人民幣：不是你想的那么疲軟

The renminbi’s seemingly endless grind lower against the US dollar has been one of the financial stories of 2016, triggering a wave of capital outflows from China that Goldman Sachs estimates may have totalled $1.1tn since August 2015.

人民幣兌美元匯率似乎跌跌不休，這已成為2016年金融領(lǐng)域的故事之一，引發(fā)了一波資本外流浪潮。據(jù)高盛(Goldman Sachs)估計，自2015年8月以來，中國資金外流規(guī)?；蛞堰_到1.1萬億美元。

The once closely controlled Chinese currency has tumbled 6.5 per cent to an eight-year low of Rmb6.945 against the greenback this year, taking its slide since August 2015 to 10.6 per cent.

 曾經(jīng)受到嚴密控制的人民幣兌美元匯率今年下跌了6.5%，目前處在1美元兌6.945元人民幣的8年低點，如果從2015年8月算起，跌幅則達到10.6%。

As increasingly panicky Chinese and foreign entities have sought to evade the ongoing devaluation of their renminbi holdings by getting money out of the country, capital outflows have surged, with estimates of their size ranging from the $520bn the Institute of International Finance believes was spirited out of China in the first 10 months of 2016 to Goldman’s $1.1tn figure.

 中外各類實體越來越驚慌失措，為了避免自己所持的人民幣資產(chǎn)持續(xù)貶值，他們紛紛尋求將資金轉(zhuǎn)移出中國，這導(dǎo)致資金外流激增。各機構(gòu)對中國資金外流規(guī)模有不同的估計，比較低的有國際金融協(xié)會(Institute of International Finance)估計的2016年頭10個月流出5200億美元，比較高的就是上文高盛的估計——自2015年8月以來流出了1.1萬億美元。

Yet, arguably, there is another interpretation of what is happening to the currency of the world’s second-largest economy, one which may help allay some of the panic.

然而，對于全球第二大經(jīng)濟體的貨幣當前的走勢還有另外一種解釋，它或許有助于緩解恐慌情緒。

Since the end of June, the renminbi has been remarkably stable against the trade-weighted basket of 13 currencies introduced by the People’s Bank of China in December 2015.

自今年6月底以來，人民幣相對于貿(mào)易加權(quán)貨幣籃子的匯率一直非常穩(wěn)定，這個籃子由13種貨幣組成，是中國央行(PBoC)在2015年12月推出的。

Having closed at an index level of 95.02 on June 30, the renminbi has oscillated in a range of 93.78 to 95.34, according to the weekly updates released by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System, an arm of the People’s Bank. The most recent figure, for December 16, shows a reading of 94.99, just 0.03 points below that of June 30.

根據(jù)中國央行下屬的中國外匯交易中心(China Foreign Exchange Trade System)發(fā)布的每周更新數(shù)據(jù)，人民幣匯率指數(shù)在6月30日收于95.02的水平，此后一直在93.78到95.34的區(qū)間內(nèi)振蕩。12月16日的最新數(shù)據(jù)顯示，該指數(shù)讀數(shù)為94.99，只比6月30日的讀數(shù)低了0.03點。

“Although there has been a lot of talk about crisis or big problems against the dollar, [the renminbi] has held very stable in basket terms since early July,” says Robert Minikin, head of Asia FX strategy at Standard Chartered.

渣打銀行(Standard Chartered)亞洲外匯策略主管羅伯特•米尼肯(Robert Minikin)表示：“盡管許多人都在說人民幣兌美元匯率可能遭遇危機或者出現(xiàn)大問題，但自7月初以來人民幣相對于貨幣籃子一直非常穩(wěn)定。”

That this has been little noticed is largely due to the market’s (and indeed the media’s) almost total obsession with the renminbi’s bilateral rate against the dollar.

 這一點卻幾乎沒人注意到，這在很大程度上是由于市場(實際上是媒體)幾乎把所有注意力都放在了人民幣兌美元的雙邊匯率上。

Yet Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank, said in February that keeping the renminbi “at a broadly stable level” against the basket, would be the “keynote” of the bank’s new exchange rate regime.

然而中國央行行長周小川在今年2月份就說過，“保持一籃子匯率的基本穩(wěn)定”，是人民幣匯率形成機制的“主基調(diào)”。

Admittedly, Mr Zhou’s argument was somewhat undermined by the behaviour of the renminbi in the first half of 2016, when it fell 5.9 per cent against the basket, before finding stability in the second half.

