當(dāng)今時(shí)代的意識(shí)形態(tài)之戰(zhàn)

If 2016 was the year that opponents of the liberal, rules-based world order built up over 70 years won stunning national victories — in Britain and the US — then 2017 was the year in which the supporters of liberal openness scrambled to mobilise.

如果2016年是那些反對(duì)過(guò)去70年逐步建立起來(lái)的以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的自由世界秩序的人在國(guó)家層面上(英國(guó)和美國(guó))取得了驚人勝利的一年，那么2017年就是自由開(kāi)放秩序的支持者奮起反擊的一年。

2018 is set to be the year they confront one another. As governments harness state power for their respective sides, tension long simmering within each country morphs into a conflict between nations.

2018年，雙方將正面對(duì)抗。隨著各國(guó)政府利用國(guó)家權(quán)力各自為營(yíng)，各國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)蓄勢(shì)已久的緊張局面演變成了國(guó)與國(guó)之間的沖突。

Profound structural economic change in almost all rich countries had increasingly separated those who reaped the benefits from those of their fellow citizens the transformation had left behind.

在幾乎所有富裕國(guó)家發(fā)生的深層結(jié)構(gòu)性經(jīng)濟(jì)變化，使得既得利益階層日益脫離了被這種轉(zhuǎn)變遺忘的同胞。

In Brexit and Donald Trump’s election victory, self-declared champions of the left behind took control of the national agenda with a promise to break with the internationalist liberal order. In reaction, centrist leaders elsewhere — most explicitly, Emmanuel Macron in France — have had to define themselves as that order’s defenders.

在英國(guó)退歐和唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)成功當(dāng)選美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的過(guò)程中，是自稱(chēng)維護(hù)被遺忘群體權(quán)益的那些人以打破國(guó)際自由秩序的承諾控制了國(guó)家議程。作為應(yīng)對(duì)，其他國(guó)家的中間派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人——最突出的是法國(guó)的埃馬紐埃爾•馬克龍(Emmanuel Macron)——不得不把自己定義為自由秩序的捍衛(wèi)者。

EU institutions and many European governments, together with Canada and Japan, now make up an avowedly liberal internationalist camp working to defend a multilateral system of collaborative rules-based governance for economic openness to mutual advantage.

歐盟各機(jī)構(gòu)和歐洲很多政府、再加上加拿大和日本，如今組成了公開(kāi)的自由國(guó)際主義陣營(yíng)，努力捍衛(wèi)以協(xié)作規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的互利性經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)放多邊治理體系。

The anti-liberal front’s undisputed leader, meanwhile, is the US under President Trump. The best guide to his goals is a plain reading of his statements from the inaugural speech to the recent update of the national security strategy. It is a zero-sum world in which there cannot be economic winners without losers, and it is each country for itself. Both camps want to make, or remake, the world in their image.

與此同時(shí)，反自由主義陣營(yíng)無(wú)可爭(zhēng)議的領(lǐng)袖是特朗普治下的美國(guó)。讀一讀他從就職演講到最新國(guó)家安全戰(zhàn)略的各項(xiàng)聲明，就能明白他的目標(biāo)。這是一個(gè)零和世界，他們篤信在經(jīng)濟(jì)上沒(méi)有輸家就不可能有贏家，每個(gè)國(guó)家各自為戰(zhàn)。兩個(gè)陣營(yíng)都希望以自己的設(shè)想塑造或重塑這個(gè)世界。

It is not the first time that whole nations have had to choose which ideology to rally behind. The same happened in the 1930s, and again during the cold war. Then, too, countries aligned along ideological divides, partly fuelled by economic and social conflict that had previously riven their domestic politics. As a result the battle shifted to the international stage where it was waged by all means including war, direct or by proxy.

這并不是第一次出現(xiàn)所有國(guó)家都不得不選擇支持哪種意識(shí)形態(tài)的情況。上世紀(jì)30年代曾出現(xiàn)同樣的局面，冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期又再一次出現(xiàn)。當(dāng)時(shí)，各個(gè)國(guó)家也是根據(jù)意識(shí)形態(tài)的分歧(部分是因?yàn)橹耙呀?jīng)撕裂國(guó)內(nèi)政治的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)沖突而產(chǎn)生)站隊(duì)。結(jié)果是斗爭(zhēng)轉(zhuǎn)移到國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上，以直接戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)或代理人戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)等各種形式開(kāi)戰(zhàn)。

Within countries the conflict was to some extent repressed, as governments tried to ensure the side they had picked internationally was not undermined at home. For liberal states, this meant varying degrees of suppression of sympathy with fascism or communism. In dictatorships of the right and left, the elimination of dissenting views was total.

在國(guó)家內(nèi)部，沖突在某種程度上被壓制，各國(guó)政府努力確保他們?cè)趪?guó)際上選擇的一方在國(guó)內(nèi)不受動(dòng)搖。對(duì)于自由主義國(guó)家而言，這意味著不同程度地壓制對(duì)法西斯主義或共產(chǎn)主義的同情。在右翼和左翼的獨(dú)裁制國(guó)家，這意味著消除異見(jiàn)。

There is no sign that the current global realignment will cause war between the camps; and we may still hope that political violence within nations can be avoided. But in three other arenas, the battle is on.

眼下沒(méi)有跡象表明目前的全球重新站隊(duì)將引發(fā)兩個(gè)陣營(yíng)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng);我們或許也仍然能夠?qū)Ρ苊飧鲊?guó)內(nèi)部政治暴力抱有希望。但是在其他三個(gè)領(lǐng)域，戰(zhàn)斗已打響。

One is international institutions, in particular those in charge of global economic governance. The Trump administration seems determined to undermine the World Trade Organization, whose arbitration function it is sabotaging by frustrating the appointment of judges to the appellate panel. Conversely, the EU and Japan are trying to demonstrate the organisation’s value to US interests by offering a united front in a WTO context against a perceived abusive trade policy by China.

