讓兩任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)頭疼的伊拉克總理：馬利基

WASHINGTON — One day in the fall of 2007, President George W. Bush joined Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in a video conference to sign a “declaration of principles” on the future of the Iraqi-American relations. As Mr. Bush scrawled his name, Mr. Maliki in Baghdad just passed his pen over his copy, pretending to sign.

華盛頓——2007年秋的一天，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)與伊拉克總理努里·卡邁勒·馬利基(Nuri Kamal al-Maliki)開(kāi)了一個(gè)電視會(huì)議，目的是為兩國(guó)關(guān)系的未來(lái)簽署一份“原則宣言”。當(dāng)時(shí)，布什簽下了自己的名字，而身在巴格達(dá)的馬利基只是把筆放在文 件上方，假裝簽字。

At the last minute, Mr. Maliki had decided not to sign because he said he had not read the document’s final wording, but he did not mention this to Mr. Bush, who had no idea his counterpart’s pen had not actually touched paper. An American official in the room noticed, however, and as soon as Mr. Bush’s image vanished from the screen, accosted a Maliki aide, saying, “Don’t screw with the president of the United States.”

最后一刻，馬利基決定不簽字，因?yàn)樗f(shuō)他還沒(méi)有讀過(guò)文件的最后措辭，但他沒(méi)有把這一點(diǎn)告訴布什。布什不知道馬利基的筆根本沒(méi)有碰到紙，不過(guò)，屋內(nèi)的一名美國(guó)官員注意到了。布什的畫(huà)面一從屏幕上消失，他就對(duì)馬利基的一名助手厲聲說(shuō)道，“別想跟美國(guó)總統(tǒng)?；ㄕ?。”

The incident that day nearly seven years ago typified the vexing and volatile relationship between the Iraqi prime minister and his American sponsors. Events were often not what they seemed, nor did they work out as they were supposed to. Mr. Maliki rose from obscurity to power in part with American help, but first Mr. Bush and then President Obama found him to be a mercurial and often unconstructive ally who caused as many headaches as he solved.

將近七年前的這一幕，能很好地說(shuō)明伊拉克總理與其美國(guó)支持者之間，令人惱火又變幻莫測(cè)的關(guān)系。事情往往并不像表面看起來(lái)那樣，結(jié)果也通常事與愿違。 原本默默無(wú)聞的馬利基之所以能掌權(quán)，部分也是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)的幫助，但是布什以及隨后的奧巴馬總統(tǒng)都發(fā)現(xiàn)，他是一個(gè)善變的盟友，而且經(jīng)常起不到任何作用，他造成 的問(wèn)題與解決的問(wèn)題一樣多。

Now as Mr. Maliki reaches a moment of truth, either stepping down or trying to preserve power, Mr. Obama and the American government are trying to maneuver the Iraqi leader one last time in hopes of replacing him with a more reliable figure who can pull that fractious country together and work more collaboratively with Washington.

現(xiàn)在馬利基面臨著一場(chǎng)抉擇——從命下臺(tái)，或者試圖攥緊權(quán)力。此時(shí)，奧巴馬和美國(guó)政府也正在努力最后一次影響這位伊拉克領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，希望能用一個(gè)更值得信賴(lài)的人物來(lái)取代他。這個(gè)人要能夠把難以掌控的伊拉克凝聚起來(lái)，并且更好地與華盛頓進(jìn)行合作。

For weeks, the president and his aides have said it was not their role to tell Iraq who its leader should be, but they made eminently clear on Monday that it was time for Mr. Maliki to step aside in favor of Haider al-Abadi, a fellow member of the same Shiite party nominated by President Fuad Masum to be the next prime minister.

數(shù)周以來(lái)，奧巴馬及其助手都表示，他們沒(méi)有資格指示伊拉克，應(yīng)該讓誰(shuí)擔(dān)任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。但是他們周一曾明確表示，現(xiàn)在馬利基應(yīng)該下臺(tái)，支持屬于同一個(gè)什葉 派政黨的海德?tīng)?middot;阿巴迪(Haider al-Abadi)。伊拉克總統(tǒng)福阿德·馬蘇姆(Fuad Masum)已提名阿巴迪擔(dān)任下一任總理。

Mr. Obama and Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. each called Mr. Abadi to congratulate him, and when the president went before cameras on Martha’s Vineyard to repeat that publicly, he pointedly did not mention Mr. Maliki’s name. When a reporter asked if he had a message for Mr. Maliki, the president walked away. That was the message.

