董事會應該如何牽制維權(quán)投資者

The hottest topic in many corporate boardroomstoday is shareholder activism — or more specifically,the vulnerability of becoming the target of ashareholder activist and what to do about it. Insteadof dreading this or, worse, have to defend againstit, boards of directors should be proactive aboutgetting out ahead of it. As insiders, we are in abetter position to act on our fiduciary responsibilityto represent the interests of shareholders than is anindependent party, and we have more tools andpower at our disposal to do so. Done right, thismight result in some healthy, but managed changes.

如今，在許多公司的董事會議室里，最熱門的話題是股東維權(quán)行動，更確切的說，是被維權(quán)股東盯上的可能性以及應對之策。董事會不應對此諱疾忌醫(yī)，甚至拖到不得不奮力反抗，而是應當在問題出現(xiàn)前就主動出擊。與獨立當事人相比，我們作為董事會成員，處于更有利的地位，能更好地履行我們的受托責任，代表股東利益，而且我們掌握著許多工具和權(quán)力，來幫助我們做到這一點。若處理得當，這可能會帶來一些控制得當?shù)挠幸孀兓?/p>

 

 

The influence the activists are having in the market has never been greater. Simply put, whatthey are doing is attracting more interest and more capital, now estimated at north of $115billion, 10 times the levels of the 1990’s. Distributing their messages has also become easier.They often communicate via social media and business news channels to emotionallypressure management and collaborate with other shareholders.

如今，維權(quán)投資者的市場影響力之大，可謂前所未見。簡言之，他們?nèi)缃袷艿降年P(guān)注更多，吸引的資金也更多，目前估計已經(jīng)突破1150億美元，是20世紀90年代的10倍。維權(quán)投資者“傳經(jīng)布道”也變得更加容易。他們經(jīng)常通過社交媒體和商業(yè)新聞頻道發(fā)表看法，借此向公司管理層施壓，并與其他股東聯(lián)合起來。

So what is a board of directors to do? Boards are empowered to protect shareholders, butmany shareholders have become sympathetic to activists because they believe the system hasinherent conflicts of interest; that directors are more interested in collecting paychecks andpreserving their status quo than in exercising their fiduciary duty to shareholders.

那董事會應該怎么做?董事會被授權(quán)保護股東，但許多股東認為，現(xiàn)行體制存在內(nèi)在利益沖突，而董事們更熱衷于從公司領(lǐng)薪水、維持自身現(xiàn)狀，而非履行對股東的信托責任，股東們因此對維權(quán)投資者持贊同態(tài)度。

Conversely, the board’s time horizon for creating value is by definition much longer than thatof any one activist, and many boards and management teams feel activists are too short-termand just don’t get the complexities of the landscape in which they operate. Operating realitiesinclude balancing the interests of customers, suppliers, employees, and regulators.Implementing well-managed changes, while navigating these factors, often takes longer thaninvestors may realize.

相反，董事會的價值創(chuàng)造投資期比任何維權(quán)投資者的都要長得多，許多董事會和管理團隊感到，維權(quán)投資者過于注重短期收益，根本不了解企業(yè)經(jīng)營領(lǐng)域的復雜性。經(jīng)營企業(yè)需要平衡客戶、供應商、員工和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的利益。在兼顧上述因素的同時，引進管理得當?shù)母淖儯枰臅r間，往往比投資者想的要長。

But there are many things public company boards can do to better align with their coreresponsibility to the stockholders—and they can do it in a way that is proactive and more long-term in nature than if it is in response to an activist.

不過，在更好地履行對股東的核心責任方面，上市公司董事會確實大有可為。而且，與應對維權(quán)投資者不同的是，董事會可以事前采取行動，并立足長遠。

Here are three ideas, which are meant to be directional rather than prescriptive.

以下是筆者在此方面的三個想法，旨在拋磚引玉，并不要求一一照做。

Let shareholders air it out.

讓股東暢所欲言

Most boards only receive input from reading reports by sell-side analysts, who are not theirshareholders, and from the CEO and CFO, who directly talk to institutional shareholders.Imagine, as an executive, never meeting with your boss to get feedback, but instead receivingit filtered from someone on your staff. That’s essentially what happens for many boards.

大多數(shù)董事會對企業(yè)的了解，來自于閱讀由賣方分析師撰寫的報告，以及由企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官和首席財務(wù)官提供的信息。其中，賣方分析師并非企業(yè)股東，而企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官和首席財務(wù)官則直接與機構(gòu)股東對話。試想，作為一名管理者，怎能從不與自己老板碰面以獲取其反饋，而是聽信自己員工的一面之詞?然而，在許多董事會，現(xiàn)狀都是如此。

The shareholders are ultimately the “boss” of the board in the sense that the board serves astheir proxy for enhancing intrinsic value. Yet boards typically hear about shareholder concernsindirectly and often not attributed to any specific shareholder.