國(guó)際機(jī)構(gòu)是其中一個(gè)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)，特別是那些負(fù)責(zé)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)治理的機(jī)構(gòu)。特朗普政府似乎下定決心要削弱世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)的影響力，通過(guò)阻撓為WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)任命法官來(lái)破壞WTO的仲裁功能。相反，歐盟和日本則試圖通過(guò)在WTO框架下提供統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線，對(duì)抗其認(rèn)為的中國(guó)濫用貿(mào)易政策的行為，以此展示該組織對(duì)美國(guó)利益的價(jià)值。

Another arena is alliance building. The shock of isolationist victories accelerated work on deepening the existing global economic order. The EU has completed free trade agreements with Japan and Canada, and intensified talks with Mexico, Australia and New Zealand. Japan and Canada, besides tying up with the EU, are pushing forward the Trans-Pacific Partnership with the remaining 11 members after the US abandoned it.

另一個(gè)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)是結(jié)盟。孤立主義獲勝的沖擊加速了深化現(xiàn)有全球經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序的工作。歐盟已經(jīng)與日本和加拿大簽訂了自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定，并加強(qiáng)了與墨西哥、澳大利亞和新西蘭的磋商。除了與歐盟聯(lián)手外，日本和加拿大還在美國(guó)放棄《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)后，與其余11個(gè)成員國(guó)一起推進(jìn)該協(xié)定。

As for Mr Trump, he seems more eager to build bridges with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and befriend autocrats from the Philippines to Saudi Arabia than to shore up relationships with allies or maintain the political unity of Nato. In Europe, Hungary and Poland — the jury is out on Austria — are tilting towards his camp.

至于特朗普，他似乎更急于與弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的俄羅斯建立橋梁，并與從菲律賓到沙特阿拉伯的獨(dú)裁者交朋友，而非鞏固與盟友的關(guān)系或保持北約(Nato)的政治團(tuán)結(jié)。在歐洲，匈牙利和波蘭——奧地利目前還說(shuō)不準(zhǔn)——正在向特朗普陣營(yíng)傾斜。

Paradoxically, the most important arena for governments engaged in a global ideological battle remains their own public at home. This third dimension is decisive if the cold war is anything to go by. Communism was boosted by the great depression, but later could not indefinitely survive the evidence that it simply did not perform as well for its people as liberal-democratic capitalism. Conversely today, populist nationalism derives much of its strength from a mishandled financial crisis and mismanaged (often non-existent) policy responses to rapid structural change.

矛盾的是，對(duì)于參與全球意識(shí)形態(tài)斗爭(zhēng)的政府來(lái)說(shuō)，最重要的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)仍然是國(guó)內(nèi)公眾。如果冷戰(zhàn)有任何參考價(jià)值的話，那就是這個(gè)第三戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)將起到?jīng)Q定性作用。共產(chǎn)主義的發(fā)展受到了大蕭條的推動(dòng)，但后來(lái)仍無(wú)法無(wú)限期地挺過(guò)一個(gè)事實(shí)——對(duì)于其人民來(lái)說(shuō)，其表現(xiàn)不如自由民主資本主義。相反，如今民粹民族主義大部分的力量都來(lái)自于政府對(duì)金融危機(jī)的處置不當(dāng)及其在應(yīng)對(duì)快速結(jié)構(gòu)變化時(shí)的糟糕政策(往往是沒(méi)有應(yīng)對(duì)政策)。

In the long term, liberals have cause for hope: withdrawing from the liberal order will surely bring lasting harm to countries where isolationists are now in charge. But that hope is vulnerable to two threats. First, if the liberal order unravels, early withdrawers may hold the advantage. Second, the anti-liberals may show short-term economic results for longer than liberals can stay in power — in part because they are free from the pieties of conventional policy.

從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，自由主義者有理由抱有希望：退出自由主義秩序必然會(huì)給那些如今由孤立主義者掌權(quán)的國(guó)家?guī)?lái)持久傷害。但是這一希望面臨著兩個(gè)威脅。首先，如果自由主義秩序崩潰，早期的退出者可能占據(jù)優(yōu)勢(shì)。其次，反自由主義者展示的短期經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)果，可能比自由主義者當(dāng)權(quán)的時(shí)間更長(zhǎng)久——部分是因?yàn)榍罢卟皇軅鹘y(tǒng)政策的影響。

While conflicts remained domestic, caution was harmful but sustainable. That luxury is gone. In a global battle of ideas, liberals must show urgently that the existing order can be made to work for everyone. The 1930s and the cold war both saw economic liberalism survive by becoming radically more progressive than before. It is time for such a bold, centrist radicalism again.

當(dāng)沖突仍然停留在國(guó)內(nèi)時(shí)，謹(jǐn)慎雖然有害但可持續(xù)。如今，這種奢侈的時(shí)光已經(jīng)結(jié)束了。在全球意識(shí)形態(tài)大戰(zhàn)中，自由主義者必須抓緊時(shí)間，證明現(xiàn)有秩序可以為所有人服務(wù)。上世紀(jì)30年代和冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期都見(jiàn)證了這一點(diǎn)：經(jīng)濟(jì)自由主義通過(guò)比之前大為激進(jìn)地進(jìn)步而挺了過(guò)來(lái)?，F(xiàn)在又是大膽的中間派激進(jìn)主義大展拳腳的時(shí)候了。