崛起的中國(guó)，伴隨著與西方的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖突

News Analysis - As China Rises, Economic Conflict With West Rises Too - NYTimes.com

Davos 2010

As China Rises, Economic Conflict With West Rises Too

By KATRIN BENNHOLD

Published: January 26, 2010

DAVOS, SWITZERLAND — As recently as 2008, when China was still an emerging economy eager to put its best  forward for Western consumers, it lifted censorship on several Web sites before the Beijing Olympics. At the same time, it responded to entreaties from U.S. and European politicians, allowing its currency to appreciate against the dollar.
發(fā)自瑞士達(dá)沃斯——就在不久以前的2008年，中國(guó)依然是一個(gè)盡可能滿(mǎn)足西方消費(fèi)者的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，為了北京奧運(yùn)會(huì)的召開(kāi)而放松了對(duì)許多網(wǎng)站的審查。也就在那時(shí)，中國(guó)回應(yīng)了美國(guó)和歐洲的政治家的要求，放寬了對(duì)人民幣的限制和對(duì)美元的匯率。

    China is no longer emerging. It has emerged — sooner and more assertively than had been expected before the wrenching global financial crisis, which badly damaged all the established industrial powers, from the United States to Europe and Japan.
中國(guó)已經(jīng)不再是一個(gè)新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體了。在嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了老牌工業(yè)國(guó)家如美國(guó)、歐洲和日本的金融危機(jī)發(fā)生之前，比預(yù)想中更為迅速和果斷的成為了一個(gè)不可忽視的力量。

    These days, the renminbi is frozen at an undervalued level, and Internet controls are stricter than ever — even as Google, one of America’s most prominent companies, threatens to leave.
最近這些日子，人民幣的匯率被凍結(jié)在一個(gè)被低估的狀態(tài)，并且因特網(wǎng)正處于一個(gè)前所未有的嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管當(dāng)中。即使是如GOOGLE這樣的著名公司威脅離開(kāi)都無(wú)濟(jì)于事

     “China is the West’s greatest hope and greatest fear,” said Kristin Forbes, a former member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers and one of hundreds of top officials and executives flocking to this winter resort for the annual World Economic Forum, which is taking place Wednesday through Sunday.
白宮經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)前任顧問(wèn)，Kristin Forbes是這樣評(píng)價(jià)的“中國(guó)是西方最大的希望，也是西方最嚴(yán)重的威脅”?，F(xiàn)在他正在與其他數(shù)以百計(jì)的官員和首席執(zhí)行官們一起涌向達(dá)沃斯經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇的冬季會(huì)場(chǎng)，參加將于周三至周日舉行的峰會(huì)。

    “No one was quite ready for how fast China has emerged,” said Ms. Forbes, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Now everyone is trying to understand what sort of China they will be dealing with.”
“沒(méi)有人為中國(guó)如此快速的崛起做好了充分的準(zhǔn)備” 作為麻省理工的教授，F(xiàn)orbes女士認(rèn)為“現(xiàn)在所有人都在嘗試著去了解他們將處理怎樣程度的中國(guó)。”

    For the first time, economists point to Chinese spending — not the U.S. consumer — as the key to a global recovery. China’s gross domestic product could overtake that of the United States within a decade, one report predicted this month, while others speculated about when the renminbi might start to challenge the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們第一次指出中國(guó)人的花費(fèi)，而不是美國(guó)的消費(fèi)者，是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的關(guān)鍵。有一個(gè)研究報(bào)告在本月指出中國(guó)龐大的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)可能將會(huì)在未來(lái)的十年內(nèi)取代美國(guó)。與此同時(shí)，其他人還在著預(yù)測(cè)什么時(shí)候人民幣將會(huì)開(kāi)始挑戰(zhàn)美元，成為新的全球儲(chǔ)備貨幣。

    And as developing countries everywhere look for a recipe for faster growth and greater stability than that offered by the now-tattered “Washington consensus” of open markets, floating currencies and free elections, there is growing talk about a “Beijing consensus.”
與此同時(shí)，全世界的發(fā)展中國(guó)家都在尋找使自己快速增長(zhǎng)和更加穩(wěn)定的藥方。他們開(kāi)始放棄破爛的“華盛頓共識(shí)”中所敘述的開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)，流通貨幣和自由選舉。而是討論更加美好的“北京共識(shí)”。