股東是董事會的“老板”，董事會是幫助股東增進企業(yè)內(nèi)在價值的代理人。然而，董事會通常只能間接獲悉股東看法，而且往往很難聽到單個股東的看法。

A huge opportunity is missed without direct contact. This is exactly the opportunity theactivists are availing themselves of by contacting blocks of shareholders to exchange views onunderperforming companies and collaborating on remedies.

就這樣，與股東直接接觸的大好機會被白白浪費。而維權(quán)投資者正是抓住了這一機會，與大批股東進行接觸，交換對業(yè)績不佳的公司的看法，并共同尋求補救之法。

Boards should do the same. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this. For example,Coca-Cola Co. Director Maria Elena Lagomasino, Chair of the Compensation Committee, metdirectly with one large shareholder and also considered specific feedback derived from majorinstitutional shareholders of Coke on the issue of executive compensation. This input led tothe revised approach to equity compensation, communicated by her directly withshareholders through the company’s website.

董事會也應該這樣做。要做到這一點，可以通過多種方式。舉例來說，可口可樂公司(Coca-Cola Co.)董事、薪酬委員會主席瑪麗亞o埃萊娜o拉格馬西諾，曾就高管薪酬問題與一位大股東直接會面，并考慮可口可樂主要機構(gòu)股東對該問題的具體反饋?？煽诳蓸犯鶕?jù)獲得的反饋信息，對股權(quán)薪酬進行了調(diào)整。拉格馬西諾通過公司網(wǎng)站，直接與股東就該調(diào)整進行了溝通。

This could even become part of a regular process. For example, a designated board membercould invite large shareholders to periodic get togethers to air their thoughts and concerns.This feedback could either be summarized for the board by that board member or delivereddirectly by a representative from the group at a board gathering.

這甚至可能會成為常規(guī)做法。例如，可以指定一名董事，邀請大股東們參加定期聚會，暢談自身想法和顧慮。股東們的反饋，可以由該董事向董事會簡要概述，也可以由一名股東代表直接在董事會上進行陳述。

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is even more ambitious. It hosts more than 30,000 shareholders inOmaha annually and allows them more than six hours to ask unfiltered questions. Recently,Chairman and CEO Warren Buffett offered some sage advice on the subject. “I believe inrunning the company for shareholders that are going to stay, rather than the ones that aregoing to leave.”

在這方面，伯克希爾哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway Inc.)走得更遠。該公司每年邀請3萬多名股東齊聚奧馬哈，股東們有6個多小時可以隨意提問。關(guān)于這一點，伯克希爾哈撒韋董事長兼首席執(zhí)行官沃倫o巴菲特最近給出了一條明智的建議。“我經(jīng)營公司，是為了那些準備長期持有的股東，而不是那些準備短線操作的股東。”

If a designated director or a designated third party representing the board were to reach outto shareholders from time to time, both sides would learn and benefit. It would allow keydirectors to educate shareholders, as well as build credibility and a relationship beforeproblems arise. In addition, shareholders can add insight to the board, because they oftenspeak with competitors, customers, and suppliers of the company and can bring an “outside in”perspective that can be hugely valuable.

如果指定一名董事或第三方來代表董事會，時常與股東接觸，董事會和股東都將從中受益。關(guān)鍵董事將有機會對股東進行教育，并在問題出現(xiàn)前樹立信譽、建立關(guān)系。此外，股東可以同董事會分享自己的獨到見解。股東往往與企業(yè)的競爭對手、客戶以及供應商有接觸，因而能提供“由外及內(nèi)”的獨特視角，這可能對企業(yè)極具價值。

Limit terms, but don’t install terms limits.

限制任期年限，但不限制任期屆數(shù)。

This means setting up a mechanism for both attracting new directors with some of the skillsets of long-term shareholders, as well as a mechanism for rotation off the board to createroom for new thinking, more diversity, and women.

這意味著建立相應機制，吸引具有部分技能組合的長期股東成為新董事，同時確立董事解聘機制，以便催生新思維、促進多元化、增加女性董事數(shù)量。

For removing directors, the solution that activists primarily advocate is a hard term-limit. Asan alternative, many companies instead opt for a retirement age. I am not a fan of either. Whycreate a system that force out good board members?

對于解聘董事，維權(quán)投資者往往主張實行嚴格的任期限制。作為替代方案，許多公司通常是對董事設(shè)定退休年齡。我對這兩種方案都不太贊同。為何要建立一個機制，迫使那些出色的董事讓位?

Then again, most boards have at least one or maybe a few directors who are not adding asmuch value as a new member might bring and therefore represent an “opportunity cost.” Oncedirectors are on a board, it can be extremely difficult to naturally rotate them off. Firing afriend is tough under the best conditions, and even more so because there is no economicincentive.

