ONE day Jim Barnes,who not only was one of my principal brokers but an intimate friend as well,called on me.He said he wanted me to do him a great favour.He never before had talked that way,and so I asked him to tell me what the favour was,hoping it was something I could do,for I certainly wished to oblige him.He then told me that his firm was interested in a certain stock;in fact,they had been the principal promoters of the company and had placed the greater part of the stock.Circumstances had arisen that made it imperative for them to market a rather large block.Jim wanted me to undertake to do the marketing for him.The stock was Consolidated Stove.
I did not wish to have anything to do with it for various reasons.But Barnes,to whom I was under some obligations,insisted on the personal-favour phase of the matter,which alone could overcome my objections.He was a good fellow,a friend,and his firm,I gathered,was pretty heavily involved,so in the end I consented to do what I could.
It has always seemed to me that the most picturesque point of difference between the war boom and other booms was the part that was played by a type new in stock-market affairs—the boy banker.
The boom was stupendous and its origins and causes were plainly to be grasped by all.But at the same time the greatest banks and trust companies in the country certainly did all they could to help make millionaires overnight of all sorts and conditions of promoters and munition makers.It got so that all a man had to do was to say that he had a friend who was a friend of a member of one of the Allied commissions and he would be offered all the capital needed to carry out the contracts he had not yet secured.I used to hear incredible stories of clerks becoming presidents of companies doing a business of millions of dollars on money borrowed from trusting trust companies,and of contracts that left a trail of profits as they passed from man to man.A flood of gold was pouring into this country from Europe and the banks had to find ways of impounding it.
The way business was done might have been regarded with misgivings by the old,but there didn't seem to be so many of them about.The fashion for gray-haired presidents of banks was all very well in tranquil times,but youth was the chief qualification in these strenuous times.The banks certainly did make enormous profits.
Jim Barnes and his associates,enjoying the friendship and confidence of the youthful president of the Marshall National Bank,decided to consolidate three well-known stove compames and sell the stock of the new company to the public that for months had been buying any old thing in the way of engraved stock certificates.
One trouble was that the stove business was so prosperous that all three companies were actually earning dividends on their common stock for the first time in their history.Their principal stockholders did not wish to part with the control.There was a good market for their stocks on the Curb;and they had sold as much as they cared to part with and they were content with things as they were.Their individual capitalisation was too small to justify big market movements,and that is where Jim Barnes' firm came in.It pointed out that the consolidated company must be big enough to list on the Stock Exchange,where the new shares could be made more valuable than the old ones.It is an old device in Wall Street—to change the colour of the certificates in order to make them more valuable.Say a stock ceases to be easily vendible at par.Well,sometimes by quadrupling the stock you may make the new shares sell at 30 or 35.This is equivalent to 120 or 140 for the old stock—a figure it never could have reached.
It seems that Barnes and his associates succeeded in inducing some of their friends who held speculatively some blocks of Gray Stove Company—a large concern—to come into the consolidation on the basis of four shares of Consolidated for each share of Gray.Then the Midland and the Western followed their big sister and came in on the basis of share for share.Theirs had been quoted on the Curb at around 25 to 30,and the Gray,which was better known and paid dividends,hung around 125.
In order to raise the money to buy out those holders who insisted upon selling for cash,and also to provide additional working capital for improvements and promotion expenses,it became necessary to raise a few millions.So Barnes saw the president of his bank,who kindly lent his syndicate three million five hundred thousand dollars.The collateral was one hundred thousand shares of the newly organised corporation.The syndicate assured the president,or so I was told,that the price would not go below 50.It would be a very profitable deal as there was big value there.
The promoters' first mistake was in the matter of timeliness.The saturation point for new stock issues had been reached by the market,and they should have seen it.But even then they might have made a fair profit after all if they had not tried to duplicate the unreasonable killings which other promoters had made at the very height of the boom.
Now you must not run away with the notion that Jim Barnes and his associates were fools or inexperienced kids.They were shrewd men.All of them were familiar with Wall Street methods and some of them were exceptionally successful stock traders.But they did rather more than merely overestimate the public's buying capacity.After all,that capacity was something that they could determine only by actual tests.Where they erred more expensively was in expecting the bull market to last longer than it did.I suppose the reason was that these same men had met with such great and particularly with such quick success that they didn't doubt they'd be all through with the deal before the bull market turned.They were all well known and had a considerable following among the professional traders and the wire houses.
The deal was extremely well advertised.The newspapers certainly were generous with their space.The older concerns were identified with the stove industry of America and their product was known the world over.It was a patriotic amalgamation and there was a heap of literature in the daily papers about the world conquests.The markets of Asia,Africa and South America were as good as cinched.
The directors of the company were all men whose names were familiar to all readers of the financial pages.The publicity work was so well handled and the promises of unnamed insiders as to what the price was going to do were so definite and convincing that a great demand for the new stock was created.The result was that when the books were closed it was found that the stock which was offered to the public at fifty dollars a share had been oversubscribed by 25 per cent.
Think of it!The best the promoters should have expected was to succeed in selling the new stock at that price after weeks of work and after putting up the price to 75 or higher in order to average 50.At that,it meant an advance of about 100 per cent in the old prices of the stocks of the constituent companies.That was the crisis and they did not meet it as it should have been met.It shows you that every business has its own needs.General wisdom is less valuable than specific savvy.The promoters,delighted by the unexpected oversubscription,concluded that the public was ready to pay any price for any quantity of that stock.And they actually were stupid enough to underallot the stock.After the promoters made up their minds to be hoggish they should have tried to be intelligently hoggish.
What they should have done,of course,was to allot the stock in full.That would have made them short to the extent of 25 per cent of the total amount offered for subscription to the public,and that,of course,would have enabled them to support the stock when necessary and at no cost to themselves.Without any effort on their part they would have been in the strong strategic position that I always try to find myself in when I am manipulating a stock.They could have kept the price from sagging,thereby inspiring confidence in the new stock's price stability and in the underwriting syndicate back of it.They should have remembered that their work was not over when they sold the stock offered to the public.That was only a part of what they had to market.
They thought they had been very successful,but it was not long before the consequences of their two capital blunders became apparent.The public did not buy any more of the new stock,because the entire market developed reactionary tendencies.The insiders got cold feet and did not support Consolidated Stove;and if insiders don't buy their own stock on recessions,who should?The absence of inside support is generally accepted as a pretty good bear tip.
There is no need to go into statistical details.The price of Consolidated Stove fluctuated with the rest of the market,but it never went above the initial market quotations,which were only a fraction above 50.Barnes and his friends in the end had to come in as buyers in order to keep it above 40.Not to have supported that stock at the outset of its market career was regrettable.But not to have sold all the stock the public subscribed for was much worse.
At all events,the stock was duly listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the price of it duly kept sagging until it nominally stood at 37.And it stood there because Jim Barnes and his associates had to keep it there because their bank had loaned them thirty-five dollars a share on one hundred thousand shares.If the bank ever tried to liquidate that loan there was no telling what the price would break to.The public that had been eager to buy it at 50,now didn't care for it at 37,and probably wouldn't want it at 27.
As time went on the banks' excesses in the matter of extensions of credits made people think.The day of the boy banker was over.The banking business appeared to be on the ragged edge of suddenly relapsing into conservatism.Intimate friends were now asked to pay off loans,for all the world as though they had never played golf with the president.
There was no need to threaten on the lender's part or to plead for more time on the borrower's.The situation was highly uncomfortable for both.The bank,for example,with which my friend Jim Barnes did business,was still kindly disposed.But it was a case of“For heaven's sake take up that loan or we'll all be in a dickens of a mess!”
The character of the mess and its explosive possibilities were enough to make Jim Barnes come to me to ask me to sell the one hundred thousand shares for enough to pay off the bank's three-million-five-hundred-thousand-dollar loan.Jim did not now expect to make a profit on that stock.If the syndicate only made a small loss on it they would be more than grateful.
It seemed a hopeless task.The general market was neither active nor strong,though at times there were rallies,when everybody perked up and tried to believe the bull swing was about to resume.
The answer I gave Barnes was that I'd look into the matter and let him know under what conditions I'd undertake the work.Well,I did look into it.I didn't analyse the company's last annual report.My studies were confined to the stockmarket phases of the problem.I was not going to tout the stock for a rise on its earnings or its prospects,but to dispose of that block in the open market.All I considered was what should,could or might help or hinder me in that task.