    China’s rise will be on prominent display in Davos this week, with the biggest Chinese delegation in the World Economic Forum’s history. The local Chinese restaurant has been fully booked since early January. The 54 Chinese officials and executives — including the presidents of the country’s sovereign wealth fund and export-import bank — were expected not only to rub shoulders here but also, as one put it bluntly, to “go shopping.”
中國(guó)的崛起將與中國(guó)有史以來(lái)最大的代表團(tuán)一道，在本周的達(dá)沃斯峰會(huì)上得到凸顯。當(dāng)?shù)氐闹袊?guó)餐廳早在一月初就已經(jīng)訂滿(mǎn)。54名中國(guó)官員和企業(yè)家的龐大陣容，包括了中國(guó)主權(quán)基金和中國(guó)進(jìn)出口銀行的總裁。他們不僅僅被期望著出席，更被渴望著直接去投資。

    When the United States was snapping at the heels of the British empire, the global hegemon of the early 20th century, the situation caused plenty of friction, even though both countries spoke the same language, shared similar cultures and were liberal democracies.
當(dāng)美國(guó)在20世紀(jì)初，急切的接管日不落帝國(guó)的霸權(quán)地位中，出現(xiàn)了一系列的摩擦。即使他們兩國(guó)是使用同一種語(yǔ)言，共享著相似的文化，并且都是自由民主國(guó)家都不能避免。

    China, in contrast, is a Confucian- Communist-capitalist hybrid under the umbrella of a one-party state that has so far resisted giving greater political freedom to a growing middle class. Now its ascendancy is about to set off what many officials and experts see as a backlash on both sides of the Pacific.
與英美兩國(guó)情況所不同的中國(guó)，是一個(gè)在中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，由儒學(xué)，共產(chǎn)主義，中央集權(quán)融匯而成的國(guó)家so far resisted giving greater political freedom to a growing middle class。如今，許多官員和專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為，中國(guó)的優(yōu)勢(shì)將會(huì)使太平洋兩岸的對(duì)抗一觸即發(fā)。

    “It’s not surprising that China’s remarkable economic rise would be unsettling to some,” said Pascal Lamy, the director general of the World Trade Organization.
WTO的總干事Pascal Lamy認(rèn)為“中國(guó)的突然崛起，將會(huì)毫不令人驚訝的讓某些人不安。

    So far, the backlash against China has been largely rhetorical. Stephen Roach, the Asia chairman of Morgan Stanley, counts 45 anti-China legislative measures introduced in the U.S. Congress between 2005 and 2007. None passed.
截止目前為止，與中國(guó)的對(duì)抗只是停留在口頭上。Morgan Stanley 亞洲區(qū)總裁Stephen Roach指出在2005年到2007年期間，總共有45條反對(duì)中國(guó)的法律措施被提出，但都未在美國(guó)眾議院通過(guò)。

    That could change, as tricky midterm elections loom in the United States and politicians there and in Europe become more outspoken in blaming China’s currency peg to the dollar, which gives its industries a competitive edge, for rising joblessness at home.
這種情況可能會(huì)被改變，隨著微妙的中期選舉的臨近。美國(guó)和歐洲的政客們由于國(guó)內(nèi)不斷攀升的失業(yè)率，開(kāi)始撕破臉皮，更直接的責(zé)備人民幣對(duì)美元的匯率，認(rèn)為匯率衰弱了國(guó)內(nèi)的工業(yè)實(shí)力。

    Some targeted tariffs have been imposed in recent months. Washington has penalized imports of Chinese tires and coated paper products. Both the United States and the European Union are restricting Chinese steel.
最近幾月，一些定向的關(guān)稅制度被采納。華盛頓開(kāi)始懲罰從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的輪胎和某些紙制品（coated paper products）。美國(guó)和歐盟都限制了中國(guó)的鋼鐵。