無可否認，人民幣在2016年上半年的走勢多少削弱了周小川這一說法的可信性，期間人民幣兌一籃子貨幣的匯率下跌了5.9%，下半年才穩(wěn)定下來。

As a result, the currency has fallen almost as much against the basket as against the dollar this year, although the shape of the slide has differed sharply, with the renminbi’s 2.1 per cent fall against the greenback in the first six months of the year accelerating to a 4.5 per cent slide in the second half, as the first chart shows.

因此，今年以來，人民幣相對于一籃子貨幣的跌幅和相對于美元的跌幅是差不多的，只是下滑形態(tài)迥異。如圖一所示，上半年人民幣兌美元匯率下跌2.1%，下半年跌幅則為4.5%。

But might something important have changed mid-year? Might the People’s Bank now be using its formidable currency intervention to achieve the target Mr Zhou outlined in February? Mr Minikin thinks so.

或許年中的時候有什么重要的事情發(fā)生了變化?或許央行正在利用其強大的外匯干預(yù)手段來實現(xiàn)周小川在今年2月提出的目標?米尼肯認為情況正是如此。

His argument is that the basket has been king since its introduction in December 2015 but that the renminbi’s starting level against the basket was problematic, given the currency’s “powerful upswing” in trade-weighted terms between the middle of 2014 and Aug 2015. (Over the longer term it rose more sharply still, as the second chart, based on an index drawn up by the Bank for International Settlements, indicates).

 他的觀點是，自中國央行2015年12月開始采用貨幣籃子以來，這個籃子一直是最重要的，但是考慮到人民幣貿(mào)易加權(quán)匯率在2014年中到2015年8月期間“強勢上揚”(在更長時間跨度內(nèi)這個匯率升幅更大，見圖二，該圖基于國際清算銀行(BIS)一項指數(shù)繪制)，人民幣相對于這個籃子的初始匯率水平是有問題的。

During the first half of 2016, the People’s Bank “took back roughly half of that overvaluation,” he says, allowing the currency to drift back towards a “truer” level.

他說，2016年上半年，中國央行“將高估的部分抹掉了差不多一半”，使人民幣朝著“更真實”的水平回落。

“All along they were assessing the value of the currency on a trade-weighted basis, but at the beginning of this year the starting point was not a very good level to lock in because they were locking in the revaluation of 2015,” Mr Minikin says.

“他們一直在貿(mào)易加權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)上對人民幣進行估值，但今年年初的初始匯率水平并不適合鎖定，因為當時鎖定的是2015年人民幣再估值后的水平，”米尼肯說。

However, with the trade-weighted renminbi seemingly reaching a level the People’s Bank was comfortable with by the end of June, since then “the authorities are doing exactly what they said they would do and pretty much what we think they should do,” he adds.

然而，到6月底時，隨著人民幣貿(mào)易加權(quán)匯率看似達到中國央行滿意的水平，此后“當局所做的正是他們聲稱會做的事情，也和我們所想的他們應(yīng)該做的事情差不多，”他補充道。

Not everyone shares this interpretation of events, however. Mark Williams, chief Asia economist at Capital Economics, says “there are two ways” of reading the situation, with one being that “since the middle of the year the People’s Bank has more formally adopted a peg against the basket”.

 然而，不是每個人都認同這種解讀。凱投宏觀(Capital Economics)首席亞洲經(jīng)濟學(xué)家馬克•威廉姆斯(Mark Williams)表示“有兩種方式”解讀這種情況，一種是“自年中以來央行更正式地采用了釘住貨幣籃子的機制”。

“I don’t think that’s right,” Mr Williams says, however. Instead, he believes the stability against the basket is more the result of the resurgence of the dollar, which fell on a trade-weighted basis in the first half of the year, before rallying in H2.

“我不認為這種看法是對的，”威廉姆斯說。相反，他認為，人民幣對貨幣籃子的匯率保持穩(wěn)定，在更大程度上是美元復(fù)蘇的結(jié)果，今年上半年美元的貿(mào)易加權(quán)匯率走弱，然后在下半年回升。

Because of this, any continued renminbi depreciation against the basket in H2 would have led to a sharper fall still against the greenback.

