特朗普的經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)劃真會(huì)造福勞動(dòng)階級(jí)？

Following a brief market plunge, the President-elect’s speech on Tuesday night was more conciliatory than many expected and emphasised his commitment to infrastructure investment. Investors have, on balance, concluded that the combination of a shift to very expansionary fiscal policy and major reductions in regulation in sectors ranging from energy to finance to drug pricing will raise demand and reflate the American economy.

在短暫的市場(chǎng)暴跌后，當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)特朗普在上周二晚的演講比很多人預(yù)期的更加溫和，強(qiáng)調(diào)了他對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資的承諾?？偟膩碚f，投資者的結(jié)論是，向極具擴(kuò)張性的財(cái)政政策轉(zhuǎn)變、結(jié)合大幅削減對(duì)從能源到金融再到藥品定價(jià)等多個(gè)領(lǐng)域的監(jiān)管，將促進(jìn)需求并刺激美國經(jīng)濟(jì)。

The result has been a rise in real interest rates and inflation expectations, along with a strong stock market and a strong dollar. Experience suggests, however, that initial market responses to major political events are poor predictors of their ultimate impact.

結(jié)果是實(shí)際利率和通脹預(yù)期上升，同時(shí)股市走高、美元表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁。然而，經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明，市場(chǎng)對(duì)于重大政治事件的最初反應(yīng)，通常無法準(zhǔn)確預(yù)示事件的最終影響。

The late MIT economist Rudiger Dornbusch made an extensive study of the results of populist economic programmes around the world, finding that while they sometimes had immediate positive results, over the medium- and long-term they were catastrophic for the working class in whose name they were launched. This could be the fate of the Trump programme given its design errors, implausible assumptions and reckless disregard for global economics.

已故的麻省理工學(xué)院(MIT)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家魯?shù)细?bull;多恩布施(Rudiger Dornbusch)在廣泛研究了世界各地民粹主義經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)劃的結(jié)果后發(fā)現(xiàn)，盡管這些計(jì)劃有時(shí)會(huì)產(chǎn)生立竿見影的正面結(jié)果，但是從中期和長期來看，這些打著造福勞動(dòng)階級(jí)旗號(hào)推出的計(jì)劃會(huì)對(duì)勞動(dòng)階級(jí)造成災(zāi)難性的打擊。鑒于特朗普計(jì)劃的設(shè)計(jì)錯(cuò)誤、不合理的假設(shè)以及對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況的草率忽視，特朗普計(jì)劃可能也會(huì)難逃這樣的命運(yùn)。

I have long been a strong advocate of debt-financed public investment in the context of low interest rates and a decaying US infrastructure, so I was glad to see Mr Trump emphasise it. Unfortunately, the plan presented by his advisers, Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross, suggests an approach based on tax credits for equity investment and total private sector participation that will not cover the most important projects, not reach many of the most important investors, and involve substantial mis-targeting of public resources.

我長期以來一直非常贊成在利率水平較低以及美國基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施陳舊的背景下，以債務(wù)融資進(jìn)行公共投資。因此，看到特朗普強(qiáng)調(diào)這一點(diǎn)我很高興。遺憾的是，他的顧問彼得•納瓦羅(Peter Navarro)和威爾伯•羅斯(Wilbur Ross)提出的方案表明，該計(jì)劃的實(shí)現(xiàn)方式將基于為股權(quán)投資和全體私人部門參與提供稅務(wù)抵免，不會(huì)覆蓋一些最重要的項(xiàng)目、觸及不到很多最重要的投資者、并且將涉及公共資源的大量錯(cuò)配。

Many of the highest return infrastructure investments — such as improving roads, repairing 60,000 structurally deficient bridges, upgrading schools or modernising the air traffic control system — do not generate a commercial return and so are excluded from his plan. Nor can the non-taxable pension funds, endowments and sovereign wealth funds that are the most promising sources of capital for infrastructure take advantage of the program.

很多回報(bào)最高的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資——比如改善道路狀況、修復(fù)60000座存在結(jié)構(gòu)性缺陷的危橋、升級(jí)學(xué)校設(shè)施和空中交通管制系統(tǒng)——不會(huì)帶來商業(yè)回報(bào)，因此被排除在特朗普的計(jì)劃之外。享受免稅待遇的養(yǎng)老基金、捐贈(zèng)基金和主權(quán)財(cái)富基金這類最有可能為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施提供資金的機(jī)構(gòu)，也無法受益于該計(jì)劃。

I am optimistic regarding the efficacy of fiscal expansion. But any responsible economist has to recognise that, past a point, it can lead to some combination of excessive foreign borrowing, inflation and even financial crisis. As Dornbusch showed, in emerging markets this can happen quite quickly. In the US the process would take longer.