I discovered for one thing that there was too much stock held by too few people—that is,too much for safety and far too much for comfort.Clifton P.Kane & Co.,bankers and brokers,members of the New York Stock Exchange,were carrying seventy thousand shares.They were intimate friends of Barnes and had been influential in effecting the consolidation,as they had made a specialty of stove stocks for years.Their customers had been let into the good thing.Ex-Senator Samuel Gordon,who was the special partner in his nephews' firm,Gordon Bros.,was the owner of a second block of seventy thousand shares;and the famous Joshua Wolff had sixty thousand shares.This made a total of two hundred thousand shares of Consolidated Stove held by this handful of veteran Wall Street professionals.They did not need any kind person to tell them when to sell their stock.If I did anything in the manipulating line calculated to bring in public buying—that is to say,if I made the stock strong and active—I could see Kane and Gordon and Wolff unloading,and not in homeopathic doses either.The vision of their two hundred thousand shares Niagaraing into the market was not exactly entrancing.Don't forget that the cream was off the bull movement and that no overwhelming demand was going to be manufactured by my operations,however skilfully conducted they might be.Jim Barnes had no illusions about the job he was modestly sidestepping in my favour.He had given me a waterlogged stock to sell on a bull market that was about to breathe its last.Of course there was no talk in the newspapers about the ending of the bull market,but I knew it,and Jim Barnes knew it,and you bet the bank knew it.
Still,I had given Jim my word,so I sent for Kane,Gordon and Wolff.Their two hundred thousand shares was the sword of Damocles.I thought I'd like to substitute a steel chain for the hair.The easiest way,it seemed to me,was by some sort of reciprocity agreement.If they helped me passively by holding off while I sold the bank's one hundred thousand shares,I would help them actively by trying to make a market for all of us to unload on.As things were,they couldn't sell one-tenth of their holdings without having Consolidated Stove break wide open,and they knew it so well that they had never dreamed of trying.All I asked of them was judgment in timing the selling and an intelligent unselfishness in order not to be unintelligently selfish.It never pays to be a dog in the manger in Wall Street or anywhere else.I desired to convince them that premature or ill-considered unloading would prevent complete unloading.Time urged.
I hoped my proposition would appeal to them because they were experienced Wall Street men and had no illusions about the actual demand for Consolidated Stove.Clifton P.Kane was the head of a prosperous commission house with branches in eleven cities and customers by the hundreds.His firm had acted as managers for more than one pool in the past.
Senator Gordon,who held seventy thousand shares,was an exceedingly wealthy man.His name was as familiar to the readers of the metropolitan press as though he had been sued for breach of promise by a sixteen-year-old manicurist possassing a five-thousand-dollar mink coat and one hundred and thirty-two letters from the defendant.He had started his nephews in business as brokers and he was a special partner in their firm.He had been in dozens of pools.He had inherited a large interest in the Midland Stove Company and he got one hundred thousand shares of Consolidated Stove for it.He had been carrying enough to disregard Jim Barnes' wild bull tips and had cashed in on thirty thousand shares before the market petered out on him.He told a friend later that he would have sold more only the other big holders,who were old and intimate friends,pleaded with him not to sell any more,and out of regard for them he stopped.Besides which,as I said,he had no market to unload on.
The third man was Joshua Wolff.He was probably the best known of all the traders.For twenty years everybody had known him as one of the plungers on the floor.In bidding up stocks or offering them down he had few equals,for ten or twenty thousand shares meant no more to him than two or three hundred.Before I came to New York I had heard of him as a plunger.He was then trailing with a sporting coterie that played a no limit game,whether on the race track or in the stock market.
They used to accuse him of being nothing but a gambler,but he had real ability and a strongly developed aptitude for the speculative game.At the same time his reputed indifference to highbrow pursuits made him the hero of numberless anecdotes.One of the most widely circulated of the yarns was that Joshua was a guest at what he called a swell dinner and by some oversight of the hostess several of the other guests began to discuss literature before they could be stopped.
A girl who sat next to Josh and had not heard him use his mouth except for masticating purposes,turned to him and looking anxious to hear the great financier's opinion asked him,“Oh,Mr.Wolff,what do you think of Balzac?”
Josh politely ceased to masticate,swallowed and answered,“I never trade in them Curb stocks!”
Such were the three largest individual holders of Consolidated Stove.When they came over to see me I told them that if they formed a syndicate to put up some cash and gave me a call on their stock at a little above the market I would do what I could to make a market.They promptly asked me how much money would be required.
I answered,“You've had that stock a long time and you can't do a thing with it.Between the three of you you've got two hundred thousand shares,and you know very well that you haven't the slightest chance of getting rid of it unless you make a market for it.It's got to be some market to absorb what you've got to give it,and it will be wise to have enough cash to pay for whatever stock it may be necessary to buy at first.It's no use to begin and then have to stop because there isn't enough money.I suggest that you form a syndicate and raise six millions in cash.Then give the syndicate a call on your two hundred thousand shares at 40 and put all your stock in escrow.If everything goes well you chaps will get rid of your dead pet and the syndicate will make some money.”
As I told you before,there had been all sorts of rumours about my stock-market winnings.I suppose that helped,for nothing succeeds like success.At all events,I didn't have to do much explaining to these chaps.They knew exactly how far they'd get if they tried to play a lone hand.They thought mine was a good plan.When they went away they said they would form the syndicate at once.
They didn't have much trouble in inducing a lot of their friends to join them.I suppose they spoke with more assurance than I had of the syndicate's profits.From all I heard they really believed it,so theirs were no conscienceless tips.At all events the syndicate was formed in a couple of days.Kane,Gordon and Wolff gave calls on the two hundred thousand shares at 40 and I saw to it that the stock itself was put in escrow,so that none of it would come out on the market if I should put up the price.I had to protect myself.More than one promising deal has failed to pan out as expected because the members of the pool or clique failed to keep faith with one another.Dog has no foolish prejudices against eating dog in Wall Street.At the time the second American Steel and Wire Company was brought out the insiders accused one another of breach of faith and trying to unload.There had been a gentlemen's agreement between John W.Gates and his pals and the Seligmans and their banking associates.Well,I heard somebody in a broker's office reciting this quatrain,which was said to have been composed by John W.Gates:
The tarantula jumped on the centipede's back
And chortled with ghoulish glee:
“I'll poison this murderous son of a gun.
If I don't he'll poison me!”
Mind you,I do not mean for one moment to imply that any of my friends in Wall Street would even dream of double-crossing me in a stock deal.But on general principles it is just as well to provide for any and all contingencies.It's plain sense.
After Wolff and Kane and Gordon told me that they had formed their syndicate to put up six millions in cash there was nothing for me to do but wait for the money to come in.I had urged the vital need of haste.Nevertheless the money came in driblets.I think it took four or five installments.I don't know what the reason was,but I remember that I had to send out an S O S call to Wolff and Kane and Gordon.
That afternoon I got some big checks that brought the cash in my possession to about four million dollars and the promise of the rest in a day or two.It began at last to look as though the syndicate might do something before the bull market passed away.At best it would be no cinch,and the sooner I began work the better.The public had not been particularly keen about new market movements in inactive stocks.But a man could do a great deal to arouse interest in any stock with four millions in cash.It was enough to absorb all the probable offerings.If time urged,as I had said,there was no sense in waiting for the other two millions.The sooner the stock got up to 50 the better for the syndicate.That was obvious.
The next morning at the opening I was surprised to see that there were unusually heavy dealings in Consolidated Stove.As I told you before,the stock had been waterlogged for months.The price had been pegged at 37,Jim Barnes taking good care not to let it go any lower on account of the big bank loan at 35.But as for going any higher,he'd as soon expect to see the Rock of Gibraltar shimmying across the Strait as to see Consolidated Stove do any climbing on the tape.
Well,sir,this morning there was quite a demand for the stock,and the price went up to 39.In the first hour of the trading the transactions were heavier than for the whole previous half year.It was the sensation of the day and affected bullishly the entire market.I heard afterwards that nothing else was talked about in the customers' rooms of the commission houses.