奧巴馬和副總統(tǒng)小約瑟夫·R·拜登(Joseph R. Biden Jr.)已分別致電阿巴迪表示祝賀。當(dāng)奧巴馬在瑪莎葡萄園島(Martha’s Vineyard)，面對(duì)攝像機(jī)再次公開(kāi)表示祝賀時(shí)，他故意沒(méi)有提馬利基的名字。當(dāng)一名記者問(wèn)奧巴馬，有什么話想對(duì)馬利基說(shuō)時(shí)，奧巴馬轉(zhuǎn)身離開(kāi)。這就是他 要說(shuō)的話。

“He’s stubborn and he’s a fighter and he’s going to be resisting this,” said James F. Jeffrey, who watched both presidents deal with Mr. Maliki, first as Mr. Bush’s deputy national security adviser and then as Mr. Obama’s ambassador to Baghdad. “Everybody’s pulled his hair out with him.”

“他很頑固，是個(gè)斗士，肯定會(huì)抗拒這種安排的，”詹姆斯·F·杰弗里(James F. Jeffrey)說(shuō)。“所有人在與他打交道時(shí)都很一籌莫展。”杰弗里緊密觀察過(guò)兩位總統(tǒng)與馬利基的交涉，他曾在布什政府擔(dān)任副國(guó)家安全顧問(wèn)，隨后又擔(dān)任奧巴馬的駐巴格達(dá)大使。

In the end, Mr. Jeffrey said, it will fall to the Americans or someone else to convince Mr. Maliki to go. “I think he will step down if he has to rather than have a coup,” Mr. Jeffrey said. “He’ll try everything under the sun to block it, including arresting people, but at some point someone has to talk with him.”

杰弗里說(shuō)，最后要么美國(guó)，要么其他什么人，肯定需要說(shuō)服馬利基下臺(tái)。“我認(rèn)為在迫不得已的情況下，他肯定會(huì)下臺(tái)，而不是發(fā)動(dòng)政變，”杰弗里說(shuō)。“他肯定會(huì)用盡一切手段來(lái)阻止這種情況發(fā)生，包括逮捕人。但總有一天，有人需要和他談?wù)劇?rdquo;

Mr. Maliki, a relatively little-known Shiite politician who spent much of Saddam Hussein’s reign outside of Iraq, was a surprise choice for prime minister in 2006 after months of deadlock. Mr. Bush was eager for the Iraqis to finally pick a prime minister who would be more decisive than Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and Mr. Bush’s ambassador in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, encouraged Mr. Maliki to run.

馬利基是一個(gè)相對(duì)而言并不起眼的什葉派政治人物，薩達(dá)姆·侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)統(tǒng)治的大部分時(shí)間里，他都不在伊拉克。2006年，經(jīng)過(guò)數(shù)月的僵持，他被出人意料地選為總理。當(dāng)時(shí)，布什迫切希望伊拉克能夠選擇一名比易 卜拉欣·賈法里(Ibrahim al-Jaafari)更果斷的總理，而且布什政府當(dāng)時(shí)的駐伊拉克大使扎爾梅·哈利勒扎德(Zalmay Khalilzad)也鼓勵(lì)馬利基參加競(jìng)選。

“You have to understand Jaafari to understand Maliki,” Mr. Jeffrey said. “With Jaafari, we couldn’t get him to make a decision at all. With Maliki, he was a better leader, at least at the beginning.”

“要弄懂馬利基，首先要弄懂賈法里，”杰弗里說(shuō)。“對(duì)于賈法里，我們根本沒(méi)辦法讓他做出什么決策。而馬利基是個(gè)更好的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，至少一開(kāi)始是這樣。”

It proved complicated, however. By that fall, Americans were frustrated with Mr. Maliki, who resisted reining in Shiite militias. Stephen J. Hadley, the president’s national security adviser, told Mr. Bush in a classified memo, which was leaked, that Mr. Maliki was either “ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions” or incapable of taking action.

然而事實(shí)證明，事情很復(fù)雜。到那年秋天，拒絕約束什葉派武裝組織的馬利基令美國(guó)深感失望。在一份外泄的機(jī)密備忘錄中，時(shí)任總統(tǒng)國(guó)家安全事務(wù)顧問(wèn)斯蒂 芬·J·哈德利(Stephen J. Hadley)告訴布什，馬利基要么“不了解當(dāng)前的局勢(shì)，要么曲解了他的意圖”，要么就是無(wú)力采取行動(dòng)。

Eventually, Mr. Bush doubled down on Mr. Maliki anyway with a risky troop surge and made a point of holding weekly video conferences with him in an effort to mentor him in the art of coalition politics.

