“最佳實(shí)踐”詛咒
如果說我從商業(yè)記者這一行學(xué)到了一樣?xùn)|西，那就是受挫與失敗的商界領(lǐng)袖很少愿意接受采訪，而成功的老總往往主動(dòng)要求在聚光燈下亮相。
By the same token, business leaders love biographies, where in the lives of great figures they can trace the similarities to their own careers. Consultants and academics research leading companies while corporate laggards shrink from study.
同理，商界領(lǐng)袖們愛看人物傳記，在那些偉大人物的生平中，他們能夠追尋那些與自身職業(yè)生涯相似的地方。咨詢師和學(xué)者們研究領(lǐng)先企業(yè)，而落后的企業(yè)不愿成為研究對(duì)象。
So the curse of “best practice” spreads. Chief executives seek simple, repeatable patterns in success stories. Here is the problem, though: often those patterns are neither simple nor repeatable. Worse still, they may propagate bad behaviour and unproductive methods.
于是“最佳實(shí)踐”詛咒傳播開來。首席執(zhí)行官們從成功故事中尋找簡(jiǎn)單、可復(fù)制的規(guī)律。但有個(gè)問題：這些規(guī)律往往既不簡(jiǎn)單又不可復(fù)制。更糟的是，它們可能助長(zhǎng)糟糕行為和不具成效的方法。
It would be senseless for every generation of leaders to have to start from scratch, ignoring proven ways to be more productive and profitable. But the follow-the-leader approach can backfire.
如果每一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者都要從一張白紙開始，無視那些更具成效、也更有利可圖的做法，那未免很愚蠢。但對(duì)成功的先行者亦步亦趨也可能事與愿違。
Freek Vermeulen of London Business School points out that perception bias, imperfect copying of methods, herd-like benchmarking against top-ranked rivals and an obsession with short-term results can sucker companies into bad habits.
倫敦商學(xué)院(London Business School)的弗里克•韋穆倫(Freek Vermeulen)指出，感知偏差、對(duì)方法的不完善復(fù)制、對(duì)排名靠前的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手進(jìn)行羊群式的基準(zhǔn)比對(duì)，以及癡迷于短期結(jié)果，都可能令企業(yè)沾染上陋習(xí)。
Like a virus, rather than killing their host quickly, bad practices linger long enough to be transmitted to others.
陋習(xí)就像病毒，它們不會(huì)迅速殺死它們的宿主，而是會(huì)持續(xù)很久，以便被傳染到其他人。
A bias towards perceived success is inevitable, Prof Vermeulen says. He and Xu Li, now at ESMT in Berlin, showed people a decade’s worth of performance data for 1,000 companies, each of which followed one of three strategies. After a while they noticed that people stopped poring over complex information on each company and fell back on the performance ranking. Using the rank of a few successful companies as a rule of thumb, most wrongly decided that their strategy was best, when most companies following that path underperformed.
韋穆倫稱，人們對(duì)成功的認(rèn)識(shí)不可避免地會(huì)存在偏見。他與柏林歐洲管理技術(shù)學(xué)院(ESMT Berlin)的Xu Li，向人們展示了1000家企業(yè)10年來的業(yè)績(jī)數(shù)據(jù)，每家企業(yè)都遵循三種戰(zhàn)略之一。不久，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)人們不再注意每家公司的復(fù)雜信息，而是把目光重新投向業(yè)績(jī)排名。多數(shù)人把少數(shù)幾家排名靠前的成功企業(yè)當(dāng)作正確戰(zhàn)略的化身，錯(cuò)誤地認(rèn)定它們的戰(zhàn)略就是最好的，而實(shí)際上遵循這條路線的多數(shù)企業(yè)表現(xiàn)不佳。
“It’s human [nature], when people have information overload and there’s a lot of companies to look at,” Prof Vermeulen told me. “[But] I don’t think it’s necessarily inevitable that we can’t do something about those biases.”
“這是人的本性，當(dāng)人們掌握的信息過多，又有大量公司要研究，”韋穆倫告訴我。“但我并不認(rèn)為我們對(duì)這些偏見就真的無能為力。”
Managers sometimes stick with what was once deemed best practice simply because they never question why such methods still apply. In his book, Breaking Bad Habits, Prof Vermeulen cites Britain’s broadsheet newspapers, whose format is a relic of a long-repealed tax on the number of pages printed.
有時(shí)，管理者之所以堅(jiān)持以往公認(rèn)的最佳實(shí)踐，只是因?yàn)樗麄儚牟毁|(zhì)疑這些方法為何仍然適用。在其新書《破除陋習(xí)》(Breaking Bad Habits)中，韋穆倫提到了英國(guó)的大報(bào)，歷史上英國(guó)曾針對(duì)報(bào)紙的頁數(shù)征稅，后來這個(gè)稅種被廢止，但這種報(bào)紙規(guī)格保留了下來。
One way to lift the curse of best practice is to be aware of how — and where — a method is being used and whether its success is specific to one sector, company or country.