I didn't know what it meant,but it didn't hurt my feelings any to see Consolidated Stove perk up.As a rule I do not have to ask about any unusual movement in any stock because my friends on the floor—brokers who do business for me,as well as personal friends among the room traders—keep me posted.They assume I'd like to know and they telephone me any news or gossip they pick up.On this day all I heard was that there was unmistakable inside buying in Consolidated Stove.There wasn't any washing.It was all genuine.The purchasers took all the offerings from 37 to 39 and when importuned for reasons or begged for a tip,flatly refused to give any.This made the wily and watchful traders conclude that there was something doing;something big.When a stock goes up on buying by insiders who refuse to encourage the world at large to follow suit the ticker hounds begin to wonder aloud when the official notice will be given out.
I didn't do anything myself.I watched and wondered and kept track of the transactions.But on the next day the buying was not only greater in volume but more aggressive in character.The selling orders that had been on the specialists' books for months at above the pegged price of 37 were absorbed without any trouble,and not enough new selling orders came in to check the rise.Naturally,up went the price.It crossed 40.Presently it touched 42.
The moment it touched that figure I felt that I was justified in starting to sell the stock the bank held as collateral.Of course I figured that the price would go down on my selling,but if my average on the entire line was 37 I'd have no fault to find.I knew what the stock was worth and I had gathered some idea of the vendibility from the months of inactivity.Well,sir,I let them have stock carefully until I had got rid of thirty thousand shares.And the advance was not checked!
That afternoon I was told the reason for that opportune but mystifying rise.It seems that the floor traders had been tipped off after the close the night before and also the next morning before the opening,that I was bullish as blazes on Consolidated Stove and was going to rush the price right up fifteen or twenty points without a reaction,as was my custom—that is,my custom according to people who never kept my books.The tipster in chief was no less a personage than Joshua Wolff.It was his own inside buying that started the rise of the day before.His cronies among the floor traders were only too willing to follow his tip,for he knew too much to give wrong steers to his fellows.
As a matter of fact,there was not so much stock pressing on the market as had been feared.Consider that I had tied up three hundred thousand shares and you will realise that the old fears had been well founded.It now proved less of a job than I had anticipated to put up the stock.After all,Governor Flower was right.Whenever he was accused of manipulating his firm's specialties,like Chicago Gas,Federal Steel or B.R.T.,he used to say:“The only way I know of making a stock go up is to buy it.”That also was the floor traders' only way,and the price responded.
On the next day,before breakfast,I read in the morning papers what was read by thousands and what undoubtedly was sent over the wires to hundreds of branches and out-of-town offices,and that was that Larry Livingston was about to begin active bull operations in Consolidated Stove.The additional details differed.One version had it that I had formed an insiders' pool and was going to punish the overextended short interest.Another hinted at dividend announcements in the near future.Another reminded the world that what I usually did to a stock I was bullish on was something to remember.Still another accused the company of concealing its assets in order to permit accumulation by insiders.And all of them agreed that the rise hadn't fairly started.
By the time I reached my office and read my mail before the market opened I was made aware that the Street was flooded with red-hot tips to buy Consolidated Stove at once.My telephone bell kept ringing and the clerk who answered the calls heard the same question asked in one form or another a hundred times that morning:Was it true that Consolidated Stove was going up?I must say that Joshua Wolff and Kane and Gordon—and possibly Jim Barnes—handled that little tipping job mighty well.
I had no idea that I had such a following.Why,that morning the buying orders came in from all over the country—orders to buy thousands of shares of a stock that nobody wanted at any price three days before.And don't forget that,as a matter of fact,all that the public had to go by was my newspaper reputation as a successful plunger;something for which I had to thank an imaginative reporter or two.
Well,sir,on that,the third day of the rise,I sold Consolidated Stove;and on the fourth day and the fifth;and the first thing I knew I had sold for Jim Barnes the one hundred thousand shares of stock which the Marshall National Bank held as collateral on the three-million-five-hundred-thousand-dollar loan that needed paying off.If the most successful manipulation consists of that in which the desired end is gained at the least possible cost to the manipulator,the Consolidated Stove deal is by all means the most successful of my Wall Street career.Why,at no time did I have to take any stock.I didn't have to buy first in order to sell the more easily later on.I did not put up the price to the highest possible point and then begin my real selling.I didn't even do my principal selling on the way down,but on the way up.It was like a dream of Paradise to find an adequate buying power created for you without your stirring a finger to bring it about,particularly when you were in a hurry.I once heard a friend of Governor Flower's say that in one of the great bull-leader's operations for the account of a pool in B.R.T.the pool sold fifty thousand shares of the stock at a profit,but Flower & Co.got commissions on more than two hundred and fifty thousand shares and W.P.Hamilton says that to distribute two hundred and twenty thousand shares of Amalgamated Copper,James R.Keene must have traded in at least seven hundred thousand shares of the stock during the necessary manipulation.Some commission bill!Think of that and then consider that the only commissions that I had to pay were the commissions on the one hundred thousand shares I actually sold for Jim Barnes.I call that some saving.
Having sold what I had engaged to sell for my friend Jim,and all the money the syndicate had agreed to raise not having been sent in,and feeling no desire to buy back any of the stock I had sold,I rather think I went away somewhere for a short vacation.I do not remember exactly.But I do remember very well that I let the stock alone and that it was not long before the price began to sag.One day,when the entire market was weak,some disappointed bull wanted to get rid of his Consolidated Stove in a hurry,and on his offerings the stock broke below the call price,which was 40.Nobody seemed to want any of it.As I told you before,I wasn't bullish on the general situation and that made me more grateful than ever for the miracle that had enabled me to dispose of the one hundred thousand shares without having to put the price up twenty or thirty points in a week,as the kindly tipsters had prophesied.
Finding no support,the price developed a habit of declining regularly until one day it broke rather badly and touched 32.That was the lowest that had ever been recorded for it,for,as you will remember,Jim Barnes and the original syndicate had pegged it at 37 in order not to have their one hundred thousand shares dumped on the market by the bank.
I was in my office that day peacefully studying the tape when Joshua Wolff was announced.I said I would see him.He rushed in.He is not a very large man,but he certainly seemed all swelled up—with anger,as I instantly discovered.
He ran to where I stood by the ticker and yelled,“Hey?What the devil's the matter?”
“Have a chair,Mr.Wolff,”I said politely and sat down myself to encourage him to talk calmly.
“I don't want any chair!I want to know what it means!”he cried at the top of his voice.
“What does what mean?”
“What in hell are you doing to it?”
“What am I doing to what?”
“That stock!That stock!”
“What stock?”I asked him.
But that only made him see red,for he shouted,“Consolidated Stove!What are you doing to it?”
“Nothing!Absolutely nothing.What's wrong?”I said.
He stared at me fully five seconds before he exploded:“Look at the price!Look at it!”
He certainly was angry.So I got up and looked at the tape.
I said,“The price of it is now 31?”
“Yeh !Thirty-one and a quarter,and I've got a raft of it.”
I know you have sixty thousand shares.You have had it a long time,because when you originally bought your Gray Stove—”
But he didn't let me finish.He said,“But I bought a lot more.Some of it cost me as high as 40!And I've got it yet!”
He was glaring at me so hostilely that I said,“I didn't tell you to buy it.”
“You didn't what?”
“I didn't tell you to load up with it.”
“I didn't say you did.But you were going to put it up—”
“Why was I?”I interrupted.
He looked at me,unable to speak for anger.When he found his voice again,he said,“You were going to put it up.You had the money to buy it.”
“Yes.But I didn't buy a share,”I told him.
That was the last straw.
“You didn't buy a share,and you had over four millions in cash to buy with?You didn't buy any?”
“Not a share!”I repeated.
He was so mad by now that he couldn't talk plainly.Finally he managed to say,“What kind of a game do you call that?”
He was inwardly accusing me of all sorts of unspeakable crimes.I sure could see a long list of them in his eyes.It made me say to him:“What you really mean to ask me,Wolff,is,why I didn't buy from you above 50 the stock you bought below 40.Isn't that it?”
“No,it isn't.You had a call at 40 and four millions in cash to put up the price with.”
“Yes,but I didn't touch the money and the syndicate has not lost a cent by my operations.”
“Look here,Livingston—”he began.
But I didn't let him say any more.