最終，布什還是在馬利基身上押上了更多籌碼。布什冒險(xiǎn)向伊拉克大幅增兵，為了表明自己的態(tài)度，還堅(jiān)持每周同他召開(kāi)視頻會(huì)議，試圖啟發(fā)馬利基理解聯(lián)盟政治的藝術(shù)。

But the fake-signing episode underscored American frustrations. Even though Mr. Maliki later signed the agreement for real, when Iraqi foes plotted to push him out, some in the White House agreed that he should go, including Brett McGurk, the official who had confronted the Maliki aide about the fake signing, and who now works for Mr. Obama.

但簽名作假事件加深了美國(guó)的失望。盡管馬利基后來(lái)真的簽署了該協(xié)議，但當(dāng)伊拉克國(guó)內(nèi)的敵人謀劃推翻他時(shí)，白宮的一些人一致認(rèn)為他應(yīng)該下臺(tái)，其中包括 布雷特·麥古爾克(Brett McGurk)。現(xiàn)在供職于奧巴馬政府的麥古爾克，正是當(dāng)年就簽名作假，向馬利基的助手質(zhì)問(wèn)的那名官員。

Mr. Bush rejected the idea but sent Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Baghdad to tell Mr. Maliki to shape up. “You’re a terrible prime minister,” she told Mr. Maliki. “Without progress and without an agreement, you’ll be on your own, hanging from a lamppost.”

布什回絕了這個(gè)主意，但他派國(guó)務(wù)卿康多莉扎·賴(lài)斯(Condoleezza Rice)前去巴格達(dá)，告訴馬利基要好好表現(xiàn)。“你是個(gè)糟糕的總理，”她告訴馬利基。“如果不取得進(jìn)展，不尋求共識(shí)，你就會(huì)孤立無(wú)援，遲早被吊在路燈柱上。”

Mr. Maliki remained impulsive. He ordered a hasty, haphazard military operation against Shiite militias in Basra that was very nearly a disaster but succeeded with last-minute American help. Mr. Maliki, observed Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, “went from being docile to being John Wayne.”

馬利基依然行事沖動(dòng)。他下令對(duì)巴士拉的什葉派武裝采取行動(dòng)，這場(chǎng)毫無(wú)章法的草率行動(dòng)幾乎成了一場(chǎng)災(zāi)難，但在美國(guó)的幫助下，行動(dòng)在最后時(shí)刻取得了成 功。南卡羅萊納州共和黨參議員林賽·格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)注意到，馬利基“從一個(gè)順從的人，變成了約翰·韋恩(John Wayne)”。

When Mr. Obama came into office, the relationship changed again. He thought Mr. Bush was too directly involved and did not continue the weekly conversations with Mr. Maliki. Instead, he left it to Mr. Biden to manage the prime minister.

奧巴馬上臺(tái)時(shí)，雙方關(guān)系再度發(fā)生變化。奧巴馬認(rèn)為布什的介入過(guò)于直接，不再繼續(xù)與馬利基每周進(jìn)行會(huì)談，而是讓拜登管理這位總理。

Mr. Biden concluded that major moves, like passing a law on oil revenue sharing, “couldn’t come in one fell swoop,” said a senior administration official, who insisted on anonymity to discuss diplomacy. “So there was more focus on incremental, doable steps that he could take. And we had some success in that, more on some issues than others.”

奧巴馬政府的一名高級(jí)官員表示，拜登斷定，重大舉措，比如通過(guò)有關(guān)石油收入分配的法律，“不會(huì)一蹴而就。因此，拜登更關(guān)注馬利基可能采取的漸進(jìn)、可 行的步驟。通過(guò)這樣做，我們?nèi)〉昧艘恍┏煽?jī)。這個(gè)議題上成績(jī)或許多一點(diǎn)，那個(gè)議題上成績(jī)或許少一些。”由于在討論外交議題，這名官員要求匿名。

But in the vice president’s phone calls with Mr. Maliki, the official said, “what always shone through was that he suffers from the same malady that so many regional leaders suffer from — the inability to conceive of how to share power with other key groups and constituencies.”

但這名官員稱(chēng)，在副總統(tǒng)拜登與馬利基的電話通話中，“他總會(huì)表現(xiàn)出，他和許多地區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人一樣，面臨著同一個(gè)問(wèn)題——無(wú)法設(shè)想該如何與其他關(guān)鍵團(tuán)體及選民陣營(yíng)分享權(quán)力。”