    But none of those measures go as far as climate change proposals in France and the United States, which call for border taxes on products from countries — China in particular — that do not accept higher costs for carbon emissions in producing energy and making goods. If “the U.S. opts for friction,” Mr. Roach said, “the Chinese can be expected to respond in kind.”
但是，這些措施都沒(méi)有在法國(guó)和美國(guó)提出的環(huán)境改變倡議后果嚴(yán)重。他們號(hào)召增加對(duì)那些不愿接受高昂的因生產(chǎn)商品和能源的而產(chǎn)生的碳征收的排放費(fèi)用，而中國(guó)將受此影響極其嚴(yán)重。Roach先生認(rèn)為，“如果美國(guó)選擇摩擦，那么中國(guó)應(yīng)該會(huì)在某種程度上作出反應(yīng)。”

    China has its own version of political jockeying. Several foreign companies already complain that doing business in China has become more difficult. Lured until a few years ago by tax rates less than half of those applying to Chinese companies, executives now cite an increase in red tape and a growing number of “buy China” mandates from government procurement offices.
中國(guó)有自己的政治發(fā)展觀。一些外國(guó)公司已經(jīng)開(kāi)始抱怨在中國(guó)做生意開(kāi)始變得困難。在幾年前，外企總裁們還受著中國(guó)對(duì)外企征收相當(dāng)于中國(guó)本土企業(yè)一半稅收的誘惑，如今，他們卻指出官僚氣氛的日益濃重和不斷增長(zhǎng)的來(lái)自政府采購(gòu)部門(mén)的“購(gòu)買(mǎi)中國(guó)”任務(wù)。

    The standoff with Google has illustrated the difficulties foreign business faces in China. It has also starkly raised the question of who will have the upper hand in future negotiations.
中國(guó)開(kāi)始對(duì)Google的冷淡表明了外資企業(yè)在中國(guó)的面臨的困難。并且赤裸裸的提出了誰(shuí)將在未來(lái)的談判中獲得先機(jī)。

    “The operating environment is tougher than ever for Western companies,” said James McGregor, head of the government relations committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in China. “But unlike Google, most Western companies also need China more than ever.”
美國(guó)中國(guó)商會(huì)政府關(guān)系委員會(huì)主席James McGregor指出“中國(guó)的運(yùn)營(yíng)環(huán)境得到西方企業(yè)前所未有的關(guān)注，但大多數(shù)西方企業(yè)，不像Google，也開(kāi)始對(duì)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)有前所未有的依賴(lài)”。

    China is the biggest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world: 450 of the Fortune 500 companies have business presences there, and many of those still reeling at home are doing brisk business in China. “G.M. is hurting anywhere else, but here things are quite profitable,” Mr. McGregor said.
中國(guó)作為最大的吸引外國(guó)投資國(guó)，世界500強(qiáng)中的450家在中國(guó)開(kāi)展業(yè)務(wù)，并且許多在自己國(guó)家增長(zhǎng)緩慢的，卻在中國(guó)獲得了快速增長(zhǎng)。McGregor說(shuō)“GM在世界各處經(jīng)營(yíng)，但在這里，利潤(rùn)是出奇的多。”

    Business interests in China could make it harder for Western politicians to lash out. “It’s a situation the U.S. was in for a long time,” said Ms. Forbes, the M.I.T. professor. “Many people didn’t like U.S. policy, but you had to be in the U.S. market.”
商業(yè)上在中國(guó)獲取的利潤(rùn)讓西方政治家們更加難以敲打中國(guó)。麻省理工教授Forbes女士認(rèn)為“美國(guó)支持了一種事態(tài)很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間了，那就是很多人可以不喜歡美國(guó)的政策，但是你必須在美國(guó)的市場(chǎng)中。”