“You listen to me,Wolff.You knew that the two hundred thousand shares you and Gordon and Kane held were tied up,and that there wouldn't be an awful lot of floating stock to come on the market if I put up the price,as I'd have to do for two reasons:The first to make a market for the stock;and the second to make a profit out of the call at 40.But you weren't satisfied to get 40 for the sixty thousand shares you'd been lugging for months or with your share of the syndicate profits,if any;so you decided to take on a lot of stock under 40 to unload on me when I put the price up with the syndicate's money,as you were sure I meant to do.You'd buy before I did and you'd unload before I did;in all probability I'd be the one to unload on.I suspect you figured on my having to put the price up to 60.It was such a cinch that you probably bought ten thousand shares strictly for unloading purposes,and to make sure somebody held the bag if I didn't,you tipped off everybody in the United States,Canada and Mexico without thinking of my added difficulties.All your friends knew what I was supposed to do.Between their buying and mine you were going to be all hunky.Well,your intimate friends to whom you gave the tip passed it on to their friends after they had bought their lines,and the third stratum of tip-takers planned to supply the fourth,fifth and possibly sixth strata of suckers,so that when I finally came to do some selling I'd find myself anticipated by a few thousands of wise speculators.It was a friendly thought,that notion of yours,Wolff.You can't imagine how surprised I was when Consolidated Stove began to go up before I even thought of buying a single share;or how grateful,either,when the underwriting syndicate sold one hundred thousand shares around 40 to the people who were going to sell those same shares to me at 50 or 60.I sure was a sucker not to use the four millions to make money for them,wasn't I?The cash was supplied to buy stock with,but only if I thought it necessary to do so.Well,I didn't.”
Joshua had been in Wall Street long enough not to let anger interfere with business.He cooled off as he heard me,and when I was through talking he said in a friendly tone of voice,“Look here,Larry,old chap,what shall we do?”
“Do whatever you please.”
“Aw,be a sport.What would you do if you were in our place?”
“If I were in your place,”I said solemnly,“do you know what I'd do?”
“What ?”
“I'd sell out !”I told him.
He looked at me a moment,and without another word turned on his heel and walked out of my office.He's never been in it since.
Not long after that,Senator Gordon also called.He,too,was quite peevish and blamed me for their troubles.Then Kane joined the anvil chorus.They forgot that their stock had been unsalable in bulk when they formed the syndicate.All they could remember was that I didn't sell their holdings when I had the syndicate's millions and the stock was active at 44,and that now it was 30 and dull as dishwater.To their way of thinking I should have sold out at a good fat profit.
Of course they also cooled down in due time.The syndicate wasn't out a cent and the main problem remained unchanged:to sell their stock.A day or two later they came back and asked me to help them out.Gordon was particularly insistent,and in the end I made them put in their pooled stock at 25?.My fee for my services was to be one-half of whatever I got above that figure.The last sale had been at about 30.
There I was with their stock to liquidate.Given general market conditions and specifically the behaviour of Consolidated Stove,there was only one way to do it,and that was,of course,to sell on the way down and without first trying to put up the price,and I certainly would have got stock by the ream on the way up.But on the way down I could reach those buyers who always argue that a stock is cheap when it sells fifteen or twenty points below the top of the movement,particularly when that top is a matter of recent history.A rally is due,in their opinion.After seeing Consolidated Stove sell up to close to 44 it sure looked like a good thing below 30.