話又說回來，大多數(shù)董事會至少都有那么一位甚或好幾位董事，創(chuàng)造的價值小于引入新董事可能帶來的價值，導致了“機會成本”。一旦某人進入公司董事會，要想將其解聘決非易事，正所謂請神容易送神難。即便天時地利，炒朋友的魷魚都很難，在沒有經(jīng)濟激勵的情況下，更是難上加難。

It’s emotionally easier just to “wait it out.” This is even more complicated when a CEO inheritsa board that was picked and groomed by her predecessor and doesn’t have the collectiveskills for her new strategy.

感情上，更容易的做法是“干等著”。而且，當首席執(zhí)行官面對的董事會，成員全都是由前任首席執(zhí)行官挑選并推薦，其技能組合不能滿足企業(yè)新戰(zhàn)略的需求時，事態(tài)將更加復雜。

My view is that boards would be well served to adopt a process that specifically outlines therotation process and that is understood and implemented for new directors. In other words,limited terms, but not unified term-limits. By making this change for all new directors, it side-steps the issue of those already on the board, making it easier to implement on a go forwardbasis.

我認為，董事會應確立相應程序，明確規(guī)定新董事輪換機制，并確保該規(guī)定得到理解和執(zhí)行。換言之，限制任期年限，但對任期屆數(shù)不做統(tǒng)一限制。僅對新任董事適用上述改變，能有效規(guī)避來自于現(xiàn)任董事的阻力，從而使新規(guī)更易推行。

I lean toward a system in which each new member of the board agrees to hand in theirresignation every six to eight years, with the idea being that some directors will be asked toserve multiple terms it they are uniquely qualified to help the CEO and company build value,but many will be thanked for their service and move on after that time frame.

我傾向于這樣一個體系：每位新任董事都同意，每六至八年遞交一次辭呈。如果有些董事在幫助首席執(zhí)行官和企業(yè)創(chuàng)造價值方面，能發(fā)揮無可替代的作用，會被請求連任。至于那些沒有突出作用的董事，將在企業(yè)對他們此前的服務(wù)表示感謝后，就此離開董事會。

The decision regarding whose resignations to keep, or whose to accept, could be made eitherby an appointed director, or by an absolutely confidential and binding majority vote of theother board members. This latter approach might be easier socially.

是否接受某位董事的辭呈，可由一位指定的董事，或其余董事絕對保密且具有約束力的多數(shù)票來決定。后一種做法可能更易實行。

Think like an activist.

像維權(quán)投資者那樣思考。

Directors must insist on asking management to analyze strategic choices as an activist would:by looking at alternatives to the strategies the CEO is recommending. This is not typical. Themore common pattern is for the CEO to consider options and present only the recommendedone to the board.

董事們必須堅決要求企業(yè)管理層像維權(quán)投資者一樣分析戰(zhàn)略選擇：審視在首席執(zhí)行官推薦的戰(zhàn)略之外，有何替代方案。這種做法十分罕見。通常的做法是，首席執(zhí)行官在權(quán)衡各種戰(zhàn)略后，僅向董事會介紹自己認為最好的戰(zhàn)略。

The road not taken is the one the activist will surface so the board must have analyzed thesealternatives. This means understanding what it would mean to get out of underperformingoperations, split up the company and evaluate varying alternatives for measuring and handlingexcess cash versus the ones being recommended. If these choices are not discussed, theboard will be poorly prepared to articulate and defend its alternative course.

維權(quán)投資者主張的，必然是企業(yè)未采用的戰(zhàn)略。因此，董事會必須提前分析所有替代方案。這意味著弄清與首席執(zhí)行官推薦的戰(zhàn)略相比，放棄業(yè)績不佳的公司、分拆企業(yè)、評估測量和處理過剩現(xiàn)金的各種替代方案意味著什么。如果董事會沒有討論上述選擇，將在闡明和捍衛(wèi)自身戰(zhàn)略方面準備不足。

Importantly, an analysis of the break-up or private transaction value of a company that showsa higher value than where the stock is trading does not oblige a company to make a sale.There have been many times in history where macro-economic or other conditions have madethe current stock market and private transaction values poor indicators of intrinsic value.The board’s duty is to enhance the latter, exercising its duty of care, by fully understandingwhat strategic choices the company is making and why.

重要的是，分析顯示某企業(yè)的拆分或私人交易價值大于其股票市值，并不表示企業(yè)必須出售。歷史上，由于宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境或其他條件，導致當前股市和私人交易價值偏離企業(yè)內(nèi)在價值的例子并不鮮見。董事會的職責，是提升企業(yè)內(nèi)在價值，行使審慎職責，充分理解企業(yè)做出的戰(zhàn)略決策，以及做出決策的理由。

By proactively using their power to align with long-term shareholder value creation, boards canhelp companies avoid the disruption that a shorter-term activist agenda will bring.

通過主動利用手中權(quán)力，積極配合創(chuàng)造長期股東價值，董事會可以幫助企業(yè)避免維權(quán)投資者的短期議程將帶來的混亂。