普京的盜賊統(tǒng)治

 

普京的盜賊統(tǒng)治

Now in his third (nonconsecutive) presidential term, Vladimir Putin presents himself as the strong and virtuous leader who rescued Russia from the chaos, corruption, penury and weakness of the 1990s.

弗拉迪米爾·普京(Vladimir Putin)在其第三任(非連續(xù))總統(tǒng)任期上，將自己打造為一個強大而善良的領(lǐng)袖，將俄羅斯從20世紀(jì)90年代以來的混亂、腐敗、赤貧和積弱中拯救出來。

State-controlled news media and Kremlin spin doctors disseminate this message diligently — and to good effect, judging from Putin’s 80 percent approval rating. But with “Putin’s Kleptocracy,” Karen Dawisha, a respected scholar of Soviet and Russian politics at Miami University in Ohio, seeks to shred this carefully constructed narrative.

政府控制下的新聞媒體與克里姆林宮的媒體顧問們孜孜不倦地散播這個信息，收到了良好的成效——普京的支持率高達(dá)80%。但是俄亥俄州邁阿密大學(xué)著名蘇聯(lián)與俄國政治學(xué)者凱倫·達(dá)維沙(Karen Dawisha)在她的《普京的盜賊統(tǒng)治》(Putin’s Kleptocracy)一書中，試圖打破這種精心建構(gòu)的說法。

Her verdict is not merely that Putin’s boast of having built a potent, efficient state that fights for the little guy and against the venality of the powerful is bunk. Her bedrock claims are that the essential character of Putin’s system is colossal corruption and that he is a prime beneficiary. The thievery, she says, has made him fabulously rich, along with a coterie of trusted friends dating back to his days as a K.G.B. officer in Communist East Germany, then as first deputy mayor in 1990s St. Petersburg, then as head of the Federal Security Service.

普京聲稱，自己已經(jīng)建立起一個強大而高效的國家，它為普通人而奮斗，反對權(quán)力腐敗，這本書并不僅僅主張普京的夸口是空話，它的基本觀點是：普京體系的最基本特點正是大規(guī)模的腐敗，而普京就是最主要的受益人。本書認(rèn)為，竊國令普京暴富，還有他在共產(chǎn)主義東德期間擔(dān)任克格勃官員、90年代在圣彼得堡擔(dān)任第一副市長和聯(lián)邦安全委員會主席期間結(jié)識的密友小圈子也跟著發(fā)了財。

In explaining the system’s workings, Dawisha enumerates the standard shenanigans of crooked regimes: bribetaking from domestic and foreign companies seeking business permits; kickbacks from inflated no-bid contracts for state projects; privatization deals rigged to enrich cronies who will later be cash cows for the Kremlin; illicit exports of raw materials purchased at state-subsidized prices and sold for a killing; “donations” from oligarchs eager to keep feeding at the government’s trough; real estate scams yielding mega-profits and palatial homes; money laundering; election-fixing; labyrinthine offshore accounts; lucrative partnerships with the mob; and the intimidation, even elimination, of would-be whistle-blowers.

為了解釋這一系統(tǒng)如何運作，達(dá)維沙列舉了貪贓枉法的政權(quán)的種種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)詭計：向謀求商業(yè)許可的國內(nèi)外公司收取賄賂;從國有項目夸大的非投標(biāo)合同中收取回扣;非法操縱私有化合同，令普京的好友致富，而這些朋友日后亦為克里姆林宮提供大量現(xiàn)金;非法出口以政府津貼價格購買的原材料，并以低價出售;接受來自渴望繼續(xù)從政府獲利的寡頭政治家的“捐贈”;房地產(chǎn)騙局令少數(shù)人暴富，建起宮殿般的房屋;洗錢;操縱選舉;撲朔迷離的離岸賬戶;與黑幫有利可圖的合作伙伴關(guān)系;恫嚇甚至消滅可能出現(xiàn)的舉報者。

To prosper, Russia’s superrich must demonstrate absolute loyalty to the president. As Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other tycoons have discovered, the punishment for defiance is severe.