It worked out as always.Bargain hunters bought it in sufficient volume to enable me to liquidate the pool's holdings.But do you think that Gordon or Wolff or Kane felt any gratitude?Not a bit of it.They are still sore at me,or so their friends tell me.They often tell people how I did them.They cannot forgive me for not putting up the price on myself,as they expected.
As a matter of fact I never would have been able to sell the bank's hundred thousand shares if Wolff and the rest had not passed around those red-hot bull tips of theirs.If I had worked as I usually do—that is,in a logical natural way—I would have had to take whatever price I could get.I told you we ran into a declining market.The only way to sell on such a market is to sell not necessarily recklessly but really regardless of price.No other way was possible,but I suppose they do not believe this.They are still angry.I am not.Getting angry doesn't get a man anywhere.More than once it has been borne in on me that a speculator who loses his temper is a goner.In this case there was no aftermath to the grouches.But I'll tell you something curious.One day Mrs.Livingston went to a dressmaker who had been warmly recommended to her.The woman was competent and obliging and had a very pleasing personality.At the third or fourth visit,when the dressmaker felt less like a stranger,she said to Mrs.Livingston:“I hope Mr.Livingston puts up Consolidated Stove soon.We have some that we bought because we were told he was going to put it up,and we'd always heard that he was very successful in all his deals.”
I tell you it isn't pleasant to think that innocent people may have lost money following a tip of that sort.Perhaps you understand why I never give any myself.That dressmaker made me feel that in the matter of grievances I had a real one against Wolff.
一天,我的好朋友,同時也是我的一位主要經紀商吉姆·巴恩斯來找我,他說需要我?guī)蛡€忙。這樣的話要是放在以前,他是從來不會說的。我問他需要幫什么忙,希望我能夠幫得上,因為我確實想表達一下我對他的感激之情。他告訴我說,與某只股票有關,事實上他們是這家公司的主要承銷商,而且握有很多股票,現在行情變了,他們想把這一大筆股票賣出去。吉姆想讓我?guī)退茝V這個聯(lián)合爐具公司的股票。
因為很多原因,我不想受這件事牽連,可是我受過吉姆的恩惠,他又從個人角度來求我?guī)兔?,僅憑這一點,就足以說服我。我的朋友吉姆是個好人,我想他的公司必定與這件事情關系很深,因此我最終決定要盡力幫他。
我總覺得,戰(zhàn)爭帶來的市場繁榮與其他情況下的市場景氣之間有個最明顯的區(qū)別,那就是青年銀行家們在股市中有了自己的新角色。
這一次的股市繁榮屬于自發(fā)現象,誰都清楚其中的原因,可同時,美國的最大銀行與信托機構也在使出吃奶的力氣幫各種承銷公司和軍火商,使他們在很短時間內就搖身一變,成了百萬富翁。其中的情形非??尚?,只要某人說他的朋友在聯(lián)軍委員會有朋友,就會得到別人送上的一大筆所需資金,開展還沒到手的合約。我曾聽人說過一些離譜的事情,小員工成了公司總裁,做了幾百萬的交易,就是靠著信托公司的信任借到了錢,然后在人們之間轉來轉去,讓誰都受到了合約的恩惠。從歐洲向美國流入了數目巨大的黃金,銀行就必須要找到辦法來儲存這些黃金。
這樣做生意,讓老前輩們看到肯定會非常不齒,可此時已經很少有老前輩們活躍了。在和平年代,老當益壯的銀行總裁恰逢其時,可在這樣的非常時期,他們壓力很大,年輕才是主要的本錢。很明顯,銀行獲得了非常令人艷羨的利潤。
馬歇爾國民銀行的那位年輕總裁,與吉姆及其合伙人的關系很好,深獲信任,他們打算將三家很有名氣的爐具公司合并到一起,再把新公司的股票推銷出去。過去的好幾個月里,只要有股票,不管什么股,人們都想著要買進。
其中有個問題,就是爐具公司業(yè)務很好,所以,這三家公司自成立以來,普通股是首次賺到股利。大股東們不想丟掉控制權。在沒有上市的市場中,股票行情很好,大股東們愿意放出去的股票都已經被搶購一空,這樣的結果令他們非常滿意。這三家公司有一些非常小的資本額,沒辦法讓市場出現波動。此時,吉姆的公司進來了,他說只要三家公司合并,那就足以在交易所掛牌了。此后,新股的價值肯定高于舊股。在華爾街,這算是老套路了,讓股票換身裝扮,就能提高價值。比如當一只股票按照面值很難賣出的時候,只要把它一分為四,就能用30美元或35美元的價格賣掉。這就相當于原來的股票是按照120美元或者140美元的價格賣出。而這樣的價位,原來的股票是不可能實現的。
看來吉姆及其合伙人鼓動了一群朋友支持合并計劃,他們?yōu)榱藢崿F投機的目的,持有很多格瑞爐具公司的股票。這家爐具公司很大,因此合并方式是用一股格瑞的舊股票兌換四股聯(lián)合爐具的新股票。然后,中部爐具與西部爐具也緊隨其后,用一股換一股的條件加入了合并計劃。他們兩家公司在沒上市市場上的股價是25到30美元,格瑞比較有名且有股利可分,因此股價大概是125美元。
他們從那些堅持要賣出股票從而套現的股東手里買斷了股票,用來籌集資金。同時為了有足夠改觀業(yè)務的額外運營資金和承銷費用,他們需要募集幾百萬美元。所以,吉姆以10萬新公司的股票作為質押,去跟心腸不錯的馬歇爾國民銀行總裁借了350萬美元。就我知道的情況,公司內部向銀行總裁保證過,股價不會低于50美元。這個交易的價值不小,所以里面的利潤非??捎^。
公司人士行事的第一個錯是沒有掌握好時機。新股在市場流通中已經飽和,他們應該知道這個,可即使這樣,他們若不想像其他公司那樣,得到在股市最景氣的時候能得到的高額利潤,也就能夠賺到不小一筆資金了。
你不能輕易說吉姆和合伙人是一群笨蛋或經驗欠缺的毛頭小子。他們可都是精明的成年人,對華爾街上的一切手段都很清楚,有的人甚至是非常出色的股票交易者。可是他們的所作所為,卻不光是高估了股民們的購買力。畢竟,他們在實打實地進行市場測試前,是沒辦法判斷購買力有多少的。他們更嚴重的錯是想著讓多頭市場持續(xù)時間更長一些。我覺得,可能是因為他們曾經都成功地做過交易,尤其是在快速操作而賺錢方面成就突出,從而致使他們對自己能夠在多頭市場疲軟之前就賺到錢充滿信心。他們都名氣不小,在業(yè)內的專業(yè)交易者和證券經紀商當中都有粉絲。
這個事例的宣傳很到位,報紙確實非常大方,報道了一大篇內容,提到那三家公司是美國爐具產業(yè)的范本,產品在世界上都很有名氣,合并三家公司,是愛國主義行為。日報上發(fā)表了很多報道,說他們在世界范圍內是如何開疆拓土的,已經在亞非拉地區(qū)的市場中站穩(wěn)了腳跟。
閱讀報紙財經版的讀者們都知道,這家公司的董事都是非常著名的人物。公關工作搞得好,公司內部沒有署名的人也做了承諾,說股價一定會呈現出什么樣的結果,非常肯定且有說服力,所以為新發(fā)行的股票搭建了很大的市場需求。最終在申購完了以后,按照50美元公開銷售的股票,認購量超出了四分之一。