    If business executives are looking to China for its low manufacturing costs and sizable market, political leaders are studying a state perceived to have found a recipe for lifting millions out of poverty with fast growth, even if that means a stiff measure of domestic repression. “You hear more and more people talking about a Beijing consensus,” Ms. Forbes said.
隨著商人們?cè)谥袊?guó)尋找到廉價(jià)的勞動(dòng)力和上規(guī)模的市場(chǎng)，政治領(lǐng)袖們研究著通過(guò)快速增長(zhǎng)讓百萬(wàn)人脫貧，即使意味著忍受?chē)?guó)內(nèi)僵硬的約束，“你聽(tīng)到了越來(lái)越多的人在討論北京共識(shí)”， Forbes說(shuō)。

    But what exactly is the Beijing consensus? Some see it as a form of economic management with greater government involvement that is on the rise across the world. Others interpret it to mean more strictly controlled capital markets, which have made a re-appearance even in previously open countries like Brazil. Policy makers in Malaysia and Dubai focus on replicating China’s special economic zones, which afford generous terms to foreign investors in manageable geographic areas.
但什么是北京共識(shí)？有些人認(rèn)為它是一種在有政府廣泛的參與其中的經(jīng)濟(jì)管理，并且這種方式開(kāi)始在世界流行。其他人解釋它為更加嚴(yán)格控制的“計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)”，是先前開(kāi)放國(guó)家如巴西采用方式的重現(xiàn)。馬來(lái)西亞和迪拜的政策制定者們關(guān)注于重建中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)，為外國(guó)投資者在一定地理范圍內(nèi)提供慷慨的條件。

    Some suggest that China’s lack of democracy is an advantage in making unpopular but necessary changes. “It is more challenging for democratic systems because every day they come under public pressure and every short period they have to go back to the polls,” said Victor Chu, chairman of First Eastern Investment Group in Hong Kong, the largest direct investment firm in China. “China is lucky to have the ability to make long-term strategic decisions and then execute them clinically.”
有些人認(rèn)為中國(guó)缺乏民主幫助其易于做一些不受民眾支持卻必要地變革。“民主社會(huì)正在經(jīng)歷越來(lái)越多的挑戰(zhàn)，因?yàn)槊刻欤麄兌家惺芄娨庖?jiàn)的壓力，每一個(gè)短時(shí)期，他們都要重新面對(duì)投票。” 中國(guó)最大直接投資公司第一東方投資的董事局主席Victor Chu說(shuō)道，“中國(guó)幸運(yùn)的有能力去指定長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的規(guī)劃并且冷靜的去實(shí)施。”

    With China’s rising clout, the West has less leverage over Beijing. When China was seeking to join the World Trade Organization a decade ago, it accepted compromises to U.S. and European demands. At climate talks last month in Copenhagen, however, China blocked a comprehensive deal and refused to go beyond its earlier promises. Portrayed as a deal breaker in the Western media, at home it was celebrated as the country that stopped the West from imposing its terms on developing countries, Mr. Chu said.
隨著中國(guó)的迅速崛起，西方對(duì)中國(guó)的影響力在日益減少。當(dāng)十年前，中國(guó)嘗試著加入WTO時(shí)，中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)和西方的要求做出了妥協(xié)。然而，上個(gè)月在哥本哈根的氣候論壇，中國(guó)阻止了全面協(xié)議，并且拒絕做出超過(guò)以前做出的承諾。當(dāng)他在西方被媒體描述為協(xié)議破壞者的時(shí)候，在國(guó)內(nèi)卻慶祝著阻止了西方強(qiáng)壓給發(fā)展中國(guó)家的條款。楚先生說(shuō)道。

    Western diplomats complain about the way Beijing is dragging its feet more than Moscow on sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and is propping up unsavory regimes across the world in its hunt for the natural resources to power its growth.
西方外交家抱怨著北京在拖延西方制裁伊朗核設(shè)施的計(jì)劃，甚至超過(guò)了莫斯科。并且認(rèn)為北京為了獲得自然資源以增長(zhǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)，在資助世界上那些有著壞名聲的制度。

    Some say Chinese officials are using their country’s $2.4 trillion in foreign currency reserves as a bargaining chip, knowing that any hint of reducing those reserves would rattle currency markets.
一些人說(shuō)中國(guó)官員在運(yùn)用它們國(guó)家240億的外資儲(chǔ)備作為討價(jià)還價(jià)的籌碼，中國(guó)被認(rèn)為任何縮減儲(chǔ)備的暗示都會(huì)震動(dòng)貨幣市場(chǎng)。
 

