2018年保持樂觀的理由

The year 2018 is beginning with economic and geopolitical indicators pointing in very different directions. Global stock markets are at record highs and economic confidence is growing across most of the developed world. But while investors are bullish, followers of international politics are very nervous.

2018年的大幕已徐徐拉開，但經(jīng)濟和地緣政治信號指向了截然不同的方向。全球股市處于創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄高位，多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)國家的經(jīng)濟信心都在增長。然而，雖然投資者感到樂觀，但關(guān)注國際政治形勢的人們卻非常緊張。

In recent years, it has tended to be the Middle East that delivers bad news, and Asia that specialises in optimism. This year could reverse that pattern. The biggest geopolitical risk is a war on the Korean peninsula. If the US carries through on President Donald Trump’s threat to use “fire and fury” to disarm North Korea it will be the first time that America has gone to war with another nuclear-armed state. The risks are literally incalculable.

前些年，帶來壞消息的往往是中東，亞洲則負(fù)責(zé)帶來樂觀。今年情況可能會反過來。最大的地緣政治風(fēng)險是朝鮮半島爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭。如果美國兌現(xiàn)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)總統(tǒng)發(fā)出的威脅——用“火與怒”解除朝鮮核武裝——這將是美國首次同另一個擁有核武器的國家開戰(zhàn)。這風(fēng)險簡直無法估量。

By contrast, there are several big things that could finally go right in the Middle East. The combination of turmoil in Iran, liberalising reforms in Saudi Arabia and the final defeat of Islamic State on the battlefield would all be serious setbacks for the most fundamentalist and confrontational forms of Islamism.

相比之下，中東有幾件大事最終可能出現(xiàn)轉(zhuǎn)圜。伊朗的動蕩、沙特阿拉伯的自由化改革以及“伊斯蘭國”(Islamic State)最終在戰(zhàn)場上被擊敗，都將成為伊斯蘭主義中原教旨勢力和好戰(zhàn)勢力的重大挫折。

Investors and economists seem to be discounting the risk of war in North Korea. But national security experts are much less sanguine. Many say that the atmosphere in Washington now is uncomfortably reminiscent of the mood before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 — when the US foreign policy establishment talked itself into believing that a pre-emptive war against Saddam Hussein was a good idea. In a similar manner, war with North Korea is moving from the unthinkable into the thinkable column.

投資者和經(jīng)濟學(xué)家似乎低估了朝鮮半島爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭的風(fēng)險。但國家安全專家悲觀得多。許多人表示，華盛頓如今的氣氛跟2003年美國入侵伊拉克之前可怕地相像——當(dāng)時美國外交政策機構(gòu)說服自己相信，對薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)發(fā)動先發(fā)制人的戰(zhàn)爭是個好主意。如出一轍的是，對朝鮮發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭如今正在從不可想象之事變?yōu)橐粋€可以斟酌的選項。

Senator Lindsey Graham, a Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, says that war is “inevitable” — if North Korea does not halt its nuclear weapons programme. General HR McMaster, the president’s chief national security adviser, is also sounding increasingly hawkish. He has pledged that the US will “do anything necessary” to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear programme.

美國參議院軍事委員會(Senate Armed Services Committee)的共和黨成員林賽•格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)稱，如果朝鮮不停止核武計劃，戰(zhàn)爭將“不可避免”?？偨y(tǒng)首席國家安全顧問赫伯特•雷蒙德•麥克馬斯特(HR McMaster)將軍的論調(diào)也越來越強硬。他誓言美國將“采取一切必要手段”阻止平壤的核計劃。

These uncompromising statements need to be weighed against the factors that have always deterred an American attack — above all the threat that North Korean retaliation could cause hundreds of thousands of casualties in neighbouring South Korea.

需要結(jié)合那些一直令美國不敢發(fā)動攻擊的因素來看待上述強硬言論——其中最重要的因素是朝鮮的報復(fù)可能導(dǎo)致鄰國韓國出現(xiàn)無數(shù)傷亡。

One possibility is that the US military has told the White House that it can keep casualties in South Korea to an acceptable level — by pre-emptive strikes that target the North Korean missiles aimed at Seoul, the South Korean capital. But, even if that worked, it would leave open the question of how to find and secure the regime’s nuclear weapons — a mission that would probably have to involve ground troops.

一種可能性是，美國軍方已向白宮表示，可以通過如下方式將韓國出現(xiàn)的傷亡人數(shù)維持在可接受的水平：對瞄準(zhǔn)韓國首都首爾的朝鮮導(dǎo)彈進行先發(fā)制人的打擊。但即便這一策略能奏效，一個問題依然存在：如何找到和控制住平壤的核武器——這是一項很可能需要地面部隊參與的任務(wù)。

It still sounds too dangerous to contemplate, particularly given that America’s closest Asian allies — Japan, South Korea and Australia — would be very unlikely to back a pre-emptive strike. A New Year’s message from Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, played upon this division — threatening the US with nuclear weapons, while offering dialogue with South Korea.