你想啊,公司使了好幾周的勁兒,把股價提升到了75美元以上,平均股價也達到了50美元以上,能夠看到的最好結果是按照這樣的價位,把所有新股都賣出去。以這個價位釋股,說明合并了的幾家公司的股票原來的價格大概翻了一番。這是一次危機,他們本該做出應對措施,卻紋絲不動。這說明每個行業(yè)都有自身的特殊需求,常人的眼光沒有專業(yè)人士的眼光那么有價值。公司的人因為股票被超額認購而非常高興,他們很確定地以為,不論它的價格高到多少,發(fā)行多少股,人們都會拿著金錢沒有節(jié)制地買進。他們真是愚蠢至極,竟然沒有足額配售準備減持給大眾的股票。公司內部決定要貪心時,也應該貪得稍微聰明點兒呀。
全額配售股票,這是他們最該做的事。如此一來,當他們把那些說要公開銷售出去的所有股票都賣給股民后,還有四分之一的不足。在必要的時候,這個不足應該能夠起到支撐股價的作用,不用公司內部自己出錢。公司內部沒有絲毫付出,就能讓自己位于非常優(yōu)勢的股市戰(zhàn)略地位,這可是我炒作股票的時候,一直想辦法找尋的優(yōu)勢。他們本來能夠對股價下跌做出防范措施,鼓舞股民們對這只新股充滿信心,從而對股票背后的公司堅定信心。公司應該知道在把配售的股票發(fā)售給股民們以后,自己的工作并沒完,這些都僅僅只是他們必須要做的一部分。
公司自己覺得做得很不錯,可沒過多長時間,他們所犯的兩個巨大錯誤就導致了嚴重的后果。人們看到股市出現了回調跡象,就不再去買進這只新發(fā)行的股票了。公司內部也跟著擔心了,也就沒有去支撐聯(lián)合爐具股票。在股市回調期,如果連自己內部的人都不買進股票的話,那誰還會去買呢!內部人士都不支持,往往就會被看作已經是很清晰的利空信號了。
沒必要再說那些詳細的統(tǒng)計數字了,聯(lián)合爐具股票的價格與股市中的其他股票一樣,波動起伏著。不過再也沒有高過一開始上市時稍高于50美元的價格。吉姆和他的合伙人最終只好買進,以便把股價穩(wěn)定在40美元以上。在剛剛上市時不支持這只股票,這讓人覺得非常遺憾和可惜??墒?,沒有把股民們認購的股票全部銷售出去,這是更加失敗的舉動。
總而言之,這只新股票在紐交所順利地掛牌,然后股價也很自然地在下滑,直至以37美元的價格停住才罷。股價能夠在這個價格上停止,是因為吉姆及其合伙人必須把股價頂到這個價位上。他們合作的銀行質押了10萬股,按照每股35美元向他們借了錢,假如銀行想要斬斷股票收回貸款,那還真難說準股價會跌成什么樣子。人們在50美元的時候急著往進買,如今跌成37美元了,反而對它沒了任何興趣,或許就算跌到27美元都還會是無人搭理的狀態(tài)。
時間長了,人們就開始思索銀行大量往外放款的事。青年銀行家們的日子臨近尾聲了,銀行業(yè)好像面臨著重要轉折,仿佛在猛然之間,就要回歸原來那種謹慎保守的狀態(tài)。那些本來和銀行家非常親近和友好的人,如今被銀行家追著要債,讓他無論如何都要還款,好像雙方之間以前從來沒有一起玩過高爾夫一般。
放款的這邊不可能逼迫,貸了款的這一邊又不會求著對方寬限些時日。這樣的狀態(tài),讓兩邊都很為難。就像我的朋友吉姆,與他打交道的銀行還是那么友好的樣子,可情況已經變成了:“請一定要還清貸款,不然我們都會面臨無法想象的后果?!?/p>
面臨這樣的困難局面,以及有可能引發(fā)的嚴重后果,吉姆不得不來找我?guī)兔Γ屛掖u10萬股,回收資金,還銀行那350萬美元的貸款。他已經不做通過這些股票賺錢的夢了,只要公司能少虧掉一點兒,他們就謝天謝地了。
這看起來是個沒有任何希望的任務。股市大盤沒有一點兒活力,后勁不足,偶爾出現個小小反彈,人們都精神一振,打算相信多頭市場即將來臨,僅此而已。
我對吉姆說需要分析一下后再告訴他,我如果想做這個事情,需要什么條件。我的確分析了一下這個事情,我研究的不是公司的最新年報,而只是想弄清這個問題發(fā)生在股市行情中的哪個階段。我不用公司盈余和未來的理想走向去為這只股票打開市場,抬高價格,而要通過公開市場把這些股票清空。我需要思考的是,僅僅在這個任務當中,哪些因素應該能夠或者可能幫到我,哪些因素又會或者可能會對我不利。
比如,我看到少數人手中握著大量的股票,意味著他們控制了過多數量的股票,因此會很不安全,數量多到了足以讓人寢食難安的程度。克里夫頓·甘恩公司持股7萬,他們公司的業(yè)務包括銀行投資和經紀行當,也是紐交所會員,還是吉姆的朋友。多年以來,這家公司一直醉心于爐具股票,所以在三家公司的合并事宜上,他們的作用非同小可,他們也誘導了自家客戶,使之對這只股票的前景抱了很大幻想。原參議員塞繆爾·戈登也手持7萬股,他是他侄子開的一家名為戈登兄弟公司的高級合伙人。還有,名氣很大的約書亞·伍爾夫也有6萬股。華爾街的這幾個老行家一共持有聯(lián)合爐具公司的20萬股,不用哪個好心人士對他們說什么時候應該賣出。如果我有炒作跡象,想吸引人們買進股票,也就是把這只股票弄得比較活躍有力,必然會看到甘恩、戈登和伍爾夫要往外拋出必定不是小數目的股票。一想到他們那20萬股會像尼亞加拉大瀑布那樣涌入股市,就不會愉快。不要忘記,多頭市場的高峰期已經過去了,無論我有多高超的操作技巧,都不可能搭建出非常廣闊的市場需求。吉姆有節(jié)制地退后,以便把事情交給我來做,而他并沒有多少美好的幻想。在多頭市場臨終的時候,他把這只水分很高的股票交給我去賣。報紙上當然沒有關于多頭市場臨近結束的報道,可我清楚這個局面,吉姆跟我一樣清楚,甚至能夠肯定,銀行也非常清楚。
可我答應了,因此就托人去請甘恩和伍爾夫。那20萬股,就像國王請達摩克利斯吃飯時,懸在他頭頂的劍一樣。我想,要把頭發(fā)換成一條大鐵鏈,這樣才會安全。我覺得,最輕巧的辦法就是與他們制定一個共贏合同。如果他們對我稍加配合,在我賣出銀行那10萬股的時候,他們能夠忍住不賣,我就能夠幫他們創(chuàng)造出一個大家可以一起出售股票的市場。事情本該如此,就算他們想賣出十分之一的股票,又不想讓聯(lián)合爐具股票下跌,是不可能的事情。他們非常明白,因此也沒試圖往外賣。我只是希望他們在合適的時候再賣,不要讓自私壓制了理智。無論是在華爾街還是其他地方,占了有利的位置卻無所作為,不會有好果子吃。我準備讓他們徹底明白,太早拋售或者不考慮別人就去拋售,是會妨礙出售股票的,時不我待啊。
我希望提出的建議能夠說服他們這些經驗老到的華爾街大腕,不要在聯(lián)合爐具股票上抱太大的幻想。甘恩的公司生意非常好,分公司都開到了11個城市,有大量顧客,他還多次做過股票炒作集團的操盤人。
參議員戈登有7萬股,是個大富豪。他曾經受到過一個年僅16歲的女美甲師對他背信棄義的控告,所以《都市新聞報》的讀者們對他的大名非常熟悉。那個美甲師有一件5000美元的貂皮大衣和戈登寫給她的132封信。戈登幫助侄子們創(chuàng)建了公司,他本人也是公司的高級合伙人。他曾經在幾十個炒作集團里參與過業(yè)務。他以繼承的方式掌握了中部爐具公司的一大把股票,其后用它們換了合并的聯(lián)合爐具公司的10萬股。他手中有這么多股票,完全不用管吉姆提供的不靠譜的利好消息,所以他可以在多頭市場慢慢消散前就賣出3萬股,換回現金。后來,他對朋友說,是其他股東和與他關系很親近的老朋友們勸他不要再賣出,他才因為顧及情面,沒有再出售,要不然他就會賣出更多的股票。此外我剛才也提到過,市場也沒有為他的賣出提供機會。
第三個人就是伍爾夫,或許他是三人中間最著名的一個。在過去的20年,誰都清楚他是交易大廳里有名的賭棍。他在拉抬和摜壓股價領域鮮有對手,對他而言,兩三萬股票和兩三百股票是沒什么不一樣的。我在去紐約之前就對他的賭博名聲耳熟能詳。他那時候還在一個非常喜好賭博又沒有限定賭資上限的小公司里做事,那是一家既賭股票又賭馬的小集團。
人們都習慣于說他就是個賭徒,除此之外一無是處,可他的能力確實非常強,對待投機游戲也有很值得稱贊的態(tài)度。而且,據說他對追求知識毫無興趣,因此也有很多與他相關的奇聞逸事。一個流傳最廣的笑話說,有一次伍爾夫參加上流社會的宴會,女主人考慮不周全,使得很多賓客都互相談論起了文學,氣氛熱烈得連女主人都沒辦法制止了。
坐在伍爾夫身邊的一個女孩不知道他那張嘴巴只會用來吃飯,所以回頭與他對話,急切地想知道這個大富豪有什么看法。她問他:“嗯,伍爾夫先生,你怎么看待巴爾扎克?”
伍爾夫非常禮貌,停止了吃東西,然后咽下口中的食物后說:“對于那些沒有上市的股票,我是從來不交易的。”
他們就是聯(lián)合爐具公司的三個最大股東。與他們見面后,我對他們說,假如他們能組成一個小團隊,籌集到一筆錢,然后以比市價稍高一點兒的股價,把買進股票的選擇權交給我,我就會設法搭建起賺錢的市場。他們馬上就問,到底需要多少錢。
我回答說:“你們手里握著聯(lián)合爐具的股票很長時間了,卻沒有任何辦法。你們合起來有20萬股,你們自己非常清楚,你們除了能夠搭建一個市場去交易之外,根本沒有絲毫的時機賣出。這個市場必須要足夠大,才能完全吸納你們的這筆股票,現金也要足夠多,才可以在一開始買進必須要買的股票。如果錢不太夠,開始了又停頓不前,是起不了作用的。我建議你們成立聯(lián)合小團隊,籌集600萬,再按照40美元的股價,把20萬股票的買進選擇權授予你們的小團隊,同時把你們手中所有股票托管在信托賬戶。不出問題的話,你們會賣掉手中那些僵死的鳥兒,你們小組也能賺到一筆錢。”
正如我之前所說,坊間流傳著我在股市上賺錢的各種謠言。我想這些說我成功了但其實沒有成功的流言是有助于我的??偠灾也恍枰蛩麄兌嘧鍪裁唇忉?。他們非常明白,如果只靠單打獨斗,事情不會有什么進展,他們覺得我的想法不錯。臨走時,他們答應要成立一個小團隊。
