俄經(jīng)濟如今已經(jīng)得救還是死緩

Russia just saved its currency and its banks–or,more precisely, gave them a stay of execution.

俄羅斯剛剛挽救了該國貨幣和銀行業(yè)，或者更準確地說，使其得以茍延殘喘。

No, it didn’t throw a hatful of hard currency at them.No, it didn’t say it would inject more capital intothem (at least not till next year). What it did was tosuspend (or, for the cynics, abandon) pretty muchall the prudential standards that define whether ornot they’re solvent. In layman’s terms, it’s lettingthem pretend–for an unspecified period of time–thatthey’ll be repaid by the companies that have their money.

俄羅斯既沒有向銀行系統(tǒng)投入大量硬通貨，也沒有許諾會注入更多資金(至少在明年之前不會)，它所做的，只是放松了(在憤世嫉俗者看來，是放棄了)大部分用于判定是否具有償付能力的審慎標準。通俗點說，就是讓銀行無限期的假裝它們將收到借款公司的還款。

Before we go any further, a lot of very respectable opinion says that relaxing prudentialstandards is exactly what you should do at a time of crisis, to stop the risks in a weak bankingsystem from crystallizing all at once, and making things worse than they need to be. The casefor doing so is all the stronger when you have good reason to think the crisis is likely to beshort-lived, and that all you have is a liquidity crisis, rather than a solvency one. It’s anargument that the U.S. and Europe have been thrashing out ever since 2008.

在我們繼續(xù)深入討論之前，很多非常受人尊敬的觀點表示，放寬審慎標準恰恰是危機時期所應采取的行動，這可以避免風險在脆弱的銀行體系內(nèi)驟然凸顯，從而使得情勢不必要的惡化。當你有理由相信危機可能只是暫時的，你所面對的只不過是流動性危機，而非償付危機時，就更有理由這么做。這是美國和歐洲自2008年以來反復討論得出的結(jié)論。

Russia thinks its crisis will be temporary, because it’s caused by an oil market that is currentlyovershooting in reaction to a supply shock and will, in time, return to a price level closer to thelong-term average, one which will allow the economy to carry on as normal (albeit with a bit ofbelt-tightening). Hence the current liquidity squeeze on banks from panicked customers isjust something that has to be ridden out. It’ll all be alright in the end.

俄羅斯認為，其危機只是暫時的，是由于石油市場面對供給沖擊反應過度所造成的，而油價終究會回歸長期均衡的水平，使得俄羅斯經(jīng)濟得以恢復正常(雖然需要稍微緊縮開支)。因此，當前因客戶恐慌造成的銀行流動性短缺必須被克服，最終一切將安然無恙。

In this spirit, banks will no longer have to mark their bond portfolios to market prices. They canpretend their holdings are worth 100 cents on the dollar, rather than the 20 cents they’d get ifforced to liquidate today. They’ll be able to book foreign currency loans at exchange ratesthat are three months out of date. Both measures reduce the amount of (ruble-denominated)capital that they have to hold to meet legal norms.

本著這種精神，俄羅斯銀行再也不用按市場價格對其債券投資組合進行計價。它們可以假裝自己所持有的頭寸一美元仍然價值100美分，盡管事實上，如果現(xiàn)在它們被迫清償，其持有的頭寸一美元僅能作價20美分。銀行還能夠按照三個月前的匯率記錄外幣貸款。這兩項措施降低了銀行為滿足法定標準必須持有的(盧布標價)資金額。

It gets better. You can now transfer all of your foreign currency-denominated credit risk to theCentral Bank, which will now accept FX claims on companies as collateral for loans in dollars. Inother words, let the CBR worry about getting the money out of a Cyprus-based tradingaffiliate in the bankruptcy proceedings if the worst comes to the worst. Strictly speaking, thecredit risk is not directly transferred as it would be under an outright sale, but the effect ismuch the same: you get the cash today, and we’ll worry about the loan quality another day.

更棒的是，現(xiàn)在你還可以將所有外幣標價的信用風險轉(zhuǎn)嫁給俄羅斯中央銀行，央行現(xiàn)在將接受外匯債券作為企業(yè)美元貸款的抵押。換言之，如果情況糟糕到極點，怎么從正在破產(chǎn)程序中的某塞浦路斯貿(mào)易分公司拿到錢這種事，就讓俄羅斯央行來擔心吧。嚴格來說，信用風險不能像賣斷那樣直接轉(zhuǎn)移，但影響卻大致相同：你先得到現(xiàn)金，日后我們再來擔心貸款質(zhì)量。

Banks will also be allowed to offer higher rates on deposits to encourage people to keep theirmoney in the system. That breaks with the previous logic that banned super-elevated depositrates because they’re normally the last resort of a bank that’s going under.

銀行也獲準提高存款利率，以鼓勵人們將資金留在銀行系統(tǒng)。這打破了之前的邏輯，即禁止超高存款利率，因為其通常是即將破產(chǎn)的銀行壓箱底的最后一招。

But the pièce de résistance here is the very distillation of what debt crisis junkies call “Extendand Pretend.” Even if you have to restructure your loans, delaying repayment, changing theircurrency and cutting the interest rate, you still won’t have to change the risk-weighting yougive to that loan (so you still won’t have to hold more capital against it).

但是，這里的重點是債務危機迷們所說的“貸款延期、假裝沒事”(Extend and Pretend)的精髓。即使你不得不重組貸款、推遲還款、改變幣種并降低利率，你依然無需改變你給予此項貸款的風險權重(因此，你仍然無需為這些貸款預備更多資金)。

This gives state-backed companies (whose local-currency debts largely carry a zero risk-weighting under Basel III rules) carte blanche to default to domestic banks, because thelenders will be able to pretend nothing has happened (as regards holding capital against theloans). Loss recognition, be damned! President Vladimir Putin has often talked of his country’spivot to China – here it is in glorious action.

這使得俄羅斯國家支持的企業(yè)(按照巴塞爾協(xié)定III的規(guī)則，這些企業(yè)的本幣債務風險權重大都為零)能隨心所欲的對國內(nèi)銀行違約，因為(就針對貸款的準備金而言)，貸款機構(gòu)將能假裝什么事都沒有發(fā)生。

Another provision has much the same effect, suspending risk-weightings on loans tocompanies affected by sanctions. Heck, even if you do have to recognize a loss on a loan, theCBR will now give you two years, rather than one, to provision against it.

另一項規(guī)定的效果大致相同，暫停受制裁影響企業(yè)的風險權重。即使你不得不承認貸款發(fā)生損失，俄羅斯央行現(xiàn)在將給你兩年，而非一年的時間為貸款進行撥備。

As noted, this can all make a degree of sense on one basic assumption: the crisis istemporary, and your clients will actually stay in Russia and work out their problems honestly.

如上所述，這些都在一定程度上有道理，但必須基于一個基本假設，即危機是暫時的，而且你的客戶都將留在俄羅斯，真正解決他們的問題。