Mr Trump would call into question something even more fundamental: belief in the capacity of the US to choose reasonably well-informed and competent leaders. Under a President Trump, the democratic system would lose much of its credibility as a model for the organisation of a civilised political life. Mr Putin and other actual or would-be despots would cheer. Their belief that talk of western values is just hypocrisy would be vindicated. But those who see the US as a bastion of democracy would despair.
在遭受這一切損害之后，把特朗普這樣一個不稱職的人選上臺，將使一種更根本的東西遭到質(zhì)疑：那就是人們對于美國有能力選出見多識廣、能干的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的信心。如果特朗普當上總統(tǒng)，民主制度作為文明政治生活組織制度之典范的信譽將損失大半。普京和其他當前的獨裁者以及未來的準獨裁者將會歡呼。他們認為談?wù)撐鞣絻r值觀只是虛偽作派的觀點將被證明是正確的。但是，那些把美國視為民主堡壘的人會感到絕望。
If Mr Trump were to win, it would be a regime change for the world. It would, for example, end efforts to manage the threat of climate change, possibly forever. But even his candidacy suggests that the US role in the global order risks undergoing a transformation. That role depended not only on American economic and military prowess, but also on the values it represented. For all its mistakes, the ideal of a law-governed democratic republic remained visible. Hillary Clinton is an imperfect candidate. Mr Trump is something else altogether. Far from making America great, his presidency might unravel the world.
如果特朗普獲勝，這將是整個世界都要面對的一場政權(quán)更迭。比如，應(yīng)對氣候變化威脅的努力大概將從此不了了之。但是，他成為總統(tǒng)候選人就已表明，美國在全球秩序中的角色可能經(jīng)歷一場轉(zhuǎn)變。這個角色不僅依賴于美國的經(jīng)濟和軍事實力，也依賴于它所代表的價值觀。盡管有許多錯誤，一個法治的民主共和國的理想依然明顯可見。希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)是一個不完美的候選人。特朗普則完全是另類。他若成為美國總統(tǒng)，非但不能讓美國變得偉大，還可能讓世界分崩離析。