這三人沒怎么耗費精力就成功勸說了很多朋友加入。我想,他們談論這個小團隊的利益時,比我還要確定。我聽到的所有消息都說,他們非常確信我的看法,所以他們的內幕消息有一定的依據。總之在幾天后,他們就聯(lián)合成立了一個小團隊。甘恩、戈登和伍爾夫按照40美元授予了我20萬股票的買進選擇權,我為這些股票成立了信托管理。這樣,就不會在我拉抬股價的時候,有股票溜進市場中了。這個團隊中的人員之間沒有多少信任度,很多非常有可能成功的交易,卻沒有像預料的那樣成功,類似的例子很多,所以我要做好自我保護。在華爾街上,狗沒有反對咬狗的愚蠢偏見。那時候,第二家美國鋼鐵線纜公司上市,公司內部互相指責說對方違約,在想辦法出售股票。約翰·蓋茨與他的朋友,賽里曼斯家族和銀行合伙人之間,都曾經有過君子協(xié)定。好吧,我在經紀商那里卻聽到了別人讀過下面這首據說是蓋茨寫的詩:
毒蜘蛛跳上蜈蚣的背,
殘忍又幸災樂禍地發(fā)笑,
我要毒死這個害人精,
否則的話它就會反過來毒死我。
請注意,我沒有一丁點兒影射華爾街的朋友們曾經在股市上欺騙我的意思,不過出于原則,你還是要為所有突發(fā)事件做好準備,這是顯而易見的。
甘恩、戈登和伍爾夫對我說了他們已經組團的消息,并說準備籌集600萬現金。接下來,我無事可做,就等著這筆款到位。我讓他們加快速度,這是非常重要的。不過這筆款項是分階段到位的,大概通過四五次才完成籌備。我不知道其中的原因,可我有印象的是,我向他們三人發(fā)過特別緊急的求救信號。
某天下午,一筆大款項的支票到了我手中,我也就有了大概400萬的現金,同時我也接到他們的承諾,說其余款項過上一兩天就能到位。如今來看,在多頭市場結束前,這個小團隊可能會獲得一些小成就。不過,就算各方面條件都達到最佳程度,那也不是百分百肯定的,我行動開始得越早越有利。一只本來不受待見的股票,忽然出現了一些新動向,股民們是不會有多大興趣的。不過當你手中有了400萬美金后,能夠做的事情就會更多,完全可以使人們對這只股票產生興趣。這筆款完全能夠吸進一切有賣出可能性的股票。時機如果真的跟我說的一樣迫在眉睫,我也就不需要等還沒到位的那200萬了,我越能夠趁早把股價抬高到50美元,對這個小團隊來說也越有利,這是顯而易見的。
第二天一早,股市開盤后,我驚奇地發(fā)現,聯(lián)合爐具公司股票出現了大量的交易,這是非常難得一見的現象。正如我剛剛所說,好幾個月來,它一直處于萎靡不振、一步都邁不動的狀態(tài),股價也一直在37美元左右停滯。吉姆使出了吃奶的勁兒,試圖讓它不要再下跌不止。他按照每股35美元向銀行質押,貸回來一筆巨款。提到上漲,他是想看到聯(lián)合爐具股票價格上漲,可是這卻比看到直布羅陀海峽的礁石在海面上漂移還要困難。
伙計啊,這只股票在那天早上表現出的需求量真是大,股價漲到了39美元。在第一個小時的交易段內,交易量就超過了以往半年的成交總量。當天,這只股票成了最熱門的股票,同時整個股市都受到了它的影響,有了一點兒多頭市場的氣色。后來,我聽說人們在交易大廳內都不談論其他事情,只討論與這只股票有關的話題。
我不清楚這是什么意思,可看到聯(lián)合爐具股票活了過來,我就覺得在感情上沒有受到打擊。通常而言,我沒必要去打聽很難見到的股票波動的消息,我那些交易大廳里幫我做交易的朋友和其他好朋友都會向我傳達消息。他們覺得我肯定想知道,所以會把他們聽到的所有消息和謠言都通過電話告訴我。
我在這天聽到了聯(lián)合爐具公司確實有內部人在買進股票的消息,沒有任何洗盤動作,所有的交易都是正兒八經的買進。買股票的人在股價到37至39美元的時候,把所有賣出的股票都盡收囊中,人們請他給個這么做的理由,哪怕提供一點兒內幕消息也行,可是卻沒有得到答復。這個現象,使得那些緊盯著市場的聰明的交易人員覺得,一定有什么內幕在醞釀,會有很大的行情變動。公司內部的人買進自家股票,使得股價上漲,而他們又不鼓勵其他股民跟進,這就讓那些執(zhí)著的股民開始到處搜索消息,打聽到底什么時候會有正式的變動通知。
我個人什么都沒干,只是認真觀察,甚覺奇怪。我也追蹤著這只股票的交易走勢。第二天,人們買進這只股票的數量越發(fā)多了,而且更加猛烈。按照業(yè)內賬冊的記錄,之前幾個月里37美元以上想賣卻沒賣出的股票,此時非常輕松地就被市場吸納了,而且又沒有更多的新賣單拉住上漲的勢頭。股價一如既往地上升,超過40美元,然后又漲到了42美元。
此時,我認為應該把銀行質押的那些股票拋出了。我自然不會覺得,我賣出這么多股票會拉低股價,而只要我整體持股的平均成本在37美元,就沒人指摘我。我清楚這只股票的價值,通過對它在幾個月里被冷落的狀態(tài)進行觀察后,我或多或少了解了這只股票的市場情況。我謹慎地把股票賣向市場,最后賣出了3萬股,真的沒有拉低漲勢。
那天下午,有人對我講了出現這種及時又神奇的漲勢的原因。好像在前一天收盤后到這一天開盤前的這段時間,有人向營業(yè)員透露消息,說我如烈火般兇猛地看好聯(lián)合爐具公司,還打算按照以往慣例,把股價抬高15到20個點,中途不會停歇。所謂我的慣例,其實是那些從不會去研究我記錄的人的片面看法。負責傳播內幕消息的人是伍爾夫,真是來頭好大呀。正是因為他自己的內線買進了股票,使得股價從前一天開始上漲。他那些營業(yè)員群體中的好朋友非常高興跟著他的消息走,他了解的內幕真的很多,不會對跟隨自己的粉絲們提供假消息。
其實,進入市場的股票比我原來擔心的要少一些。你要是記得我已經控制住了30萬股,就明白我起先的那些擔心并非多余,現在要拉升股價變得輕松多了。弗勞爾州長說得對——每天都會有人罵他炒作自己公司負責的如芝加哥瓦斯和聯(lián)邦鋼鐵等股票——他說:“我知道只有買進才是讓股價上漲的唯一辦法?!边@也是營業(yè)員們抬升股價的唯一方法。價格會反映買盤,跟著上漲。
第二天早餐前,我在報紙上看到了一條消息,這是好多人都能看到的,沒什么可懷疑的,這條消息會通過電報送達幾百家股票分公司和外地的股票交易公司。報道說,拉里·利文斯頓馬上會下大功夫做多聯(lián)合爐具股票。各個報紙的報道中涉及的細節(jié)性內容大同小異,有一家說我組織了一個內部機構,準備向那些過度放空的空頭進行大反擊。還有一家報道說,公司在不久后就要發(fā)布配股消息。另有報道也在提醒人們,要注意我在操作那些吃香的股票時取得的成就,但同時也有報道說這個公司為了讓內部人士吃飽股票,從而隱藏了資產。一切新聞報道都覺得這只股票的漲勢才剛剛開始。
那天早上,在開盤之前,我還沒到辦公室看我的信件,就已經得知華爾街上充斥著剛出爐的內幕消息,讓大家趕緊買聯(lián)合爐具的股票。我的電話響了一上午,電話員接到了上百個電話,問的都是同一個問題:聯(lián)合爐具的股價到底會不會上漲。我必須承認,伍爾夫、甘恩和戈登,或許還有吉姆,他們把透露內幕消息這樣的事情做得天衣無縫。
我真不知道追隨我的人這么多。哈,一早上收到了大量來自全國各地的買單,都買的是幾千股,這只股票在三天前可是多低價位都沒人搭理呀。你不要忘記,其實股民們完全是靠著報紙知道了我是個非常成功的大賭徒,這可得感謝那些極富想象力的記者。
伙計們,情況發(fā)展成這樣,股價上漲第三天的時候,我賣出了聯(lián)合爐具的股票,緊接著連賣了三天,然后才察覺我已經把吉姆質押給馬歇爾國民銀行的10萬股拋售空了,這可是350萬美元的質押股呀。如果說,一個作手花最低的成本實現了最終目標屬于最成功的炒作,那么這次有關聯(lián)合爐具的炒作肯定是我在華爾街的奮斗歷程中最出色的成績。啊,我連任何股票都沒有買進,我都沒有為了后來能夠賣出得輕松些而先買進。我也沒有把股票抬升到最高點再正兒八經地賣出。我甚至不必在價格一路走低時把賣出作為主要的行動,反而是在價格抬升時賣出的。這簡直就如同在游樂場里做了個美夢,沒有耗費多少精力,就挖掘出了別人為你搭建的龐大的買方市場。特別是在你急著想拋售的時候。以前,我聽弗勞爾州長的朋友說過,有一次,這位偉大的多頭領袖為一家公司炒作的時候,這家公司獲利賣出了5萬股,可是弗勞爾團隊卻賺了超過25萬股的交易手續(xù)費。漢密爾頓提到過,詹姆斯·凱恩為了售出聯(lián)合銅礦公司的22萬股,通過必要的炒作過程,最少需要做70萬股的交易。這樣的手續(xù)費成本太高了。對照這些情況,再看看我付出的手續(xù)費,只有我為吉姆賣出10萬股的那點兒費用,我覺得這是個非常了不起的事情。
雖然他們同意籌集的600萬資金沒有完全到位,可我向好友吉姆做出的承諾已經實現,我也不想把之前自己賣出的任何股票再買進來,反而只想好好找個地方去度個短假。我的記憶已經模糊了,可我清楚記得的是我讓這只股票順其自然地去發(fā)展,不久后它就價格下跌了。某一天,整個股市都很疲軟,一個做多頭的人很失望,他想迅速賣掉手里的聯(lián)合爐具股票。由于他引發(fā)的賣壓,使得股價跌破了40美元,到了我買進選擇權的價位以下。好像沒人再想要這只股票了。我原來說過,自己并不怎么太看好股市,所以我很感激出現了那一點兒奇跡,使我能夠賣掉10萬股,而且還沒有出現與傳達消息的大善人所預想的情形,即在一周內將股價拉升二三十美元。這只股票在沒有支撐的情況下,價格一直下跌。有一天跌得非常嚴重,到了有史以來的最低價位32美元。估計你還記得,吉姆和他的伙伴們把持的股價是37美元,以防銀行拿他們的10萬股去市場釜底抽薪。
那天,我安靜地坐在辦公室里研究股市行情,有人說伍爾夫來了。我請他進來后,一眼就看到他直沖我過來,不太高大的身軀被怒氣包裹著,好像發(fā)胖了一般。
他走到我跟前,大聲說道:“哎,這算怎么回事?”
