中國(guó)債務(wù)問題未必釀成災(zāi)難

　　The case for the prosecution: George Soros, who isconsiderably richer than you, says China’s debtsremind him eerily of the US pre-2008. The defence:people often say this sort of thing, and China alwaysshrugs it off.

　　控方的理由是：比你富有得多的喬治•索羅斯(GeorgeSoros)說，中國(guó)的債務(wù)詭異地讓他聯(lián)想起美國(guó)在2008年前的情形。辯方的理由是：人們經(jīng)常這么說，而中國(guó)總能安然無(wú)恙。

　　Sure, its borrowing generates remarkably scarynumbers. With every flavour included — households, local and central government, corporate— HSBC puts debt at 249 per cent of GDP. Annual credit growth is 15 per cent, twice that ofnominal GDP. Central government is obscurely entwined in much of it, backing state-ownedenterprises and local municipalities.

　　沒錯(cuò)，中國(guó)的借貸數(shù)據(jù)極為可怕。匯豐(HSBC)表示，若計(jì)入各類債務(wù)(家庭、地方和中央政府、企業(yè))，中國(guó)的債務(wù)與國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比達(dá)到249%。年度信貸增速達(dá)到15%，是名義GDP增速的兩倍。為國(guó)有企業(yè)和地方政府提供擔(dān)保的中央政府，隱晦地與很大一部分債務(wù)扯在一起。

　　But the defence has some strong points. Being much poorer, China has much more potentialto grow than pre-crisis America. It finances its own debts, more or less: households lend tobanks, who lend to corporates — the reverse of the subprime wheeze.

　　但辯方的理由也很有力。由于比危機(jī)前的美國(guó)窮得多，中國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)潛力也要大得多。中國(guó)或多或少為本國(guó)的債務(wù)提供資金：家庭向銀行放貸，銀行向企業(yè)放貸——這與美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)的模式相反。

　　In contrast to the US, years of trade surpluses have left China with ample foreign reserves. Itscapital markets are volatile, but nothing like the Wild West of runaway securitisation seen inthe US circa 2008. Debt is still largely held on banks’ balance sheets. And those banks look safeenough. At 12.9 per cent, Industrial and Commercial Bank has a common equity tier onecapital ratio in the same ballpark as JPMorgan.

　　與美國(guó)形成反差的是，多年的貿(mào)易順差讓中國(guó)擁有充足的外匯儲(chǔ)備。中國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)并不平穩(wěn)，但不像2008年前后美國(guó)失控的資產(chǎn)證券化那么瘋狂。債務(wù)基本上仍在銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上。而那些銀行看起來(lái)足夠安全。中國(guó)工商銀行(ICBC)的普通股一級(jí)資本充足率為12.9%，與摩根大通(JPMorgan)差不多。

　　The defence wins. China is not pre-crisis America. Those who hear history rhyme too well areusually not listening closely. Although a country cannot indefinitely increase its debts twice asfast as GDP, predicting the nature and timing of the end is a mug’s game.

　　辯方贏了。中國(guó)不是危機(jī)前的美國(guó)。那些對(duì)歷史回聲聽力太好的人通常聽得不夠仔細(xì)。盡管一個(gè)國(guó)家的債務(wù)不可能無(wú)止境地以兩倍于GDP增速的速度增長(zhǎng)，但預(yù)測(cè)其終點(diǎn)的性質(zhì)和時(shí)機(jī)是毫無(wú)把握的。

　　A more pertinent worry is that China’s debt spigot sends credit flowing to unproductiveplaces: inefficient SOEs, sectors struggling with overcapacity, property. This slows downreform, and the more debt, the harder the eventual move towards freer capital markets.

　　更值得擔(dān)憂的是，中國(guó)的債務(wù)閥門讓信貸流向徒勞無(wú)益的領(lǐng)域：效率低下的國(guó)有企業(yè)，艱難應(yīng)對(duì)產(chǎn)能過剩的行業(yè)，以及房地產(chǎn)。這減緩了改革步伐，債務(wù)越多，就越難最終轉(zhuǎn)向更自由的資本市場(chǎng)。

　　Don’t worry, HSBC says. The latest credit upsurge has gone into infrastructure, and propertyin areas where people want houses. Since 2014, Beijing has chivvied local authorities intoswapping opaque shadow finance for more transparent municipal bonds. A hereticalthought: China’s debt binge does not have to end in catastrophe.

　　匯豐說，別擔(dān)心。最近激增的信貸流入了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，以及那些仍有住房需求的地區(qū)的房地產(chǎn)。自2014年以來(lái)，北京方面敦促地方政府將不透明的影子金融轉(zhuǎn)化為更為透明的市政債券。一種異端思想是，中國(guó)的債務(wù)盛宴不一定以災(zāi)難告終。