    “As China is emerging on the global stage with unprecedented power and influence,” said David Shambaugh, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University who is in China as a Fulbright scholar, “it is not proving to be the global partner the United States and E.U. seek.”
喬治華盛頓大學(xué)國(guó)際政治系教授，目前在中國(guó)作為福布萊特法案基金的受贊助學(xué)者， David Shambaugh認(rèn)為：“鑒于中國(guó)正以前所未有的力量和影響力登上國(guó)際舞臺(tái)，它并不是在嘗試要成為美國(guó)和歐洲所尋求的那種世界合作伙伴。”
 

    In the world of power politics, that is not particularly surprising. Like many Western countries, China will act only when it is in its interest.
這點(diǎn)并不是非常令人驚訝，考慮到這個(gè)世界是強(qiáng)權(quán)政治。就像其他所有的西方國(guó)家一樣，中國(guó)將會(huì)只在關(guān)系到它切身利益的時(shí)候才采取行動(dòng)。

    Mr. Chu of First Eastern Investment said he expected China to resume a gradual appreciation of the renminbi later this year, not because Washington was lobbying for it but because signs of inflationary pressure and bubbles in the Chinese credit and housing markets were mounting. This month, the Chinese authorities raised interest rates and moved to curtail bank loans.
第一東方投資的楚（音譯）先生說(shuō)，他認(rèn)為中國(guó)將在今年晚些時(shí)候開(kāi)始重新浮動(dòng)人民幣匯率，并不是為了應(yīng)付華盛頓的游說(shuō)，而是由于通貨膨脹的壓力和中國(guó)信用體系和房屋市場(chǎng)升溫的泡沫。這個(gè)月，中國(guó)官方提升了利率和存款準(zhǔn)備金率。

    Kenneth Rogoff, an economics professor at Harvard University who just spent two weeks in China, warns that the country will face its share of economic troubles in the years ahead. But that will not change the underlying trend, he said.
哈佛大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授Kenneth Rogoff就在不久前在中國(guó)度過(guò)了兩周，他警告道中國(guó)將會(huì)在未來(lái)的幾年中面對(duì)基本經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，但這不會(huì)改變潛在的中國(guó)崛起的趨勢(shì)。

    While China remains much poorer than the advanced industrial powers of the West on a per-capita basis, its rapid growth should enable it to pass Japan this year as the world’s second-largest economy.
當(dāng)中國(guó)仍然在人均資本上窮于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的時(shí)候，它的快速經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)將使他在今年超越日本，成為世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

    A new report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers predicts that China could overtake the United States as the largest economy as early as 2020. In 2003, Goldman Sachs made waves by suggesting that the Chinese G.D.P. might match that of the United States by 2041. Five years later, the forecast was revised to 2027.
普華永道最近的一份報(bào)告預(yù)測(cè)中國(guó)最快將在2020年接替美國(guó)，成為最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。在2003年，高盛建議稱(chēng)中國(guó)GDP將在2041年追上美國(guó)。僅僅五年后，這個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)就被修訂為2027年。

    According to Mr. Rogoff, over the next four decades or so, the Chinese renminbi will gradually come to rival the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency, making China’s response to its increasingly central role in the global economy critical.
根據(jù)Mr. Rogoff的預(yù)測(cè)，在未來(lái)的40年或更久中，人民幣將會(huì)漸漸的成為美元的對(duì)手，威脅美國(guó)在世界儲(chǔ)備貨幣上的領(lǐng)先地位。這逼迫中國(guó)應(yīng)對(duì)作為在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)中的中心角色所要做出的貢獻(xiàn)和責(zé)任。

    The risk, Mr. Shambaugh of George Washington University said, is that “the world will be asking more and more of China but getting less and less in return.”
    喬治華盛頓的Shambaugh先生認(rèn)為，這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是由于“世界將會(huì)越來(lái)越多的向中國(guó)發(fā)問(wèn)而越來(lái)越少的獲得回復(fù)。”