奧巴馬主義導(dǎo)致危險的不作為

Dwight D Eisenhower left the White House in 1961cautioning against the designs of the military-industrial complex assembled to confront theSoviet Union. Barack Obama sees a real and presentdanger in a Washington foreign policyestablishment inclined to set militaryintervention as the default option.

德懷特•D•艾森豪威爾(Dwight D Eisenhower) 1961年離開白宮時，曾告誡美國人要警惕為對抗蘇聯(lián)而打造的軍工復(fù)合體設(shè)計。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)認(rèn)為，華盛頓的外交政策體制內(nèi)人士構(gòu)成真實(shí)且迫在眉睫的危險，這些人傾向于把軍事干預(yù)當(dāng)作默認(rèn)選項(xiàng)。

Mr Obama likes to recall Eisenhower’s view of war as mankind’s “most tragic and stupid folly”.He has resolutely resisted what his Republican predecessor once called a “recurringtemptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculoussolution to all current difficulties”.

奧巴馬喜歡援引艾森豪威爾的戰(zhàn)爭觀，即戰(zhàn)爭是人類“最可悲最愚蠢的胡鬧”。他堅決抵制他的共和黨前任所稱的一種“反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的誘惑——認(rèn)為某些壯觀的、代價高昂的行動可能成為當(dāng)前所有困難的奇跡般解決方案”。

America got what it voted for in 2008. Mr Obama won because he was not George W Bush. As astate senator in Illinois he had opposed the invasion of Iraq and campaigned to bring thetroops home from the Middle East. The aversion to war, the frustration with Arab allies, thediplomatic outreach to Iran, irritation with “freeriding” Europeans and a reluctance to takeon Russia’s Vladimir Putin over Ukraine, all fit the temperament of a leader intent on avoiding“stupid shit”. The surprise is that so many were surprised by his refusal to be drawn into a fightwith Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

2008年，美國在選舉中如愿以償，把奧巴馬選入白宮。奧巴馬獲勝的原因在于他不是喬治•W•布什(GeorgeW Bush)。在擔(dān)任伊利諾伊州參議員時，奧巴馬就反對出兵伊拉克，并在競選中承諾從中東撤軍。厭惡戰(zhàn)爭、對阿拉伯盟友的失望、與伊朗進(jìn)行外交接觸、對歐洲國家“搭便車”表示不滿，以及不愿在烏克蘭問題上與俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)攤牌，所有這些都符合一位決心避免“做蠢事”的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的性情。意外的是，竟有如此多的人對他拒絕被卷入與敘利亞巴沙爾•阿薩德(Bashar al-Aassad)政權(quán)開戰(zhàn)感到驚訝。

All this is charted by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic after a series of interviews with thepresident. What stands out from Mr Goldberg’s elegant essay is Mr Obama’s unshakeableconviction that he is on the right side of history. There is not the smallest smidgen of self-doubt. Others (including White House aides) saw the failure to enforce a “red line” on MrAssad’s use of chemical weapons as a big blow to US power and prestige. The president sayssimply: “I’m very proud of this moment”.

在對奧巴馬進(jìn)行了一系列訪談后，杰弗里•戈德堡(Jeffrey Goldberg)把這一切都勾勒在了《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic)的一篇文章中。從戈德堡這篇精彩文章中脫穎而出的是奧巴馬毫不動搖的信念——他站在歷史正確的一邊。他沒有絲毫一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)自我懷疑。其他人(包括白宮的一些助理)則認(rèn)為，未能對阿薩德使用化學(xué)武器執(zhí)行“紅線”是對美國實(shí)力和威望的重大打擊。奧巴馬只是簡單地說：“我對這一刻感到非常自豪”。

Even leaders so obviously untroubled by self-doubt fret about their legacy. Watching Syriaburn cannot be comfortable. Mr Obama wants to be remembered instead for the remarkablediplomatic deal that has checked Iran’s nuclear programme, for the opening to Cuba, for apivot to Asia and for last December’s global deal on climate change.

即便是那些顯然不為自我懷疑所累的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，也會為自己將留下什么樣的政治遺產(chǎn)而操心。眼睜睜地看著敘利亞戰(zhàn)火紛飛不可能讓人舒服。相反，奧巴馬希望世人記住他推動的阻止伊朗核計劃的重大外交協(xié)議、與古巴關(guān)系和解、重返亞洲以及去年12月達(dá)成的全球氣候變化協(xié)議。

The starting point is a visceral scorn for what Mr Obama calls a “Washington playbook” thatmeasures US power in terms of the willingness to deploy force. When the US steps back, thestory runs, its credibility is shredded. In Mr Obama’s mind such logic leads inexorably tomilitary intervention. Credibility, as Mr Goldberg writes, becomes “dropping bombs onsomeone to prove you are willing to drop bombs on someone”.

起點(diǎn)是對奧巴馬所稱的“華盛頓劇本”——用部署軍隊的意愿來衡量美國的實(shí)力——的本能輕蔑。按照這種邏輯，只要美國后退一步，其可信度就會蕩然無存。在奧巴馬看來，這必然會導(dǎo)致軍事干預(yù)。戈德堡寫道，可信度將變成“為了證明你愿意扔炸彈而向某人扔炸彈”。

In truth, Mr Obama’s critics have argued for something less than a rush to war in Syria — forsafe zones and more help for the rebels rather than tens of thousands of boots on the ground.The costs of international inaction have been counted in hundreds of thousands killed andmillions driven from their homes. And yes, there has been a visible effect on America’sinternational standing. Mr Obama’s answer to this catastrophe: “There are going to be timeswhere we can do something about innocent people being killed but there are going to be timeswhen we can’t.”