為了不斷繁榮發(fā)展，俄羅斯的巨富們必須對總統(tǒng)絕對忠誠。如米哈伊爾·霍多爾科夫斯基(Mikhail Khodorkovsky)和其他若干大亨們的遭遇所示，如果試圖反抗，就會遭受嚴(yán)厲的懲罰。

Dawisha won’t disappoint readers seeking examples of industrial-size sleaze. She reckons Putin’s private wealth at $40 billion and lists among his prized possessions yachts, planes and palaces — along with a $700,000 wristwatch collection for good measure. As for the Friends of Vladimir, Dawisha writes that “more than half of the $50 billion spent on the Sochi Olympics simply disappeared into the pockets of Putin’s cronies.” The Rotenberg brothers, Putin’s childhood chums, alone garnered $2.5 billion of the outlay for the games.

達(dá)維沙找到許多大規(guī)模的污穢丑聞，定然不會讓讀者失望。她估算，普京的私人財富約在400億美元左右，并列舉了他昂貴的私人游艇、飛機(jī)和豪宅，此外還有價值70萬美元的腕表收藏。至于弗拉迪米爾的朋友們，達(dá)維沙寫道：“索科冬奧會花費的500億美元中，約有一半來自普京密友們的口袋。”僅僅普京的兒時密友羅登伯格(Rotenberg)兄弟就為奧運會掏了25億美元。

Russia’s roster of 110 billionaires remains remarkably static, even as the wealthy in other countries rise and fall. What these plutocrats share are longstanding, close connections to Putin. And not a few are former K.G.B. operatives themselves.

不管其他國家的富人如何沉浮起落，俄羅斯的億萬富翁名單相對保持著穩(wěn)定。他們的共同之處是，都與普京保持著長期密切的關(guān)系，其中有不少人本身就是克格勃的前特工。

Dawisha’s charges are not entirely new: Her copiously researched account relies on books, news reports, official documents, memoirs, WikiLeaks and witness testimonies collected by Russian and foreign journalists. The torrent of detail, some of it well known and peripheral to her kleptocracy theme, can drown readers who are untutored in Soviet and Russian politics. Still, “Putin’s Kleptocracy” is the most persuasive account we have of corruption in contemporary Russia. Dawisha won’t be getting a Russian visa anytime soon. Her indictment — even if it wouldn’t stand up in a court of law — hits Putin where it really hurts.

達(dá)維沙的指控并不完全新鮮：為創(chuàng)作此書，她大量研究了各種書籍、新聞報道、官方文件、回憶錄、維基解密資料，以及俄羅斯國內(nèi)外記者收集的證詞。諸多細(xì)節(jié)之中，有些是廣為人知的，而且對她的“盜賊統(tǒng)治”主題而言比較次要，這些會令不熟悉蘇聯(lián)與俄羅斯政治的讀者感到頭昏腦漲。不過《普京的盜賊統(tǒng)治》仍然堪稱關(guān)于當(dāng)前俄羅斯腐敗狀況的最有說服力的描述。達(dá)維沙近期內(nèi)不可能得到俄羅斯簽證了。她的控訴盡管不是在法庭上進(jìn)行，但真正擊到了普京的痛處。

He may cop to being an authoritarian (he boasts of building a strong state), a nationalist (he wears a cross, preaches patriotism and praises the Orthodox Church) and an empire builder (he brags about retaking Crimea and is unapologetic about seeking a sphere of influence). But the accusation that he’s a common crook, or even an uncommon one, is different — and a charge he doesn’t treat lightly. That’s why Russian reporters avoid it, especially as political controls have tightened, and why Dawisha’s original publisher, Cambridge University Press, declined to print the book on the advice of its lawyers worried about the possibility of legal action.

他或許承認(rèn)自己是個獨裁者(他夸口說自己建造了一個強大的國家)、一個民族主義者(他戴十字架、鼓吹愛國主義、贊美東正教)，乃至一個帝國的締造者(他夸口說自己收回了克里米亞地區(qū)，毫不心虛地謀求擴(kuò)大勢力范圍)。但這本書指控他就是個騙子，甚至是個非同尋常的騙子，這就完全不一樣了，這個指責(zé)是他無法輕視的。正因如此，俄羅斯的記者們都回避這個指控，特別是當(dāng)前的政治控制已經(jīng)收緊;正因如此，達(dá)維沙原先的出版者，劍橋大學(xué)出版社拒絕出版這本書，因為律師擔(dān)心它有可能為他們招來法律訴訟。