LUV達沃斯

Here are further glimpses of the Davos kaleidoscope.

以下是達沃斯萬花筒的另外幾個景象。

First, my friend Moises Naim, editor of Foreign Policy, gave me a new acronym on the global recovery. It is LUV. The L is for the L-shaped recovery of the European economies. The U is for the U-shaped recovery of the US economy. The V is for the shape of the recovery of big emerging economies.

首先，我的朋友、《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)雜志主編莫塞斯·奈姆(Moises Naim)告訴了我一個有關全球復蘇的新縮略語：LUV。L代表歐洲各經(jīng)濟體的L型復蘇，U代表美國經(jīng)濟的U型復蘇，而V代表大型新興經(jīng)濟體的復蘇形態(tài)。

This looks depressingly right to me. In particular, the eurozone seems to have decided on an adjustment to its huge internal imbalances that is loaded entirely on the weak countries of the periphery. But the periphery cannot adjust if the core - namely, Germany - does not adjust too, by expanding demand. Neither the ECB nor the German government seems to understand this simple point, though one coalition partner - the FDP - does seem to do so.

在我看來，這種表述既正確，又令人郁悶。尤其是，歐元區(qū)似乎決定對其巨大的內(nèi)部失衡進行調(diào)整，而調(diào)整負擔完全壓在周邊的虛弱國家上。但是，除非歐元區(qū)核心（即德國）擴張需求，從而也走上調(diào)整的道路，否則歐元區(qū)周邊是無法調(diào)整的。歐洲央行(ECB)和德國政府似乎都不理解這一簡單的道路，盡管德國執(zhí)政聯(lián)盟中的自由民主黨(FDP)似乎明白這一點。

Second, the global attempt at addressing imbalances - the “mutual assessment programme” being orchestrated by the International Monetary Fund - may well run into the sand this year. That would be a great pity.

其次，旨在解決失衡的全球層面努力——國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)策劃的“相互評估計劃”(mutual assessment programme)——今年很可能會不了了之。那將是一個很大的不幸。

What is needed is political commitment at a high level. The concern is that, with the crisis largely over, the will to take on difficult issues - exchange rates, for example - will disappear. It was easy for everybody to agree to expand spending and ease monetary policy last year. Now it all gets harder. It would be depressing if top politicians forgot how close the world economy came to disaster just over a year ago. But they may well do so, all the same.

目前需要的是高層的政治承諾。人們的擔心在于，隨著金融危機基本上告終，應對棘手問題（如匯率）的意志將會消失。去年，各國很容易同意擴大支出，放松貨幣政策?，F(xiàn)在，一切都會變得更加艱難。如果高層政界人士忘記世界經(jīng)濟僅在一年多以前是多么接近災難邊緣，那將是令人郁悶的。但這些人很可能還是會忘記。

Third, the relationship between the US and China is widely accepted as central. These behemoths look quite similar. Both can respond well to crisis, but neither seems able to deal with long-term structural weaknesses. China's failures centre on its over-reliance on investment and exports, the adverse shift in income distribution, away from households, and the extraordinarily low share of consumption in GDP. US failures are well-known, too: energy policy, for example. Welcome to the policy gridlock of Chimerica.

第三，人們普遍承認，美國與中國的關系處于中心地位。這兩個龐然大物看上去頗為相似。兩國面對危機都能作出很好的反應，但似乎都不能應對長遠的結構弱點。中國的失敗之處主要在于過度依賴投資和出口、不利于家庭的收入分配轉移，以及消費占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比重異常之低。美國的失敗之處也是人們所熟知的，能源政策就是一例。歡迎來到“中美國”(Chimerica)的政策僵局。

Fourth, I am increasingly concerned that stimulus - especially fiscal stimulus - will be withdrawn too soon. We must remember that the developed countries still have enormous slack in their economties. It is not clear that a withdrawal of fiscal stimulus would - or even could - be adequately offset by monetary policy.

第四，我越來越擔心刺激措施（尤其是財政刺激措施）可能撤銷得過早。我們必須記住，發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體內(nèi)部仍存在嚴重的不景氣。目前尚不清楚，財政刺激撤銷后，貨幣政策是否將（或者說能夠）充分彌補缺口。

Finally, I am listening to Lawrence Summers as I write. He has emphasised that we cannot maintain global integration if it is seen as a source of domestic disintegration. This tension - that between the global economy and domestic politics - is a central challenge of our time. It affects everything we try to do.

最后，我著筆之際正在聽白宮經(jīng)濟顧問勞倫斯·薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)發(fā)表講話。他強調(diào)指出，如果全球一體化被視為國內(nèi)解體的源頭，我們就不能保持全球一體化進程。全球經(jīng)濟與國內(nèi)政治之間的這種緊張態(tài)勢，是我們這個時代的中心挑戰(zhàn)。它影響著我們要做的每一件事。

本文為作者為FT.com撰寫的博客。

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