“伍爾夫先生,請坐吧?!蔽铱蜌獾卣f完后坐了下來,好讓他能夠平靜下來。
“我不坐,我只想知道是怎么回事?”他把嗓門提到了最高。
“什么怎么回事?”
“你到底把它怎么了?”
“我把什么怎么了呀?”
“就是股票,那只股票!”
“哪只股票?”我問道。
我這樣一無所知的樣子更加使他生氣了,他繼續(xù)吼著:“聯(lián)合爐具。你把它怎么了?”
“沒怎么呀,我肯定什么都沒做,出什么問題了?”我問。
他直勾勾地瞪了我足足五秒鐘,然后大叫:“你瞧瞧股價!瞧瞧!”他真的特別氣憤。
我站起來看了看股價,然后說:“現在股價是31又1/4美元?!?/p>
“沒錯!31又1/4美元,而我手里有一大把?!?/p>
“你有6萬股,我清楚。這筆股票在你手中時間不短了,因為你當時買進格瑞爐具的時候……”
他不等我說下去就打斷了我的話,他說:“但是我后來又買了很多,有的是按照40美元高價買的,現在還在我手里!”
他怒火中燒地看著我,我說:“我又沒讓你買?!?/p>
“什么?”
“我沒讓你買那么多?!?/p>
“我的意思不是說你讓我買的,可是你準備要拉抬股價……”
“我為什么要這樣做?”我打斷了他的話。
他氣得一言不發(fā),直盯著我,半天才開口說:“原來你是要抬高股價的,你有錢買?!?/p>
“沒錯啊,可是我沒有買?!蔽覍λf。這像是我最后亮出的撒手锏。
“你沒買?你拿著400多萬美金可以用,但是你沒有買?”
“連一股都沒買?!蔽抑貜偷?。
此時,他已經氣得說不出話來了,良久才說道:“你這玩的是什么把戲?”
還不知他心里面怎么惡毒地罵我呢。從他的眼神中,我看到了他給我定的一連串罪責。我對他說:“伍爾夫,你想問的是,我為什么沒用50美元以上的價格買你手里那些40美元以下買進的股票吧?”
“不,不是。你有40美元吸進的選擇權,而且又有400萬現金可以用來抬高股價?!?/p>
“沒錯,可是我并沒有用這些錢,而且我也沒有讓這個團隊賠一美元?!?/p>
“你聽我說,利文斯頓……”他說。
不過我堵住了他要說的話。
“你聽我說,伍爾夫。我清楚你和戈登、甘恩一共有20萬股套在里面了,而且知道我如果拉抬股價的話,肯定沒多少股票沖進股市,但我必須要這么做,因為一方面得為這只股票搭建出市場來,其次要利用40美元的選擇權賺錢??赡阋词且驗閷ψ约菏掷锬昧撕脦讉€月的6萬股只賣到40美元非常不滿意,要么是因為對小團隊分給你的利潤不滿意,因此你在40美元以下的時候買進了很多股票,想在我用團隊的那筆錢拉抬的時候再倒給我,你認定了我會這樣。你想在我買之前自己先買進,而且在我賣出之前自己先賣出,總之你把我當作你倒賣股票的對象。我想你肯定覺得我能把股價拉抬到60美元。事情很清晰,你可能買進了1萬股,就是為了再倒出。我如果不背黑鍋的話,你為了確保有人背黑鍋,就向美國、加拿大和墨西哥的所有股民透露內幕消息,根本不考慮為我增加了多少困難。你所有的朋友都知道我該怎么做,在我和他們買進的時候,你幸災樂禍。哼,你把內幕透露給朋友,他們買進股票的時候,再把消息一傳十、十傳百地傳播給更多的笨蛋,這么一來,等我最終要賣的時候,會發(fā)現自己面對的是好幾千個聰明的投機分子。伍爾夫,這可真是個好心的主意啊。在我還沒想到要買的時候,聯(lián)合爐具就開漲了,你知道我有多吃驚,我有多感激,竟然以40美元的價位替大家把10萬股賣給了那些想著等漲到五六十美元再倒賣出去的人。我沒用那400萬為團隊謀利潤,特別傻吧?那是我可以用到股票買進上的錢,可我要在自認為該買的時候買。嗯,而我覺得沒必要去買進。”
伍爾夫在華爾街上混了好多年,不會讓憤怒的情緒妨礙正事。在我說話的時候,他逐漸心平氣和了。等我說完,他就比較友好地說:“你聽我說,拉里,我的朋友,那我們該怎么辦呢?”
“你們愛怎么辦就怎么辦?!?/p>
“呵呵,拿出點兒風度啊。你如果是我,你會怎么辦?”
“我如果是你,”我認真地說道,“你想知道嗎?”
“怎么辦?”
“我會全部賣掉!”我回答道。
他盯著我好一會兒,一句話也沒說,轉身離開了辦公室,這之后沒再來過。
事后不久,參議員戈登也來找過我,抱怨是我讓他們身處困境。最后,甘恩也跟著起哄。他們忘了在組建團隊時,他們手中的股票一點兒都沒法大把賣出去。他們只記得我手里握著幾百萬現金,而在市場比較活泛,股價漲到44美元的時候,沒有為他們賣出。此時股價下跌到了30美元,像一潭絕望的死水。在他們看來,我就該為他們賣出股票,該為他們賺很多的錢。
過了一段時間,他們都逐漸心平氣和了。這個小團隊沒有賠錢,仍然面臨著需要賣掉大量股票的問題。過了一兩天,他們找我?guī)退麄兘鉀Q困難,戈登尤其堅持。最后,我讓他們把共同的股票鎖在25又1/2美元上。我為他們效勞,酬金是按照這個價格賣出股票后一半的利潤。這只股票最終報價在30美元左右,我又要為他們賣出股票了。在考慮整體股市行情,特別是聯(lián)合爐具股票情況的前提下,只有一個辦法能夠賣出它,那就是一路往下賣,而且不能提前去做拉抬股價的事。我敢肯定,如果想著為了賣個比較好的價格而一路抬高,那肯定能收到很多股票,可是如果壓低了價格賣,我可以找到人買。他們總覺得,只要在高點上下跌了15或20個點,就變得很便宜了,特別是從近期出現的高點上下跌,他們就會認為股價馬上就要反彈。之前聯(lián)合爐具漲到了44美元,如今跌到30美元以下了,就覺得必定是非常便宜的好股票。
這樣賣,就與原先一樣,非常順利地實現了目標。那些撿便宜的人買了很多,使得我能夠賣完小團隊的持股。只是,你覺得戈登、伍爾夫和甘恩會感謝我嗎?不可能的。他們還是對我充滿了抱怨,反正他們的朋友是這么對我說的。他們常常對別人說,我是怎樣收拾他們的。他們對我沒拉抬股價以達成他們的心愿一直心存芥蒂。
其實,伍爾夫和其他人如果在當時不傳播那些熱熱乎乎的內幕消息的話,我肯定是沒辦法賣掉10萬股的。如果按照我一向的那種做法,也就是合理而自然地去操作,我就要讓自己接受能賣的一切價格。我對你講過,市場已經處于空頭狀態(tài),有這樣的前提,要賣出股票,不一定非要孤注一擲地做,可一定不能在價格上計較。除此之外別無他法,不過我覺得他們可能不相信我的這個觀點。他們三人還是對我氣呼呼的,而我卻很平和。發(fā)怒不是什么好事。我經歷過的那些不止一次的教訓使我明白,愛生氣的投機分子是沒什么前途的。在這件事情上,他們生氣并沒為我留下什么后續(xù)的麻煩??晌乙獙δ阏f的是,發(fā)生了一件奇怪的事情。有一天,我妻子去了一個經人推薦的女裁縫師那里。她是一個水平很高的裁縫,性格非常好,服務態(tài)度也不差。這是我妻子第三或第四次去,裁縫跟我妻子已經比較熟悉了。裁縫對她說:“我希望利文斯頓先生能夠把聯(lián)合爐具的股價拉抬起來,我們手里握著一些它們的股票,因為有人對我們說他要拉抬這只股票,我們向來就聽說他經手的所有股票交易都非常成功。”
我對你講,一想到那些無辜的人們因為聽了那些所謂的內幕消息而損失了錢財,我就很不愉快。或許,如今你會明白,我為什么從來不對人說什么內幕消息。女裁縫的話讓我感覺到,要說怨氣,該由我對伍爾夫來發(fā)才對。