因此，在今年下半年，人民幣相對于貨幣籃子的任何進一步貶值都會導(dǎo)致人民幣兌美元匯率出現(xiàn)更大幅度的下跌。

“If they had allowed weakness against the basket that would have led to more concerns about what is happening to the renminbi and more capital outflows,” Mr Williams says.

“如果他們讓人民幣相對于貨幣籃子走弱，就會導(dǎo)致們更加擔憂人民幣的走向，導(dǎo)致更多資本外流，”威廉姆斯說。

Instead, he argues that the People’s Bank has engaged in “opportunistic devaluation against the basket”.

相反，他認為，中國央行讓人民幣“對貨幣籃子進行了機會主義的貶值”。

In other words, when the dollar was falling, the PBoC felt able to let the renminbi weaken against the basket, but when the dollar rose, the central bank instead kept the renminbi stable against the basket, in order to minimise its decline against the resurgent greenback.

換句話說，當美元貶值的時候，中國央行覺得可以讓人民幣相對于貨幣籃子走弱，但當美元升值的時候，中國央行就讓人民幣相對于貨幣籃子保持穩(wěn)定，以盡可能降低人民幣對強勢美元的跌幅。

Indeed, since November 8, when Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the US presidential election set off a powerful dollar rally, the renminbi has strengthened in trade-weighted terms.

事實上，自11月8日唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)在美國大選中意外取勝使美元開始強勢上揚后，人民幣貿(mào)易加權(quán)匯率走強了。

“You end up with these stop-start moves against the basket and the dollar,” says Mr Williams. “The issue is that, try as they might, the People’s Bank can’t get financial markets to focus on the basket.”

“到頭來，央行對人民幣的一籃子匯率和兌美元匯率采取這些起起停停的舉措，”威廉姆斯說：“問題在于，盡管嘗試過，但中國央行無法讓金融市場關(guān)注貨幣籃子。”

Win Thin, global head of emerging market currency strategy at Brown Brothers Harriman, believes the renminbi’s steadiness against the basket since the end of June is little more than a reflection of Beijing’s desire for “some measure of stability”.

 布朗兄弟哈里曼(Brown Brothers Harriman)新興市場貨幣策略全球主管Win Thin認為，自6月底以來人民幣相對于貨幣籃子的穩(wěn)定只是反映出北京方面維持“一定程度的穩(wěn)定”的意愿。

“The last thing they want is uncontrolled capital outflows. It’s not just China, we have seen outflows from most of the emerging markets,” he says.

“他們最不希望看到的是不受控制的資本外流。不僅僅是中國，我們在大多數(shù)新興市場都看到了外流，”他說。

Despite this, Mr Thin says few people he comes across focus on the rate against the basket. “We look at the bilateral rate for our clients. Investors, politicians, everyone is still pretty much fixated on the dollar rate,” he says.

 盡管如此，Win Thin表示，他接觸過的人中很少有人關(guān)注人民幣的一籃子匯率。“我們?yōu)榭蛻絷P(guān)注雙邊匯率。投資者、政治人士，每個人依然基本只關(guān)注人民幣對美元匯率，”他說。

Mr Minikin says an increased focus on the basket would help reassure people that China is not heading for the rocks.

米尼肯表示，更加注重貨幣籃子將有助于讓人們放心，中國并非正在觸礁。

“Over time, as market participants and corporates become more attuned to the new regime, people will realise that there isn’t any big China crisis or devaluation out there, so this will allow confidence to be restored,” he says.

“隨著時間推移，市場參與者和企業(yè)將日益適應(yīng)新匯率機制，人們會意識到中國不會出現(xiàn)什么大的危機或者貶值，這將促使信心恢復(fù)，”他說。

Nevertheless, even the StanChart man does see scope for turbulence ahead. His 2013 book The Offshore Renminbi: The Rise of the Chinese Currency and Its Global Future, outlined the turbulence faced by the Australian dollar when that currency was internationalised in the 1980s.

然而，即使是米尼肯，也看到未來有出現(xiàn)動蕩的可能。他在2013年出版的著作《人民幣的崛起：國際地位及影響》(The Offshore Renminbi: The Rise of the Chinese Currency and Its Global Future)講到了澳元在上世紀80年代國際化進程中出現(xiàn)的動蕩。

With Beijing now committed to allowing the renminbi to follow suit, he believes a few more bumps in the road may be inevitable.

 北京現(xiàn)在正致力于讓人民幣走上同樣道路，米尼肯認為，未來不可避免地還會再出現(xiàn)顛簸。