解決匯率問題不能靠犧牲貿(mào)易

We have seen this film before. The US Congress isthreatening a trade war to punish “currencymanipulators”, those it deems to be boosting theirtrade balance artificially at the expense of America.Ordinarily, a threat of legislative action like thisfolds in the face of a presidential veto. In the pastthis has resembled a good cop-bad cop routine. TheWhite House would point to anger on Capitol Hill inorder to persuade the likes of China and Japan tocurb manipulation against the dollar.

我們以前看到過這種景象：美國國會正威脅要發(fā)動貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)來懲罰“匯率操縱國”，即那些它認(rèn)為以犧牲美國利益為代價(jià)、人為提振本國貿(mào)易收支的國家。通常情況下，美國國會采取立法行動的威脅會因美國總統(tǒng)行使否決權(quán)而止步。過去，這就像是一種“有人唱白臉、有人唱紅臉”的例行公事。為了說服中國和日本等國收斂針對本幣兌美元匯率的操縱，美國政府會以國會對此感到憤怒向這些國家施壓。

 

 

This time, however, the number of Democrats and Republicans pledging their support forlegislation looks unusually potent. President Barack Obama rightly insists that dealing withcurrency devaluation should be separated from matters of trade. He must hold firm both onthe Trade Promotion Authority he seeks from Congress — that enables him to submit “fasttrack” deals to an up-or-down vote — as well as the Transpacific Partnership talks that are intheir final stages. Both Atlantic and Pacific trade deals are at a crossroads. It would be asetback to global growth prospects if they were sabotaged by politics in the very country thatinitiated them.

不過，這一次，承諾支持上述立法的民主黨和共和黨人數(shù)似乎異乎尋常地有說服力。美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)堅(jiān)稱，應(yīng)對貨幣貶值是一回事，貿(mào)易是另一回事。他是對的。他必須在兩方面堅(jiān)守立場：一是尋求從國會得到“貿(mào)易促進(jìn)授權(quán)”(Trade Promotion Authority)，該授權(quán)能讓他把“快車道”(fast-track)協(xié)議提交直接表決(up-or-down vote);二是已進(jìn)入最后階段的《跨太平洋戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡稱TPP)談判。跨大西洋和跨太平洋貿(mào)易協(xié)定目前均處在十字路口。如果這兩個(gè)貿(mào)易協(xié)定被其發(fā)起國的政治斗爭破壞，將對全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長前景構(gòu)成打擊。

However, Mr Obama should take nothing for granted. John Boehner, the Speaker of the USHouse of Representatives, has said he needs at least 50 Democratic votes to pass TPA. Yet 150of the 188-strong Democratic caucus have already signed a petition opposing it. Unlike onprevious rounds, they are joined by a growing number of Republicans who object to anythingthat increases Mr Obama’s authority.

然而，奧巴馬不應(yīng)認(rèn)為這一切不用費(fèi)力就能得到。美國眾議院議長約翰•博納(John Boehner)已經(jīng)表示，他需要至少50張民主黨的贊成票才能通過貿(mào)易促進(jìn)授權(quán)。但在眾議院的總共188名民主黨議員中，已有150人簽署請?jiān)笗磳Q(mào)易促進(jìn)授權(quán)。與前幾次的情況不同，這次有越來越多的共和黨人也加入了這些民主黨人的陣營，因?yàn)樗麄兎磳σ磺袝U(kuò)充奧巴馬權(quán)力的議案。

Their motives may be different. The left smells a multinational rat that would gnaw at US labourand environmental standards. The right wishes to poke Mr Obama in the eye. Combined, theyare an unholy alliance capable of wrecking global trade negotiations.

