報(bào)告：中國(guó)關(guān)注北極冰層融化戰(zhàn)略意義

China has started paying attention to the strategic implications of the melting of Arctic ice and could seek a more active role in regulating use of the region, a new report said yesterday.

昨日一份新公布的報(bào)告顯示，中國(guó)已開(kāi)始關(guān)注北極冰層融化的戰(zhàn)略意義，并可能在監(jiān)管對(duì)該地區(qū)的利用方面尋求發(fā)揮更積極作用。

The findings of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's paper indicate that the Arctic could emerge as another area in which China starts defining global strategic interests, following investments in Africa and moves to build a presence in the Indian Ocean.

斯德哥爾摩國(guó)際和平研究所(SIPRI)這份報(bào)告的研究結(jié)果顯示，北極地區(qū)可能成為中國(guó)著手界定自己全球戰(zhàn)略利益的另一塊區(qū)域——在這之前，中國(guó)已在非洲進(jìn)行了投資，并采取行動(dòng)在印度洋確立自己的存在。

SIPRI said the prospect of the Arctic being navigable during summer months had driven Beijing to allocate more funds for polar research, and scholars were pushing the government to develop an Arctic strategy.

SIPRI表示，北極地區(qū)夏季期間可通航的前景，已促使北京方面為極地研究撥出更多資金，學(xué)術(shù)界人士也在敦促政府制定北極戰(zhàn)略。

“Because China's economy is reliant on foreign trade, there are substantial commercial implications if shipping routes are shortened during the summer months each year,” the report said. Taking the Northern route through an ice-free Arctic could cut the trip from Shanghai to Hamburg by 6,400km compared with the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal and piracy-induced high insurance costs could be avoided.

該報(bào)告稱(chēng)：“鑒于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)外貿(mào)的依賴(lài)，如果航線在每年夏季的幾個(gè)月里能夠縮短，那對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)將具有重大商業(yè)意義。”從上海到漢堡的航程，若取道北線穿過(guò)無(wú)冰的北極地區(qū)，將比途徑馬六甲海峽和蘇伊士運(yùn)河縮短6400公里，還可省卻為防范海盜而支付的高昂保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)用。

A potential strategic interest of China could be in the extraction of natural resources of the Arctic, the report said.

報(bào)告表示，中國(guó)的潛在戰(zhàn)略利益之一，可能在于開(kāi)采北極地區(qū)的自然資源。

Linda Jakobson, author of the report, said although China had a strong polar research programme, Beijing had yet to research the economic and security implications of an ice-free Arctic as it was “wary that active overtures would cause alarm in other countries due to China's size and status as a rising global power”.

報(bào)告作者琳達(dá)•雅各布森(Linda Jakobson)表示，雖然中國(guó)有著強(qiáng)大的極地研究計(jì)劃，但北京方面尚未研究無(wú)冰北極的經(jīng)濟(jì)和安全意義，因?yàn)樗?ldquo;擔(dān)心采取積極姿態(tài)會(huì)引起其它國(guó)家的警覺(jué)，這是由中國(guó)的規(guī)模和其作為新興全球大國(guó)的地位所致”。

But a small group of vocal scholars have started looking at the Arctic from a political perspective, identifying threats and opportunities for China in the region. “China is particularly wary of Russia and whether it might demand high passage fees which could erase some or most of the potential efficiency gains,” Ms Jakobson told the FT. Geographic and political factors made the strategic situation in the Arctic “much more complicated” than the Antarctic.

但一小批敢言的學(xué)者已開(kāi)始從政治視角審視北極，識(shí)別中國(guó)在該地區(qū)面臨的威脅和機(jī)遇。雅各布森向英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》表示：“中國(guó)尤其警惕俄羅斯的態(tài)度，以及俄羅斯是否會(huì)收取高昂的北極通行費(fèi)，抹掉部分甚至大部分潛在的效率增益。”地理和政治因素使得北極地區(qū)的戰(zhàn)略形勢(shì)較南極地區(qū)要“復(fù)雜得多”。

In spite of the low-key official attitude, Ms Jakobson believes that Beijing has an agenda in the Arctic, including the adjustment of international laws such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to the new situation and the hope for permanent observership in the Arctic Council, a regional governmental body.

盡管中國(guó)官方采取了低調(diào)姿態(tài)，但雅各布森相信，北京方面擁有自己的北極議程，包括修訂相關(guān)的國(guó)際法以適應(yīng)新的形勢(shì)，例如《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)；并希望在區(qū)域性的政府間機(jī)構(gòu)北極理事會(huì)(Arctic Council)獲得永久觀察員身份。

譯者/汪洋