實(shí)際上，奧巴馬的批評者當(dāng)初并未主張全力投入敘利亞戰(zhàn)爭;他們建議設(shè)立安全區(qū)，向叛軍提供更多援助，而非派遣數(shù)萬地面部隊。國際社會不作為的代價是數(shù)十萬人死亡，數(shù)百萬人被迫逃離家園。當(dāng)然，這對美國的國際聲譽(yù)造成了明顯影響。奧巴馬對這一災(zāi)難性結(jié)果的回答是：“有時我們能夠采取行動幫助無辜的人免遭殺戮，但有時我們無能為力。”

The president has a point. The US retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan was proof enough of thelimits of military power. Losing wars has done more damage to American credibility thanchoosing not to fight them. It is hard enough even for a superpower to maintain order betweenstates; it is all but impossible to impose it within fractured states.

美國總統(tǒng)的話有一定道理。美國從伊拉克和阿富汗撤軍就足以證明軍事力量的局限性。輸?shù)魬?zhàn)爭對美國可信度的損害比選擇逃避戰(zhàn)爭更大。對于一個超級大國而言，維持國家間的秩序已經(jīng)夠難了;在分裂的國家內(nèi)部維持秩序就更不可能了。

The Washington mindset has not caught up with the think-tank reports charting the rise ofChina and global power shifts of the past decade. There is a reluctance to admit the passingof the unipolar moment and a just-do-something reflex that tends to reach first for a militaryoption. I am with those who believe the US should have done more to support the uprisingagainst Mr Assad’s regime. I am less confident the outcome would have been measurablydifferent.

華盛頓的思維模式還未跟上各種智庫報告，后者描繪了過去10年間中國的崛起以及全球?qū)嵙Φ霓D(zhuǎn)移。體制內(nèi)人士不愿承認(rèn)單極世界的時刻已經(jīng)過去，而做點(diǎn)什么的本能反應(yīng)往往會首先考慮軍事選項(xiàng)。我支持一些人的想法，他們認(rèn)為美國本應(yīng)做更多來支持反對阿薩德政權(quán)的起義。但我并不認(rèn)為這樣做的結(jié)局會有明顯不同。

For all that, Mr Obama’s deracinated calculation misses the human dynamic in internationalrelations. There is no algorithm to mimic the personal judgments that leaders invariably makeof their allies and adversaries. Perceptions count for as much as reality. It really does matter ifan adversary concludes that hesitation here will be replicated by weakness there. Beijingnotices when Mr Putin gets away with it. Successful diplomacy demands leverage;semaphoring an aversion to military entanglement depletes that leverage.

盡管如此，奧巴馬精明的算計還是忽視了國際關(guān)系中的人性動因。沒有任何算法可以模擬領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對其盟友和對手做出的個人判斷。感性認(rèn)識與現(xiàn)實(shí)同等重要。如果讓對手得出結(jié)論：你在這件事上的猶豫將重現(xiàn)于另一件事上的軟弱，那將確實(shí)事關(guān)重大。當(dāng)普京能夠?yàn)樗麨闀r，北京方面注意到了。成功的外交需要杠桿;公開宣布厭惡軍事干預(yù)只會自毀杠桿。

The president is content to call himself a foreign policy realist — though he insists the hard-headed assessment of core national interests that keeps him out of the Middle East isleavened by the internationalism that has seen him at the centre of the climate change talks.

奧巴馬滿足于稱自己為一個外交政策現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者，盡管他堅稱，他既有讓他置身中東事外的對國家核心利益的現(xiàn)實(shí)評估，也受到推動他置身于氣候變化談判中心的國際主義的影響。

What is missing from the Obama doctrine is a strategic view of the role of US leadership insustaining global order. Analysis drifts into an excuse for paralysis, but inaction carries asmany dangers as intervention. Mr Obama’s realism bleeds into fatalism. To observe that theUS cannot solve every problem in a disordered world should not be to conclude it ispowerless. Disorder is contagious and does not respect neat lines drawn around core nationalinterests.

“奧巴馬主義”缺失的是從戰(zhàn)略角度看待美國在維持全球秩序方面的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)角色。分析漸漸淪為癱瘓的借口，但不作為的危險與出手干預(yù)同樣多。奧巴馬的現(xiàn)實(shí)主義已經(jīng)淪為宿命論。有關(guān)美國無法在一個無序的世界解決所有問題的觀察心得，不能作為美國無能為力這一結(jié)論的依據(jù)。失序會傳染，而且不會尊重圍繞國家核心利益劃出的清晰界線。

As for Eisenhower, cautious he might have been about the rise of the military industrialcomplex, but he was not a non-interventionist. To the contrary, he was drafted to keep theRepublican nomination out of the hands of Robert A Taft — the isolationist who had arguedthat US core interests did not extend to the defeat of Nazi Germany.

至于艾森豪威爾，他或許對軍事工業(yè)復(fù)合體的崛起抱有戒心，但他并非一名不干涉主義者。相反，他當(dāng)初參選就是為了不讓羅伯特•A•塔夫脫(Robert A Taft)贏得共和黨總統(tǒng)候選人提名，后者是一名孤立主義者，曾表示美國的核心利益不包括打敗納粹德國。