我看好財(cái)政擴(kuò)張的效果。但是任何負(fù)責(zé)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都不得不承認(rèn)，超過某個(gè)度，財(cái)政擴(kuò)張可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)以下三種情況中的一種或多種：外債過高、通脹、甚至是金融危機(jī)。正如多恩布施表明的那樣，在新興市場(chǎng)，這種局面可能會(huì)很快形成。在美國，該過程耗時(shí)會(huì)更長。

Even without taking account of the likely costs of the infrastructure plan (which the Trump team badly underestimates) or the propodefenceense build-up, the Trump tax reform proposals are too expensive. Many, like the proposed abolition of the estate tax, will only benefit the high-saving wealthy.

即使不考慮特朗普的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施計(jì)劃(特朗普?qǐng)F(tuán)隊(duì)嚴(yán)重低估了該計(jì)劃的成本)以及鞏固國防提議的可能成本，特朗普的稅制改革提議也太過昂貴了。就像廢除遺產(chǎn)稅的提議一樣，很多提議只會(huì)有益于儲(chǔ)蓄率較高的富人。

While drastic changes in the proposed domestic programme are necessary for it to work, the general direction of increasing public investment, reforming taxes and adjusting regulation is appropriate. The same cannot be said of Mr Trump’s global plan, which rests on a misunderstanding of how the world economy operates.

盡管特朗普針對(duì)國內(nèi)事務(wù)所提出的計(jì)劃需要做出劇烈改變才能奏效，但是該計(jì)劃增加公共投資、改革稅制以及調(diào)整監(jiān)管的總體方向是恰當(dāng)?shù)?。特朗普針?duì)全球的計(jì)劃則不然，后者是基于他對(duì)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行方式的錯(cuò)誤理解。

Consider the immediate effects of Mr Trump’s victory. The Mexican peso has depreciated about 10 per cent relative to the dollar over fears of new protectionist policies, and many other emerging market currencies have also fallen sharply. The impact of this change is to raise the cost of anything the US exports to Mexico and to lower the cost of anything Mexico exports to the US.

考慮一下特朗普獲勝后的直接影響。由于市場(chǎng)擔(dān)心美國會(huì)出臺(tái)新的保護(hù)主義政策，墨西哥比索兌美元匯率下跌約10%，很多其他新興市場(chǎng)貨幣也急劇下跌。這一變化的影響是增加了美國向墨西哥出口任何東西的成本、而降低了墨西哥向美國出口任何東西的成本。

It will also make Mexico and other emerging markets much cheaper relative to the US for global companies. So US workers, particularly in manufacturing, will see increased pressure.

對(duì)于全球企業(yè)而言，這還將使墨西哥和其他新興市場(chǎng)相對(duì)美國的成本更加低廉。因此美國的工人(特別是制造業(yè)工人)，將承受更大壓力。

The plan seems to assume that we can pressure countries not to let their currencies depreciate, as suggested by the intention to have the new treasury secretary name China as an exchange rate manipulator. This is ludicrous. While there are reasonable arguments that China manipulated its exchange rate for commercial advantage in the past, the reality is that for the past year the country has intervened to prop up its exchange rate. The same is true of most emerging markets. Not even US presidents with political mandates can repeal the laws of economics.

該計(jì)劃似乎假定我們可以迫使他國不讓其貨幣貶值，正如特朗普讓新財(cái)長把中國定為匯率操縱國的打算所顯示的那樣。這是荒唐的。盡管有合理證據(jù)表明中國過去曾為了貿(mào)易利益而操縱匯率，但是事實(shí)是中國過去一年一直通過干預(yù)支撐人民幣匯率。大多數(shù)新興市場(chǎng)也是一樣。即便是擁有政治授權(quán)的美國總統(tǒng)也不能推翻經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)律。

Populist economics will play out differently in the US than in emerging markets. But the results will be no better. All with a stake in the global economy must hope that now, as has happened often in the past, a US president faced with the responsibility of governing preserves the valid core of campaign economic plans while making major adjustments.

在美國實(shí)施民粹主義經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)劃的過程將不同于在新興市場(chǎng)實(shí)施同類計(jì)劃的過程。但是結(jié)果會(huì)一樣糟糕。如今，所有參與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的國家肯定都期望，正如過去通常的情況一樣，面對(duì)治理責(zé)任的美國總統(tǒng)可以在保留競(jìng)選經(jīng)濟(jì)綱領(lǐng)中站得住腳的核心要素的同時(shí)，對(duì)該綱領(lǐng)做出重大調(diào)整。

The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

本文作者為哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard University)查爾斯•W•艾略特大學(xué)教授(Charles W. Eliot university professor)、曾擔(dān)任美國財(cái)政部長