這些反對者的動機(jī)可能各不相同。其中的左翼聞到了一只會啃食美國勞工及環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的“跨國老鼠”的氣味。右翼則希望給奧巴馬添堵。這兩類人合起來，形成了一個(gè)能夠毀掉全球貿(mào)易談判的邪惡聯(lián)盟。

The main problem is that such a measure is unworkable. It would slap duties on imports fromcountries deemed to be manipulators, this being defined as central bank interventions aimed atproviding a currency subsidy. In practice these are hard to prove. One person’s devaluation isanother’s monetary policy.

但更主要的問題在于，懲罰所謂匯率操縱國的做法行不通。它會對美國從那些被認(rèn)為是匯率操縱國的國家進(jìn)口的產(chǎn)品強(qiáng)加額外關(guān)稅，這里的匯率操縱被定義為央行為提供一種匯率補(bǔ)貼而干預(yù)匯率。在實(shí)踐中，匯率操縱很難被證實(shí)。一些人認(rèn)為是壓低匯率的事情，另一些看來卻是正當(dāng)?shù)呢泿耪摺?/p>

It could also rebound on the US. Many, including China, objected to the US quantitative easingprogrammes on precisely such grounds. The US is now complaining about the impact of theEuropean Central Bank’s QE. Both actions were launched to stimulate demand but alsoboosted exports. Deciding which are manipulations is not a precise science, as the IMF hasmade clear. Shunting adjudication to the World Trade Organisation would not alter thatobjection.

美國還可能因此搬起石頭砸了自己的腳。包括中國在內(nèi)的很多國家，曾經(jīng)正是以這樣的理由反對美國的量化寬松(QE)計(jì)劃。美國如今則在抱怨歐洲央行(ECB)量化寬松的影響。這兩個(gè)舉措的推出均是為了刺激需求，但也是為了刺激出口。正如國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)闡明的那樣，判定哪些行為屬于匯率操縱并不是一門精確的科學(xué)。即使將判定工作轉(zhuǎn)交給世貿(mào)組織(WTO)，這一反對理由也依然成立。

The second problem is that it would ruin any chances of a trade deal. The 13-member TPP talksare nearing conclusion. If Congress inserted a currency clause into the final deal it wouldprompt Japan to abandon the process — and possibly others.

第二個(gè)問題是，它會毀掉一切達(dá)成貿(mào)易協(xié)定的機(jī)會。13國參與的TPP談判正接近尾聲。如果美國國會在最終協(xié)定中插入一項(xiàng)匯率條款，將導(dǎo)致日本退出談判——其他參與國可能也會如此。

The same applies to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership talks, which are at anearlier stage. Germany’s record export growth is partly helped by the euro’s recentdepreciation. Any measure that punished the eurozone for its currency’s downward drift wouldonly hasten the protectionism US lawmakers say that they are trying to stop.

這同樣適用于《跨大西洋貿(mào)易和投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Transatlantic Trade and InvestmentPartnership，簡稱TTIP)談判，該協(xié)定的談判尚處于早期階段。德國創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的出口增長，部分得益于近期的歐元貶值。如果因歐元匯率下滑而采取措施懲罰歐元區(qū)，只會讓美國立法者口口聲聲努力防止的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義更早現(xiàn)身。

The dollar is currently riding high because US growth outpaces most of its partners. If therecovery has returned fewer middle class jobs than hoped to US shores, it is because ofautomation, not competitive devaluation. In any case, trade is not the forum with which toaddress US currency concerns. Mr Obama knows this. So do cooler heads in Congress. Let ushope they prevail.

由于美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長快于它的大部分貿(mào)易伙伴，美元匯率目前正處于上漲之中。如果說美國經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇帶來的中產(chǎn)階級就業(yè)崗位回流少于預(yù)期，那也是由自動化、而非競爭性貨幣貶值導(dǎo)致的。無論如何，貿(mào)易都不是化解美國匯率擔(dān)憂的場所。奧巴馬明白這點(diǎn)。美國國會中頭腦較冷靜的議員也明白這點(diǎn)。我們希望他們能占得上風(fēng)吧。