朝鮮發(fā)展核武的目的：守還是攻？

When Kim Jong Un’s half-brother was murdered in an international airport this year, many pointed to medieval motivations: the exiled sibling represented a threat and had to be eliminated.

當(dāng)金正恩(Kim Jong Un)同父異母的哥哥今年在某國(guó)際機(jī)場(chǎng)被謀殺時(shí)，許多人指出了其中類似中世紀(jì)王朝政治的動(dòng)機(jī)：被流放的兄弟對(duì)國(guó)王是一種威脅，必須被除掉。

Six months later, North Korea’s supreme leader continues to revel in shocking the global community as he shows off his growing military power with an endless stream of advanced weapons tests.

六個(gè)月后，朝鮮最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人繼續(xù)以令國(guó)際社會(huì)震驚為樂——用源源不斷的先進(jìn)武器試驗(yàn)來(lái)炫耀朝鮮不斷增長(zhǎng)的軍事實(shí)力。

In its publicly stated views, Pyongyang portrays its audacious pursuit of nuclear weapons as a necessary defensive measure to ward off US aggression. But experts are divided on whether the secretive regime’s ambition is only self-preservation, or whether its intentions are altogether more aggressive.

在公開的宣傳中，平壤將其冒險(xiǎn)研發(fā)核武器的行為稱為抵御美國(guó)侵略的必要防御措施。但這個(gè)神秘政權(quán)的核野心僅僅是為了自保，還是完全更具侵略性，專家們也意見不一。

Nicholas Eberstadt, a Korea expert at the conservative American Enterprise Institute think-tank, is among those who believe that North Korea’s ultimate aim is to fight and win a war with the South.

保守派智庫(kù)美國(guó)企業(yè)研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的朝鮮問題專家尼古拉斯•埃伯施塔特(Nicholas Eberstadt)等一些學(xué)者認(rèn)為，朝鮮的終極目標(biāo)是與韓國(guó)開戰(zhàn)并贏得這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

“If Pyongyang can force an American president to blink in a future Korean crisis, then the US-South Korea military alliance will collapse,” he says. “US forces will be out [of South Korea] and the Kim family regime will take a giant step to settling the still unfinished Korean war on its terms.”

“如果平壤能迫使美國(guó)總統(tǒng)在未來(lái)的一場(chǎng)朝鮮半島危機(jī)中立場(chǎng)有所動(dòng)搖，那么，美韓軍事同盟將解體，”他說(shuō)，“美國(guó)軍隊(duì)將撤出(韓國(guó))，金氏家族政權(quán)將朝著按自己的想法解決這場(chǎng)仍未結(jié)束的朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)邁出一大步。”

Fears over such a scenario are growing in South Korea, where citizens have begun to question whether the US is truly ready to defend its longstanding ally in the face of a nuclear-armed adversary.

在韓國(guó)，人們對(duì)這一前景的擔(dān)憂正在加劇。韓國(guó)民眾已經(jīng)開始質(zhì)疑，美國(guó)是否真的準(zhǔn)備好在一個(gè)擁有核武器的對(duì)手面前保衛(wèi)其長(zhǎng)期盟友。

“All the pieces for the North’s design are slowly but deliberately falling into place,” Mr Eberstadt adds. “The nukes, the missiles, the cyber war component.”

“朝鮮的每一步棋都經(jīng)過了精心考慮，在緩慢地完成它的布局。”埃伯施塔特補(bǔ)充道，“包括核武器、導(dǎo)彈、網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)。”

The actions of US President Donald Trump have done little to inspire Seoul’s confidence. After Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test on Sunday, Mr Trump took to Twitter to accuse South Korea of appeasing the North. It then took almost 36 hours before he picked up the phone to discuss the matter with Moon Jae-in, his South Korean counterpart.

美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的言行幾乎無(wú)助于激起首爾的信心。上周日朝鮮進(jìn)行第六次核試驗(yàn)之后，特朗普在Twitter上指責(zé)韓國(guó)姑息朝鮮。過了將近36個(gè)小時(shí)，特朗普才與韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)文在寅(Moon Jae-in)通電話討論此事。

Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, also believes Pyongyang is seeking to “induce a division in the South Korea-US alliance”. He believes the North’s threats last month to bomb the US Pacific territory of Guam “could make Americans nervous and question why they should protect South Korea at the expense of their own security”.

位于首爾的韓國(guó)統(tǒng)一研究院(Korea Institute for National Unification)前院長(zhǎng)金泰宇也認(rèn)為，平壤方面正試圖“離間韓美同盟”。他認(rèn)為，朝鮮上月發(fā)出的轟炸美國(guó)太平洋領(lǐng)土關(guān)島的威脅，“可能讓美國(guó)人感到緊張，并質(zhì)疑為什么要以犧牲自身安全為代價(jià)保護(hù)韓國(guó)”。

However, others see North Korea’s nuclear build-up as rooted in self-protection.