破解最佳實(shí)踐詛咒的一個(gè)方法，就是弄清一種方法如何——以及在哪里——被應(yīng)用，以及它的成功是否局限于某一行業(yè)、企業(yè)或是國(guó)家。
Prof Vermeulen points out, for example, that US companies stuttered when they tried to introduce Total Quality Management, the meticulous Japanese method for process and product improvement, in the 1980s and 1990s. US imitators applied it in idiosyncratic ways. They simplified the system, took shortcuts and added features such as performance measurement, although W Edwards Deming, one of TQM’s architects, believed this “builds fear, demolishes teamwork, [and] nourishes rivalry and politics”.
韋穆倫指出，當(dāng)年美國(guó)公司在試圖引入全面質(zhì)量管理(Total Quality Management)時(shí)就不順利，這是20世紀(jì)80及90年代一種旨在改進(jìn)流程與產(chǎn)品的日式精細(xì)管理方法。美國(guó)的效仿者采用全面質(zhì)量管理的方式很獨(dú)特。他們簡(jiǎn)化了這一體系，大走捷徑，還添加了績(jī)效評(píng)定等花樣，盡管全面質(zhì)量管理的設(shè)計(jì)者之一威廉•愛德華茲•德明(W. Edwards Deming)認(rèn)為這樣做會(huì)“營(yíng)造恐懼心理、破壞團(tuán)隊(duì)協(xié)作、并滋生較勁行為和勾心斗角”。
Similarly, when Michelin, the tyremaker, tried to introduce lean production methods — as pioneered by Toyota — in the 1990s, it succeeded in improving productivity at the expense of agility and at a cost to its carefully nurtured humane corporate culture.
同樣，上世紀(jì)90年代，輪胎制造商米其林(Michelin)在嘗試引進(jìn)了由豐田(Toyota)首創(chuàng)的精益制造方法后，成功地提高了生產(chǎn)率，但卻犧牲了靈活性以及該公司精心培育的人性化的企業(yè)文化。
Eric Ries, author of The Lean Startup and The Startup Way, has laid out broad principles for “lean” methods to be used by companies launching products, but he agrees that “there’s always going to be a tension between wanting to seek out universal laws [and] recognising that context matters a great deal.”
《精益創(chuàng)業(yè)》(The Lean Startup)及《創(chuàng)業(yè)之路》(The Startup Way)的作者埃里克•里斯(Eric Ries，見文首照片)，闡述了推出產(chǎn)品的公司所用的“精益”方法的籠統(tǒng)原則，但他也同意“在尋求普遍規(guī)律與認(rèn)識(shí)到具體情況很重要之間總是存在矛盾”。
Another way to avoid bad habits is to put working methods to the test. Start small and revisit practices regularly to assess consequences. In other words, apply a version of the “build-measure-learn” method taught by Ries.
另一個(gè)避免陋習(xí)的辦法是對(duì)工作方法進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。以小規(guī)模起步，定期審議相關(guān)實(shí)踐以評(píng)估后果。換句話說，就是采用里斯所倡導(dǎo)的“打造——衡量——學(xué)習(xí)”方法的某個(gè)版本。
Michelin, seeking a way to make itself more agile and responsive to customers five years ago, tried a new management approach first with selected teams, giving more responsibility to frontline workers. It extended the successful experiment to production lines, then pilot factories, before this year rolling it out to the group.
五年前，米其林開始設(shè)法變得更靈巧，更快地響應(yīng)客戶需求，該公司先與選定的團(tuán)隊(duì)嘗試一種新的管理方法，讓第一線員工承擔(dān)更多責(zé)任。隨后，米其林將成功的實(shí)驗(yàn)推廣到生產(chǎn)線，接著是試點(diǎn)工廠，最后在今年在整個(gè)集團(tuán)實(shí)施。
Of course, the good practices of today, such as Michelin’s initiative or Ries’s lean start-up methods, adopted by companies such as General Electric, may become the bad habits of tomorrow.
當(dāng)然，今天的最佳實(shí)踐也許會(huì)成為明日的陋習(xí)。米其林的舉措或里斯的精益創(chuàng)業(yè)法都是如此，后者已被通用電氣(General Electric)等企業(yè)采用。
The key is not to be lulled by short-term success into pursuing practices that jeopardise long-term survival.
關(guān)鍵是不要被短期成功蒙蔽，去追逐那些危及長(zhǎng)期生存的實(shí)踐。
Consider the lemming. Bounding cliffwards in the slipstream of its furry comrades, it must feel as though running with the pack is best practice. It is only just before impact that the hapless creature realises it should have veered away from the dangerously popular path that leads to the precipice.
想想旅鼠。追隨著它們毛茸茸的同伴一起跳下懸崖，它們一定認(rèn)為隨大流就是最佳實(shí)踐。只有在快要落地時(shí)，這些可憐的生物才會(huì)意識(shí)到，自己本應(yīng)遠(yuǎn)離危險(xiǎn)地?fù)湎驊已碌娜后w。
Andrew Hill is the FT’s management editor 譯者/偲言
