央行該向政府“交棒”

Central banks have been engaged in unprecedented monetary experimentation. Unlike scientists developing drugs, fear of the unknown has had no moderating influence on their activities. That in itself is alarming. Nor is it possible to reverse recent policies. Now governments must accept responsibility for resolving an incipient global solvency crisis.

全球各主要央行近年投入史無前例的貨幣實驗。不像科學(xué)家們開發(fā)藥物，對未知的恐懼并未對央行活動產(chǎn)生抑制效果。這本身就是令人震驚的。近年政策也是不可能逆轉(zhuǎn)的?，F(xiàn)在，各國政府必須承擔(dān)起責(zé)任，應(yīng)對一場正在露頭的全球償付能力危機(jī)。

The monetary stimulus provided repeatedly over the past eight years has failed to produce the expected expansion of aggregate demand. Debt levels have risen, especially in emerging market economies, constraining expectations of future spending and current capital expenditures. Consumers have had to save more, not less, to ensure adequate income in retirement.

過去8年一再提供的貨幣刺激，未能像預(yù)期那樣擴(kuò)大總需求。債務(wù)水平已上升，尤其是在新興市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體，制約了有關(guān)未來消費和當(dāng)前資本支出的預(yù)期。消費者必須儲蓄更多而非更少，以確保退休后有足夠的收入。

At the same time, easy money threatens two sets of undesirable side effects.

另一方面，寬松貨幣可能產(chǎn)生兩組不受歡迎的副作用。

First, current policies foster financial instability. By squeezing credit and term spreads, the business models of banks, insurance companies and pension funds are put at risk, as is their lending. The functioning of financial markets has also changed, with market “anomalies” indicating hidden structural shifts, and many asset prices bid up to dangerously high levels.

首先，當(dāng)前政策助長了金融不穩(wěn)定。通過擠壓信貸息差和期限息差，銀行、保險公司和養(yǎng)老基金的業(yè)務(wù)模式面臨風(fēng)險，它們的放貸也面臨風(fēng)險。金融市場的運作也發(fā)生了變化，市場“異?，F(xiàn)象”預(yù)示著隱藏的結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)變，許多資產(chǎn)價格被哄抬到危險的高水平。

Second, current policies threaten future growth. Resources misallocated before the crisis have been locked in through zombie banks supporting zombie companies. And with neither financial institutions nor financial markets functioning properly, real misallocations since the crisis have been further encouraged.

其次，當(dāng)前政策對未來增長構(gòu)成威脅。危機(jī)之前錯配的資源已被固化，因為僵尸銀行支持著僵尸企業(yè)。由于金融機(jī)構(gòu)和金融市場的運轉(zhuǎn)都不正常，自危機(jī)以來實際錯配受到了進(jìn)一步鼓勵。

Perhaps we need look no further for the cause of the alarming slowdown in global growth than the insidious effects of easy-money policies. Two vicious circles are at work with a wounded financial system contributing to both. On the demand side, accumulating debt creates headwinds, leading to more monetary expansion and more debt.

要尋找令人吃驚的全球增長放緩的原因，也許我們只需要考察寬松貨幣政策的不良效果。兩種惡性循環(huán)正發(fā)生作用，而受傷的金融體系對兩者都起到推波助瀾的作用。在需求側(cè)，債務(wù)積累引發(fā)逆風(fēng)，導(dǎo)致更多貨幣擴(kuò)張和更多債務(wù)。

This explanation contrasts sharply with the hypothesis of a “savings glut”: little more than a tautology for slow demand growth. On the supply side, misallocations slow growth which again leads to monetary easing, more misallocation and still less growth. This explanation seems far more convincing than “secular stagnation” in an era of extraordinary technological advances.

這種解釋與“儲蓄過剩”的假設(shè)形成了鮮明對比：那不過是需求增長緩慢的同義反復(fù)。在供應(yīng)側(cè)，錯配拉低了增速，進(jìn)而也導(dǎo)致貨幣寬松、更多錯配和增長更加乏力。這種解釋似乎遠(yuǎn)比非凡技術(shù)進(jìn)步時代的“長期停滯”更令人信服。

Accepting the importance of these varied effects also undercuts the popular argument that central banks must reduce the “financial” rate of interest whenever the “natural” rate of interest (the expected rate of return on capital) declines. If expected profits have collapsed as a side effect of past monetary policies, this hardly seems to justify maintaining such polices.

接受這種種后果的重要意義，還削弱了這樣一種流行說法：只要“自然”利率(預(yù)期的資本回報率)下降，央行就必須降低“金融”利率。如果預(yù)期利潤大幅下滑是以往貨幣政策的副作用，這似乎很難為維持此類政策提供正當(dāng)理由。

If central banks should not continue doing what they are doing, what should they do? One tempting option is to say “tighten up”. The problem is that damage cannot be undone. All the problems identified above have rendered both the real and financial side of the global economy enormously fragile.

如果央行不應(yīng)該繼續(xù)做它們正在做的事情，那么它們應(yīng)該做什么?一個誘人的選項是說“收緊”。問題在于，損害無法挽回。上面列舉的所有問題，已使全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的實際和金融層面都變得極為脆弱。

Fortunately there is a way forward, but it relies on government action rather than that of central banks.

所幸有一條出路，但它依賴政府(而非央行)的行動。

To please John Maynard Keynes, two sets of solutions are commonly suggested. First, governments with fiscal room for manoeuvre should use it. That room could be increased through legislating medium-term fiscal frameworks to ensure debt sustainability over time. Second, emphasis should be put on infrastructure investment with the private sector.

為了取悅約翰•梅納德•凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)，經(jīng)常有兩套解決方案被提出來。首先，具有財政回旋余地的政府應(yīng)該使用它。通過立法確立中期財政框架、確保隨著時間推移債務(wù)具有可持續(xù)性，財政回旋余地還可以增大。其次，應(yīng)該注重讓私營部門參與基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資。

To please Friedrich Hayek, two sets of solutions are also suggested. Excessive debt must be solved by write-offs and restructuring. This might require recapitalisation or closure of financial firms that made bad loans. Second, structural reforms to raise growth potential and the capacity to service debt will pay longer-term dividends.

為了取悅弗里德里希•哈耶克(Friedrich Hayek)，也有兩套解決方案被提出來。必須通過減記和重組來解決過高負(fù)債的問題。這或許會要求對持有不良貸款的金融公司重新注資，或者將其關(guān)閉。其次，實施結(jié)構(gòu)性改革以提高增長潛力和償債能力，這將帶來長期紅利。

We must please both Keynes and Hayek. It is not an either/or world.

我們必須同時取悅凱恩斯和哈耶克。這不是一個非此即彼的世界。

Evidently, there will be obstacles. We need a paradigm shift in thinking about how the economy and policy works. Further, we need legislation to allow implementation of many of the policies suggested above. Finally, we need the political will to accept that central banks can only “buy time” for governments to act. That time is now up.

顯然，前方會存在障礙。在思考經(jīng)濟(jì)和政策如何運行方面，我們需要一次范式轉(zhuǎn)換。此外，我們需要通過立法，落實以上建議的許多政策。最后，我們需要擁有這樣的政治意志，即接受央行只能為政府行動“贏得時間”。這種時間現(xiàn)在到尾聲了。