然而，有些專家認(rèn)為朝鮮打造核武庫(kù)歸根到底是為了自保。

Some point to frequent mentions in North Korean state media of Libya’s Muammer Gaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein — dictators who met grisly ends after failing to realise that “nuclear deterrence serves as the strongest treasured sword” — as evidence that the regime is motivated more by fear than belligerence.

他們認(rèn)為平壤政權(quán)的行為更多是出于恐懼、而非好戰(zhàn)，證據(jù)就是，朝鮮官方媒體經(jīng)常提及利比亞的穆阿邁爾•卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)和伊拉克前總統(tǒng)薩達(dá)姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)——兩位因未意識(shí)到“核威懾是最強(qiáng)大的寶劍”而遭遇可怕結(jié)局的獨(dú)裁者。

“Pyongyang is trying to strike a deal with Washington on its own terms,” says Kim Dong-yeob, a researcher at Kyungnam University in Seoul. “It wants a security guarantee from the US and a guarantee for the regime’s survival.”

“平壤正試圖按自己的想法與華盛頓達(dá)成協(xié)議。”韓國(guó)慶南大學(xué)(Kyungnam University)研究員金東燁(Kim Dong-yeob)表示，“它希望得到美國(guó)的安全保證，一項(xiàng)對(duì)朝鮮政權(quán)存續(xù)的保證。”

North and South Korea have remained technical enemies since the 1950s Korean war ended in armistice rather than a peace treaty. Pyongyang views the continued US military presence in South Korea, as well as joint drills with Seoul, as precursors to an invasion.

自上世紀(jì)50年代朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)停戰(zhàn)(雙方簽署的是停戰(zhàn)協(xié)定，而非和平條約)以來(lái)，朝韓兩國(guó)實(shí)際上一直處于敵對(duì)國(guó)家狀態(tài)。平壤方面將美國(guó)在韓國(guó)持續(xù)的軍事存在及美韓定期聯(lián)合軍演視為入侵的前兆。

Some experts believe North Korea is seeking a deal that would recognise it as a legitimate nuclear state and free it from the grasp of international sanctions. Such a deal would also entail a peace treaty with the US as a security commitment, a move that would be met with consternation in Seoul.

有專家認(rèn)為，朝鮮正在尋求達(dá)成一項(xiàng)協(xié)議，即讓國(guó)際社會(huì)承認(rèn)其為合法的擁核國(guó)，使其擺脫國(guó)際制裁的束縛。達(dá)成這樣的協(xié)議首先需要與美國(guó)簽署和平條約作為安全承諾，而此舉將引發(fā)首爾的恐慌。

For Stephan Haggard, a North Korea expert at the University of California, San Diego, the recent sabre-rattling from the Kim regime is directed more at China than the US or South Korea.

在加州大學(xué)圣迭戈分校(University of California, San Diego)的朝鮮問題專家史蒂芬•哈格德(Stephan Haggard)看來(lái)，金正恩政權(quán)近期的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)叫囂更多地是針對(duì)中國(guó)，而非美國(guó)或韓國(guó)。

“The tests are not a sign of confidence but desperation: an effort on the part of Kim Jong Un to sway the Chinese to back off their recent sanctions commitments, which are in fact quite draconian,” Prof Haggard suggests in a blog post for the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

“這些試驗(yàn)顯示的不是信心，而是絕望：金正恩試圖說(shuō)服中方收回最近的制裁承諾，這些承諾實(shí)際上相當(dāng)嚴(yán)厲，”哈格德在為彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)撰寫的一篇博文中表示。

Growing trade with China, by far North Korea’s largest trading partner, has until now helped the Kim regime mitigate the burden of sanctions and fuel economic growth. But last month China signed off on tough new UN sanctions banning North Korea from exporting coal, iron and lead in a move that could cut Pyongyang’s $3bn export revenues by more than one-third.

直至最近，不斷擴(kuò)大的對(duì)華貿(mào)易(中國(guó)是朝鮮最大的貿(mào)易伙伴)幫助金氏政權(quán)減輕了制裁造成的負(fù)擔(dān)，推動(dòng)了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。但上月，中國(guó)同意執(zhí)行聯(lián)合國(guó)新的嚴(yán)厲制裁(禁止朝鮮出口煤、鐵和鉛)，制裁可能令朝鮮30億美元的出口收入減少逾三分之一。

“The North Korean regime is pulling resources from a variety of overseas accounts to sustain its balance-of-payments deficit with China, now virtually its only significant trading partner,” Prof Haggard says. “The regime is perfectly aware of what is in those accounts and how long they will last, and it does not like what it is seeing.”

“朝鮮政權(quán)正在從各種海外賬戶中抽取資源，以支撐其對(duì)中國(guó)的國(guó)際收支逆差，而中國(guó)眼下實(shí)際上是其唯一重要的貿(mào)易伙伴。”哈格德表示，“朝鮮政權(quán)十分清楚這些賬戶里有多少東西，能堅(jiān)持多久，而答案是它不愿看到的。”

Additional reporting by Kang Buseong Kang Buseong補(bǔ)充報(bào)道