這樣做聽起來還是太危險，根本不能納入考慮，尤其是考慮到美國最親密的亞洲盟友——日本、韓國和澳大利亞——幾乎不可能支持先發(fā)制人的打擊。朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人金正恩(Kim Jong Un)在新年賀詞中就利用了這種分歧——用核武器威脅美國，同時表示愿與韓國進行對話。

So my starting assumption for 2018 is that there will not, in the end, be a war on the Korean peninsula. A conventional president would worry deeply that US “credibility” would be compromised by a failure to deliver on his solemn promise to stop North Korea’s nuclear programme. But President Trump invents his own reality, so is much less likely to be concerned by appearances.

因此，我對2018年的頭一個預(yù)測是，朝鮮半島最終不會爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭。一位慣常的總統(tǒng)可能極為擔(dān)心的是，如果未能兌現(xiàn)自己阻止朝鮮核計劃的莊重承諾，美國的“可信性”會受損。但是，特朗普總統(tǒng)生活在他自己想象出來的“現(xiàn)實”里，因此不大可能受表面上的“食言”所困擾。

In any case, one good rule about geopolitical predictions is that the truly world-changing events — from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 — are the ones that the experts had not foreseen. This week’s unanticipated outbreak of demonstrations on the streets of Iran is a useful reminder of that fact.

無論如何，一條關(guān)于地緣政治預(yù)測的屢試不爽的規(guī)律是，真正改變世界的事件——從柏林墻倒塌到9•11恐怖襲擊——都是專家們未曾預(yù)見到的。上周伊朗街頭意外爆發(fā)的示威活動便很好地提醒了我們記住這一事實。

Pessimism is usually the best bet in the Middle East. From the Iraq war to the Arab spring to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the most gloomy assessments are often vindicated. So it should be acknowledged that in Iran, the likeliest outcome is that the current rash of protests will fizzle out or be crushed, as they were in 2009.

對于中東，悲觀的預(yù)測通常是沒錯的。從伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭到“阿拉伯之春”再到巴以和平進程，最悲觀的判斷往往被證明是正確的。因此，應(yīng)該承認(rèn)，就伊朗當(dāng)前的抗議活動而言，最可能的結(jié)局是，它會虎頭蛇尾地消失，或像2009年那樣被鎮(zhèn)壓。

On the other hand, Islamist fundamentalism is an economic and social dead-end — and people stuck in a dead-end eventually try to reverse their way out. Something of the sort may already be under way in Saudi Arabia, where the impetuous crown prince Mohammed bin Salman seems genuinely determined to take on the Wahhabi establishment. If the rivalrous groups of Islamist hardliners lose ground in Riyadh and Tehran — and on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq — then 2018 could go down as a year of historic setbacks for Islamist fundamentalism.

另一方面，伊斯蘭原教旨主義道路無論在經(jīng)濟上還是社會上都是一條死胡同——卡在死胡同里的人們最終將設(shè)法轉(zhuǎn)身尋找新出路。這種轉(zhuǎn)身可能已經(jīng)在沙特出現(xiàn)，沖勁十足的王儲穆罕默德•本•薩勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)看上去已下定決心要向瓦哈比派建制派開戰(zhàn)。如果伊斯蘭強硬派的對抗組織在利雅得和德黑蘭(以及在敘利亞和伊拉克的戰(zhàn)場上)節(jié)節(jié)敗退，那2018年可能會成為伊斯蘭原教旨主義遭受歷史性挫折的一年。

After a dismal run in world politics, it is certainly time to be reminded that there can be good, as well as bad, surprises. My own new year’s resolution is to try to snap out of Trump and Brexit-induced gloom.

在對世界政治進行過一番慘淡分析之后，我們當(dāng)然應(yīng)該提醒自己，未來可能還會有我們未曾預(yù)料到的好事(以及壞事)發(fā)生。我自己的新年決心是設(shè)法從特朗普和英國退歐引發(fā)的悲觀情緒中振作起來。

In that spirit, I will predict that most of the big risks that currently worry pundits will not happen. There will not be a war on the Korean peninsula, nor will there be one in the South China Sea or in eastern Europe. The EU will not fall apart, Brexit negotiations will not break down and markets will not crash. By contrast, there will be big and positive change in the Middle East. And England will win the World Cup.

本著這種精神，我認(rèn)為，當(dāng)前令專家們擔(dān)心的多數(shù)重大風(fēng)險都不會發(fā)生。朝鮮半島不會爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭，南中國海和東歐也不會。歐盟不會分崩離析，英國退歐談判不會破裂，股市也不會崩盤。相比之下，中東地區(qū)將出現(xiàn)巨大而積極的變化。英格蘭隊還將贏得世界杯。